EXISTENTIAL PROCESS IN THE NOVELISTIC ART
OF SAUL BELLOW

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CHAPTER I

NATURE OF THE MONOGRAPH, PROCEDURE, PREVIOUS WORK, PURPOSES AND SPECIFIC ELEMENTS TO BE PROVEN

I. GENERAL STATEMENT ON THE NATURE OF THE MONOGRAPH

The literary phenomena of the Twentieth Century are the existential motifs that have appeared for both philosophical and literary considerations. One must take cognizance of the fact that this existential movement as an articulated force involves much of Western literature. For instance, in addition to the dramatic French varieties of existential thought which spread to British and American literature, the earlier work of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Dostoevsky served as impetus for the later Twentieth Century movement, as found particularly in novels and plays.

The position taken in this monograph is that Existentialism cannot be philosophically justified as even Sartre admits. Briefly, Existentialism as a valid philosophy cannot be justified since its proof would rely on the use of the very essential structures which the followers of Existentialism deny totally. Therefore, the treatment in this specific monograph must relate to Existentialism as a literary trend. The question as to the scope of this work is to
what form of literature must be the focus for applying linguistic structures to existential writing.

From a literary point of view, the play as drama has many unsatisfactory features, not the least of which is the fact that the playwrights and the play carry certain essential ideas into operation. That is, drama identifies itself with recognizable basic conflicts or crises over some objective thing or idea. This very identification in terms of accepted dramatic criteria is in effect anathema to the existentialist. Therefore, the novel with its more limited form of expression is more suitable to measuring existential notes through the linguistic structures that carry them. Another reason for choosing the novel is its form which lends itself to the longer experience of time, time which furnishes more existential crises and conflicts. These considerations bring out the need of relating to the nationality and name of existential writers.

Although Sartre, Camus, Dostoevsky, and Kierkegaard could be treated in a monograph of this kind, better judgment demands a focus on non-European writers. The reason, a very sound one, is that their unique linguistic patterns would pose an additional difficulty on scholars who have no real competence with those linguistic patterns as found in Russian and French writing. The decision as to choosing American or English novelists or one of each is resolved in using an American writer: Saul Bellow.
While Americans in their American English have virtually the same sentence patterns as their English counterparts, there are significant syntactical differences and different meanings in the referential and distributive areas. Writing in an American environment and being conscious of a greater familiarity in American linguistic structure, the writer of this monograph can better define American works and their existential pattern. Bellow is selected because he is one of the most significant American novelists in an existential sense. The range of meanings that his statements carry is within the lexical scope of the educated American reader.

The objection that might well be levied in other cases and instances, namely that one ought not deal with figures too close to the contemporary scene, will pose few problems in this instance. The elements of Existentialism are clearly identifiable, and there is little controversy as to the forms they take. The orderly and scientific applications of Plutchik's theory—to be defined—will be used specifically in relation to the gerundial and participial elements found in the asserted existential statements in the novels of Saul Bellow.

The specific nature of this monograph consists in identifying the number and kinds of instances of existential utterances found in the sentences, or greater compositions, of the novels to be treated. Without laboring the point, the essential philosophy as found in
literature involves morphological and syntactical statements whose termination by periods indicate the beginning and end of an utterance.

The Existential point of view is that all is process, with nothing complete in itself. For example, the process is a flow of "accusing," "willing," "enduring," and "agonizing." Granting that the existentialist ends his sentences with periods—ironically an indication that he is not practicing what he preaches, or that he is a slave to his linguistic environment—a necessary conclusion must be that the existentialist, in this case Bellow, uses his sentences to make finite assertions about non-ending processes. Thus, the answers to his statements would have to be found in his linguistic structures. Since this novelist asserts that the existentialist is different from the essentialist, the language he uses must be visible proof of the existentialistic positions he asserts.

The linguist agrees, with rather unvarying uniformity, that the minimal linguistic utterance is a sentence; therefore, he who would analyze materials in these novels for existential meanings must look to the sentence structure. There must be within the sentence, in looking at the morphological and the syntactical word order, features which are different from the traditional meanings carried by the word symbols. If the word order of these linguistic patterns by Bellow could be shown to be different from those of ordinary
linguistic patterns, then such differences in the word order would speak for themselves. A rather easy linguistic problem would be solved simply through verifying the ruptured or changed word order as syntax. However, the sentence patterns of this American writer, as is also true of English existential writers, has no marked differences from the word order used by non-existential writers. Therefore, one must look to the morphology or word structure changes. No existentialist, however bold his thesis may be, has been found to violate phonemic order. For example, the "-ing" feature which might be added to "sing" would never be used as a prefix. Thus, the answers would have to be carried through some morphologically predictable variation of the word.

Participial and gerundial forms are at point in a morphological focus. The gerundial and participial forms carry connotations of process rather than of completion. They represent the action of the state for its own sake. Thus, such a term as "choosing" is not directed toward an end but for its own value. In short, the existentialist does not choose something but engages in choosing. If Bellow's art can be shown to have a heavy and unusual reliance on participial and gerundial forms, such incidence in reliance will go to prove scientifically his existential position.

Recognizing the fact that the total personality of the speaker is always involved in the writing, and that the writing in
this instance must carry the existential notes, the emotion stressed by the existentialist must be carried by the words. In this case, they must be carried by the participial and gerundial terms. Since that is so, the application of any tenable emotive theory to the written statement in terms of measuring the emotive intensities should be fruitful if the application is possible. Plutchik's emotive theory can be shown as possible and workable.

Thus, in summary, the nature of this monograph involves the identification of gerundial and participial forms carrying the existential process, a process which carries unique emotive states. The verification of these emotive states through a psycholinguistical application of an emotive theory can be made. Therefore, insofar as the art of this American writer is concerned, the existential position can be located in and verified by incidences of gerundial and participial forms.

Of course, this task could not be complete without some evidence by way of contrast. This contrast can be brought about in two ways: first, the existential position can be shown to demand progressive participial and gerundial forms, while the non-existential position can be shown to be without them. Second, the existential position can rest upon simply showing not that the progressive gerundial and progressive participial forms are absent from the non-existential writer, but only that the non-existential
writer uses them to a slight degree in comparison and then not to avoid the completion of a process--not as an object. The second position is the one that is taken here.

What has been done in this field before? Insofar as can be discovered as of this time, no article, book, or dissertation has been directed at this unique linguistic problem. The existentialist's position has been stated by William Barrett, Gabriel Marcel, Carl Jaspers, Jean Wahl, and Julien Marias, among many others. These writers have focused on the notional aspect of Existentialism and have used as evidence the statements of the writers themselves. The assumption made here is that there are four traditional (and essentialistic) literary philosophies: Romanticism, Classicism, Naturalism, and Rationalism, with realism as a method. There is one non-traditional literary philosophy, the non-essentialistic existentialism.

In American literature, at least, there is a difficulty in distinguishing, through reading the story only, among Romanticism, Naturalism, and Existentialism. Examination of many articles written by scholars and critics will reveal such confusion, a confusion existing within these writers and scholars. The linguist, with his knowledge of American-English patterns, can perceive that both Naturalism and Romanticism as found in literature can be distinguished through variations in the use of American-English language
patterns, as well as through variations within the structures of each basic or transformational pattern.

The romantic or naturalistic statement, as literary, will reflect the differences cited above, but will have in common that which the existential statement will not have. The existential statements reveal a process stated in terms of the use of the part of speech structured as a verb, but used as a nounal and/or adjec-
tival as progressive, but never-ending. Of course, that which the romantic and naturalistic literary statements will have in common will be that of having their processes completed.

The romantic statement, for example, will show the imagination as being located in nature; the naturalistic statement will show the imagination as part of nature herself; and the existentialistic statement will show the imagination as progressing to or away from nature, but never arriving, never reaching the end of the movement "to or from."

II. PROCEDURE

The monograph will evolve through different chapters representing steps. The first chapter concerns the general nature of the monograph form and indicates and describes the general and particular purposes thereof. The points which need definition, proof, and support are indicated in the first chapter, as the first step.
Thus, the general nature, the goals and objectives, and the procedures as steps constitute the first step and the first chapter.

