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BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

DR. L.W. BARNES, EDITOR: Volume VI, Number 2

The Pronoun

The term itself would indicate that a pronoun is that part of speech which can be used as a noun. But, let us stress once more that other parts of speech may be used as nouns. Thus, we have, definition-wise, a problem. We cannot define a pronoun as such because it can be used in place of a noun when other parts of speech can have the same function.

We have indicated, before, that in such sentences as

The guilty will be punished.

Over is out.

Fishing is an exciting sport.

a part of speech other than a noun is functioning as one. In the first sentence, "guilty" is an adjective. In the second sentence "Over" is an adverb. In the third sentence "Fishing" is a verb. That is, "guilty" is an adjective by structure; "Over" is an adverb by structure; and, "Fishing" is a verb by structure. However, each functions as a nounal.

It can be argued, of course, that a "pronoun" used as a noun is unique in that the "pronoun" does not take a regular determiner before it.

Perhaps, then, we need to amend or mend the definition to state that a pronoun is that part of speech that can, like some other parts of speech, be used in place of a noun, but that, unlike other parts of speech used as nouns, cannot have a regular determiner before it.

Our regular determiners are those in the subclasses that are designated as "Beharts," "Demonstratives," "Articles," "Possessives or Genitives," and "Null (\emptyset)." Now, our articles are "a," "an," and "the." Our demonstratives are "this," "that," "these," and "those." Our "Beharts--behaving as articles--are composed of such words as "each," "every," "some," and "several," --among others. The Possessives include "my," "your," "his," "their," and "John's"--among others. But we are left with a problem.

Null -- \emptyset -- is a regular determiner. We can have nouns with null before them. Apparently, we must have the null before every pronoun. Then, we must restate the definition by ensuring that while we agree that a pronoun can be used for a noun--as is true of other parts of speech--the pronoun is unique in not taking before it any regular determiner other

Now, let us go back and see where we really are. The pronoun--by structure-- can meet some of the tests of the noun. The pronoun can reflect "more," "fewer," and "less." The pronoun can reflect the quality of having two or more attributes or qualities. The pronoun, like a noun, can have a null before it.

But, the pronoun cannot have a noun before it. And, the pronoun must have null before it. Then, too, in its written form, the pronoun cannot have the apostrophe mark for the possessive. We are not too enthused about stating this last means of structural identification because we are then dealing with the written aspects of grammar. We would much rather concern ourselves with the oral aspects. Now, apparently, we are on solid ground with respect to distinguishing the noun from the pronoun, both structurally and functionally.

Let us look at what are called the "classes" of pronouns. While there is some variation in stating the classes, the classification listed below will be that of the substantial majority of grammarians. We have the Personal Pronouns, the Relative Pronouns, the Interrogative Pronouns, the Demonstrative Pronouns, and the "Indefinite Pronouns."

The Personal Pronouns are indicated as

I	We	
You	You	
He, She, It	They	<u>as for the nominative case.</u>

Then we have the Personal Pronouns for the objective case as

Me	Us
You	You
Him, Her, It	Them

Then, for the possessive case we have the personal pronouns as

My, Mine
 Your, Yours
 His, Her, Hers, Its
 Our, Ours,
 Your, Yours
 Their, Theirs

We will make only one or two observations here. First, we must note that the regular determiners do not include, for the possessive, "Hers," "Ours," "Yours," "Mine," and "Theirs." Next, we must consider the classification of the nominative, the objective, and the possessive cases as indicating that we have the one speaking (nominative), the one addressed (objective), and that which possesses or is possessed--the possessive or genitive case.

The Demonstrative Pronouns offer few problems: we have "this," "that," "these," and "those." We have seen that these four words can be used and are used as regular determiners.

There are three Interrogative Pronouns, and they are used in asking questions. We have "who," "which," and "what." Now, the kind of pronoun we are speaking about here does meet the structural tests for a pronoun. Functionally, although these pronouns, as interrogative, are used in asking questions, each varies. "Who" has three case forms: "who" for the nominative, "whose" for the possessive, and "whom" for the objective. "Which" and "what" have the same form for the nominative and objective cases, but have no possessive form. We might note that the Interrogative Pronouns can be used in indirect questions:

She asked me what he wanted.
Tell me whom you greeted.
I wonder which you chose.


Then, too, we can well consider that we can have the following pronouns as interrogatives: whoever, whatever, whatsoever, and whosoever.

We have the relative pronoun. This pronoun is often stated in terms of two further subclasses: we have the simple relatives as "who," "which," and "that." We have the compound relatives as "whatever," "whatsoever," "whoever," "whosoever," "whosoever," "whomever," "whomsoever," "whichever," and "whichsoever."

Functionally, the relative pronoun has two tasks: first, it is a connective; and, second, it is a reference word. In the sentence "Jerry discovered the blue lake which was vast," "which" connects the clause "which was vast" with the antecedent "lake" and is used instead of "lake" as the subject of the verb "was." In the sentence "That is the boy whom you kicked," the relative pronoun "whom" is both a connective and the object of the verb "kicked." Now, let us take a look at the "Indefinite" Pronouns. We can have a real problem here.

With respect to the indefinites "some," "any," "all," "many," "few," "each," and "both" we have no difficulty. The difficulty comes with "someone," "somebody," "anyone," "everybody," "everything," and "nobody,"--among a few others. These terms do not have to accept a null before them. We can, on many occasions, use our regular determiners before them. Furthermore, we can use the apostrophe for the possessive form. We would probably be thinking quite clearly and logically were we to consider that in each case we are talking about some one body, some one thing, every single body, any one body, and every one thing. Either "thing," or "body" has the demand of the noun by structure. We would be sound, I believe, to take these compounds and classify them as nouns.

Then, too, we would do well to call the cardinal a noun. We refer, specifically, to "one." "One" meets all of the tests for the noun. It is suggested that you look at the other indefinites not listed here--such as "neither," "either," and "another." Apply the tests for a noun by structure to all alleged indefinites, and you will find that some should be classified as nouns by structure.



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BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

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Dr. L.W. Barnes, Editor

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Ronald Bottrall "English Poetry and English "

The creative act is difficult to pin down. The creative process escapes human comprehension. We need not be surprised that such is the case. Without probing into why such a condition is so, we might consider that the freely-flowing imagination cannot be stopped and cannot be dammed up. When can we give orders to the imagination to cease or to slow down so that we can see images in their fleeting movements?

The lines of the poem, for example, are lines which show the net results of the process of the imagination, but they are not the process itself. We see traces left, but we cannot understand why the traces of the imaginative act were made and how they came about.

Although we cannot stop and examine the creating process, we have, in art and its various forms, the aesthetic object-picture-- poem, bars of music, or simply designs. We can see the results of the act. The product of the acting or the act of creation is before us.

In looking at the end result, or the aesthetic object, of a poem, we know as fact that the words are there. They are arranged in some unusual order. The words may undergo such ordinary and repeated usage that they fail to evoke an emotive spark.

In much the same way as we go to the dictionary and look at the accentual forms of words we try to dissect each word and derive its meaning in a microcosmic context. The poem is an entire organic unit. There is a problem to be solved, a thesis stated, a theme implied, and, usually, a title to indicate that the poet was not writing to be writing: he was writing about some thing, some body, some idea, some institution, or some event.

If a poet or reader decides to consider what a poem means, he works in terms of the title and the range of meanings which the title does carry. Now, no meaning is derived--if Gurrey is correct--until and unless some impact has been made on the nervous system of the reader--some lasting impact.

If a poet or reader decides to consider what a poem means to him, he restricts the range of meanings. He grasps the lines of the poem within the context of his own range of meanings or biases. Of course, the critic or reader, or the poet as reader and critic, can see an assertion justified to the extent that the reader, of any kind, can create a new poem out of the poem read--should he so desire. However, the lines of the aesthetic object, or the poem, as such, still remain. Nevertheless, the critic can create his own meanings out of the poem. However, trouble comes when the critic praises the artist or condemns the author because of what the critic has made from the poet's work(s). There is a need to distinguish between what a critic can do by creating or re-creating a poem in his own terms, and what the original writer produced--in the sense of a series of sound units, and/or in the sense of the graphic black marks and white spaces which confine or free the words which, as a poem, constitute the "aesthetic product."

If a poet's poem is the object of an extended explication by a critic, one might consider that one of two events has taken place. First, if a critic comes out with the right explanation, he has re-created the true poem. If he handles his work out of sympathy or empathy with the original writer and his words, he has created a "brand new poem." Here, we seem to be saying that the critic "can never be a loser." All the critic can do, if the truth be known, is to produce a written or oral argument about the aesthetic object, and the argument normally takes the form of an analysis.

Different critics often belong to different schools. The "historical critic" makes his utterances in the form of language patterns and tones that have little sympathy for other schools-- such as the following-- the textual, the psychological, the philosophical, the sociological, the mythopoeic, and the reportorial, among some others. Language patterning, skillfully arranged, may have the disadvantage of taking a reader down one road through the critics' maneuvers, when other roads are equally available.

Too much emphasis on "meaning" as such, and "meaning" in isolation will get us only a short distance along the trip which leads to poetic enchantment. The sound patterns, the rhythms, the images, visual and kinaesthetic, and the word play ultimately determine the excellence of the poem.

But, the solution is not very simple. Although poetry is made with words and not with ideas, the total range of ornaments of poetry and figures of speech must lead to the meanings. I am not certain that poetry is really made with words. The poet and the reader must work with words which stand for the poem. The aesthetic object is the poem's visual and/or tonal reality. However, both words and their tonal features stand for what the poem must be. Words do carry meanings, and carry nothing else. Man's ideas, his attitudes, and his sensorial makeup(s) demand the kinds of imagery and phonology which carry meanings.

No one would talk about a painting or piece of music without carefully considering the medium, or without considering how the artist has used his materials. Words are different--not the same at all. They have their everyday use and usage. They are ordinary. They are precise. They are vague. They evoke a sense of the ineffable. They lead to sensorial responses. Some words form the cliché or the worn-out phrase. Others are simply familiar and comfortable. In painting and in sculpture, the created pattern matters. With poetry, we are in a new world. We all believe that we know, better than anyone else, how to use words.

Now, I believe a good poem to be a successful and satisfying formal expression of significant attitudinal experiences. A good poem should sharpen our perceptions of sensuous forms--the world of eye, ear, taste, smell, and sound. A good poem should make us different individuals, to the extent that we respond to rhythmical patterns, poetic structure, and poetic logic that we had not before met. If we read the poem correctly, our sense of values should be altered. We should be aware of different emotive responses to different situations. We should be able to distinguish between the sublime and the ridiculous. We should be able to tell the differences between desired sentiment and the undesirable sentimentality. We should be able to distinguish between bathos, as false emotion, and pathos, as true emotive response.

A bad poem is one which allows the reader to become aware of a difference between form and content, that does not have lines referring back to its initial assertion, that does not consistently develop a poetic logic of feeling through having movements from the more general to the more specific words.

When all this is said and hearkened unto, there is the problem of experience. Although all words in the poem are found in the dictionary, not all of them are known to the reader. We may have instances where the writer of the poem, or the speaker in the poem, uses symbols in ways not understood by the reader. Wordsworth's gatherer of leeches, existing precariously among hills and dales, was to the poet a powerful symbol of resolution and independence. The reader, unaware of certain poetic logic, or unaware of the nature of the symbol, as literary, or poetic, may not understand.

Wordsworth's "The Solitary Reaper" offers few problems in its early reference to nightingales and their songs and sounds. The reader understands the meanings carried by "weary bands of travellers," and "Among Arabian sands." However, they are often checked by the "Cuckoo" in the following lines. They have never seen or heard of one. What is romantic and exotic to one group of readers may be commonplace to another group. Much can be done by IMAGINATION, but imagination is not the same matter as EXPERIENCE. Experience with meanings carried by various words is often essential in allowing or moving the reader to respond with wonder and imagination to the words of the poetic statements.



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BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

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Dr. L.W. Barnes, Editor Sixth Year: Number 4

L.W. Barnes : "Some More Thoughts on the Adjective"

That adjectives are hard to define notionally becomes quite evident on serious consideration of that part of speech. Roberts, in his Understanding Grammar*, notes that the assertion that nouns name substances and adjectives indicate qualities does not really aid us too much. We run into trouble trying to define "substance" and "quality."

Jespersen in his Philosophy of Grammar considers that we can distinguish nouns from adjectives in that adjectives are less specialized than nouns. Adjectives, according to the Jespersen school of thinking on this score, relate to more things than is true of nouns. When an adjective becomes nounal-- is used as a noun-- the adjective applies to fewer things as a nounal than was the case when the adjective was an adjective.

Now, both Jespersen and Roberts, and too many others, run into difficulty--and run others into difficulty-- by not distinguishing between structure and function. In reality, Jespersen and Roberts err in their assertions that the adjective becomes a noun. The adjective becomes no such thing. An adjective by structure is always an adjective, but, in some instances the adjective may function or behave as a noun.

Roberts talks about "blue" as an adjective in the "blue dress." Then he indicates that "when blue becomes a noun ('out of the blue')." "blue" becomes more specialized and does so or becomes so because of its now being a noun. It would be far more appropriate to suggest that when one part of speech is used as another, its use as the other part becomes more specialized. And why should that not be the case? However "blue" is by structure an adjective and remains one. That we see fit to use the adjective as a noun indicates something about the nature of our language. We might suggest that two things indicated are that we stress the quality of a thing at times, rather than the thing itself, and, further, in our idiom, we gain freshness and vigor through using the adjective metaphorically. We suggest, then, that we distinguish carefully parts of speech from others structurally, and then look to their effects when they function as other parts of speech. But, the adjective does not become a noun--although we can perhaps change an adjective to a noun through certain deletions or additions.

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There are problems with defining the adjective in terms of modification, limitation, and description. Let us review the problems. It is difficult to see how "modify" can apply, logically, to any relationship the adjective may have with respect to the noun or pronoun. No change or alteration is made in applying the adjective to a noun before or after a verb. There is a way through which we might use the term "modify" to relate the adjective to the noun, or nounal. Here we might say that the speaker's or listener's response to an adjective may modify the attention or direction from the noun or pronoun to its quality. That is, in using the assertion "gray cat," with relation to the "cat" we may modify "cat" by changing our interest or concern in the cat to its "grayness." We will have to change the traditional verbalizing on this modification score to bring about this new view or slant to "modification."

Then, "limit" is a problem, for certainly we cannot limit the nounal as such by placing an adjective in a prenominal or postnominal position. But, we can limit the speaker's attention or the listener's attention to the quality or attribute of the nounal. We are more sensitive to the term "describe" with reference to what an adjective is alleged to do to the nounal. To describe any thing, idea, event, institution, or person, we would, in effect, need to consider every quality or characteristic that nounal does, in reality, possess. Even could that be done--which is far from likely--listing all the qualities might reveal all that can be known about the nounal, but not what the nounal is, in fact, or essence. Thus, the "descriptive" label for an adjective is far from satisfactory. But an adjective does mark something about the nounal. The adjective does signal something about the nounal. The adjective, used by itself, for a nounal does signal the fact that for the time or place the quality is so important that it merits in a particular context being considered as "that spoken about." Thus, if we say "The miserable" shall be pitied, being miserable has such significance that the quality becomes the noun. (The psycholinguistical support for this position is overwhelming.)

Roberts, in Understanding Grammar gives the following examples of modification. In so doing he concludes that there is a general trend in calling the word before the noun an adjective, and that this general trend carries considerable force:

a high fence	a stone fence
a muddy road	a mud road
a large committee	a citizens committee

Roberts indicates that if we call "high," "muddy," and "large" adjectives on the ground that they modify nouns, then we must call "stone," "mud," and "citizens" adjectives for they modify the same nouns." But, he himself, is not happy with that solution. He goes on to tell us why he is not happy. However, we shall check him at this point for his conclusion that he must call "stone," "mud," and "citizens" adjectives because they modify the same nouns as those modified by "high," "muddy," and "large" is not correct.

3

"Some More Thoughts on the Adjective"

He is not correct because any noun by structure that occupies the first slot to the left of a noun used as the subject, object, or object of a preposition must be filled--if the slot is filled--by a pure noun that functions as a noun. (In fact, the subject, object, or object of a preposition in a sentence need not be a noun but can be nounal.)

The words "stone," "mud," and "citizens" are nouns by structure. They meet the following tests:

- | | |
|---------------------------|--|
| a. more, fewer, or less | c. having two or more attributes |
| b. how much? or how many? | d. being able to take a pronoun before them. |

Since they are nouns by structure, and purely so, they can never be other than nouns. However, they may function as some other part(s) of speech. But, in the cases signified by Roberts, they do not function as adjectives. Since they occupy the slot immediately to the left of the nouns specified, they behave as nouns. For, as we have seen on more than one occasion, pure nouns immediately to the left of a nounal have a special role. Such terms as "made of," "constituted from," "a class of," and "broken down into" come to mind. Here the fence is one made from stones. The road belongs to a class of roads known as "mud." The committee happens to be one of a class known as "citizens."

Now, "muddy," can be an attribute of a road at a particular time, but "mud" is not. A ring can be made of gold, but the quality of the ring or the attribute would be designated as "golden." We simply must see that a pure noun occupying the slot to the left of a nounal can never function as an adjective, but must always function as we have indicated in the examples.

Other linguists distinguish on the basis of filling the first and third positions. (The first position is filled by nominal one, the second by verb markers and the verb, the third by the verb completer assembly, and the fourth, optionally, by the adverb.)

In this theory, if the same word can fill the first and third positions, where in the first position we do have a noun and an adjective to its left, then the word is an adjective: "That yellow rose is yellow." Since "yellow" is to the left of "rose" in the first position and since "yellow" fills the third position, "yellow" is an adjective. Yet, these linguists, most assuredly on the right track, stop short of claiming the test as absolute and foolproof. Yet, they do not need to so stop. Their assumption that they should not assert this criterion for defining the adjective is based on their assumption that any word to the left of the nounal, not a determiner, must be an adjective. In the next issue, we shall indicate specifically how their assumption about the adjective's ability to fill the third and first positions, for the same adjective, is entirely correct and justified.

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MOREHEAD STATE UNIVERSITY BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS
DR. L.W. BARNES, EDITOR VOLUME VI (SIXTH YEAR) NUMBER V

"MORE CONSIDERATIONS OF THE ADJECTIVE"

IN THE LAST ISSUE (4), WE POINTED OUT THAT WORDS SUCH AS "MUD," "STONE," AND "FENCE" BEFORE OTHER NOUNS ARE NOUNS BY STRUCTURE, AND THEY FUNCTION AS NOUNS, NOT AS ADJECTIVES. (THE FIRST SLOT TO THE LEFT OF A NOUN USED AS THE SUBJECT OF THE SENTENCE, THE OBJECT OF THE VERB, OR THE OBJECT OF A PREPOSITION IS OPTIONAL. BUT IF THE SLOT IS FILLED, THE SLOT MUST BE FILLED BY A PURE NOUN BY STRUCTURE FUNCTIONING AS A PURE NOUN.)

WE REFER TO ROBERTS' STATEMENTS ON THE SCORE OF FILLING THE POSITIONS BEFORE AND AFTER THE VERB:

PROFESSOR FRIES IN STRUCTURE OF ENGLISH ATTEMPTS TO SEPARATE NOUN MODIFIERS FROM ADJECTIVE MODIFIERS BY USING THE FRAME "THE GOOD (NOUN) IS GOOD." IF THE WORD IN QUESTION WILL SUBSTITUTE FOR GOOD IN BOTH PLACES, IT IS AN ADJECTIVE; IF NOT, IT IS NOT. THUS, IN COMPARING "THE OLD SURGEON" AND "THE TREE SURGEON," WE FIND THAT "OLD" IS AN ADJECTIVE BECAUSE WE CAN SAY, "THE OLD SURGEON IS OLD," "TREE" IS NOT AN ADJECTIVE BECAUSE WE CANNOT SAY "THE TREE SURGEON IS TREE." THIS TEST IS HELPFUL, BUT IT IS NOT FOOLPROOF. IN OUR EARLIER EXAMPLES, IT WOULD SHOW "HIGH," "MUDDY," AND "LARGE" TO BE ADJECTIVES AND "CITIZENS" TO BE A NOUN. BUT IT LEAVES US IN DOUBT ABOUT "STONE" AND "MUD" WHICH SEEM TO FIT THE TEST "THE STONE FENCE IS STONE," "THE MUD ROAD IS MUD," AND YET APPEAR NOT TO HAVE THE CHARACTERISTICS OF "HIGH," "MUDDY," AND "LARGE."

BUT THE TEST IS FOOLPROOF AND IS SO BECAUSE "STONE," "MUD," AND OTHER SUCH NOUNS BEFORE THE NOUNAL ARE NOUNS BY STRUCTURE AND NOUNS BY FUNCTION. THEY DO NOT FUNCTION AS ADJECTIVES. ALL THAT WE ARE SAYING WHEN WE PLACE "STONE" IN THE THIRD POSITION AFTER THE VERB "TO BE" IS THAT THE VERB "TO BE" CAN HAVE ITS COMPLETER (IN THE THIRD POSITION) A NOUNAL. WE KNOW THAT THE

ROBERTS, UNDERSTANDING GRAMMAR, HARPER, N.Y. (PP. 91FF1)

VERB "TO BE" CAN BE COMPLETED (IN THE THIRD POSITION) BY A NOMINAL, AN ADJECTIVE, OR LOCATION. THE TEST IS FOOLPROOF, BUT WE ARE IN A MORE IMPREGNABLE POSITION IF WE USE THE "SEEMS" AND "VERY" TEST FOR THE ADJECTIVE. THEN THERE CAN BE NO POSSIBILITY OF BEING CONFUSED. THAT IS, WE CAN USE THE PHONOLOGICAL TEST + THE THIRD POSITION TEST AS IN.

THE GOOD BOY SEEMS VERY GOOD.
THE MUDDY ROAD SEEMS VERY MUDDY.
THE LARGE PORTION SEEMS VERY LARGE.
BUT NOT
THE STONE FENCE SEEMS VERY STONE.
THE MUD ROAD SEEMS VERY MUD.

IN REVIEW, THEN, WE NEED TO POINT OUT WHAT SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN OVERLOOKED BY SO MANY GRAMMARIANS FOR SO LONG--THE FACT THAT THERE IS A SLOT JUST TO THE LEFT OF THE NOUNALS USED AS SUBJECTS, OBJECTS OF THE VERB(S), AND OBJECTS OF THE PREPOSITION(S). THIS SLOT, AGAIN, IS FILLED BY A PURE NOUN FUNCTIONING AS A NOUN.

WE NEED TO STAND ON THIS DEFINITION BY STRUCTURE. ROBERTS, AS IS THE CASE WITH SO MANY OTHERS, MAKES A POINT THAT ADJECTIVES DO NOT FORM AN -S PLURAL, BUT NOUNS DO. NOT ALL NOUNS FORM AN -S PLURAL, NOR DO ALL NOUNS FORM A PLURAL.

THEN THE ASSERTION IS MADE THAT ADJECTIVES MAY BE COMPARED AND NOUNS CANNOT BE COMPARED. ROBERTS USES THE ILLUSTRATION OF BEING ABLE TO COMPARE THE ADJECTIVE AS IN "HIGH," "HIGHER," AND "HIGHEST," BUT NOT "STONE," "STONER," AND "STONEST," BUT, WHAT ABOUT THE FOLLOWING PROBLEM? WE HAVE "CAUTIOUS," "MORE CAUTIOUS," AND "MOST CAUTIOUS." BUT, THEN, WE CAN HAVE "STONE," "MORE STONE..." AND "MOST STONE." (WE AGREE THAT THE LATTER IS NOT USED FREQUENTLY OR ORDINARILY. BUT SUCH USAGE IS A FACT, IF AN INFREQUENT ONE.)

IT IS TRUE THAT SOME ADJECTIVES HAVE ENDINGS WHICH MARK THEM AS ADJECTIVES. AMONG THESE ARE SUCH AFFIXES AS -ARY, -AL, -IC, -Y, -FUL, -LESS, -EN, -ABLE, -IVE, -OUS, -ISH, AND -SOME; BUT WHEN WE HAVE OTHER PARTS OF SPEECH ENDING WITH THE SAME TERMINAL MORPHEME AS IN "VIGOROUSLY," "SADDEN," AND "MISSIVE," WE SHOULD NOT RELY ON THESE ENDINGS FOR IDENTIFICATION. WE CANNOT DEFINE UNTIL AND UNLESS WE CAN A UNIQUE OR DISTINCT FEATURE. FROM AT LEAST ONE UNIQUE FEATURE DENIED TO ALL OTHER PARTS OF SPEECH WE CAN DEFINE THAT ONE PART OF SPEECH. WE HAVE THAT DEFINITION IN THE FILLING OF THE FIRST AND THIRD POSITIONS, TOGETHER WITH THE "SEEMS," "VERY," AND "QUITE" TESTS.

ROBERTS AND OTHERS ALSO SUGGEST THAT WE MAY CALL SOME WORDS "LIMITING ADJECTIVES." WE THINK SUCH A TERM QUITE UNFORTUNATE. HE LISTS SUCH WORDS AS

MY
A

THE
SEVERAL

BOTH
EVERY

AS "LIMITING ADJECTIVES." NOW, "A," "AN," AND "THE" ARE ARTICLES. THEY ARE SO BECAUSE THEY ARE UNIQUE IN BEING ABLE TO STAND FOR ALL OF THE QUALITIES OF THE NOUNAL BEFORE WHICH THEY APPEAR. THOSE THREE ARE THE ONLY PURE ARTICLES. PRONOUNS ARE OFTEN USED AS ARTICLES--FUNCTION AS ARTICLES. BUT THEY ARE RECOGNIZED OR DEFINED AS PRONOUNS THROUGH MEETING THE STRUCTURAL TESTS FOR PRONOUNS--AS WE HAVE SEEN BEFORE.

ONCE WE HAVE DEFINED A PART OF SPEECH BY STRUCTURE, WE THEN INDICATE THE FUNCTIONS THAT CAN BE TAKEN CARE OF BY THAT PART OF SPEECH BY STRUCTURE. FIRST, HAVING IDENTIFIED THE ADJECTIVES, AS SUCH, WE SEE WHAT THEY, AS ADJECTIVES, CAN DO. THEN WE FIND OUT WHAT FUNCTIONS OTHER PARTS OF SPEECH CAN TAKE CARE OF WHEN THEY FUNCTION AS ADJECTIVES.

IN SLOT-FILLING, WE KNOW THAT MOVING FROM RIGHT TO LEFT FROM THE NOUNS THAT ARE USED AS SUBJECTS, OBJECTS OF VERBS, AND OBJECTS OF PREPOSITIONS WE HAVE (N-1) WHICH IS RESERVED FOR A PURE NOUN. THEN WE HAVE (N-2) SLOTS. SOME OF THESE ARE FILLED BY ADJECTIVES AND SOME BY OTHER PARTS OF SPEECH FUNCTIONING AS ADJECTIVES. WE HAVE THE ADJECTIVE, AS SUCH, IN THE PROPER, COLOR, SHAPE, SIZE, AGE, AND VALUE SLOTS. BUT, THEN, WE HAVE THE ADJECTIVAL SLOT ALWAYS FILLED BY VERBS FUNCTIONING AS ADJECTIVES: "INTERESTING," "BITTEN," "DELAYED," AND "BLOWN" ARE SOME EXAMPLES OF VERB FORMS BEING USED IN AN ADJECTIVAL SLOT.

AS TO WHERE THE ADJECTIVE OR ADJECTIVAL MAY OCCUR IN A SENTENCE IS A MATTER OF OBSERVATION AND DESCRIPTION. WHEN ADJECTIVES FOLLOW THE NOUN, AND DO SO NOT AS PREDICATE ADJECTIVES, WE HAVE THE NOUN TAGGED AND FOCUSED UPON. ADJECTIVES BEFORE THE NOUN OFTEN CARRY SUCH POWER AS TO "COVER UP" OR "VITIATE" THE FORCE OF THE NOUN.

THE IMPORTANT POINT IS THAT WE CAN IDENTIFY AN ADJECTIVE BY STRUCTURE AND CAN DO SO IN AN INVARIABLE AND ABSOLUTE WAY.



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BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Dr. L.W. Barnes, Editor: Volume VI, Number 6--First Number of
Seventh Academic Year Commencing Sept. 1, 1971
Dr. L.W. Barnes: "On Writing Rules for a Language"

We have become quite well aware of writing PS Rules--Phrase Structure Rules--for our sentence patterns. We can do a better job than we have done. We can do so through having individuals understand the nature of rules and through having them write their own rules. While there is little hope that we shall all agree on the exact terminology and symbolism essential in making the rules, we will come to realize that there are really few significant differences whether the rules come from Chomsky, Gleason, Carnot, O'Neil, Postal, or any other individual working with rules and writing rules.

Our rules must encompass all the kinds of statements that we can make in our language. It must be made clear that the term "rules" is not used in an entirely mandatory sense. What is mandatory, apparently, is the condition that if all rules were dropped today there would be rules made tomorrow. These rules show an amazing likeness to the rules previously dropped.

The term "rules" is best approached through understanding that they carry the means of revealing patterns existing in a language for each particular place and time of that language. The rule describes such conditions for particular times and places. The linguist does not "make" the rule. He states a rule, and the descriptive nature of linguistics is such that he can do little more than state the rule.

The PS rule which states that the predicate is unique to the "to be" sentence pattern is the result of a description of the language. The description is one which shows that there are other kinds of sentence patterns as to verbs. The description then goes on to reveal that following each verb there is a verb completer--in one case, a verb completer that is \emptyset , or null.

The verb completer for the verb "to be" pattern is the Predicate. Now, we write a rewrite rule for the Predicate. The rewrite rule comes from an observation that the verb "to be" can be completed as to its third position in the sentence by three possibilities. We can have a nounal; we can have an adjectival; and, finally, we can have a locational statement. We cannot complete the verb "to be" by such a temporal statement as "is when...." It is poor usage to utter "That is when the bell rang." But we can and should say "That was the time when the bell rang." For this time and place the description of the language is such that we write a rule which tells us that the Predicate can be broken down in the nounal, the adjectival, and the locational statement:

Now, to return to take a look at the larger picture! Phrase-Structure Rules have been constructed to take care of the basic or kernel sentence. As yet, they do not operate systematically in terms of the paragraph-or-greater-structures. These rules operate in such a way as to enable an individual using a specific language to generate an almost infinite number of examples of a particular pattern. They also enable an individual to understand that although there may be an almost infinite number of specific examples on a one pattern basis there is no infinite number of patterns.

There may be such a statement as "John is here." The word "John" can be replaced by a vast number of words. The same pattern--the "to be" pattern will be in operation. In the pattern where there is the transitive verb-- there can be an almost unending number of possibilities for substitution of a specific or particular name: "The men kicked the ball briskly" can be substituted for as in "The boys kicked the ball briskly." It is not hard to see that there can be an impressive number of examples or illustrations of a particular pattern .

It is noted that I am not detailing or reviewing sentence patterns specifically. Nor am I detailing a complete set of PS Rules. What I am doing is indicating and explaining the nature of rules. In so doing, I am looking at certain terms which do confuse both amateur and professional in dealing with the language. Consider, for a moment, the "verb."

There are many verbs: according to my completed count of specific verbs in the English language--not counting verbs with the same meaning but with variant spelling(s)--there are at least 35,675! It is doubtful that there would be much profit in spending the time essential to memorize thousands of the verbs. But, one can determine the sentence patterning which will accommodate these individual or specific verbs. There is the "to be" pattern. Then there is the "transitive" pattern. The other two patterns are, respectively, the "intransitive" pattern and the "whole-part" pattern. The PS rules take these four sentence patterns into account.

It may be interposed at this point that there are more than four sentence patterns--in the basic sense. Such is not the case in a parallel sense. While each high school text tends to show more than four patterns, these patterns, when examined, indicate that a major class has been broken into subclasses. (The problem here is that the whole and the part are mingled, with no distinction made between the whole sentence pattern--as in the intransitive--and the part pattern where the verb "to be" is completed by location which is given equal value with the entire intransitive pattern.

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
This term "whole-part" is used by me instead of the terms "copulative," "linking," or "state-of-being." In the sentence "He has hair," the word "hair" is actually a part of the subject "He." The utterances "He has a pain," and "He seems lazy" are also examples of the "whole-part" pattern.

Because of the large number of sentences and because of the large number of verbs which can be used in constructing sentences, I need to abstract or to find a rule which will show me the patterns of all sentences requiring or accepting verbs.