Chapter Two details the existential position insofar as Bellow is concerned and the total existential situation in which he operates on the American scene. Statements from his works will be selected, statements indicating his specific relationships to the existential themes and to the overall existential position.

Chapter Three contains the participial and gerundial elements derived from Bellow's work. These assertions, as quoted material, will be evaluated directly for existential notes.

Chapter Four will contain an adequate description of Plutchik's theory in all and in parts specifically devoted to application to literary structures. The gerundial and participial elements—as progressive—will be considered in terms of the emotive states they evoke, and as to the individual emotions and their dyadinal crossings in terms of final emotive complexes resulting from the work.

Chapter Five will include a survey of the specific results obtained from the examination of the participial and gerundial expressions in the writing of Bellow. The results will be evaluated in terms of significant differences and similarities. The differences and similarities, however, will be viewed as to whether or not they contain the differences within the same general existential framework. The results should show that there can be
answers for evaluating the participial and gerundial statements as defined in the purpose, and that differences and similarities are detectable with respect to specific applications by specific writers, in this instance, the art of Saul Bellow.

III. PREVIOUS WORK

As far as can be ascertained, there has been no direct work accomplished on the gerundial and participial forms with respect to being directly related to the existential position. Joos, in *The English Verb* (Wisconsin, 1964) has worked through the finite and non-finite forms of the English verb. His position, that the gerundial form serves the role of having a basis in "the other" and not resulting in completion, will serve in considering certain propositions found in the use of the gerundial progressive form in Bellow's work. Joos always shows that the participle in its progressive forms carries the concept of that which is "contemporary," in the sense of carrying along and excluding that which could be an objective goal toward which an action could carry an individual.

Much work in grammar, literary form, and meaning, and style and stylistics has been done in essays on the language of literature. The techniques and methods of approaching linguistical analyses involve the approach taken in this monograph. Seymour Chatman, Samuel Levin, David Masson, Ants Oraz, Dell Hynes,
Monroe Beardsley, John Hollander, Rulon Wells, Roger Fowler, Christine Brook-Rose, Michael Holliday, Richard Ohmann, Jan Mukarovsky, Philip Wheelwright, Roman Jakobson, and Louis Milic have focused on syntactical relationships insofar as carrying human sense and sensibility to certain forms of literature.

Linguistic Relativity and the relation of linguistic processes to perception and cognition have received much attention from Eric Lenneberg, J. Roberts, and Roger W. Brown. These sources furnish part of the background for the analysis undertaken. Work by J.M. Givens, Robert Gavin, and John Anneberg in the language of perceiving, willing, and justifying, as a part of the philosophy of ordinary language matters of law and contractual relationships, furnishes some considerable light on the significance of participial and gerundial forms. There is no claim, at this point, however, that the patterns of laws and contracts have any one-to-one relationships with those of the existential way of looking at the world. As an interesting point, the participial and gerundial forms of ordinary language and of legal and contractual relationships are significantly oriented toward the past tense completed forms, as distinct from present and past progressive forms.

Insofar as specific psychological theories are concerned, and insofar as Plutchik's emotive theory is concerned, there has been no thesis or monograph written on their applicability to linguistic patterns and the emotive-carrying propensities thereof.
IV. PURPOSES AND SPECIFIC ELEMENTS TO BE PROVEN

The purpose of this monograph is to demonstrate that existential qualities can be found in literary statements, and found objectively. The purpose is made more specific through indicating that the objective discovery involves a consideration of some linguistic aspects of the statements themselves. The over-all purpose further demands showing that there must be something unique about the linguistic statements found in existential utterances, unique in the sense of not having the same features present in non-existential writing.

There is a realization, of course, that there is an inductive procedure operating here. There is no philosophical or literary disagreement as to the basic ingredients that constitute the linguistic position. At this present time, the existential qualities, as found in literature of all kinds and through all individuals who make these existential statements, appear to be the same.

There is no doubt that the statements made by some writers will have more and different qualities present than would be true of other writers. Thus, there is no reason to believe that this necessary limitation to the statements made by an American writer in the existentialistic philosophy would do an injustice to the scientific way of looking at existentialistic experience.
The specific purpose will include showing the progressive gerundial and participial forms which will distinguish the existential qualities. Because the existential usage of the gerundial and participial results from "agonizing," "willing," "choosing," and other unique attitudinal reactions, the need for a sound measuring device as applied to these forms is required. This device is found in Plutchik's emotive theory as applied to linguistic structures carrying certain emotive intensities.

Second, the existential position stated in this monograph rests securely on showing that while the non-existential writer does use participial and gerundial forms of the progressive tense nature, he uses them for no major purpose; on the other hand, the existential writer, Bellow, uses the gerundial and participial forms in the progressive tense expressions so as to avoid having actions and states result in direct objects of his "willing," "choosing," and "agonizing."

Associated with the states and processes of "willing," "choosing," and "agonizing," what the existentialist has chosen for himself must be an emotive world. The existentialist has no emotions denied to the essentialist. He claims no radically different emotive make-up. What are the emotions or the emotive-complexes associated with the existentialist? According to such existentialists as Malraux, Genet, Sartre, de Beavoir, Mailer, Osborne, and
Durrenmatt, among many others, the emotions experienced from the flow of individual consciousness are primarily fear, rage, anger, apprehension, expectancy, dejection, disgust, loathing, despair, guilt, misery, pessimism, hate, resentment, contempt, and hostility. However, many of these are not pure emotions, but are the results of emotive crossing to get dyadic states. (In Chapter IV, the whole question of the mixing of emotions will be detailed.) Despair, guilt, misery, resentment, hostility, and aggression, are not pure emotions, but the result of the crossing of emotions.
CHAPTER II

AMERICAN EXISTENTIALISM AND THE ART OF SAUL BELLOW

I. THE AMERICAN EXISTENTIALIST

The effect of Existentialism in America is primarily on sophisticated intellectual groups in large cities and on college students and their immediate circles. The existential frame of mind that will have its effect on the mass will involve the individual who is already responsive to a combination of will and body. Instead of expressing himself in the light of passive anguish, he will express himself against traditional values rather than submit to them.

The American existentialist perverts all traditional values. His sensations are expressed in perversions of the normal basic drives. He takes on the dynamic nature of the American character, and there is little chance that two American characters will wait on time within a room.

The American will express himself. He cannot shake off his tradition for activism. He has a staunch background for expression because he is a product of the American school system. He is taught to react sensation-wise to as much experience as his formal educational environment can afford. American behavior cannot shake off the concern an individual has through his strong
will to engage himself with the world of material objects. He reaches the conclusion that his will to act, to come alive, is not directed at the essence of things outside himself, but purely at a will to be conscious of expression.

Traditionally, he is aware of himself because he reacts favorably, or unfavorably, to a body of experience that has been directed at him. The body of experience had two values: either he accepted or rejected the principles embodied and inherent in the organized data presented for his educational stimulation, or he became aware of himself, favorably or unfavorably, through the attitude taken by those who presented the experience. His educational environment involved his being compelled to attend to subject matter and his becoming aware of the learned, rather than of the learner. This environment focused reality on principles and materiality outside himself.

The American stresses the idea of the group, of social communion, or political, economic, and ethical cooperation; however, the American temperament is strongly materialistic, and the rational force in American life has gone to support a material world. All workers work in groups. Research is done by groups. Teaching is done by teams. The American existentialist recoils from a society to which he must conform. He has lost his footing in the world of external reality.
Social conflicts with minority groups, the vastly increased number of objective facts, and an incredible multiplication of personal and objective impacts impinge on an individual whose past experiences do not seem to enable him to meet the incredible speed of modern communications. Not only must the individual place himself on trial to himself, but he must also become involved with a society which places its individual members and itself under a self-scrutiny.

The second thesis of the American existentialist is that which leads to the divided self. In such a position, he admits the reality of such experience of natural forces as impersonal, the world of the intellect as externally powerful, and the world of the spirit as obtruding itself on the consciousness and the sub-consciousness of man. He rejects the invariable split among the parts of the human personality—mind, heart, and body. His external self looks outward as a seeker of externals; the inner self seeks reunion with outer self, but only on its own terms of rejecting any absolute other than itself. Agony, pain, despair, choice, and freedom are experienced when they yield to the individual the experience of living, existing.