After I have concluded that all sentences may be restated in terms of having a Noun Phrase¹ (complete subject) and the rest of the sentence (Verb Phrase), I then go to the next rule which allows me to examine the verb phrase as to parts.

I find that in American-English, for example, I can break this Verb Phrase into two smaller units. They are the verb marker and the Main Verb. (I could have used "auxiliary" or "helper" instead of "marker." I could have used such terms "as those of "chief" or "principal" instead of "main.")

I conclude that it is useful to state that the Main Verb (MV) can be restated as "or" broken down into " a Verb and, optionally, an Adverb. I have now reached the point of my earlier illustrative statements. I now need to restate the conditions that exist in my language as of this time and place for the verb. So I do my rewrite rule as follows:



Now, in order to have the reader understand what I am doing, I agree with myself and with him--I trust-- that the arrow indicated "broken down into." The braces indicate that in my language I have a choice of four verb patterns but can choose only one. I can choose only one, but I must choose one. So, I let the braces stand for "choose one and only one."

I then point out that in a basic sentence that commences NV... (where that order indicates the subject first and the verb second) there are four positions: 1,2,3,and(4). Then Position 1 is filled by the subject. Position 2 is filled by the verb. Position 3 is filled by a verb completer. The parentheses signs indicate "optional." Thus, I have a fourth position. This Position 4 is optional as to being filled. However, in my language that position if filled must be filled by an adverb.

Now, I did not make up these rules. I simply describe the conditions for my time and place, and the conditions for that time and place happen to be the same for all others using American-English in any standard sense. The third position in the V_{be} pattern is that of the Predicate. The third position in the V_i pattern is filled by \emptyset . The third position in the V_t pattern is filled by a Nominal² or an NP^2 --which is the direct object. The third position in the V_{wp} pattern is filled by a Complement. More detailed statements as to "rules" will appear in the next issue.



BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Periodicals Department
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Dr. L.W. Barnes, Editor: Volume VI, Number 7

Dr. L.W. Barnes: "On Writing Rules for Language": Part II

I look the language situation over and come to conclusions. If I come to the same conclusions often enough, I believe that there is a "law." In Linguistics, I write rules for the so-called "law." But I do not prescribe. When I am ready to start writing rules, my thinking goes from "I" to "We." At that point I am becoming quite universal in the sense of considering that what appears to me to be an adequate description of a situation in language will also be quite adequate for a large number of other individuals.

I observed in last week's issue of the Bulletin that an adequate description of the verb condition in English is one which reveals that verbs can be subsumed in four basic patterns in English: the "to be" mode, the "intransitive" mode, the "transitive" mode, and the "whole-part" mode. I then wrote a phrase structure rule in terms of that description. This rule is to the effect that

$$V \longrightarrow \left\{ \begin{array}{l} V_{be} + \text{Pred.} \\ V_i + \emptyset \\ V_t + \text{NP}^2 \\ V_{wp} + \text{Comp} \end{array} \right\}$$

One can and must be chosen--but only one for each specific sentence utterance--when we are dealing with a BSP, or Basic Sentence Pattern. Now, the rule tells one and all that in American-English, for this time and place, the verb situation is as described. Now, if the rule does not apply to our basic patterns in any one instance, I shall have to start all over again. Thus, our rules--my rules and your rules-- are held but tentatively in an "as far as we know or as well as we can ascertain for this time and place" basis.

I do not pull rules out of the magic hat; they do not come to me in any ineffable fashion. These rules are derived, distilled, or abstracted from flesh-and-blood acquaintance with specific linguistic utterances. For example, I ponder the matter of verbs and find that the matter of time sequence causes me, whether I will or not, to use verb markers.

*

As indicated in a previous issue, the term "whole-part" is one I use in place of "copulative," "linking," or "state-of-being." The reason for using the term is that the verb complete represents a part or attribute of the subject.

I find that when I want to talk about an action I am sustaining, I must make a statement such as "I am running well." If I desire to indicate something about my running in the past where that running was sustained, I will say "I was running." If I simply want to point to the past event, I will say, "I ran."

However, I am not finished yet. Let us suppose that I desire to make some utterance about the action commenced in the past and continued through the present moment. I will most likely say that "I have been running."

What if I desire to indicate that of two past events one was earlier than another? I will state that "I found my gloves where I had lost them." Then there is the question of the modals. On the simplest level, I find that using "may," "can," "will", and "shall" indicates the present tense. Using "might," "would," "should," and "could" will indicate the past tense. We know, of course, that the modals can introduce other notes, such as those where "can" is equated with physical ability and "may" is equated with permission. So, I find that I do make such statements as

Joe runs.
Joe is running.
Joe ran.
Joe was running.
Joe has run.
Joe has been running.
Joe had been running.
Joe may have been running.
Joe might have been running.
Joe had run.

In each case, we have differences in time involved.** It would appear that we are quite time conscious. Now, I did not make up these utterances in the sense of being the one who brought them into being.

When I consider other verbs, I find that I make parallel statements through them in much the same sense as those made above. I then write the rules, in the sense of indicating the descriptive elements which seem to rule the language.

In writing the rules, I decide on some kind of symbolism that a large community of readers or listeners will accept. I next have to decide on the syntax of the situation. I find that the verb markers go before the verb when we have basic sentence patterns. Then I find that each marker has a certain position with respect : to the other markers, I must show that condition in the rules.

**

We are talking about ordinary clock time here. Other kinds of time we must take into account are psychological time, eternal or religious time, and space-time.

When I consider the verb markers-- you may call them auxiliaries or helpers-- I find that closest to the verb itself is (Be+ing.) Then, one more slot to the left is (Have+en). Then, third and farthest to the left is the slot for the (Modal.)

I use the parentheses to tell you that the filling of the slots is optional. However, there is nothing optional about the fact that these markers have relative positions next to each other. All these facts have been determined through observing how "I" and "you" and hundreds of millions of other individuals use the American-English tongue.

When I write the rule for myself and for all others to follow, I let my PS rule take the form of $vm \longrightarrow (Modal)(Have+en)(Be+ing.)$


I am not yet satisfied, for I find that the modals have to be rewritten as giving the choice between the present tense and the past tense. Then, when I come to (Have+en), I find that the /en/ yields the sign of the past participle and that the /have/ can be rewritten in terms of /have/, /had/, and /had/. Then, finally, I come to the (Be+ing) before the verb itself. I find that the /ing/ indicates the sign of the present participle. Further, (Be+ing) is rewritten now --from the point of view of /be/-as /be/, /is/, /am/, /was/, /were/, /been/, and /being/, and /are/.

Now, the intent, from the primary point of view, is not to furnish information as to the descriptive condition of the English language. The intent is to show that one looks at his language and describes it. When he finds unvarying situations, he writes the rules for the language. In doing so, he works from the larger to the smaller elements, or from class to subclass.

What I have been doing in these papers is being done by many, many other individuals working in this field. In nearly all other languages the same methodology is followed. Thus, we do not make the language for other individuals. Before proceeding to indicate a set of PS rules for basic sentence patterning, I will call your attention to two points of some critical import.

Although we work in the direction S-F-M--structure-to-function-to-meaning, language does not work in a vacuum, nor does it serve its own unrelated purposes. Language serves the personality of each individual in constituting a system whereby each individual can find available to him enough linguistic competence to take care of his need for communication, expression, and communion.

The second point is that although specific individuals may not find enough linguistic wealth or potential to take care of their need to articulate their thoughts, emotions, and attitudes, there is a common store of potential great enough to serve the needs of a substantial majority of the individuals constituting any specific language-speaking community.



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BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Dr. L.W. Barnes, Editor

Dr. L.W. Barnes, "On Writing Rules for Language": Part III

In the usual approach to introducing PS rules to students, the first model usually opens with the S \rightarrow NP + VP, where "S" stands for "sentence." "NP" stands for Noun Phrase, with the agreement that the first "NP" is the subject. "VP" stands for Verb Phrase. It is not until the student is presented with successive models, with each model representing another step into complexity, that he sees the entire picture. Let us discuss this statement.


After a while, we realize that we have other than Basic Sentence Patterns. We have the "Emphatic." We have the "Interrogative." We also have the "Passive," "the Negative," and the "Exclamatory." So, we need to do a little rethinking. We need to consider the total perspective.

If we decide that the functional unit of the language is the sentence, then we need to consider the nature of the sentence. We really need to understand the range that the sentence possesses in this or any other language.

In American-English, at least, we can define the sentence as "A word or group of words followed by the fade-out of the voice." Now, this fade-out occurs in one of two ways. The voice fades out on a rising note or on a falling note. That is, the voice fades out on a "fade-rise" or on a "fade-fall." Thus, our definition is great enough to take care of the obvious declarative statement and the interrogative statements. We can also take care of the one or two word sentence since the voice goes out on a rising or falling tone.

Thus, we would not open with the single option that tells us that a sentence can be broken down into the noun phrase and the verb phrase. We have to offer a range of choices of the nature of "you must choose one but only one of these possibilities."

Therefore, the opening PS rule could look like the following graphic representation:



Here we are told that for any sentence in this particular language you must choose one of the possibilities but only one.

Without detailing the entire set of PS rules at this point again, I shall consider another aspect we have not discussed. After we tell ourselves that each particular kind of verb has a verb completer and that there are different kinds of adverbials in the fourth position, we then write the rules for our subject, or NP¹ or Nominal¹. I believe it profitable to talk about another phase of language.

It is customary to consider that each Nominal can be rewritten in terms of "Determiner," "Noun," and "Number." We easily understand that "Number" involves the "singular" or the "plural." We also understand the nature of such Determiners that we find under the subclasses "Possessives," "Articles," "Beharts," "Demonstratives," and "Null."

The Nominal "The man" can be understood, and we see that "The" relates to or is essential to "man." If we had a nominal that read "The big man" we would also understand the logic with big + man and the logic in terms of "The + big man." But, we would have some trouble discerning any logic insofar as "The + big" might be concerned.

Thus, we will have a PS rule that will take care of "The man," "big man," or "The big man." But we will not have a PS rule for "The big." In an opener such as "The very expensive chair," my troubles would come with "The very." We could write no PS rule for such a combination as "The" + very."

We can see, after a brief trial, why we would not be able to write a rule for such a case as "a" + "rich." However, we do come to a thorny area. We have the habit of letting the quality stand for the thing. While we would not rest content with an opener such as "The big," we would not hesitate to have sentences such as

The very rich will inherit more wealth.
The guilty will be punished.
The idle will enjoy relief

We would handle "The very rich" in terms of Nominal¹ → Det + Int + N + N⁰. But we could not take care of a construction such as "The big" where "big" is not followed by a noun. Thus, we come to realize, I trust, that we have to define linguistic situations where some phrasing is logical and where phrasing is not. One of these situations, as we have seen, comes where we let the quality stand as the subject or object of the sentence.

Another problem can arise when we have the two following sentences which represent the "collective" mode:

The jury have been unable to agree.
The jury has been able to agree.

Here, we have no problem with the PS rule which tells us that the Nominal¹ → Det + N + N⁰. Our problem comes in deciding whether N⁰ → \emptyset_2 or N⁰ → Z₂.

We can see that writing rules for a language is not too difficult. What is difficult is being aware of the range of possibilities which exist in the language, and, thus, ensuring that the rules will cover all cases.

One useful set of PS rules- is offered for consideration. (It is entirely useful for each individual to attempt to write his own.) While the symbols will vary, the same situations should be covered.

#Ste# \longrightarrow Nominal¹_{sj} + VP

VP \longrightarrow vs + CV

CV \longrightarrow $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} V_{be} + \text{Pred.} \\ V_i + \emptyset \\ V_i + \text{Nominal}^2 \\ V_t + \text{Comp} \\ V_{wp} + \text{Comp} \end{array} \right\}$

Pred. \longrightarrow $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Nominal}^1 \\ \text{Adjectival} \\ \text{Locational} \end{array} \right\}$

Comp. \longrightarrow $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Nominal}^1 \\ \text{Adjectival} \\ \text{Locational} \end{array} \right\}$

V_t \longrightarrow $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} V_{tsw} \\ V_{tmw} \end{array} \right\}$

vs \longrightarrow (Modal) (Have+en) (Be+ing)


Nounal \longrightarrow $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{noun} \\ \text{o.p.s} \\ \text{adjective} \end{array} \right\}$

Adjectival \longrightarrow $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{o.p.s} \\ \text{adverb} \end{array} \right\}$

Nominal¹ \longrightarrow (PrerDet) + rDet + (PtrDet) + (N-2) + (N-1) + N + N⁰ + (N+1) + (N+2)

rDet \longrightarrow $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \emptyset \\ \text{Art} \\ \text{Dem} \\ \text{Behart} \\ \text{Poss.} \end{array} \right\}$

PrerDet) \longrightarrow $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Just} \\ \text{only} \\ \text{both} \\ \text{all} \end{array} \right\}$



LEGEND

Nominal¹_{sj} = the subject

Nominal¹_{be} = a completer of verb "to be"

Nominal²_{vt} = the direct object

V_i = the intransitive

V_t = the transitive

V_{wp} = the whole-part

V_{be} = the verb "to be"

CV= Chief Verb

Pred.= Predicate

Comp.= Complement

Art.= Articles

Behart= used as an article

Dem.= Demonstratives

Poss.= Possessives

rDet= Regular Determiner

PrerDet= Preregular Determiner

PtrDet= Postregular Determiner

vs=Verb Signallers

ops= Other Parts of Speech

V_{tmw} = Multi-Worded Verb

V_{tsw} = Single-Worded Verb

There is nothing exclusive about this model for phrase structure rules. Of course, we have no transformation rules present. The model is presented to show the nature of rules. It is only through considering whether these would write each individual sentence that a thorough knowledge of the nature of the sentence can be grasped. One can see that these rules can be refined.



BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Dr. L.W. Barnes, Editor, Volume VI, Number 8 9

W.D. Lewis : " Language and Decision-Making "

We make decisions every day: the clothes we will wear, the distance we will walk, other methods of transportation than walking, and the time we will arrive for dinner. When we are faced with making decisions we know to be important, we try to consider all of the facts so that our decision may be the most satisfactory one possible. This decision-making matter is often troublesome. There are often many factors which have to be taken into consideration. We make a decision on the grounds that the results will be good for us, or good for someone else, and good because of moral values. The reason for our decision is called our motive: this motive may be selfish, unselfish, or moral. Of course, we could make a decision for the sake of making the decision--where the "making" is the important part.

When an important decision has to be made, it is a great help to be guided by principles such as fairness or kindness, so that the decision we make is based upon a worthier motive than self-interest. Having a clear conscience comes from knowing you have acted in a way you believe to be right even though it may be unpopular. That is the reason why people in authority with a strong sense of duty or firm religious principles are sometimes misunderstood by those who do not share their beliefs or points of view. Making decisions which affect other people is often difficult. Parents, teachers, doctors, and judges are constantly having to face this.

When we make a decision, we choose one thing or another. Or, we can choose not to choose. We vote, or we abstain. We say "yes," or "no." We even say "maybe." We agree or we disagree. We accept or we reject. Making up our minds is exercising this freedom of choice which we could describe as positive or negative. We could therefore indicate our choice by means of a + or -, or we could use a tick or a cross. When conditions are favorable, the proposed course of action is rendered effective. When they are unfavorable, it is rendered ineffective.

If I say that I will go to the coast for the day provided the car is repaired and the weather is fine, I am making two conditions upon which my decision to go to the sea will depend. We now, of course, need some language to articulate this situation to the decision-maker, or to others interested in the process.

We can use our language through constructing a table, should we so desire. Let us construct one, agreeing that another would be possible.

The Conditions	Proposal	Symbol
1. Car repaired weather bad	Go to sea?	0 (no)
2. Car repaired weather good	Go to sea?	1 (yes)
3. Car trouble weather wet	Go to sea?	0
4. Car trouble weather fine	Go to sea?	0

Here we have use simple statements . In so doing, we have set up four apparently unambigulous conditions. If the car is in good shape or repaired and if the weather is fine, we will go to the coast, or to the sea.

We have designated two symbols as "yes" or "no". The first "0" indicates that we will not go; the second "1" indicates that we will go. Here we have one chances out of four of going to the coast. We try, from a language point of view, to be unambiguous in such an instance as we have here.

Now, we have apparently used our language with some degree of precision. Whether we could or should be more precise, linguistically, is that which we should consider.

On the basis of what we have said, we might need to indicate a starting point more clearly. When I say that "I will go to the coast for a day provided the car is repaired and the weather is fine," there are two "if...then" statements as we can see.

The words would seem to carry the following meanings :

1. My car at the time of the proposal needs repairs.
2. The weather must be fine before I will set out for the coast.
3. I will have to know that the car is repaired before I set out for the coast.

Now, we may say that we understand what is going on. However, the initial statements made is to the effect that some "I" will go to the coast for the day, with certain provisions made.

It is possible that the fine weather may turn wet after the "I's" departure. It is possible that the repaired car may develop problems after the "I" has started." The problem would seem to be with "I will go.....provided the car is repaired and the weaaher is fine."

Either the mind at work is not too precise, or the language reflecting the decision made is not prcise. Or, both conditions may exist. We can say, of course, that the "I" envisions that if the car is repaired and if the weather is fine--at the start--he will go to the coast. However, as has been suggested, he may start but might not reach the coast under certain conditions.

The problem could be happily resolved, linguistically, were the "I" to indicate that he would start for the coast if two prior conditions resulted. First, the car must be repaired, and, second, the weather must be fine at the time he proposes to depart. The decision-making should be communicated to others in terms of language which may remove as much ambiguity as possible. Let us look at a short paragraph, one involving a decision.

Jack decided to wear his new tie. It was bright blue, and he felt very smart when he had it on. Although no one else seemed to notice it, he was glad that he had worn it.

Let us look at the statements, chronologically:

1. John decided.
2. He wore his tie. Sentence 1
3. It was new

It was blue.
It was bright.
He felt very smart. Sentence 2
He had it on.

1. Other people were there.
2. He believed something x negative Sentence 3 reconstruction.
3. They noticed his tie


1. He was glad, Sentence 3 Reconstructed.
2. He had worn his tie.

Each statement has been reduced to its simplest elements, with as ambiguity removed as possible.

Careful observation of each statement indicates that we would answer any question as to John's decision to wear his new tie in terms of its importance to John. Asked to decide whether John's decision to wear his new tie was (trivial) (important only to John) or (far-reaching), we would make the middle choice.

Having made simple kernel sentences or statements for the most part, we become aware of the words "new," "blue," "bright," "felt very smart," and, terminally "glad he had worn it."

His speculation that others did not seem to notice it does not disturb him because we have a signal from the word "although." Now, we did not use "although" in our format above. We can use such words as "although" in a symbolic sense, defining the symbol. Let us consider that we call such words as "although" subtractive, using the minus symbol "-." Then, if the subtraction gives a positive result, we could use "Pos," or "Neg" if such a case might be. Now, the subtractive aspects represented by "although" are indicated by "-." That it turns out well is indicated by "Pos." So, for this kind of a language solution, we could designate the "although" aspects of the adverbial clause as "-Pos."



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BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Dr. L.W. Barnes, Editor : Volume VI, Number 4/0

W.D. Lewis " Language and Decision-Making --The Algebra of Sentences.

Language used emotionally is like a mirror reflecting the user's point of view. At the same time it often distorts the facts. For this reason, at least, one always has to be aware of-and to beware-- language directed toward arousing the emotions.

Let us consider Sentence Algebra by considering the implications of a simple statement such as :

I will go to a show tonight if I have had my meal
by 6 p.m. and if Jim will come with me.

Here a decision is to be made which is dependant upon two factors. One is my meal-time, and the other is my friend's willingness to accompany me. Neither of them is something about which I can have any doubt. They will occur or they will not. Therefore it should be possible to treat the proposition mathematically.

Before we can do so, we must ensure that our language of " Mathematics" is adequate. We will need symbols for the elements of our sets. We will need operators to combine them, and we will need symbols to express the final relationship after they have been combined.

If we borrow symbols from other branches of mathematics it will save our inventing new ones, but we must be careful in our choice. It would be foolish to use + for an element of a set when its familiar function is that of an operation. (We can argue the wisdom of our use of -Pos in the preceding article.) In the Algebra of Number we are usually accustomed to letters representing elements, so there would be nothing confusing in allowing them to represent 'conditions' which are the elements of this algebra.

In the Algebra of Number we are usually concerned with size or quantity, but in the Algebra of Propositions we are establishing their being effective or non-effective. We use the symbols--as before-- of "0" and "1." (We choose these because the modern computer, with its Binary Code uses "1" and "0.") We could use = to mean "is," so that =1 would mean "is effective," and =0 would mean "is ineffective." All we need to consider now are suitable symbols for operators.

Until we can define the way in which conditions may be combined we will use a neutral * to signify some kind of operation. We may now symbolize the statement like this:

The Algebra of Sentences

That I will go to the show [if I had a meal by 6 p.m.] and [if Jim comes] is true.

Becomes algebraically ... $A * B = 1$

That is to say: Condition A combined in some way with Condition B makes my intention effective.

Now consider another situation such as:

John will go if it is fine, or if Peter takes him in his car.

This may be symbolized in the same way:

That John will go [if it is fine]. or [if Peter takes him] is true.

Algebraically... $A * B = 1$

The Algebra we have tentatively adopted looks the same in both cases, and we have to decide whether the same sign $*$ will do for the operator in both cases.

In Arithmetic we use a $+$ sign for [6 and 4], [6 plus 4] for [add four to six] or [increase 6 by four], because in each we mean combine the elements 6 and 4 in the same way.

The question before us at the moment is whether or not two conditions linked by "and" have the same effect upon the proposition as they do when they are linked by "or."

Putting the question another way, we ask:

"Is A and B, the same thing as A or B?"

If they are the same in effect we can use the same operator* for both, but if they are not we shall have to use different operators to distinguish between them.

We examine this question.

Table I

Proposition	Condition A	Condition B	Truth
I will go	Had meal by 6 p.m.	Jim comes	Yes
I will go	Not had meal	Jim comes	No
I will go	Had meal	Jim does not come	No
I will go	Not had meal	Jim does not come	No

Proposition true [it is fine] or [Peter calls]

John will go	It is fine	Peter calls	Yes
John will go	It is not fine	Peter calls	Yes
John will go	It is fine	Peter does not call	Yes
John will go	It is not fine	Peter does not call	No

Clearly, the cases are different. In the first, BOTH of the conditions have to be true at the same time. This occurs only once out of four. In the second example, so long as EITHER is true the proposition is true. This occurs three times out of four.

We will therefore distinguish between them by using different operators. Let us agree to use \wedge to mean "both" and " \vee " to mean "either or both." * Our algebra now looks like this.

Both A and B necessary $A \wedge B = 1$.
 Either A or B sufficient... $A \vee B = 1$.

Using symbols has the great advantage of conciseness. This can be seen if we compare the examples of the last section by writing them side by side and using symbols 1 and 0 to indicate the positive and negative forms of the two conditions.

If	$A \wedge B = 1$	If	$A \vee B = 1$
then	$1 \wedge 1 = 1$	then	$1 \wedge 1 = 1$
but	$0 \wedge 1 = 0$	or	$0 \wedge 1 = 1$
and	$1 \wedge 0 = 0$	or	$1 \wedge 0 = 1$
and	$0 \wedge 0 = 0$	but	$0 \wedge 0 = 0$

Another convenient way of showing we mean the negative form of a condition is to use a "dash" after the appropriate symbol. Thus A' means the negative of A and is called "A-not." The tables of combined conditions are even clearer by this method:

If	$A \wedge B = 1$	If	$A \vee B = 1$
then	$A \wedge B = 1$	then	$A \wedge B = 1$
but	$A' \wedge B = 0$	or	$A' \wedge B = 1$
and	$A \wedge B' = 0$	or	$A \wedge B' = 1$
and	$A' \wedge B' = 0$	but	$A' \wedge B' = 0$

You should take the trouble to translate these statements into words, so that the logical meaning is clear in your mind *

Consider a situation like the following: "The President will order the blockade of Eland where missile bases are built, and his Naval Commander says it will be effective." Our statement $A \wedge B = 1$ now represents:

A... the bases are built
 B... a blockade could be made effective
 $= 1$ the decision will be taken.

Notice that if it were proved there were no bases in Eland, or that they were being dismantled, there would be no reason for the blockade. If the President were advised by his Naval Commander that a blockade would be ineffective there would be no point in ordering it: We would have $A' \wedge B = 0$ or $A \wedge B' = 0$.



BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Dr. L.W. Barnes, Editor: Volume VI. Number ~~7~~ 11

Dr. R.V. Duvanny: "On the Language of Composition"

First, let me say that I do not speak about oral composition here. Of course, "oral" indicates the spoken language, and I will heartily agree that language is, in essence, "oral." I start with the human being, himself, in speculating about composition.

One of the problems in speculating about composition is that invariably we are thrown back to the arena of freshman compositions or into that of advanced compositions. In the first, the freshman must struggle to become a sophomore insofar as he is battering his way through three or six semester hours. In the second area, that of the advanced composition scene, students generally fight through another three or six hours to work toward certification as teachers.

But these are specific matters, matters which simply make concrete the whole problem of composition. In confining my remarks to the written composition, I must, of necessity, consider the area that is that of the "non-creative" variety of composing and that which is called "creative writing." And here I must speak of the emotive aspects of composition.

Invariably we are always thrown back to the individual. Even if a reminder is an obvious one, it would seem as though composition has to be essentially a matter of some kind of communication. In my response to the world of things, events, persons, and ideas, I respond somehow. Now, I can respond silently to myself, but I am forced to the conclusion that when I do so words are somehow involved. I can respond without words--as by gesture or more overt physical action. I can respond through music presumably without words. But, in our time, we would probably agree that we do respond through words.

I can speak to a large number of individuals personally or impersonally. I can speak aloud to myself. I can speak to one or two people directly. I can expect a response to my speech. I can expect no response to my speech. (Here, I use "speech" broadly, to include speaking or writing.) I can speak so as to have agreement or disagreement as the result of my utterances. In any of these cases, I am "composing."

It is inevitable that there will be oral composition all of the time. I can conceive a situation where communication without language or its representation can occur. But I cannot think of very many such situations. Orally, my tones and gestures can direct or reinforce my words in sentence --or-greater--structure. In written composition, I have to rely on the written word.

Now, what kinds of written composition can I have? In an arbitrary way, I shall divide these into two main classes. I can have the kind of composition where I desire understanding, only. I can have the kind of composition where I simply desire to explain, to identify, to point out, or to elucidate. In so doing, I am not concerned with arousing an emotional response on the part of the "other." It is true that I may arouse an emotive response, but such is not my intent. I shall, therefore, try to use my language so that there will be a minimal number of instances where the emotive response should come about from the nature of the language itself.

For example, I shall not use such terms as "bash," "clash," "slaughter," "weasel out," or "sic 'em" if I am trying to point out, explain, or identify. (It is true that I could be merely pointing out the significance of such terms as I have just used. But the reader here will understand the point I am making.) It is true that if I am discussing political parties merely for the sake of factual information, I can run into some problems if, for example, an individual by the result of his experience, or as the result of his family background, hates the term "Democrat." Here, he would respond not so much to the composition of phonemes as he would to the experiences he has had where the word itself stands for that which is negative to him.

In this kind of writing, where the effort is made to point out, to explain, or to clarify, whatever words in combination are used such words are not intended to arouse the emotive response of the reader.

More technically, if I decide, as I do, that "attitudes" are composed of beliefs and emotions, and that I do not desire the reader to adopt an attitude, then I will avoid, as much as possible, words alone or in combination that will tend to evoke emotive responses. I think that we can see, at this point, that writing compositions is not an easy matter. Now, I do not speak of the kind of oral or written composition that is essential in motivating people to write compositions. I am concerned only with the composition range as identified thus far in this article.

I am also assuming--an assumption that must break down as to degree--that the writer must intend his words and that the reader must understand such intention. Now, in the real world of written composition, the phrasing that is, per se, intended to explain and to identify does contain ingredients that do evoke emotive responses. Because words do carry so many different meanings on different levels, it would seem difficult to have pure expository pieces of composition. Even when I mention the word "Friday," I run into trouble with those who take certain attitudes toward or about "Friday." Even when I mention "grading" in the sense of explaining its "meaning," I run into emotional reactions and responses from the reader who takes a dyslogistic view toward being rated in a vertical scale. I run into personal or attitudinal responses from the reader as to his own feelings about "grading."


It would appear that we do not need much training in composition to arouse attitudes. Of course, we need much training to arouse specific attitudes in specific ways. Our problem, in expository writing is to keep the readers' responses, on the intellectual plane, insofar as that is possible.

We approach such composition in the language of physical sciences, less so when we enter the composition of "biology." The language which treats of certain organs of the body is far more likely to evoke an emotional response than would be true of the language which discusses rock formations. We can see the reason for some of the emotive response in that the organs, as abstract, in study become quite concrete in face of our own personal responses to our own organs. There is much that is quite removed from flesh-and-blood in the mathematical compositions. Such, of course, is truer in the purely numerical statement of a problem than in a word problem.

Even in a dissertation on automobiles, where the dissertation is meant for information, not for personal reaction, the mention of certain specific makes of automobiles is certain to cause some personal response from the reader. If the discussion is purely on the basis of heavy cars, medium cars, and light cars, then the emotive response will be diminished. However, we then run into a problem.

As individuals we want to respond to the concrete example, that which we can evidence at least to the senses. We cannot respond to "heavy" automobile, but we can and do respond to "Cadillac," "Buick," and "Lincoln." When we respond to the concrete example, then the emotions begin to have their play in time. Ironically, we do not understand too well until we have the more concrete example. When we have the concrete personal example, we bring our attitudes with us. Then, there is the danger of having the communication that is in the mind of the writer subsumed in another way by the reader. I am certain that this phenomenon must have bothered Plato. We seem to be caught in the impasse where the pure nature of a phenomenon can never be known or conveyed because the language of communication is never free from the elements of emotions. Without the emotive elements, it would appear that little communication, if any, would prevail.

Yet, as I have observed, certain subjects lend themselves to the language of communication more easily than others. Without abandoning my questioning view (s) as to the problems of the language of communication, I must observe that many other languages as well as ours are sufficiently objective in the fields of sciences and mathematics to the extent that men can do their work in communication reasonably well. Of course, the fact that we find the language of communication difficult to control should not cause us to direct our efforts any less intensely in the direction of more effective communication. The direction and degree of effective communication is one of the major responsibilities of school and university systems.



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BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Dr. L.W. Barnes, Editor Volume VI, Number 812

Dr. D.P. Duvanney "The Language of Composition--Part II

Whether the work is creative or not, the words in each case come from the dictionary of the language, a dictionary that is the common denominator for all individuals using that language. I have never been able to perceive that there are words in the dictionary that are uniquely those of the creative speaker or writer. But I have observed that many of the words would be somewhat inappropriate for a piece of creative writing. I would not have my readers under the illusion or under the delusion that there are words that are uniquely those of the creative writer.

It is rather the pace and the arrangement of the words which determine to a large degree whether or not we have exposition or poetry. Without going into the area of creative writing, I will limit my remarks to the kind of composition where someone tries to explain some idea, person, event, or thing to someone else. The supposition is that I will use written composition to convey some bit of information to other individuals. The kind of composition I am speaking about will not be that of persuasion. The rhetoric that uses persuasion is certain to arouse some emotive response. I simply wish that my readers will, in each instance, understand what I have to convey. I do not desire, in this instance, to have them reach any agreement other than that they understand what I am uttering. I have already agreed that no matter how careful I am in trying to utter sentences that carry but one clear meaning, I am bound to be defeated because of the number of ways through which utterances carry meanings on different levels. For example, in trying to describe a Siamese cat or in trying to narrate the instances of behavior of a Siamese cat, I must run into situations where the readers are by nature either strongly for or strongly against Siamese cats.

Even in the world of mathematics I may have some considerable difficulty because the reader may dislike mathematics of any kind or degree. I may have much difficulty in describing a horse to those who have never seen a horse, or to those who have lost money on a horse. Nevertheless, the kind of composition I have in mind at this point is that which seeks to give information as much devoid of feeling or sensibility as possible. To some degree, putting this kind of composition over is a "game." But the game is an intellectual one.

But lest there be any unfortunate misunderstanding, all kinds of compositions are games, and, in each case, there is a strong intellectual discipline in each game. One of the features of the intellectual part of composition is that of "ordering." Written composition simply has to be a matter of order. Whether the rules are explicitly stated in each case, the rules of the game are there. For there can be no order without rules.