II. THE EXISTENTIAL ART OF SAUL BELLOW

Saul Bellow (1915— ) is a brilliant novelist in the line and tradition of the Jewish-American writers. Together with Malamud,
Gold, Goldman, and Roth, Bellow is a dominant and literate spokesman in contemporary literature. They have established a tradition among themselves, and reading one seems very much like reading another. Bellow presents the remaining traces of the American-Jewish writer who had to fight American prejudice. We also find traces of Bellow's contemporaries who oppose war, authoritarianism, persecution, and intellectual sterility.

Bellow presents a heritage of alienation, isolation, solitude, suffering, endurance, cynicism, and perseverance. But today, Bellow must write what he is: a citizen of the United States. America is the scene for and of his writing. He must accommodate to this scene in all of its middle-class aspects. The tastes are bitter, arid, and sterile. Bellow has found out that enforced physical alienation, perhaps, is better than spiritual alienation.

Bellow's choice is that of every American: how to keep one's identity in this kind of world. He adds to his problems by harrassing himself about the left, and by forcibly maintaining a ghetto in his mind. Bellow suffers easily. He has a background of suffering, but his suffering is raised to an art which is almost artificial.

Bellow, as Jewish, does not dare to get away from the Jewish material. His Jewish heroes are intellectuals, but he does not make them heroic, nor does he put them into flight. They do not like the
brutal depersonalization of war, but they are not unsoldierly, nor are they defiantly militant. His stature is indicated by the fact that when his characters are called to action, they behave as credibly as anyone behaves when he is waiting and waiting and waiting. Bellow writes about antisemitism as any other Jewish writer writes about antisemitism. He reaches the truth because his mind has the ability to take the specific theme or situation and reach a significant point. Bellow must use Jewish characters in part because he must stay with real material. But the product of his artistic experience is an aesthetic object, not Jewish, not American, not Anglo-Saxon, not any slice of race, religion, or nationality. The answer, for Bellow, is that when one man reacts with another man and does so with any ideology, prejudice, and bias in mind or heart, each destroys the other. One cannot be destroyed without being the destroyer.

We are at the existential position of possessing, creating, having, and existing. If a man exists something other than the self, he will be annihilated as the annihilator.

III. SPECIFIC WORKS OF BELLOW

We consider first, Bellow's The Dangling Man (1944). This novel is about waiting. He projects the situation of waiting to be called to Uncle Sam's service as a dangling noose, waiting for
someone to slip his head in the rope. He has just left the Communists—\(\text{not an unusual condition for many Americans in the "late thirties" and "early forties." This makes him politically alienated. He has rejected Communism and he cannot go back to the right. Furthermore, he has rejected all "middle-class" values and things, but now he has to live with them. He is suspended. He does not hang in the noose as a Communist, nor in the noose as a bourgeois. He must live with the human race. He now has to return to the real problems of friends, wife, neighbors, and mistress.}

To live in the world of the ideal in America is difficult, and is so because there are very few intellectuals. Joseph would have to be a society or a club of intellectuals consisting of only one—himself. But he has to have some communication either pro or con, and no one he knows cares very much about him or his society. Iva, his wife, supports and dominates him. He is not a misanthrope, but he is alienated. He has been cast along lines that will not be acceptable in the present war environment, and he will never be permitted to live the kind of life he wants to live. He must surrender to the environment. He cannot choose, but in the army the choice will be made for him. He hurries up the draft call.

He asserts that death is the state reached when there is no choosing. But he does choose to join the army, to give up his choice. This choosing is an example of bad faith because he is
delaying the process. If he joins the army, he does not have the right to choose; therefore, he will not be able to accuse himself of not choosing when he arrives in the service. When the novel starts, he is dangling. When the novel is complete, he leaves everyone dangling—himself included, more than anyone else. When his mistress, Kitty, begins to close in on him, he also leaves that party. Finally, he must elect to go back to his old world, make peace with this world, or elect a third possibility. He chooses one he cannot go back on, one from which he cannot withdraw. But he never settled the first problem, nor the second. He has entered a world where his question of choice is not an issue because the choice is "theirs."

_Seize the Day_ (1956) has the usual fat man so dear to Bellow. His fat men are not jolly, but suffering, agonizing, and "sorry" mortals. Asa Leventhal, Kirby's target, is fat and a sufferer; so is the hero of the novel, Wilhelm. His characters have a predisposition toward the spirit of a thorough-going existentialist, but the Leventhals have a long history of accommodation which like conformity often requires more courage than revolt. The prospects for Wilhelm are not good. On this particular day the fat man is afraid; his already tenuous grip on reality is threatened. Well over forty, he has been without a position for some time. He is an ex-actor, huge, uncouth, rejected, nearly broke, hated by his father, and now trapped into losing his last few dollars in buying shares on margin—a position he has been trapped into by a psychologist, Dr. Tamkin.
As he stands near the newstand, he recalls his father, Dr. Adler, with whom he usually has breakfast, but who has already gone in for his meal. His father loves himself so much, he has no room for anyone else. Wilhelm is thinking of his failure as a Hollywood actor, of his support payments for his wife and two children, and of his past-due life insurance premiums. He finds his father in the dining room and is embarrassed in front of Mr. Perls (swine analogy). He is completely humiliated and degraded by his father when he asks for financial aid. He is completely and utterly possessed and dominated by others. Dr. Tamkin had taken possession of his last funds, and now Wilhelm is confronted with a massive grief-swollen partner. Tamkin begins to talk and Wilhelm is able to smile for the first time as a sudden onslaught of mad logic is loosed.

From the verbal barrage, Tommy Wilhelm makes some conclusions: love is an outward moving force, and everyone must love someone or something; the love to avoid is the love that annihilates the possessor and possesses him; finally, accept the fact that I am a loser, but I need not lose right away; therefore, I commit myself to experience with joyous affirmation and vigor. I shall seize the immediate futures and actualize them as presents that must pass, but affirm the consciousness of self in those moments. Seize the day!

The existentialist, in order to shut out the entire outside world of externals, must make the world a part of his own consciousness
as flowing within himself. The scene and lines quoted below make the position clear. The main character in *Dangling Man*, Joseph, has been notified that he is to report for army duty as soon as word reaches him. He is waiting for his call by staying in his room except for meals:

Re-entering waking life after the regeneration (when it is that) of sleep, I go in the body from nakedness to clothing and in the mind from relative purity to pollution. Raising the window, I test the weather; opening the paper, I admit the world.

Joseph has no appetite when he does leave his room for meals. He does not want to be a part of anyone or anything except within himself. His being uncomfortable results in his withdrawing to his room where he can be alone to make the world a part of his own consciousness.

The same desperate desire to shut out the world of demands on one's consciousness is found in *Seize the Day* when Wilhelm considers the demands of Perla and his own father, and Margaret and the children:

But at the same time, since there were depths in Wilhelm not unsuspected by himself, he received a suggestion from some remote element in his thoughts that the business of life, the real business—to carry his peculiar burden, to feel shame and impotence, to taste these quelled tears—the only important business, the highest business was being done. Maybe the making of mistakes expressed the very purpose of his life and the essence of his being here. Maybe he was supposed to make them and suffer from them on this earth.
And though he had raised himself above Mr. Perls and his father because they adored money, still they were called to act energetically and this was better than to yell and cry, pray and beg, poke and blunder and go by fits and starts and fall upon the thorns of life. And finally sink beneath that watery floor—would that be tough luck, or would that be good riddance?

Wilhelm has been insulted and embarrassed by his father in the presence of Mr. Perls. He had come to ask for help from his father, but his father insisted that he would help no one except himself. His son would have to work out his own problems.

The question of being free to be deciding or not to be deciding is central to the existentialist. The freedom to choose not to decide is as critical as the freedom to choose to decide. To decide not to decide is to dangle. Joseph, in Dangling Man, places himself in this position:

I have thought of going to work, but I am unwilling to admit that I do not know how to use my freedom and have to embrace the flunkydum of a job because I have no resources—in a word, no character. I made an attempt to enlist in the Navy last time I was reclassified, but induction, it seems, is the only channel for aliens. There is nothing to do but wait, or dangle, and grow more and more dispirited. It is perfectly clear to me that I am deteriorating, storing bitterness and spite which eat like acids at my endowment of generosity and good will. But the seven months' delay is only one of the sources of my harassment. Again, I sometimes think of it as the backdrop against which I can be seen swinging. It is still more. Before I can properly estimate the damage it has done me I shall have to be cut down.
Joseph does not want to make a choice. He continues to dangle even though his dangling is a result of his not making a choice.

Wilhelm is caught, in Bellow's *Seize the Day*, in the agonizing matter of deciding. His deciding is in terms of saving himself and his own individuality and, at the same time, giving what he has to others on his own terms, and, yet, expecting to be free of their claims. In his conversation with his father, the points are made:

"What do you mean, Dad?" said Wilhelm, surprised. "I thought I told you. Do you think I'm not willing to settle? Four years ago when we broke up I gave her everything—goods, furniture, savings. I tried to show good will, but I didn't get anywhere. Why when I wanted Scissors, the dog, because the animal and I were so attached to each other—it was bad enough to leave the kids—she absolutely refused me. Not that she cared a damn about the animal. I don't think you've seen him. He's an Australian sheep dog. They usually have one blank or whitish eye which gives a misleading look, but they're the gentlest dogs and have an unusual delicacy about eating or talking. Let me at least have the companionship of this animal. Never." Wilhelm was greatly moved. He wiped his face at all corners with his napkin. Dr. Adler felt that his son was indulging himself too much in his emotions.

Wilhelm gave no consideration to his wife and to his children other than meeting his responsibility as a father. The ideas that the children would want the dog or that the dog could be companionship for his wife were not considered.

Agony, pain, and suffering are necessary emotive states of the existential figure whether he inflicts them on himself or sees
them in others. He requires one or the other. These states are quite implicit and explicit in the scene in *Dangling Man* where our hero approaches the point of deciding, on his terms, to be taken when the army needs him:

I believe I had known for some time that the moment I had been waiting for had come, and that it was impossible to resist any longer. I must give myself up. And I recognized that the breath of warm air was simultaneously a breath of relief at my decision to surrender. I was done. But it was not painful to acknowledge that, it was not painful in the least. Not even when I tested myself, whispering, "the leash," reproachfully, did I feel pained or humiliated. I could have chosen a harsher symbol than that for my surrender. It would not have hurt me, for I could feel nothing but gratification and a desire to make my decision effective at once.

Thus Joseph leaves the decision to the armed services. He is free now to continue as he has been until he is ordered to appear for whatever duties await him.

Wilhelm achieves the ultimate in pain, agony, and suffering when he looks at the grey-haired corpse in the coffin:

Soon he was past words, past reason, coherence. He could not stop. The source of all tears had suddenly sprung open within him, black, deep, hot, and they were pouring out and convulsed his body, bending his stubborn head, bowing his shoulders, twisting his face, crippling the very hands with which he held the handkerchief. His efforts to collect himself were useless. The great knot of ill and grief in his throat swelled upward and he gave in utterly and held his face and wept. He cried with all his heart.

He, alone of all the people in the chapel, was sobbing. No one knew who he was.
The corpse was the catalyst for Wilhelm. His pain, agony, and suffering were self-inflicted because Wilhelm had not known the man in life.

The infliction of pain and suffering is usually a matter of violence for the American existentialist. Our hero in Dangling Man needs to be conscious of his own individuality which seems to have been seized by the consciousness of the landlord, Mr. Gesell. The violence directed against the landlord reveals the punishment or the attempted annihilation of the "other." When Joseph asked the landlord when he was going to turn on the heat, he is not satisfied with the answer he receives. Joseph becomes violent:

"Well, how long?" I repeated. And, when I saw that he was not going to reply, I took him by the shoulders and forced him round, pushed aside the pipe and struck him. He fell, the pipe clattering under him on the cement. But instantly he was up again, brandishing his fists, shouting, "If that's what you want!" He could not reach me. I carried him to the wall, hitting repeatedly into his chest and belly and cutting my knuckles on his open, panting mouth. After the first few blows, my anger vanished. In weariness and self-disgust I pinned him against the bricks. Hearing his thick, rasping shouts, I said pacifyingly, "Don't get excited, Mr. Gesell, I'm sorry about this. Don't get excited!"

Joseph had no thought about the pain he was inflicting on the landlord. Mr. Gesell served Joseph as a being who was to receive the violence directed toward him.

When Wilhelm approaches his father in the steam room to ask him for financial assistance, he feels the pain that accompanies
begging. His father suffers himself to turn his son away:

"It isn't all a question of money--there are other things a father can give to a son." He lifted up his grey eyes and his nostrils grew wide with a look of suffering appeal that stirred his father even more deeply against him.

He warningly said to him, "Look out, Wilky, you're tiring my patience very much."

"I try not to. But one word from you, just one word, would go a long way. I've never asked you for very much. But you are not a kind man, Father. You don't give the little bit I beg you for."

He recognized that his father was now furiously angry. Dr. Adler started to say something, and then raised himself and gathered the sheet over him as he did so. His mouth opened, wide, dark, twisted, and he said to Wilhelm, "You want to make yourself into my cross. But I am not going to pick up a cross. I'll see you dead, Wilky, by Christ, before I let you do that to me."

"Father, listen! Listen! "Go away from me now. It's torture for me to look at you, you slob!" cried Dr. Adler.

Wilhelm's blood rose up madly, in anger equal to his father's but then it sank down and left him helplessly captive to his misery.

Wilhelm has become convinced that he would receive nothing but pain and humiliation from his father, and that his father would always look on him with pain and suffering.

The specific relationships of Bellow's characters to existential themes gain nearly infinite support from the participial and gerundial elements showing the process in the existential individual. In the following chapter, specific examples of participial and gerundial forms will be taken from Dangling Man and Seize the Day to show the relationship of these forms to the existential theme.
CHAPTER III

PARTICIPIAL AND GERUNDIAL ELEMENTS

The participial and gerundial forms used by Bellow in his novels, Dangling Man and Seize the Day, are in the progressive tense so as to avoid having actions and states result in direct objects of his "willing," "choosing," and "agonizing." In a sentence that has a direct object, we find an individual making a choice or performing an action so that he is bound to some external force or object. Thus we find that the existentialist—in this case, Bellow—seldom uses this pattern of language for human converse.

The existentialist is forced back on the intransitive sentence pattern which can be completed only by some adverbial form of space, time, and degree. He also has at his disposal the verb form used as a noun—that of the -ing expression. In Dangling Man and Seize the Day—chosen by random sample—the emphasis must be on the language structures which carry the process form indicated by the -ing form and by the intransitive and state-of-being sentence patterns which carry the concepts of existence.

The work done on these novels demonstrates the close relationship language must bear to the principles of a literary philosophy. In
In this case, the literary philosophy is the one of process carried by existential writers in expressing their art.

The following statements—chosen at random—will reveal a heavy concentration of sentences whose patterns express the relativism essential in showing process at the heart of the existential writer, in this case, Saul Bellow.

He is a person greatly concerned with keeping intact and free from incumbrance a sense of his own being, its importance.

(Dangling Man, p. 19.)

Its sober opening notes, preliminaries to a thoughtful confession, showed me that I was still an apprentice in suffering and humiliation.

(Dangling Man, p. 45.)

I looked out to see him shambling through the smoke, feeling his way along the wall.

(Dangling Man, p. 53.)

"Can't you see it's raining? But I suppose even that's better than spending an evening with a nagging wife."

(Dangling Man, p. 63.)

I hurried down the remaining stairs into the vestibule, with its ageless, nameless, rooming-house hangings, its plush chairs, high, varnished, sliding doors, and, on the grained oak board, the brass nipples of call bells. From various parts of the house there were sounds: of splashing or frying, of voices raised in agreement or lowered in appeasement or persuasion, singing popular songs, of chiming telephones, or the janitor's booming radio.

(Dangling Man, p. 69.)
A streetcar was in sight, crashing forward, rocking on its tracks from side to side and kicking sparks from the waving cable.

(Dangling Man, p. 70.)

Wilhelm had a habit of moving his feet back and forth as though hurrying into the house.

(Seize the Day, p. 28.)

He felt that by disliking Margaret from the first and disapproving of her marriage he had done all that he could be expected to do.