It is a matter of intellectual ordering where I must make clear my view of some fact of experience--whether the fact is one of arithmetic, explaining bridge, ascertaining the cause of a demonstration, measuring the difference in intelligence quotients, or reporting, as fact, a baseball game. In this kind of a game I desire to explain the facts, but do not desire to convey or evoke any emotive response to the facts or about the facts.

Some of the rules are imposed by the nature of the language. In order to convey my information, I need to use the language that is available to the readers. Please note that I say "available" to the readers. It is not likely that all that I have to utter by way of words will be known to each reader. Different readers will have at their disposal a knowledge of different words. However, I should not use words which cannot be found in some common depository of the language.

Further, it would be as well that I use the words in the sentence patterning known to the readers. Then, too, there are such rules of the game as should be understood through punctuation, spelling, and grammar. In this expository kind of composition, I am not trying to fool or mislead my readers: I am trying to explain some matters rather clearly. Therefore, I shall try to use words commonly known, and, at the same time, I shall try to keep the words in their patterning as unambiguous as possible, in exposition.

If I am writing "creatively," I desire to have my sentences reveal that the speaker in the lines is thinking with deep feeling. I wish to reflect or mirror some kinds of feeling, or some kind of feelings. In creative writing I am willing if not insistent on using my private or personal language. In writing the expository piece, I am not desirous of using my personal or private language. My personal or private language is certain to reflect my attitudes which, most assuredly, will reveal the attitudes compounded of emotions and beliefs. Yet, each writer writes from an individual personality. Therefore, it is not likely that any one writer can escape the fact that he holds any bit of information in some subjective way. In writing the expository composition, he is asked to objectify the subjectivity he has.

We need to take a logical look at the situation of individuals in a given society. While each has a personal and unique individuality, one which experience indicates has some appreciable range, there are common denominators to man's thinking, feeling, and sensing. There are no emotions available to one denied all others. There are no ideas accessible to one but forbidden all others. There are no senses the store of one individual and not the store of all other individuals. (Of course, we are not speaking here of those suffering from pathological deprivations.) It is only logical and essential that we must speculate on the likelihood that the language of any single people is adequate to enable each individual in that language to communicate with himself or with others. Therefore, we conclude that despite the uniqueness of each individual, there are ways and words through which he can speak to other unique individuals, not as unique as he, in the same way.

In a quite recent text, one of whose chapters is entitled "The Mystery of Composition," its author states that

No one, as a psychologist told a student who came to him for counsel, can give us a new nervous system or miraculously enrich our background, but we can at least develop the nervous system we do have and enrich the background we do possess so that what we have to say can be of great interest to others.⁸

Now, there is quite a bit in these lines that is interesting and valuable. It would appear that the psychologist and that the author of the text are trying to make the point that everyone has something worthwhile to state. And that since such is the case, a prospective writer should not be hesitant about his own intrinsic merits or demerits insofar as writing is concerned.

I think that the significant point is that while each person has a nervous system that is not the same as that of any other individual, the nervous system is such as to experience many of the ideas, events, things, ideas, or intuitions that are common to others with their different nervous systems. Nervous systems vary, but do so finitely. There is certainly much about each nervous system that is common to all other systems.

The act of will to choose words that carry as much as possible a precise meaning in a certain set of contexts is the act of will that must objectify the fact or bit of knowledge that is to be passed from an individual to another through words.

Even granting differences in style, it is easy to ascertain that what is in the mind of an individual as to some phenomenon that is to be conveyed or stated so that others can understand in the same way can be subsumed quite closely by others. But this understanding is most complete when the language as to tone association itself is as devoid of emotive tones as possible. Again, I would agree that readers and listeners are most alert and attentive when illustrations or examples are used. But the illustrations and examples, leaning on the concrete and personal poles of appeal, can be dangerous if they lead the reader away from the abstraction they are supposed to highlight.

If we desire, then, to communicate so that others will understand what is said in much the same way as we say what we desire to communicate, we must make every effort to use words that as much as possible have the single meaning, one which does not carry, in context, the poetic element of surprise. The words must be such as to be capable of some physical measurement or apprehension. They must be those which are somehow capable of some degree of objectivity between writer and reader. To reach such a state or condition, we must somehow get away from an invitation to "just sit down and express ourselves."

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BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Dr. L.W. Barnes, Editor: Volume VI, Number 13
 "Critical Thoughts on Literature and Its Language"

I

Nearly all of us in the field of English, in its broadest sense, know when we are reading literature and when we are not. Even granting that what is literature to one person is not literature to another person with respect to any specific work of a literary nature, there is some reasonably close consensus as to what constitutes a piece of literature as distinct from some piece that is not literature.

Please note that I have not defined literature: I have said, simply enough, that I can tell one piece of literature from a work that is not literature. And I have granted and even urged that all of the concourse of those designated by "you" may or can also make this distinction.

After a few minutes in probing out each other's language specifics, we would agree, somewhat mutually, that the matter of thought and feeling is critical. In the array of forms through which the literary statements are carried, we find that the language structures are used to evoke--or to express-- some of man's emotive states.

When the speakers or actors in the literature itself reveal attitudes in conflict or crisis, we can discern some of the attitudes represented. At this point, I must do what I have not done keenly enough before. I must point out that my attitudes toward a piece of literature are quite different from the literature that is the aesthetic object I contemplate or engage in. At this point, the whole matter of language and literature gets a bit confusing.

There are several areas of confusion being intermingled. My first task is that of isolating, if I may, each confused area. Most of us who write about literature or who talk about literature are critics or teachers. If we are critics of literature, we must be critics of the work itself, of its author, or of its language, or, of all of these elements.

A critic of literature passes some kind of a judgment as to the work's being good or bad. He may also pass judgment on the poet, dramatist, novelist, or short story writer. Or, the critic may assess a certain literary work as being some kind of a competent or incompetent illustration of tragedy, comedy, or melodrama, for example.

A critic may consider that a certain author's explicit or implicit theses--coming through his literary work-- are justified, or not justified. For example, among the many issues raised in Arthur Miller's Death of a Salesman, the critic may support Miller's argument for modern tragedy as opposed to traditional tragedy. If Death of a Salesman is judged according to the standards of traditional tragedy, the play will come out poorly indeed.

The critic may state his own literary doctrine and judge works according to such a doctrine. For example, a literary critic could produce his own commandments for "literary existentialism" and then judge literary works according to these commandments. The critic may--and does-- approach a work with some subjectivity.

In so doing, he evaluates the work according to emotions or attitudes aroused in him. In many instances, the work is considered good or bad according to the attitudes that are evoked or not evoked in the light of some predetermined order and intensity set out by the critic.

Nevertheless, the critic does not come out as badly as we might expect, or even hope. His language is expository. Wayne Embler, in his "The Language of Criticism," points out that the critic does make statements of fact about a subject. I must grant the critic the language of the "indicative mood." Now, let me hasten to assure the reader that the indicative mood is not that which is always verifiable. But the indicative mood does present, through the words which stand for ideas, ideas as though they were the exact truth. Embler urges this point of view:

"The writing in this novel is very beautiful" is a sentence one might find in a critical review; and what the sentence says is that the writing is beautiful, though the critic probably knows well enough that this is his feeling about it, that this is the way the prose style appeals to him. *

Yet, I point out that the use of the verb "to be" as noted above is a sort of timeless observation, and one of indicating.

Embler's reasoning is sufficiently at point to include more observations on the language of criticism:

If a critic says "Richard Wagner is inferior to Meyerbeer, we may agree or disagree, but the sentence says-- as presumably the critic believes, and therefore, intended the sentence to say--that Wagner is inferior to Meyerbeer in the same sense that styrychine is poisonous."

* Weller Embler, "The Language of Criticism," ETC., XXII, No.3., p. 262.

** Ibid.

We come to a critical point now. The critic, however he operates, is to be subsumed in at least one common denominator. When a critic tells his readers or listeners that Person A is better or worse than Person B, we tend to take the critic's statements as fact, not as opinion. We accord the statements the same certitude as we do those of the scientific fact.

When we come across the indicative statement in science, we do not have to go to the thing itself for authority. But, in criticism, we would do well to view the aesthetic object itself. As Aldous Huxley often--very often--observed the language of criticism is most vigorous and most vigorously dogmatic.


By this time it should be somewhat apparent that the critic, in his language of criticism--about literature--often uses the indicative mood to bring the reader to the critic's position about a piece of literature, rather than to the literature itself.

And, yet, perhaps, that is precisely what the critic has in mind. Is the critic seeking, in each instance, to direct the reader to the critic's standard(s) for evaluation? Is the critic seeking to direct the reader to the critic's feeling about a piece of literature? Is the critic seeking to direct the reader's attention to the critic's language, rather than to the language of the piece of literature? Whatever the answer may be, the language and the tone of the critic are of the indicative mood, having, at all times, elements of certitude.

Now, when we look at the language of the critic, as to the specific words, we do not find the scientism that we would find in the indicative mood in a descriptive science. The critic does insist on his being able to use all words in any way. He does rest his case on some solid evidence for support. Because his range is that of life itself, literature cannot be, for the critic, an area of learning set off from all other areas. The critic, having made the assertion that all experience in life is of the nature of literature, is, of course, determined by this very defining.

In mathematics we do not expect to find such terms as "shattering," "ecstatic," "denuding," "enthraling," or "splendrous." Now, it is true that critics have produced their own unique vocabularies. On occasion, these formats seem to be a bit rigid and binding. However, the vocabulary for each writer or for each set of writers is entirely unique. Modern critics attempt to find new and refreshing meanings for words that are known to readers.

I conclude this direction of observations by pointing out that critics who have tried to find a specific and special language for literature--denied all other forms of human response and experience--have been entirely unsuccessful. However, by insisting that tearing words used in conventional contexts out of their contexts to shed light on other contexts gives vigor to language, the modern critic gives words new vitality.



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BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Dr. L.W. Barnes, Editor Volume VI, Number 14
"Views on Language and Literature": Part II

In the first section on this discussion concerning language and literature, I have taken the easiest road in talking about language, literature, and the critic. I did note that the critic uses the indicative mood, and that, as a result, his pronouncements take on the structure of the scientific assertion. However, I also called attention to the fact that the critic does not limit himself to a special glossary that would make his treatment of literature a private one, and one that would reduce literature to the role or position of a specific discipline. I was not hedging on this point: it is simply the fact that literature, as one of the arts, is a revelation of someone's response to experience as he sees it, thinks about it, and feels it.

Because the critic must talk about authors and their works, he must make what he considers some definitive statements. However, as he must also respond to that part of experience in the literary work(s), his words must carry his own feelings about what he concerns himself with. Again, we consider the critic and literature; and we consider the critic and his words about literature, and we would do well to consider the literature and its words. We depart from the consideration of the confusion the critic must order, and move to quite a tricky area. What about the "teacher of literature?"

Arbitrarily, I postpone concern about literature itself and its language. There is at this point the teacher and the literature. In each instance, words are involved. It is doubtful that the teacher will teach much literature without words. Then we have the words of the teacher, the words of literature and, inevitably, the students. Even when I define literature, I am saying something about literature, rather than defining the thing itself. I do know that: literature, involves, for most of us, "thinking with feeling about things, ideas, events, institutions, and persons, all in space and time. When I have made this statement; I have in mind that "things, ideas, events, institutions, and persons, all in space and time" do encompass all of experience--all that is strong enough to impress itself on the nervous system--all that is strong enough to evoke emotive responses.

Yet, since this definition could be about other forms of art, I would add that this thinking and feeling about experience usually comes about through words--written or spoken. Perhaps "comes about" is not a fortunate term. I say, otherwise, that literature is to be experienced through words.

I know that there will be those who will demur long enough to suggest that literature can be experienced through visualization. Then, of course, we have to decide whether or not drama, orally rendered, is literature.

But, how does anyone "teach" literature? We can teach what literature is, perhaps. Then we can define to the extent that we locate one specific difference between one form of experience and another. What makes literature distinct from non-literature? Each is carried or revealed through "words." If we want to determine that we have literature when our emotions are evoked over what we are concerned with by way of words and that we have non-literature when our emotions are not evoked, we have a recognizable possibility. Of course, we then have to decide whether the thinking with feeling is on the literature itself, or because of some other situation which the literature seems to encourage or bring about.

But we can approach definition with some degree of certainty when we realize that all that has been called literature seems to have an ingredient of affective response. Yet, this feeling is always accompanied by "thinking." Now, my desires to tackle literature or not to tackle literature are another matter. My "love" for literature is one matter; the literature is another.

Now, you and I can go through many experiences in the real world, and we would not call such experiences "literature." In this real world we would have attitudes involved, attitudes which include beliefs and emotions. How, then, do I distinguish the affective world of experience that is of the real and concrete world with the affective experience in literature? In literature I am grasping a segment of experience which may be my own private illusion or delusion of the world of experience. In literature, I do not feel for the real world, but seem to feel for my views of the real world. I do not classify my experiences in the real world as literature and non-literature. But I do make such distinctions in writing or speaking about my illusion or response to experience.

Eventually and essentially, we must deliberate on philosophic grounds, and, at that point we have to be dissatisfied with defining what a thing is by what it does. Of course, we can escape this problem by simply not facing it. The teacher of literature deals with literary pieces, in their usual and well-known forms. But what is taught?

When I teach the English Renaissance, I have a cluster of writers ranging from Spenser through Milton. I say something about each individual. When I speak about each individual, I use words to do so, and my words are about these individuals. But, such people as Spenser, Raleigh, Sidney, Shakespeare, Ben Jonson, Marlowe, and John Donne are not literature. It is possible that I could speak about these individuals in a way that my remarks, in oral or written form, might be considered literature. But, as a teacher of literature, I--and other teachers--do not make literature about the individuals or their literature. (I might as a critic). Now, I make comments about these individuals and their literary works. If the usual run of affairs accompanies my teaching, I will probably make comments about my ideas about the literary work

In teaching my literature course--in this instance the English Renaissance-- I will talk about the backgrounds of the period--economic, political, social, and religious. Yet, the background is not the literature.

If I have verve and drive, I can teach my enthusiasm for what I am doing, but such is not the literature. I can teach my understanding of the poems, for example, but the understanding is not the literature.

I can teach the structure of the poem, for example. But the structure is not the poem itself, not the literature. I can assert that what the author was is what the poem became, but that is not the poem. Even if I teach the words of the poem, that is not the poem as literature. All that I would have taught, in teaching the words, is that I am aware of the words and that I know them.

I can teach the students--and myself, enroute--that in the Faerie Queen there are several sets of symbols. But teaching that there are several sets of symbols is not teaching the poem. I can show that Spenser is the poet of "museum time," but that does not mean I teach the poem itself. I suppose that I could say that while I cannot teach the poem directly by teaching style there can be little understanding or appreciation of literature without style.

Yet, even here, I am in a quandry. To say that we can approach Spenser's poetry better through studying Spenser as an individual, through appreciating the age in which he lived, and through understanding his form(s), is to assert a valuable truth. Yet, at this point, I have not been able to teach the poems of Spenser, as literature.

I might take a new tack and suggest that Spenser's poems reveal his concern over Catholicism and Protestantism. Such is the truth, no doubt. However, to make this statement is to show what can happen through Spenser's poetry. But such is not the literature. Of course, anyone can define literature so as to equate literature with the concerns it reveals through its lines and through its teachers. Yet, when we do so, we encounter the critics. For, as they have told us, literature is not to be defined in terms of a single discipline or several disciplines. It is not to be defined as that process and achievement which better reveal history, sociology, or ethics. Literature has few bounds--and we noted that for such a reason the words of the critic have few bounds or constraints.

At this point, as a teacher of literature, I am becoming somewhat desperate. I then go to certain passages and indicate the meaning(s) that these passages have or carry. Yet, when I do so, I still have my problems. I am giving my interpretation(s) of the poem, but such is not the poem itself. Then, how do I teach literature?

I try, finally, to be honest. I do all these things or make all the steps indicated. I boldly announce that literature is the achievement of a private response to public experience. But, then, do I teach my idea(s) about my own response to a private response to some public experience? We need to redefine the concepts carried by "teacher of literature."



Dr. I. W. Barnes, Editor Volume VI, Number 15
 "Viewpoints on Language and Literature": Part III
BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

A student approached me the other day with the statement: "I want to take another course in literature. I love literature." It so happened that she was not able to get another course in literature. She was somewhat relieved to know that the course she wanted to take in literature was not required. So, she thought that she would wait another semester to take a course in literature.