(Seize the Day, p. 48.)

Wilhelm, in a blinded and convulsed aberration, pressed and pressed to try to kill the trembling of his hand as he wrote out the check for a thousand.

(Seize the Day, p. 58.)

He stood near the shining window of a fancy fruit store, holding Tamkin's paper, rather dazed, as though a charge of photographer's powder had gone up in his eyes.

(Seize the Day, p. 85.)

Those big, rambling, wooden buildings out in the neglected fields; they were like prisons. The lights burned all night in them cheating the poor hens into laying.

(Seize the Day, p. 85.)

Suffering is the only kind of life they are sure they can have, and if they quit suffering, they're afraid they'll have nothing.

(Seize the Day, p. 98.)
There was a time when people were in the habit of addressing themselves frequently and felt no shame at making a record of their inward transactions.

(Dangling Man, p. 7.)

Since eleven I have been growing restless, imagining that I am hungry again. Into the silence of the house there fall accentuating sounds, the closing of a door in another room, the ticking of drops from a faucet, the rustling of steam in the radiator, the thrum of a sewing machine upstairs.

(Dangling Man, p. 11.)

But for all that, Joseph suffers from a feeling of strangeness, of not quite belonging to the world, of lying under a cloud and looking up at it.

(Dangling Man, p. 21.)

He would never admit that he wanted to become another Locke, but there he was wearing himself thin with the effort of emulation, increasingly angry at himself, and unable to admit that the scale of his ambition was defeating him.

(Dangling Man, p. 59.)

Peeling furniture, peeling walls, posters, bridges, everything is peeling and scaling in South Brooklyn.

(Dangling Man, p. 101.)

While we seem so intently and even desperately to be holding on to ourselves, we would far rather give ourselves away. We do not know how. So, at times, we throw ourselves away. When what we really want is to stop living so exclusively and vainly for our own sake, impure and unknowing, turning inward and self-fastened.

(Dangling Man, p. 102.)
I'm harried, pushed, badgered, worried, nagged, heckled.

(Seize the Day, p. 55.)

"Listen, everywhere there are people trying hard, miserable, in trouble, downcast, tired, trying and trying."

(Seize the Day, p. 22.)

You have to think about making a living and meeting your obligations.

(Seize the Day, p. 37.)

Ass! Idiot! Dumb mule! Slave! Lousy wallowing hippopotamus! Wilhelm called himself as his bending legs carried him from the dining room. His pride! His inflamed feelings! His begging and feebleness! And trading insults with his old father--and spreading confusion over everything.

(Seize the Day, p. 55.)

But he was trying to teach me that a grown man should be cured of such feeling. Feeling got me in dutch at Rojax. I had the feeling that I belonged to the firm, and my feelings were hurt when they put Gerber in over me.

(Seize the Day, p. 56.)

The doctor looked at him with his deadly brown, heavy, impenetrable eyes, his naked shining head, his red hanging underlip, and said, "You have lots of guilt in you."

(Seize the Day, p. 73.)

"A person can become tired of looking himself over and trying to fix himself up. You can spend the entire second half of your life recovering from the mistakes of the first half."
Process, of course, must depend upon continuing or first completed actions. The infinitive will not serve because the infinitive is too universal. Individuality, not universality, is the existential focus. Therefore, participial and gerundial structures are central to the existentialist because although his life is a consciousness of his own state of being, he can gain his awareness only through a flowing of experience.

Examples will appear, supporting through their short form, certain existential qualities:

I. The existentialist starts with his own personal philosophy.

There was a time when people were in the habit of addressing themselves frequently and felt no shame at making a record of their inward transactions.

(Dangling Man, p. 7.)

As far as the fatal part of it goes, everyone on this side of the grave is the same distance from death.

(Seize the Day, p. 45.)

He wants to avoid the small conflicts of nonconformity so that he can give all of his attention to defending his inner differences, the ones that really matter.

(Dangling Man, p. 19.)

And the great, great crowd, the inexhaustible current of millions of every race and kind pouring out, pressing round, of every age, of every genius, possessors of every human secret, antique and future, in every face the refinement of one particular motive or essence—I labor, I
spend, I strive, I design, I love, I cling, I
uphold, I give way, I envy, I long, I scorn, I
die, I hide, I want.

(Seize the Day, p. 115.)

II. He is filled with foreboding concerning the "predicament" of
man.

It was my painful obligation to look and
to submit to myself the invariable question: Where
was there a particle of what, elsewhere or in the
past, had spoken in man's favor?

(Dangling Man, p. 17.)

Maybe the making of mistakes expressed the
very purpose of his life and the essence of his
being here.

(Seize the Day, p. 56.)

You can't banish the world by decree if
it's in you. Is that it, Joseph?

(Dangling Man, p. 91.)

The past is no good to us. The future is
full of anxiety. Only the present is real—the
here-and-now. Seize the day.

(Seize the Day, p. 66.)

The world comes after you. It presents
you with a gun or a mechanic's tool, it singles
you out for this part or that, brings you ringing
news of disasters and victories, shunts you back
and forth, abridges your rights, cuts off your
future, is clumsy or crafty, oppressive, treacherous,
murderous, black, whorish, venal, inadvertently
naive or funny. Whatever you do, you cannot dismiss
it.

(Dangling Man, p. 91.)
III. The existentialist is interested only in the individual and unique existence of a particular person, himself.

He is a person greatly concerned with keeping intact and free from encumbrance a sense of his own being, its importance. He keeps a tight hold because as he himself explains, he is keenly intent on knowing what is happening to him.

(Seize the Day, p. 54.)

When I suffer--you aren't even sorry. That's because you have no affection for me, and you don't want any part of me.

(Seize the Day, p. 54.)

You can divorce your wife and banish your child, but what can you do with yourself?

(Seize the Day, p. 91.)

IV. The existentialist reasons that each man knows he must be free and that he is the source of his own acts; therefore, he is in anguish, pain, and dread.

Don't talk to me about being free. A rich man may be free on an income of a million net. A poor man may be free because nobody cares what he does. But a fellow in my position has to sweat it out until he drops dead.

(Seize the Day, p. 49.)

Wilhelm had a great knot of wrong tied within his chest, and tears approached his eyes but he didn't let them out. He looked shabby enough as it was. His voice was thick and hazy, and he was stammering and could not bring his awful feelings forth.

(Seize the Day, p. 53.)

The fear lies in us like a cloud. It makes an inner climate of darkness. And occasionally
there is a storm and hate and wounding rain out of us.

(Dangling Man, p. 60.)

A man like you, humble for life, who wants to feel and live, has trouble—not wanting to exchange an ounce of soul for a pound of social power—he'll never make it without help in a world like this.

(Seize the Day, p. 80.)

V. The existentialist reasons that the meaning of his life is derived from a continual engagement in a series of choices and acts.

Of course, he has to earn his living, but he tries to strike a balance between what he wants and what he is compelled to do, between the necessity and the wish. A compromise exists, but then men's lives abound in such compromises.

(Dangling Man, p. 20.)

The spirit, the peculiar burden of his existence lay upon him like an accretion, a load, a hump. In any moment of quiet, when sheer fatigue prevented him from struggling, he was apt to feel this mysterious weight, this growth or collection of nameless things which it was the business of his life to carry about.

(Seize the Day, p. 39.)

Practical judgment was in abeyance. He had worn himself out, and the decision was no decision.

(Seize the Day, p. 58.)

VI. The existentialist believes that belief is the "consciousness" of believing. Therefore, there is no belief apart from the choosing and acting of the individual.
Oh, it is terrible! Terrible! You are not free. Your own betrayer is inside of you and sells you out. You have to obey him like a slave. He makes you work like a horse. And for what? For who?

(Seize the Day, p. 71.)

He believed that he must, that he could and would recover the good things, the happy things, the easy tranquil things of life. He had made mistakes, but he could overlook these. He had been a fool, but that could be forgiven. The time wasted must be relinquished. What else could one do about it? Things were too complex, but they might be reduced to simplicity again. Recovery was possible.

(Seize the Day, p. 78.)

One of their few remaining liberties is the liberty to wonder what will happen next.

(Dangling Man, p. 92.)