A rather simple solution had occurred to me. Since she stressed her love for literature, why should she not have as much literature as she wanted? All she would need to do would be rather easy. Simply take a book and read literature! If she wanted to read about literature, we have many books in such a vein. If she wanted to read literature herself, there would be no problem for we have thousands of all books that contain literature. She expressed a desire to read the poetry of Shelley and Keats. I was pleased to be able to suggest some readable and useful volumes of their poetry. But she was singularly unhappy, if not alarmed.

Pursuing the matter further, I wondered why she did not want to read her favorite poets' poetry. She ventured the observation that she would not get three semester hours of credit reading by herself. But then she backed away from the admission that she would pursue the poetry only if she would receive credit in semester hours. Then I ventured the possibility that she would love literature only when working with literature in a class situation. She did not accept that possibility. Finally, I found that she was talking about studying literature, in the form of poetry by Keats and Shelley.

I worked some few minutes with her in trying to have her see that studying literature might not be the same as loving literature or as enjoying or appreciating literature. Over the next few minutes' conversation, I discovered that she wanted to be told about Keats and Shelley and about their poetry. But she did not want to analyze the poetry, or "tear it to bits." She thought that intentionalism was a good thing. The poem "is the intentions of the poet. Yet, she was much keener for impressionism, in that the poetry was what she wanted the poetry to mean to her. I must admit to confusion.

My mind slipped back or over to Gurrey's view that literature is always the matter of "expectancy, surprise, and congruency." The level of observation contains simple words and situations. We are at one with them on the primary level.

I think of Shelley's brief "To--." I look at the first image which goes to the first major ; punctuation:

MUSIC, when soft voices die,
Vibrates in the memory;

Each one of these words is quite familiar to the reader or listener. The syntax is quite usual. The statement is quite explicit as to the physical aspect of music in terms of "soft voices." I can perceive that when the physical sound of the voice carrying the music is stilled, the music can vibrate on as a remembered set of chords or tunes.

At this point the nature of literature, especially poetry, becomes more patent. There is the contrast between the sound as physical and the sound as remembered, as ideal, rather than as real. I am "surprised." At this point of surprise I begin to feel attitudinally involved. The next two lines do much the same to me, or for me:

Odours, when sweet violets sicken,
Live within the sense they quicken.

Here; we go to the sense of smell; here, when the odours move to their intensity before the demise of the violet, they are smelled by our memory of them. The word "sense" intellectualizes these two lines.

I feel deeply at this point. I feel deeply because I am forced to see the great truth that often there must be a physical death, a reduction to physical nullity to gain intellectual insight into the nature of things.

The second stanza of this two-stanza verse offers the primary level of expectancy. There is no unusual syntax or semantic component:

Rose leaves, when the rose is dead,
Are heaped for the beloved's bed;
And so thy thoughts, when thou art gone,
Love itself shall slumber on.

We were surprised and moved in the first stanza at finding that when the physical senses abated, the idea of them was strong and alive. In the second stanza the thoughts of the dead may be heaped as the leaves for the dead rose, but outlasting each is the quiet but eternal force of love. When I read the lines again, I realize how powerful is the matter of thought, of Shelley's ideal world, for while love slumbers on, it has no life and no significance without the world of thought. As Gurrey observed, literature is always congruent. That is, when the whole experience is complete, the reader understands that nothing has happened that is not human, nothing that is not an illusion of life, or not a mirror of some view of life. There can be no world of thought without the world of sensation that dies to give thought life. Yet, for each individual, thought leaves when the physical life itself ends, and love, without the fire of the mind, can but slumber.

Now, of course, others will see the lines in a fashion somewhat different, I am certain. Yet, I would believe that for everyone there is always that common introduction, the swift element of being surprised into feeling by seeing experience in a new and

Now, the poem is composed of words. These words were written by a poet who was not unaware of their nature. Without the fifty-four words and punctuation marks, there would be no poem, and no literature. Since Shelley did write the poem, we conclude that the words must carry the meaning, through their structures and functions, of the poet's creative imagination. Yet, the words on the primary level are simple words, words common to each person,

The words, then, while essential, are not the meanings of the poem; in a physical sense, they may be the poem as an aesthetic object. But the arrangements in syntax and the phonological notes are part of the total structure which sets the stage for the semantic functions. The poem brought to life is the literature. The poem alive is literature; otherwise, the poem is the poem as restricted to the structuring of the words in certain orderings.


Literature--poetry and other literary forms-- is the world of experience--as ordered through words-- as seen by one individual who then reveals through his creative mind truths great enough to be represented to other human beings in this or in other ages. There are those who write literature; there are those who are set on aesthetic fire by insights into literature; there are those who are moved by the insights that the literature provides about the total world of experience, or about some unique facet of experience.

It would seem unique to literature that literature is that depiction of experience which enables a person to create within himself a total vision of a world that he does not have to objectify for any person or for any discipline, or for any ideal.

That is not to say that literature is that private view of a private experience reserved for a few individuals only. Words that are used by millions of people over many, many years are always, for each word, the product of one mind. A man uses a word; the word catches fire and carries meaning. The word finds itself in the dictionary as one of the members of a vast storehouse of words for better carrying certain kinds of meaning.

In a remote but not unusual comparison, we can say that literary works are private visions of what must be the public domain of experience. The visions are private because the one man must create through his total personality his response to what he considers some facet of life that comes as common, then as unusual and, finally, in its total picture, as appropriate to the human condition.

It might be helpful to realize that the great poem or the great novel or the great short story is each made possible because the poet or writer reduced to nothingness his own personal flow of images about himself as himself in order to hear, to see, and to portray a greater voice, that of some moving view of life itself.



MOREHEAD STATE UNIVERSITY BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Dr. L.W. Barnes, Editor: Volume VI, Number 16

Mary Netherton, "Modern Trends in Foreign Language Teaching: French :
Composition: Part I

Every since World War II the horizons of foreign language teaching have been battle fronts between theorists and proponents of conflicting teaching methods and approaches to second language learning. One may hope that the fighting has stopped now that the cognitive-code theorists have popularized their findings of the promising success of a combination of limited grammatical analysis and use of English with pattern drills (unlike the first "Polly-Parrot" drills designed to unconsciously condition students to speak in established patterns with native-like pronunciation) are designed to teach pattern transformations and generative speech. But, regardless of the eventual outcome of the preoccupation with habit formation and pronunciation perfection that has almost consumed French teaching in at least the last twenty years, nearly all French teachers who use 'il n'importe systeme' now agree that writing, or composition, has been shamefully neglected in the majority of systems, both new and old. For even if the techniques employed allow equal attention to be spent on the teaching of listening, speaking, reading, and writing, the last of these four skills to be developed is often left with the smallest amount of classroom time and the least amount of direction outside the class.

Also, since the disparity between the spoken and the written French languages is so great, the difficulty of even the simplest writing assignment makes it somewhat unpopular among students early in their writing experience. Furthermore, the lurking phantoms of "well-known" English morphology and syntax are always likely to root out whatever French systems a student has lately been taught to write. Indeed, a recognition of the intense hatred with which many American native speakers of English endure courses in English composition could indicate that French composition could be hated even more. For not only does the American student of French composition encounter all the difficulties he encounters in his English class, but he meets additional difficulties as well. Certainly, the study of composition, in which a young writer seeks to express himself in what seems to him a burdensome written medium, often causes depression and even psychic upheaval in a student who is sensitive about being corrected. Since his written words, favorite expressions, and clever locutions may seem to him to be projections of his very self, its reorganization can produce anguish and hostility. And if such feelings are present in the student who reluctantly composes in his native tongue, they become intensified as he attempts to compose in another.

Indeed, when the native language is English and the second language French, the learner suffers from more than anguish and hostility. For there is a significant problem of interference between these two languages. That is, whereas an American high school student or college student of English does not know enough about the English linguistic system to write acceptable English themes, he often seems to know English only too well to allow himself to speak or to write in French. Instead, he writes English in French. Therefore, although a student may not understand the English system he uses, he is, however, so deeply attached to its basic patterns and vocabulary that when these conflict with corresponding French patterns he has great difficulty in accepting the French. Most of the time such interference occurs on the subconscious level which prevents the student from even perceiving- or dealing with the vague and untouchable frustration that comes from earnestly trying to write clearly, while consistently having his papers rewritten by the teacher's stifling corrections.

Indeed, nearly all of the problems connected with English interference in French composition result from the fact that there are a limited number of patterns that are parallel in French and English: there are just enough similar patterns to trick, subconsciously, the student into expecting almost all sentence patterns and sentence pattern components to correspond between the two languages. Actually, however, only a few patterns are exactly congruent, while others are identical in some situations, yet not in others. Therefore, by assuming that certain French patterns allow him to channel his thoughts in the same way that his own language does, the American often thinks that he is composing in French when he is actually imposing English patterns on the French words he is using.

For instance, one pattern that sometimes corresponds exactly to its English counterpart is the subject-verb-direct object pattern. In both English and French when a verb has a noun direct object, the word order of the items is subject-verb-direct object. Therefore, the American student has no problem in composing French sentences built on this pattern. However, although English keeps this same word order--subject-verb-direct object-- when the direct object is a pronoun, French has a different order: the pronoun direct object in French precedes rather than follows the verb of which it is an object--except in the affirmative-imperative. Consequently, students often forget this difference in writing even if they observe it in speech. For although they may use strange patterns in speech without analyzing them, they often doubt and change them when they see them in the graphic form--on paper.

But however great the problem of English interference may be, it is not the only interference problem that American students face in French composition. For they must also learn to recognize and to remember French patterns which correspond to each other in some situations, but not in others. Again, the problem is more psychological than intellectual, for even though an American accepts without question numerous English inconsistencies, he may be reluctant to accept them in French.

Since there are these unconscious problems in both external and internal linguistic interference, one may wonder if it is possible for a student to avoid the almost uncontrollable act of confusing French syntax with English and not mistaking French patterns for others. At the beginning level, perhaps brief simple warnings against linguistic prejudice toward English, combined with an almost exclusive use of French in the classroom, can help establish correct French patterns in useful mental tracks with a minimal trouble from English. At the intermediate level stronger and more analytical warnings against English interference can be given, together with the greater use of French basic patterns which now may be extended and expanded to allow a wider range of controlled expression. At the advanced level the students can be allowed to indulge in the more meticulous comparative analysis and even in the heretofore forbidden art of translation in order to sharpen their awareness of the singularities of the two systems.

In the second part of this paper I will specify more particular methods and techniques that should aid in solving some of the problems the American-English student has when facing the task of written composition in French.

MOREHEAD STATE UNIVERSITY-BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Dr. L.W. Barnes, Editor: Volume VI, Number 17

Mary Netherton: "Modern Trends in Foreign Language Teaching:
French Composition Part II

Editor's Note; or Foreword

The posing of the problem and the citing of specific difficulties are most essential for focusing on what needs to be done. Mary Netherton, in this second section of the treatment of the subject, indicates useful steps that are being taken--and should be taken--to solve some of the difficulties inherent in written composition on at least a two-language level, where one is certain to pose some interference for the other.

This concern, expressed in the first part of this paper, may seem to imply that second language learning is dominated by a preoccupation for perfecting the form: however, it is possible for even the beginning students as well as the intermediate or advanced students to be taught to write French "...with an emphasis on context" ~~after~~ they have become skilled in listening and speaking and have learned to equate the spoken forms with their written symbols. "This kind of composition-writing designed to communicate meaningful information not just to illustrate and reinforce learning patterns can be broken into three stages: subsentence, sentence, and paragraph writing," ** according to Brooks' views in his work with language and its learning.

In the first of these stages, the subsentence level, the students are required to compose parts of sentences by completing a half-sentence when it is read aloud by the instructor, played on tape, or dictated from a computer. This does not mean that the student completes the sentences by writing down single words to fill in blanks. He composes propositions in which items are bound together to create meanings which transcend their glossary listing at the back of the text. In the second writing stage, during the composition of complete sentences, the student is trained to use meaningfully and accurately all the individual components of a proposition and to arrange them in acceptable sequences. In paragraph writing, the learner must align sentences "in logical order and with a sense of selection and synthesis which is culturally authentic and in agreement with current usage."***Therefore,

*
Nelson Brooks, Language and Language Learning : Theory and Practice, 2nd. Ed., N.Y., Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1964, p.173.

** Ibid., p. 173.

*** Ibid., p. 174.

after the student has progressed steadily through these three stages, wherein his development has been carefully gauged to his experience, he is ready to begin to write essays and themes.

For beyond the paragraph lies the realm of composition "where concern for creativity and the perfection of writing as a fine art begin to assume primary importance."**** However, no matter how creative, imaginative, and artistic the mind and talents of an American student of French, his writing will be labeled as "contemptible," "illiterate Franglais" or "Frenglish" unless it conforms to established French syntax and morphology. An instructor's first effort in composition-teaching, then, is to give his students practice in completing sentences from which key words have been removed. The second endeavor is to teach sentence-writing by presenting familiar information as raw material to be channeled through suggested patterns. And the third objective is to teach the organization of sentences within the paragraph unit by having students follow models in order to encourage the learning of "logic of presentation and aptness of expression in addition to correctness of form."***** By structuring the learning exercises with these careful controls, students are allowed to gain experience in writing while their writing experience is not given the freedom to fall into the familiar interference traps mentioned above.

The essence of these suggestions, therefore, is that students must be lead in an orderly and systematic fashion through the composing of propositions at the subsentence level, the constructing of complete sentences, and the integrating of sentences into paragraphs that are complete, unified, orderly, and coherent *****--but that are 'avant tout' 100 percent French. Then, and only then, after the student has gained experience and confidence in paragraph-writing, is he ready for more advanced composition assignments--putting paragraphs together to construct essays, themes, and other forms of composition.

However, even now the students should not be given extremely long assignments to prepare until they have gradually built up their composition endurance from the one paragraph level to the five-hundred word theme, and slowly beyond that point. For in moments of fatigue, bewilderment in crisis early in one's experience in writing whole composition, a student often falls into the more familiar syntactical patterns of English, unknowingly slipping away from the more correct French ones. The result is that the student who is required to write too much French too soon in his development begins to write English in French. He uses a French lexicon but arranges it in English structural schemes: he employs English idioms and French functional devices filled with French words.


Brooks, Op. Cit., p. 174

Ibid., p. 174.

James M. McCrimmon, Writing With a Purpose, 4th Ed., Boston, 1967, Houghton Mifflin, p. 109.

Another concern in addition to that of length during writing development is the problem of choice of subjects upon which longer assignments should be written. Such choices should be carefully guided by the instructor until the American student becomes skillful in converting the devious Americanisms of his thought into standard, legitimate French. Consequently, for his early writing assignments, he should be steered away from deeply personal subjects whose roots are entrenched in a purely American cultural context. For certainly the more deeply intimate the subject of his writing, the more difficult it is for him to separate the message of his thoughts from their English medium. Likewise, ideas evolving from the unique in American culture are more difficult to explain in any foreign tongue, especially in French wherein English interference is almost inevitable. Indeed, for the beginner, the best French theme topics are those taken from French literature and from French cultural concepts.

Therefore, regardless of what method American teachers of French use to teach the phonology, morphology, and fluent manipulation of the French language, many of them have come to agree that no one pure system can achieve all the objectives of teaching American students to listen, speak, read, and write French with near-native success. Thus, instructors are discovering that the best method is a mixture of methods integrated to emphasize both analysis and practice. Furthermore, they are recognizing that all methods can be adapted to the teaching of original composition . guided by applications of common sense, caution, and control.



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MOREHEAD STATE UNIVERSITY BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS Volume VI, Number 18

Dr. L.W. Barnes, Editor: "Language and the World(s) of the 'Tactile'" Part I

Much work has been done during the middle part of this century in the sensorial areas of the tactile, the worlds of touch, or pressure. Much of the work has been done by the psychologists and by the physiologists. The psychologists have been interested in human behavior and the tactile aspects of the individual. If, indeed, the skin is the boundary of each organism, there must be external pressures to which every individual must be sensitive, or sensitized. One must make the minimal or minimum suppositions that every human being must view his own responses to his own tactile pressures against the outside world, as well as the outside world's physical pressures on him, as an individual.

In addition to such pressures as those which evoke pain, warmth, and cold, as physical, there are the pressures which seem emotive or attitudinal in nature. I do not need to labor the point that everyone is aware of physical pressures of all kinds or degrees exerted against the individual--such pressures as physical blows, the thrusts of gusts of wind, the backward thrust of the steering wheel, the reactive pressures of mattresses, underwear, gloves, shoes, socks, and other pressures such as heat and water vapor.

Then, too, there are the natural pressures exerted by the body against the entire external universe. Some of these are natural, mechanical, and operative below the level of consciousness. Others are consciously manipulative. There is the opening of a door. There are the many twists and turns of arms and legs very much a part of facing an ordinary physical reality. Many of the tactile experiences are so automatic and essential that the individual is not aware of them in a way which arouses emotions or which evokes some intellectual speculations.

Then there are the pressures or experiences of touch wherein a certain kind of touch is expected. With the conscious tactile experience there is also an expectation. The expectation can be one accompanied by or indicative of an intellectual speculation. If I consciously search out to touch a certain object when I need to touch the object or when I expect to touch the object, there is at least some degree of expectancy which has to be justified. I might say to myself when I am trying to work out how to open up an object that "if I put my right hand here and my left hand there and turn, the cover should come off." There the tactile experience is projected, some level of expectation brought into my intellectual focus, and some intellectual response while I am performing the action, or after the action is performed.

The world of the tactile is never free from the world of the emotions. Whether the emotional association is that of destruction, or that of expectancy, or that of rejection, or that of deprivation, or that of dislike, touch and the emotions are many, many times inseparable. The one evokes the other. Lawrence Frank, in his excellent essay on "Tactile Communication" expresses his views:

The skin is the largest organ of the body with a variety of functions including the crucial function of acting as a thermostat for regulating the homeostatic processes. Being exposed to the world, it receives the direct impacts of the environment which it mediates to the organism. Also, the human skin is being continually renewed in the epidermis and is richly provided with sweat glands... The skin has both a taste and an odor... *

Implicit in the words is the important point that the world of touch is far from being a simple matter. Odor and taste "strike." A particular kind of an odor hits hard! We respond, I believe, to the odor as we often do to the physical pressure against the skin, generally, or against any particular part of the surface of the body, specifically. We are hit by certain perfumes. We flinch. We advance. We retreat. Quite often the odors affect not only the nostrils, but the entire body. The odors can strike physically, with no previous expectation on our part. We can anticipate the tactile blow of the odor. We can anticipate this blow intellectually or emotively. We can take attitudes or develop attitudes toward odors, and the attitude will reinforce the striking power of the odors themselves.

Such is also true of the world of different kinds of taste. I taste licorice; the taste is a blow. Now, one may interrupt me and say that it is a scientific fact that we can smell only what is diffused as a gas, that we can smell no solid. I will agree, of course. Then one can urge that no one can taste a solid. To taste anything, that thing must be in liquid form. The surface molecules of a solid are in liquid form, and, thus, when anyone asserts that he tastes cheese, for example, he really tastes the surface molecules which have become liquified. All this is granted.

But that does not take away the assertion that when I taste such a substance as licorice I am actually touched, and I do not mean by the mass or weight of the licorice as such. When an object is tasteless, quite often the object is tasteless because of behaviorial as well as physical reasons. It may be true that any form of experience which has mass, occupies space, and is subject to the pull of gravity does touch. In fact, it would be a contradiction to assert that a thing does not touch. But, apart from that volume or mass factor, the odor or taste does strike.

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Lawrence K. Frank, "Tactile Communication," article from Genetic Psychology Monographs, 56: p. 210 (1957).

We can make the same assumptions and assertions about sound. We are aware of the nature of sound waves, and we know, adequately enough, how they operate in our auditorial processes. Yet, sounds do strike. We feel them. They touch. I know what I have in mind, and I know how a soft sound "feels" in a tactile way. I can feel that pressure of the sound of the wave. I can feel the blow from the rolling tones of the drum. I can feel the shutting or opening of the door.

Then, I can also feel what I see. I am struck in different ways by the electromagnetic spectrum in operation. I am touched in different ways by red, orange, yellow, green, blue, violet, and black, and by all the combinations of color. For example, I, personally, feel whipped, cut, lashed, and infuriated by certain shades of orange. I am literally flogged by that color, and by certain shades of brown. I am jabbed by others. I am pricked by pastel colors. I do feel them physically.

Thus, in addition to the overt and explicit jabs, thrusts, pinches, twists, turnings, and crushing pressures from the world of sensible things, I am also touched in many various ways by that which I smell, by that which I taste, by that which I hear, and by that which I see. And, as I have indicated in the process of developing this paper, the pressures, as illustrations of touch, are real, whether carrying real mass, or not.

After a while--after I habituate certain kinds of real touch and after I habituate a positive or negative response or attitude toward touch whether physical by mass or weight, or whether by sound, smell, taste, or vision--my feeling or touch about these aspects of experience becomes fixed or oriented emotionally. I am impinged on not only by physical materiality but by the ideas or emotions I have associated with the vast and bewildering world of touch.

Yet, despite the fact that we are involved, irrevocably in such a world, we do not have very much of a nonverbal world of appreciation or evaluation in terms of "as...as...when." That is, we do not know how hard, soft, malleable, or ductile each thing or idea may be. When we assert that "A" is "soft" and "B" is "hard," we do not have clearly in mind the range that exists between that which is very soft, on the one hand, and that which is very hard, on the other hand.

Then, too, my emotions strike me. I can feel "anger." I am pressed down, physically, by grief. I am buffeted about by astonishment or amazement. I am involuntarily stretched, in a vertical sense, by the impact of ecstasy. In all emotions within all emotive states, I am actually "pressured." I am always touched. But the pressure or touch of words seems equally as pervasive and as powerful and as inevitable as the pressure of touch itself, or of the the senses in their tactile impacts. We need to consider the force of pressure of words at some length.

Words strike! Words touch! Phrases exert pressure. More macroscopic units of oral or written composition exert tactile force. Let us agree that the word is not the thing, not the referent. Yet, our skin can curl, expand, wrinkle, or otherwise react to the word, as well as to the physical pressure of a thing, or as well as to the blows of that which we smell, taste, see, and hear. It is excellent that I should understand the difference between the word and the referent. But I do feel, physically, the word. It may well be that I feel that word as strongly as I feel an exploratory fingernail tickling the more sensitive parts of my anatomy that are subject to tickling.

When we say that words have striking force, we admit that they strike the attention; they strike or evoke the emotions; they aid in developing attitudes; but, again, they also have physical impacts. Some words have more striking force than others; and such is the case for phonemic reasons, perhaps.

It has been known for some time that phonetic elements of a language have a certain striking power with respect to the other elements. That is, there is a relative set of values among the different phonemes insofar as the ability to strike the auditorial blow is concerned. *Nearly all linguists working with phonology will agree that the "th" combination has the least striking power and that the "i" as in line and the "oi" as in soil have the most striking power. At least we have the upper limits and lower limits of striking power.

In nearly all cases the striking power of the phonemes is set out for the vowel sounds and for the consonantal sounds separately. Of course, in finding out the total striking power of a word, for example, the result would be the total of the number of relative striking power figures for each phoneme constituting the word. If, for example, the word "W" has five distinct "RSPV" units as 11, 18, 4, 9, 13, respectively and consecutively, the total "RSPV" would be the figure "55." ** But another factor should always be considered in dealing with intensity. That factor has to be considered in terms of the unit of time required to articulate a phoneme, or set of phonemes.

* Such individuals as Paul Mills, J.B. Kelley, Ralph Potter, and Ernest Robson work in this area. Robson's book The Orchestra of Language, N.Y., Yoseloff, 1959, 191pp. is a landmark in this area.

** Relative Striking-Power Value(s).

Nearly all phonologists work in decimal fractions of the second when counting the time required to articulate a certain phoneme. The longest phonological time --duration-- is given for the "i" in "dine", for example, or the "oi" in "coil", as another example. *** Thus, we have two factors. First, there is the relative striking power of a phoneme, and, next, there is the relative decimal fraction of a second required to articulate the phoneme. It is widely agreed upon that the phonemes "k" and "t" have the lowest rmts ****, for each has a rating no higher than .02 seconds.

Much work needs to be done with regard to intensity or texture. It is possible to have a relative striking-power factor of 25 and a relative mean--time in seconds of .20, giving, for intensity, $25/.2$, or 125. It is also possible to have a relative striking-power factor of only 20 but a relative mean-time factor in seconds of but .1. In the latter case or instance, the intensity must be calculated as $20/.1$ or 200. Thus, the important point to keep in mind is that the result gained from dividing the relative striking-power value by the relative mean-time in seconds is the only fruitful way to approach the question of striking power--through intensity.

Furthermore, it is probably equally important to stress the fact that the sentence value for intensity will give a more useful result than can be obtained from looking, separately, at the intensity value for each word. The rhythm of the sentence is carried through "ups" and "downs" that are far more useful, meaning-wise, when considered in sentence context and design. Of course, this brief discussion does little justice to the substantial phonological work that is being done in this area. However, the discussion is to be considered simply along the lines of auditorial stimulation initially.

It is true that the words do appear to strike the skin and the other organs. The increase in blood pressure is more than directly related in an arithmetic sense to the difference in intensity. The intensity of the words does affect the entire tactile system, and it does effect certain changes in this system. It is not enough to ascribe this "touching" effect or this "pressuring" effect to the action of the waves on the delicate auditorial receptors. The entire human organism seems to be touched with the intensity of the word, phrase, clauses, or sentence. We now turn our attention to certain unique word listings.

Robson, op. cit., pp. 148-149.

Relative Mean-Time in Seconds

Experience with words and experience with the referents of words result in individuals being touched. The word "hospital" can strike an individual in much the same way as a blow or punch might affect him. Whether the learned experience with the hospital is a general one of a negative nature that affects the whole personality and the whole human system subject to tactile pressures or whether the experience is one where part of the total experience in the hospital gives the general or specific tactile result, there is no question that what we experience can result in tactile experiences when the word standing for the hospital is used. It could be that the sounds constituting "hospital" evoke the association of the soft punch of a hypodermic entering the skin. In this instance, the one pressure from one single experience-among classes of other experiences undergone in the hospital - is sufficient to color the entire concept of hospital on the nonverbal level and the word "hospital" on the verbal level.

We could use many other illustrations. Now, we come to the area or realm of word associations in sequence or serial form. To use one illustration, there are at least sixty words which denotatively and connotatively refer to the nose, or evoke perceptions concerning the nose. There are such words as "snout," "sneeze," "snub," "snivel," "sniffle," "snicker," and "snore," among many others. In addition to their evoking an image of the nose, these words also strike; They have distinct touching effects. There are other special lists with their special effects. There is a list of jarring and violent sounds, generally indicated through words with some onomatopoeic sounds.

Such words as "clacker," "crash," "clock," "crackle," "crash," "grapple," "crow," and "chatter" have pressure or touch effects as well as sound effects. Of course, different individuals have different sensitivities to sounds generally, and to some sounds specifically. Those who hear the sounds most acutely are often those who feel the pressure sensitively. Now, of course, all this is not to say that every word does exercise a touching or tactile effect. Nor is it true that to be struck by a word is the same physical experience as to be struck by a stone, for example. It is possible to be scratched by the physical pin so as to leave a cut, or scratch, or trace of blood. The word "scratch" will, I believe, touch or exert pressure on the individual, without leaving the external physical mark.

It is the inner sense of touch that is quite likely the same in each instance. Sometimes, as is urged in Hamlet, the "word's the thing." We do respond, then, to words through their striking power, through their intensity, through experience with the referent for which the words stand, and through the words themselves.

Each language will have words which because of their phonemic combination and their phonological ordering evoke a set of serial or sequential associations which affect us in many ways. One of the most significant ways in which we are affected is that of touch or pressure. Of course, there are other behavioral factors which need more consideration than we have been able to give here.

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Dr. L.W. Barnes, Editor

R. Q. Wunfield "Language Instruction and the English Idiom" Part I

I consider an "idiom" a set of words whose total meaning differs from the sum of its parts. When one says, for example, that we have to make a concession--that we have to give up something-- "we have to give way," we communicate or express an entirely different meaning from "give"--to present-- added to "way" or path or route. Yet, as is true in virtually all examples of idioms the metaphorical origin of the phrase seems quite apparent. Of course, there is another condition where idioms gain their effect or derive their nature through a functional shift; that is, when there is a functional shift which does not result in metaphor.

In the example "He went home," we have idiom that comes about through completing the verb "to go" with the noun used as an adverbial of location. As with all verbalizations, any idiomatic expression or statement comes from one individual. If the expression "catches on" within one or more groups, some wide acceptance results. Then the expression comes into wide usage on regional, national, or even international scenes. Eventually, an idiom, whether the result of metaphor or the result of a functional shift, obtains such wide acceptance as to become a part of the lexicon for that time and place in language history. Then people use it so regularly and easily that it does not seem as though idiom is being used.

On the other hand, an idiom may not "catch on." It may remain confined or locked within a particular language--speaking community--usually within a group of the same cultural or social background--or it may enjoy a period of popularity and then fall into disuse as it is supplanted or taken over by other modes of expression.

"I dare say" is another good instance or example of this. Not many years ago it was a popular idiom among a wide range of British people to indicate the likelihood of an observation that the speaker was making. Today, it is rarely used, and I would not be surprised if in a few years' time it were to disappear from current or wide usage.

Since idiom arises within a group of cultural similarities, we can distinguish between idiomatic usages which remain closely bound to the cultural expression of a section of the language community and those which gain universal currency. In fact, we shall find it useful to think of English idiom in four broad divisions, which I shall try to illustrate:

1. Idioms which may have been 'culture-bound' in the past, but can hardly be considered to be so now and are generally accepted as part of the lexical core of the language.

Do you know the 'short cut' to the river?
They all 'paid tribute' to John's generosity.
This, 'by the way,' is not the first time.
His parent are quite 'well off.'
She refused 'to take part' in our game.

A large number of phrasal verbs fall into this category: put off, keep back, put on, put by, go on, get on, leave off, work out, go into, look after, stand by, take up, and pick up,

Now, we may well ask why we have these phrasal verbs. We have observed that idiom is mainly associated with metaphor. We did also observe that a functional shift results in idiom. Let us take a closer look at the category of phrasal verbs.

We will agree that we have the following equations for meaning with respect to the phrasal verbs just noted:

put off = postpone	get on = make progress
keep back = retain	leave off = stop
put by = save	work out = calculate
go = continue	go into = investigate

look after = supervise
stand by = support
take up = absorb
pick up = collect

It will be quite interesting to note that in virtually all cases the phrasal verb replaces the overt Latinate form of the verb. The only phrasal verb which is not in the set of verbs with Latin prefixes is that of "leave off" which replaces "stop." In all cases other than that of "leave off" the phrasal verb carries more immediate tonal force or vigor than the single word (verb) replaced. In the case of that where "leave off" is equated with "stop," there would seem to be a phrase carrying less phonological force than "stop."

In each instance the use of the phrasal verb deepens the connotative range, and, in so doing, tends to evoke or express more emotive force. In using "put off" in place of "postpone," we substitute meanings for the rather neutral "postpone." "Put off," for example, indicates more than delaying an act or decision. A negative or blocking note is introduced. The individual as well as the act or decision is involved. There is a sense of threatening power in the "put off" that is not present in the "postpone." There is a personal equation introduced. It is not surprising that we arrive at the point where the statement "You put me off" carries far more than a "delay" meaning. We are moved, too, from the depersonalization in "postpone" to the personal note in "put off."

With "keep back" there is a sense of an order or command. There is also the meaning carried of holding something back. In addition to the note of holding back an idea, money, other things, or a group, there is also the note of "holding out" on someone or something. In this case, as with "put off", there is a more personal tone than in the single verb that the phrase substitutes for.

Each phrasal statement appears to have a much greater phonological striking power, as evidence by "put by," "work out," "pick up," and "stand by." Further, each term seems to acquire more meanings over time. That is, the term becomes more personal and more emotive-evoking. Consider, for example, "look after." A person can say that "There is no need for you to stay, I will remain and 'look after' the matter. Here, there is the substitute for ~~"supervise."~~ Then, the statement to another effect can be made. An ~~person~~ says "Don't worry, I'll 'look after' everything for you." Here, we are away from 'supervise.' The connotation is to the effect that "I'll protect your interests." Then, invariably, we come to the situation where there is a negative tone. In such an instance, we have something like the following: "He thinks that he will get away with it, but, we'll 'look after' him."

Obviously, we can continue in the same vein with each of these phrases. In using the phrase "leave off" for "stop" it might appear that we are 'going for' less force. However, such is not really the case. From a phonological point of view, the force of the phrase is about the same as that of "stop." We can obtain a greater range of meanings with or through the use of "leave off" than we can by staying with the single verb. Let us go back for a short time and consider the five sentences set out before we considered "phrasal verbs."