But we are a people of tantrums, nevertheless; a word exchanged in a movie or in some other crowd, and we are ready to fly into one another. Only, in my opinion, our rages are deceptive; we are too ignorant and spiritually poor to know that we fall on the "enemy" from confused motives of love and loneliness.

(Dangling Man, p. 97.)

VII. The conviction of making choices is never one of reason, but one of passion: human existence is passion.

The human might is too small to pit against the unsolvable. Our nature, mind's nature, is weak, and only the heart can be relied upon.

(Dangling Man, p. 90.)
Apparently we have to give ourselves some exclusive focus, passionate and engulfing.

(Dangling Man, p. 93.)

The heavy and unusual reliance on participial and gerundial forms found in Bellow's Dangling Man and Seize the Day gives credence to Existentialism as a literary trend. This trend establishes the point of view that all is process with nothing complete in itself. Since the participial and gerundial forms carry connotations of process rather than of completion, they represent the action of the state for its own sake.

The main characters in Dangling Man and Seize the Day do not believe in the intellectual, spiritual, and physical absolutes which have traditionally defined mankind. They have rejected essentialism for the thesis that the individual will that confirms man as living and existing is the only reality. Their feelings of despair, agony, and crisis are the signs that they exist. Crisis becomes a way of life for them.

Since despair, agony, and crisis must be carried by words, the application of a tenable emotive theory should prove fruitful. In Chapter Four, Plutchik's theory will be applied to ascertain the intensity of different emotions.
CHAPTER IV

PLUTCHIK'S THEORY AND ITS SPECIFIC APPLICATION
TO THE EMOTIVE STATES AROUSED THROUGH
GERUNDIAL AND PARTICIPIAL FORMS

Dr. Plutchik gives a significant statement on facts and theories of the emotions: his work is central to psychology, but is also central to problems in sociology, politics, and literature. Each of these fields of experience has to do with problems in the areas of intensity of emotion, persistence of emotion, and the problem of individual differences. Implicit in this statement is the concept that language must express the emotive makeup of man, as well as his intellectual and sensorial aspects. The "individual difference" concern is particularly at point here in view of the nature of the existentialist. Because the existentialist is primarily concerned with the problems of avoiding a philosophy that will place him in the world of intellectual objectivism, and since his consciousness of self is always a subjective matter, the only significant field left to him is that of the world of emotions in reaction with specific sensorial stimuli. The work of Robert Plutchik is not an individual matter.

Over the years from 1950 to 1962, Plutchik worked in close cooperation with international psychologists, including Chapman,
Sullivan, Horney, Stone, Mishkin, Parloff, Henderson, and Kellerman, among others. Involved in the experimental work were the university resources of clinics and psychologists in such institutions as the Universities of Berlin, Heidelberg, Upsala, Madrid, Paris, London, Oxford, Cambridge, Auckland, Oberlin, California at Berkeley, Toronto, Manitoba, British Columbia, Cincinnati, and Yeshiva. As well, many psychiatric institutes were involved in the experimental work. The many psychologists involved, the many institutions participating, and the many clinical experiments dealt with a theory of emotions, problems for a theory of emotions, a review of contemporary theories of emotion; postulates of the current theory of primary emotions, a structural model of emotions, and experimental data. Realizing that the central problem of psychology has been that of a confused theory of affective processes—referring to emotions—the challenge was to produce a single, integrating, comprehensive theory of the emotions which is relevant to all human attitudinal experience. (We define an attitude as that which is composed of a complex of beliefs plus emotions.)

This brief treatment cannot go into minute detail as to the work and specific problems. However, the variation of intensity of different emotions is treated for the first time in any substantial manner. Next, the discovery is made that attitudes persist, but that pure emotions do not persist, as such. In fact, pure emotions have a relatively short life. Individual differences are given even more
force through discovery that much of the individual-difference-complex stems from the "crossing" of certain emotions within certain emotive states.

From the work done, the current theory came out with the following postulates:

1. There is a small number of pure or primary emotions.

2. All other emotions are mixed: that is, they can be synthesized by various combinations of the primary emotions.

3. Primary emotions differ from each other with regard to both physiology and behavior.

4. Primary emotions in their pure form are hypothetical constructions or idealized states whose properties can only be inferred from various kinds of evidence.

5. Primary emotions may be intellectualized in terms of pairs of polar opposites.

6. Each emotion can exist in varying degrees of intensity or levels of arousal.¹

The teams of psychologists agreed to back their concepts of primary emotions in terms of considering that man can have only eight emotive states, or dimensions. These states or dimensions are in definite order and location with respect to each other; we list, in order, Exploration, Destruction, Reproduction, Incorporation, Orientation, Protection, Deprivation, and Rejection. Significant is the fact that within each dimension one finds several emotions. These

emotions vary in terms of intensity among themselves. (As well, each state varies in its emotive index as compared and contrasted with the other emotive states.)

The investigators found using numbers simpler than using terms of so many cubic millimeters rise and fall in blood pressure. Therefore, they used a range of numbers from three to eleven. The lowest number indicates the emotions within the emotive state in terms of the lowest intensity. In short, the numbers of the emotions from "top to bottom" indicates intensity running from the highest to the lowest numbers. The following table, taken from Plutchik's cited text, indicates, specifically, the dimensions, their emotions, and their relative intensities, numerically related. (In this text, Plutchik carries the numbers to two decimal places to the right of the point. In this treatment, considering the limits of accuracy one may work to, the number is cut down (or rounded off) to one decimal place to the right of the point.) This table shows us the states, the emotions, and their intensities. What happens, in experience, is that the states are crossed in the sense of having individual emotions cross. We do not face experience emotively with single emotions; the attitudes that form or result from experience are composed of beliefs (thoughts or precepts) plus the results we have when emotions are crossed.
### Eight Primary Emotion Dimensions*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Exploration</th>
<th>Destruction</th>
<th>Reproduction</th>
<th>Incorporation</th>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Protection</th>
<th>Deprivation</th>
<th>Rejection</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anticipation</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>Rage 9.9</td>
<td>Ecstasy 10</td>
<td>Admission 4.2</td>
<td>Astonishment 9.3</td>
<td>Terror 10.2</td>
<td>Grief 8.8</td>
<td>Loathing 9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expectancy</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>Anger 8.4</td>
<td>Joy 8.1</td>
<td>Acceptance 4</td>
<td>Amazement 8.3</td>
<td>Panic 9.8</td>
<td>Sorrow 7.5</td>
<td>Disgust 7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attentiveness</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>Annoyance 5</td>
<td>Happiness 7.1</td>
<td>Incorporation 3.6</td>
<td>Surprise 7.3</td>
<td>Fear 8</td>
<td>Dejection 6.3</td>
<td>Dislike 5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>Pleasure 5.7</td>
<td>Serenity 4.4</td>
<td>Calmness 3.3</td>
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</table>

Now, the mind works with emotions as the mind works with colors. Let us remind ourselves that the emotive states are located in the same geographical relationship as shown on the chart. The mind first mixes colors that are adjacent; the mind handles emotions the same way. Thus, calling Exploration—I, Destruction—II, Reproduction—III, Incorporation—IV, Orientation—V, Protection—VI, Deprivation—VII, and Rejection—VIII, we find that the mind first makes the following crosses. These crosses are called dyadic. The primary ones, or the ones adjacent in terms of emotions, resulting in primary dyads, are given below:

**Primary Dyads**

- anger + joy = pride
- joy + acceptance = love, friendliness
- acceptance + surprise = curiosity
- surprise + fear = alarm, awe
- fear + sorrow = despair, guilt
- sorrow + disgust = misery, remorse, forlornness
- expectancy + anger = aggression, revenge, and stubbornness

As with colors, the mind can mix every other emotion in different emotive states: I+III; II+IV; III+V; IV+VI; V+VII; VI+VIII; VII+I; and VIII+II. We have the following results:

**Secondary Dyads**

- anger + acceptance = dominance

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2Tbid., pp. 117-118.
joy + surprise = delight
acceptance + fear = submission, modesty
surprise + sorrow = embarrassment, disappointment
fear + disgust = shame prudishness
sorrow + expectancy = pessimism
disgust + anger = scorn, loathing, indignation, contempt,
hate, hostility, resentment
expectancy + joy = optimism, courage, hopefulness, conceit.  

Again, as with colors, the mind can skip two emotions and mix the
third: I+IV; II+V; III+VI; IV+VII; V+VIII; VI+I; VII+II; and VIII+III.
The following results are obtained:

**Tertiary Dyads**

anger + surprise = outrage, resentment, hate
joy + fear = guilt
acceptance + sorrow = resignation, sentimentality
surprise + disgust = loathing, hate
fear + expectancy = anxiety, caution, dread, cowardliness,
distrust
sorrow + anger = envy, sullenness
disgust + joy = morbidness
expectancy + acceptance = fatalism.

This theory is applied to social situations, psychiatric situations,
psychotic situations, educational situations, economic situations, and,
as in this instance, to literary situations.

In this monograph, every paragraph will be viewed for participial and gerundial statements. The reactions of the writer to the
paragraph in terms of emotions will be noted. The emotions will be

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³*Tbid.* p. 118.
⁴*Tbid.*
crossed in primary, secondary, and tertiary dyadic fashion. The results will be evaluated against the existential qualities. These qualities have been stated in terms of emotions evoked. The correlation between the theory of emotions weighed against the language of the novels will be equated in terms of the emotions alleged as existential.

By way of important review, the emotions alleged as part of the existential attitude are as follows: expectancy, anticipation, anger, rage, admission, surprise, terror, panic, fear, apprehension, grief, sorrow, dejection, gloominess, loathing, disgust, despair, guilt, misery, aggression, revenge, dominance, shame, pessimism, scorn, hate, resentment, contempt, and hostility. However, commencing with "despair" and running through "hostility," the material is dyadic—the result of crosses—not the emotions themselves. Care will be taken to distinguish between the emotion and the resultant dyadic crosses.

The tables will involve three units: the primary dyadic cross; the secondary dyadic cross; and the tertiary dyadic cross. The average of the emotions will be used. The fourth and final table will note the net results when considering the tables together. The results of this chapter will be discussed, in Chapter Five, in terms of the emotions alleged as significant by the existentialists themselves.
I. CONSIDERATION OF THE DATA

There are two principal ways that could have been used for deriving the emotive data for the paragraphs noted. First, there is the consideration of the tone of the material as a whole, but with emphasis that the whole is still centered on the phonological aspects of the statements. Then, there is the method which focuses attention on the particular combinations of phonemes in words—having in mind such examples as "jiffy," "jello," and "rinso" as representing sounds carrying impacts of that which is quick, deft, and entirely feminine in appeal, as opposed to "Duz," "Surf," and "Tide," with their strong masculine undertones.

Only the first approach was used. The justification for relying on the first is that fiction has a universality which has to be subsumed in the light of human behavioral situations. These situations require greater-than-sentence value for communication and expression. This technique is that of Pike and Lefevre who tend to take the "emic" approach to situations that are literary in impact. The "emic" approach is usually considered in two lights. In one interpretation, the semantical items are carried by all the statements as morpho-phonological plus all gestures and environmental situations that are present when the events are detailed, in this instance, in the novel.
Admittedly, having worked with meanings carried by certain sound combinations, this student was both consciously and subconsciously aware of the phonemic combinations in word and sentence. Because of the length of time required to make single-word analysis of the phonology of individual elements, this latter method could not be used formally and intensively. Such a task would call for many months of work. More significantly, there is grave doubt that any one writer, consciously or subconsciously, fashions each single word in syntactical order so that the meanings are to be derived from the added series of single words, which, in turn, are additive from single phonemes sequentially arranged.

There is no question that different people respond through different emotions and that another student, working through this sort of research, would find different emotions. However, there is considerable evidence to show that while different individuals respond to the same situation through different emotions, there is remarkably little difference as to the emotive states—which contain the different emotions—judged as being present.

Certainly, the same individual at different times and places would make a different response through having different "i.p.f.'s" operating. The "immediate psychological field" is defined as the cross-section of any individual, going through a behavioral experience, at a specific time as made of the following ingredients: the past
neural traces (experiences) of the individual, the present physical, emotive, and intellectual problem, and the present physiological condition of each individual. One would doubt that any individual would have precisely the same "i.p.f." at different times. However, the personality of each individual can be assessed within certain observable limits because of a complex pattern of attitudes characteristic of that one individual.

Then each individual, responding differently because of his unique "i.p.f.," would choose different emotions. However, the individual is likely to make his judgment within the same emotive states, although the specific emotions chosen within the state vary. In the instance of this monograph, without referring to past judgments, independent judgments as to the emotive states and emotions were made at five different times. There is only a seven per cent variation—although, admittedly, by the third time there may have been some unconscious selection in terms of previous judgments made.

In summary, the assertion is made that the "emic" approach is used and that five separate and apparent independent judgments were made—carrying no more than a seven per cent variation.

II. THE DATA AND CROSSES

Every twenty-fifth paragraph is selected in the two novels treated—Seize the Day and Dangling Man. The data, found in Appendix A, gives the states and the emotions found in the states. Attention
is directed to the fact that not all paragraphs were considered to have strong enough emotive tones for registration. Again, where dialogue takes place, the entire series of statements is considered to comprise a paragraph instead of having each statement considered as a paragraph. The data, in terms of dyadic crosses, is placed in four tables, numbered I, II, III, and IV, respectively, for primary, secondary, tertiary, and the summary of dyadic crossings.

Table I shows the main emotive states to be those of Destruction, Protection, Deprivation, and Rejection, with anger, fear, dejection, and dislike the average emotive values. The primary crosses revealed a mild pride, a strong complex of despair and guilt, a strong and pervasive misery and forlornness, a powerful cynicism, and lesser elements of aggression, revenge, and stubbornness.

Table II, through secondary dyadic crosses, presents resentment, hate, shame, and pessimism, quite strongly supporting the directions indicated in the primary dyadic crosses, with some slight element of conceit.

Table III brings out the deep and brooding elements of sullenness, morbidness, and anxiety, distrust, and dread. Tables II and III are quite consistent with the tonal breadth shown in Table I.

The final Table--IV--is set up to indicate the specific crosses as primary, secondary, and tertiary in one complete view. The "no cross" shows the absence of emotive states on primary, secondary, and tertiary ranges. Significant is the fact that the emotive states
detected and the emotions revealed show the powerful introversion of the individual in the existentialistic tradition. The consistently dominant attitudes reveal despair, guilt, anxiety, distrust, misery, forlornness, resentment, hate, and cynicism.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emotive State</th>
<th>Number of Samples (Random Sample--Every 25th Paragraph)</th>
<th>Average of Emotive State</th>
<th>Crosses</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I Exploration</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Attentiveness</td>
<td>I+II=Aggression, Revenge, Stubbornness</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Destruction</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>II+III=Mild Pride</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>Pleasure</td>
<td>III+IV=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV Incorporation</td>
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<td>----</td>
<td>IV+V=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V Orientation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>V+VI=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI Protection</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Fear</td>
<td>VI+VII=Pervasive Despair, Guilt</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII Deprivation</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Dejection</td>
<td>VII+VIII=Misery, Remorse, Forlornness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII Rejection</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Dislike</td>
<td>VIII+I=Cynicism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SUMMARY OF CROSSES:**

The strong emotive responses, as attitudes, are those of misery, remorse, forlornness, despair, and guilt. There are elements of aggression, stubbornness, and pride at hand.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emotive State</th>
<th>Number of Samples (Random Sample--Every 25th Paragraph)</th>
<th>Average of Emotive State</th>
<th>Crosses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>I+III=Weak Conceit</td>
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<td>II+IV=0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>III+V=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV Incorporation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>IV+VI=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V Orientation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>V+VII=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI Protection</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Fear 7.6</td>
<td>VI+VIII=Shame</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII Deprivation</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Dejection 6.7</td>
<td>VII+I=Pessimism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII Rejection</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Dislike 5.9</td>
<td>VIII+II=Hate, Resentment, Hostility</td>
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</table>

**SUMMARY OF CROSSES:**

The strong elements here are hate, resentment, hostility, shame, and pessimism with the mildest element of conceit.
### TABLE III--TERTIARY DYADIC CROSSES

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Emotive State</th>
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<th>Crosses</th>
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<td>I+IV=0</td>
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<tr>
<td>II Destruction</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Anger 7.2</td>
<td>II+V=0</td>
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<tr>
<td>III Reproduction</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Pleasure 5.8</td>
<td>III+VI=Guilt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV Incorporation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>IV+VII=0</td>
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<tr>
<td>V Orientation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>V+VIII=0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI Protection</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Fear 7.6</td>
<td>VI+I=Anxiety, Dis-trust, Dread</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII Deprivation</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Dejection 6.7</td>
<td>VII+II=Sullenness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII Rejection</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Dislike 5.9</td>
<td>VIII+III=Morbidness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SUMMARY OF CROSSES:**

Anxiety, dread, sullenness, guilt, and morbidness dominate these attitudes.
TABLE IV--SUMMARY OF ALL DYADIC CROSSES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specific Crosses</th>
<th>Answers</th>
<th>Emphasis--Strong, Moderate, Slight</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I + II</td>
<td>Aggression, Revenge, Stubbornness</td>
<td>Moderate to Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I + III</td>
<td>Conceit, Courage</td>
<td>Slight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I + IV</td>
<td>No Cross</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II + III</td>
<td>Pride</td>
<td>Slight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II + IV</td>
<td>No Cross</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II + V</td>
<td>No Cross</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III + IV</td>
<td>No Cross</td>
<td>---</td>
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<tr>
<td>III + V</td>
<td>No Cross</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III + VI</td>
<td>Guilt</td>
<td>Moderate to Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV + V</td>
<td>No Cross</td>
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<td>V + VIII</td>
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<td>Despair, Guilt</td>
<td>Moderate to Strong</td>
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<td>VI + VIII</td>
<td>Shame</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
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<td>VI + I</td>
<td>Anxiety, Distrust, Dread</td>
<td>Moderate to Strong</td>
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<td>VII + VIII</td>
<td>Misery, Remorse, Forlornness</td>
<td>Moderate to Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII + I</td>
<td>Pessimism</td>
<td>Moderate to Strong</td>
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<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII + II</td>
<td>Envy, Sullenness</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII + I</td>
<td>Cynicism</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII + II</td>
<td>Hate, Resentment</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII + III</td>
<td>Morbidness</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SUMMARY:**

Dominant attitudes are those of despair, guilt, anxiety, distrust, misery, forlornness, resentment, hate, and cynicism.
In closing, the Plutchikian analysis of the attitudes sought for and discovered in two of Bellow's novels as treated here discloses the essential psycholinguistic nature of Bellow's existential slant. There are the statements which, as the novel, constitute an aesthetic experience as literature, and as distinct from the philosophy underlying the speakers or characters in each novel. Again, there is the language which carries the principles. These may be discussed, further, from the point of view of literary criticism, or from the point of view of appreciation centered on the personal likes and dislikes of the reader. In this instance, there is the language which carries not the principles or the story, as such, but the emotive states and tones which comprise the attitudes of the major characters in each novel treated. These attitudes, set together, appear to make up a composite picture of the existential thesis.
SUMMARY STATEMENTS

In this monograph the position has been taken from the very beginning that there are certain language forms which indicate the existential statement. The treatment of a high incidence of gerundial and participial forms in the novelistic art of Saul Bellow, measured through two of his novels chosen by random sample, represents an attempt to focus on these forms as identifying the existential theme.

The initial departure point for the existentialist is his emphasis on process, on the continuing description or narration that tends to avoid the direct object, and which also tends to avoid the statement which will throw him open to the standards set up by an external world of things, institutions, ideas, and people. The position is taken that although existentialism, in fiction, is mainly French-centered, the most fruitful speculation on existential language is to be derived from English-speaking writers using our native language. Because of a greater familiarity with American-English, the author of this monograph has centered upon an American existential writer, Saul Bellow.

Much work has been done on linguistical analyses and literature in American and English writing: many of the researchers in these
areas were identified in the section "Previous Work." Reference is made, again, to Joos' work in The English Verb. The reader may have recourse to discern in detail, from the study of these sources, if he so desires, what has been mentioned as the starting point in this monograph. While there are other language forms which may be considered significant as being uniquely true to the existential statement, the incidence of the participial and gerundial forms have seemed a fruitful approach.

In carrying out the objectives of the monograph as outlined through opening assertions and procedures in Chapter One, the presence of a substantial number of participial and gerundial forms is noted. They are considered in the context of the sentence, the minimal linguistic utterance. The first task, of course, in moving to the specific problems, was that of finding a large number of such gerundial and participial forms. This task was essential for two reasons: the specific novelist, Bellow, must be shown to have such forms in an appreciable degree; the forms are essential in providing the concrete material for measuring the attitudes found in the two novels--Seize the Day and Dangling Man. In other words, showing the incidence of the participial and gerundial forms is one matter; showing that they reveal attitudes characteristic more of the existential personality than of other personalities is another matter, but one essential in giving support to the purposes of the monograph.
In order not to be controlled specifically through a general impression gained by reading the novels through first, the reading was done on a paragraph by paragraph response. From this procedure, the emotive impacts of the individual uses and usage of the forms as participial and gerundial were fused to form attitudes in terms of the central character in each instance. These attitudes, eventually, went to comprise the character or the personality of the central figures. The central question to be resolved was as to whether or not the attitudes of fear, rage, anger, apprehension, expectancy, dejection, disgust, loathing, despair, guilt, pessimism, and misery would be revealed in consistent strength.

Because there was no appreciable difference in the incidence of the gerundial forms with respect to the participial forms, there was judged to be no merit in separating the incidence numerically. When the gerundial forms were employed, they appeared to represent the individual as flowing or extended; when the participial forms were operating, they appeared to be extending and moving toward no end other than that of process.

In Chapter Three, the participial and gerundial elements are shown in a contextual form that represents their pervasiveness and which also represents the semantical aspects of the developing novel. These examples, taken from random sampling, show a central focus on extreme individualism, and a retreat from any form of universality. In
order to keep the basic existential position clear for the reader, a number of existential qualities were listed and examples, from the novels treated, given of each: the existentialist starts with his own personal philosophy; he is filled with foreboding concerning the predicament of man; he is not interested in the nature of the abstract man; he is concerned only in the individual and unique existence of himself; he reasons that each man knows he must be free and that he is the source of his own acts; therefore, he is in anguish, pain, and dread; he reasons that the meaning of his life is derived from a continual engagement in a series of choices or acts; he believes that belief is the consciousness of believing; he believes that making choices is never a matter of reason, but always one of passion. Quite significantly, the examples given, from the novels, of these seven theses, show little use of the gerundial or participial forms. When the existentialist articulates his views of experience to one outside himself or about one outside himself, he must fall back on the normal sentence patterns characteristic of the non-existentialist. As noted in the first chapter, the existential position is at its weakest in circumstances where the existentialist feels that he has to state his position: then, ironically, he must go to the "essentialistic" way of stating a position.

Following the noting of examples of the participial and gerundial terms, and following the proof afforded as to their operation within the context of the novels, the next step taken was that of applying a Plutchikian analysis to discover the attitudes resulting from
emotive responses to the participial and gerundial statements. The resultant dyadic crosses and the comparative table show the elements central to the existential attitude: expectancy, anger, fear, apprehension, pessimism, anxiety, despair, resentment, and hostility. Therefore, there is considerable evidence in favor of the positions taken in the monograph. Certainly, there are other signposts, language-wise, to identifying the existential credo. There are non-existential writers who use the participial and gerundial forms. However, Bellow's use of them is entirely at point in revealing the existential attributes and in focusing on their unique attitudes as those centering on deprivation, rejection, destruction of external forms, and protection of the individual. Fruitful suggestions might include those of considering more of Bellow's work and of considering the work of other contemporary but non-existential writers on a comparative basis, focusing on the participial and gerundial forms in each writer's art.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ENTRIES


## SAMPLES OF EMOTIVE ELEMENTS IN BELLOW'S *SEIZE THE DAY*

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SAMPLES OF EMOTIVE ELEMENTS IN BELLOW'S *DANGLING MAN*

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<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>471</td>
<td>Rejection</td>
<td>Boredom (4.7)</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>518</td>
<td>Rejection</td>
<td>Disgust (7.6)</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Accepted by:

_________________________, Chairman

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