In "short cut" we obtain compression and striking power, because it is not possible that the phrase "the shortest way," or the "nearest way," or the "shortest distance" has the force and direction of "short cut." Further, the tone of "cut" itself, together with the imagery of touch or pressure brought about by "cut," deepens the emotive tone of the phrase.

In the sentence "They all 'paid tribute' to John's generosity," we have metaphor, of course. However, we are struck by the association of "tribute" with that which is regal or imperial. The "generosity" is not legal or imperial, but the equation of meanings carried by "tribute" serves to enhance "generosity."

In the phrase "by the way," we are able to enter the area of process, since "by the way," evokes a sense of a continuing state of affairs. Thus, in "This, 'by the way, is not the first time," we convey a sense of having a chronological set of actions or omissions that establish a precedent, knocking out any chance that we are at a "first time position." Then, the 'well off' in "His parents are quite 'well off,'" deepens to a range of meanings apart from being wealthy or comfortable in a material sense. For example, the "well off," also connotes a sense of leisure, of being free from pressures. Then, in "She refused 'to take part' in our game," we have a darker tone. For the one spoken of apparently deliberately refuses to cooperate! It is not just a question of non-participation. Thus, the idiom, as discussed in this first section of the paper, extends the emotive range of meanings, at least,



Morehead State University Bulletin of Applied Linguistics

Dr. L.W. Barnes, Editor Volume VI Number 21

R.Q. Wunfield English Idiom and The Teaching of English Language Part II

I have pointed out the unique nature of idiom in the first part of this presentation. In pointing out that English idiom comes in four broad divisions, I indicated that the first division dealt with idioms which were culture-bound in the past, but not so now. Further, I pointed out that a number of phrasal verbs fall into this first category. It was then noted that the phrasal verbs introduce more power, emotively-speaking and that they do so through moving to different connotative levels.

In the second broad division, there are strong metaphorical idioms which are to some extent culture-bound. They present little communication difficulty because the metaphor is so obviously apparent. We list some of these:

He 'lost his heart' completely.
 It was a 'shot in the dark.'
 You're 'wide of the mark.'
 Until you told me, I was 'in the dark.'
 I am certain that you will 'come around' to my
 way of thinking.
 Please 'fill me in' on the details.

The metaphor is obvious. I suggest that metaphor is an indirect self-contradiction, quite explicit in nature. The metaphor in the examples just given is such as to indicate that one part of the personality--in each case--is so strongly emphasized as to stress that part to the exclusion of all other parts. In the examples the stress is entirely negative. The "sense" or the "head" or the "mind" is revealed as entirely inadequate. I am certain that this statement is readily supported in each example save that of "come around." However, some reflection should indicate that the "coming around" to "my way of thinking" is not going to come about through the rational processes of the one who makes the assertion.

The third class is also strongly metaphorical, but in order to ensure successful communication, a superficial acquaintance with the social or professional activity from which the metaphor is drawn is required. The following examples are at point:

I know you've got 'something up your sleeve.' (conjuring)
 There were no holds barred. (wrestling)
 He saw red. (bullfighting)
 We're down to rock bottom (well-digging)
 They had a stroke of luck. (from mining, a strike)

In the fourth broad division, idioms which are culture-bound to one or more language variants and would tend to sound out of place and be misunderstood if used in other variants are dominant. Consider the few following examples:

She told me she couldn't bear him.(bear his company)
In his new uniform he cut quite a dash.(made a smart and dazzling appearance)
The manager gave John a severe dressing down (spoke to him in a manner indicating serious displeasure).
She wondered whether he was on the level.(honest and straightforward)
She stood me up.(discontinued a friendship).
How did you make out?(What happened to you?)

In this last class we have a number of phrasal verbs. Many of them are orthographically identical with those in the first class, but have other culture-bound connotations.

Such idiomatic usages arise out of the cultural atmosphere that is prevalent in the language community. It would be difficult with many of them to trace them back and discover exactly how they originated. "He was stumped for an answer" comes from the cricket field. "He had another look to assure himself that all was shipshape" comes from a traditional nautical background.

All the examples given may be said to be colloquialisms. But the borderline between a colloquialism and an informal idiom is a very tenuous one, indeed. If one attempted to lay down what was or was not acceptable in formal speech, or informal speech, or in writing, he would soon become involved in pointless and unprofitable argument.

We have now to consider whether the classifications I have attempted are of any importance to a teacher of English. The teacher of English where English is the primary language has his hands full in this area. But the idiom is spoken; identification and classification are what are essential here.

Then we have the teacher of English as a foreign language. He moves along these scales as his pupils' proficiency increases, selecting carefully among culture-bound idioms those of the variant which serves him as a model, and for the purpose of encouraging understanding rather than active use. The teacher of English as a second language faces a more difficult problem.

For the whole point of a second language is that it must ultimately become available to the learner as a medium in which he can think and write creatively. He can express the whole of his personality. He cannot be expected to do this through idiom that is culturally foreign to him. For this reason, we find in areas where English is used freely as a second language that a local variant with its own idiom establishes itself. We must be careful not to suppress some foreign idiom as "bad English."

The examples given could be tolerated; in fact, we would do well to permit them:

We shall try for second-class tickets,
I want to drop down to the corner.
The examination disappointed me.
I am financially weak this week.
He went to take breakfast.
May I follow you to town.

It can be seen that the idiom is certainly intelligible. Of course, we are speaking here for the student learning English as a second language. Even so, we could tolerate these statements for students using English as their own first tongue.

As regards the first broad class, the teacher should encourage the students to learn and to use these forms. A little more caution is required with the second and third broad classes of idiom. The idiom should not be forced against natural inclination. Since few of them present problems of comprehension, there is no problem in exposing our pupils to them and leaving it to our pupils to pick and choose whatever appeals to them. In any case, picturesque language has such a strong appeal for most language-learners that they will tend to use too much rather than too little. There is therefore little need to practice using these idioms.

It is the culture-bound idiom that causes the most difficulty. These phrases tend to be misunderstood or misapplied when used within a cultural setting that is foreign to their origin. One of the major difficulties facing an outsider is to gauge the right degree of informality in which they become acceptable. Even a slight error in this can give offense or cause a sentence to sound quite ludicrous.

However, through films, radio, television, certain culture-bound idioms catch on and are readily incorporated in the local variant. That is as it should be. The more recent variants of English readily absorb from the older variants such usages which appeal and "feel right." The vital thing is that the impetus to absorb a particular idiom comes from within, thus bridging the culture gap.

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Dr. L.W. Barnes, Editor

Volume VI, Number 22

L.W. Barnes: "Thoughts on Robinson's "Ought and Ought Not"

In Philosophy, The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, Richard Robinson's "Ought and Ought Not" * suggests that there are four uses of "Ought." His first has to do with the "moral ought"; his second, with the "Prudential Ought"; the third, with the "Ideal Ought"; and, finally, his fourth, with the "Probable Ought."

In the first, the "moral ought," Robinson urges that the word "ought" is used to express the moral law or necessity. It is interesting to note that he believes that when one uses the first person singular and plural and the third person singular and plural, the inclusion of "ought" signs or signifies that "ought" carries the moral force. The sentences "I ought to love my father," and "She ought to love her brother" state the moral law, necessity, or obligation. Robinson gives as a further example the sentence "You ought not to have spoken to your mother like that." He considers this a singular moral decision coming from some moral compulsion.

We can see that each example given is a Pattern II Basic Pattern, using the transitive verb. The verb completer is quite singular, or specific? *Of course, we might wonder whether his first sentence relied upon is the general law from which he derives his subsequent examples. He states that "We ought to honor our parents." Perhaps we are to imply that the "We" is universal, and the "our" is also universal, leading to the equivalent of "Everyone ought to honor his parents." However, perhaps it is the very ambiguity of the "We" and the "our" which gives the "ought" its moral force. If the "We" is the collection of a set of intimate I's, and the "our" is a set of intimate mys, then we can have the intimacy as in "We ought not to have behaved like that toward our wives."

Robinson is fairly convinced that "You ought not to have done that" is not a clear deduction from some moral necessity. If that is the case, then Robinson, and those who are in his camp, would assert, perhaps, that the verb completer "that" is not sufficiently explicit or singular for moral law force. We might infer that Robinson would agree that a knowledge of the total situation might find the statement one deduction from some moral law. It is worth stressing the fact such discussions as these are always more clearly defined when the total situation is defined.

* Richard Robinson, "Ought and Ought Not," article in The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, Vol. XLVI, No. 177, pp. 193 et sequentia.

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By "verb completer," I mean that which occupies the third position of a basic sentence pattern.

Robinson's next example is fair enough for his position:
"You, being a strong man, ought to have gone to his aid." The position seems to be that "going to one's aid" does not specify a moral obligation or law as clearly as is the case when specifying what ought to be done or ought not to be done to one's parent, wife, or other kin. Yet, there is a distinct uneasiness here, and perhaps the uneasiness is brought about by the very linguistic ordering of Robinson's article; to use Robinson's own words:

Even when the singular judgment characterizes both the agent and the action, as "You, being a strong man, ought to have gone to his aid," it may still be obscure what, if any, moral law implies this judgment. ***

First, Robinson did not define "moral law." He did not define, for his purposes, "moral." He did not define for his purposes "law." And, he certainly did not define for his purposes or for ours the concept of moral law.

When we go back to his opening statement that the word "ought"

... is used to express moral judgments. It is used to express moral laws, as in "We ought to honour our parents ...". ****

we accept this initial statement to the effect that he considers honouring our parents a moral law. Certainly, it is his right to make that statement, trusting that the readers will go along with him. Now, our problem comes in accepting his suggestion that "honouring our parents" is a matter of moral law in a sense that "going to one's aid" is not. Presumably, we would not call it a matter of moral law that we should go to the aid of a safecracker. And it is tolerable that we would not be chided were we to insist that going to one's aid, generally, is a moral necessity, or a desirable act.

We could take a look at "strong" and consider whether that word refers to physical power, to emotive power, to moral uplift, or to intellectual power. To aid one's fellowman has been rather universally construed as a sign of satisfying one's creator, of being moral, of obeying a divine command. Now, if it is urged that it is common knowledge that one of the Ten Commandments relates to the honouring of one's parent, we can scarcely disagree. However, it is also common knowledge that a good man is one who obeys the moral law, written or unwritten, and that coming to one's aid is a moral act --and, perhaps, a moral law.

Robinson, op. cit., p. 193.

Ibid.

All through the section dealing with the moral "ought" Robinson struggles from a poor initial definition, I believe. It would have been more fruitful to open with the assertion that the inclusion of the word "morally" is both binding and explicit, at least from the speaker's or the writer's point of view. If I say that "I believe that you ought to obey this law from a moral point of view," I have no problem urging "ought" and "moral law," whether I may or may not be redundant.

Robinson points out that not everyone who makes a singular moral judgment may have in mind the general moral law or principle under which the singular statement may be subsumed or subclassified. Then, we are led to the thorny position of deciding whether individuals are conscious of the source for their particular statements. Presumably, if anyone agrees with someone else that a singular moral statement or judgment has been made, there must be some common denominator. And that denominator points to universalization.

Robinson uses as an example of a singular moral judgment "She ought to be slapped." I do not know how we can call that statement a singular moral judgment. For if that statement can be a statement that can be other than a singular moral judgment, we have a real problem. Now, that statement cannot be a singular moral judgment and not be a singular moral judgment at one and the same time. If the statement is a singular judgment at "time alpha" and another that is not a singular moral judgment at "time beta," what can we guarantee about the time of its utterance or the significance of its occasion?

The sentence "She ought to be slapped," could well refer to an occasion when she might be slapped to bring her to consciousness, an occasion of concern, rather than one of punishment. Robinson's words do suggest that this singular moral judgment could be "deduced from several general judgments."***** We know that words do carry several meanings. We know that when words are in the dictionary they carry more meanings than when in a sentence-or-greater context. Nevertheless Robinson's case is weakened considerably by his failure to establish direct deductional routes from any general moral law. Robinson abruptly shifted his position.

He shifted to one of defining "ought" in the sense of its being a categorical imperative. He negated "ought" as a value judgment. He finally rested his case as to moral law on his negation of the relevance of value-judgments. For him, "ought" and "ought not" are equated with "right" and "wrong," not with "good" or "bad." We ought to do what we are required to do, and what we are required to do is that which is right. We ought not to do that which is wrong. But, here, sadly, ordinary usage steps in to break up this Robinson gambit. We are quite willing and anxious to say that we ought to do that which is good; we ought not to do that which is bad. In the next part to this paper, we look at "ought"

***** Robinson, op. cit., p.194

***** Ibid., pp. 196-197.

again.



Morehead State University Bulletin of Applied Linguistics

Dr. L.W.Barnes, Editor Volume VI, Number 23

L.W.Barnes, "More Thoughts on Robinson's "Ought and Ought Not"

In the last issue, I raised a few questions concerning the first aspect of Robinson's "Ought and Ought Not." The problem centers on language; the problem is substantially linguistic. In asserting that "ought" and "ought not" have four meanings--moral, prudential, ideal, and probable -- Robinson poses himself the problem of defining each term as separable from the others. Presumably, when one can find an area of definition for each usage uniquely different from the others, definition has been successful. In the first use and usage of "ought" and "ought not" as matters of moral law, I suggested that in the article itself the distinctions made as to general moral and singular moral law do not hold up well. Let us look at his brief statements as to the "Prudential Ought."

Robinson gives, in his article, several statements to aid in making the distinction he so desired:

...It is used to express the prescriptions of prudence. "I think we ought to go back now, as the tide will soon be coming in." "You ought to change your shoes." "You ought to buy diamond shares." "My lawn gets mossier every year; what ought I to do? "You ought to see the play; it is most amusing." Such ought-sentences are prescriptive; but the prescription comes from prudence and not from moral law. *

Certainly, there is a difference between these examples given and "You ought not to have spoken to your mother-in-law like that." Again, there is the problem with "prudence." If the position is taken that there is a common, everyday, ordinary usage about "prudence" that is understood sufficiently well by all readers without the need to give a unique definition of that term, then we are working with some version of an ordinary language philosophy. But, even here there are senses in which not all of the statements may be for each occasion "prudential" in nature.

* Richard Robinson, "Ought and Ought Not," The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, Vol. XLVI, No. 177., p. 195

In the sentence "I think we ought to go back now, as the tide will soon be coming in," there is certainly a prudential element. If we believe that we are in danger if we remain where we are for the time and place of the tide, then the note of prudence will be coming in. If we regard "prudence" as a virtue, however, we are back to this singularity of moral law and the question of right and wrong. It is both good and right that we should be prudent; it is both wrong and bad that we are not prudent. We have a moral duty to preserve the individual self, to keep one's own self safe. Now, if it is urged that we are dealing here with a prudential aspect of the moral law, that, too, is another matter. However, the "tide" that is spoken about might be the tide of evil. In the field of metaphor, we would be with a moral judgment, rather than with a prudential one.

If it is urged that "tide" is to be taken in a literal sense, then perhaps we should be quite precisely literal. For it is of the nature of man to treat the common "tide" in a rather uncommon manner. We simply cannot legislate out of existence or out of relevance the use of "tide" in a metaphorical sense. If it is urged that we should take all statements literally unless otherwise designated, there is also a problem there, for we find ourselves contemplating what man actually does and says on more than one level.

Even in "You ought to change your shoes," there may be a problem. It is possible that the "shoes" could stand for "ways." There may well be a moral necessity for changing one's ways. Then, again, on the more literal level, the changing of the shoes may be an "ought" not because of the need to protect the shoes or the feet. The need may be one of a moral duty to keep Aunt Bessie's best oak floor free from mud, snow, or dirt. We ought to be concerned for the feelings and property of others. Now, the other two examples "You ought to buy diamond shares" and "You ought to see the play; it is most amusing" are more clearly distinct from the matter of moral judgment. However, the second one is quite different, "prudentially-speaking" from the first. I now leave the area of the prescriptive "ought" in both moral law and prudence to consider the first of his descriptive "oughts," that of the ideal "ought."

The words of his article indicate that Robinson shifted to the descriptive mode in calling his ideal "ought" a value judgment. Here, there is no command or demand as to prudence or moral law. The first sentence "Everybody ought to be happy" is not, according to Robinson, a prescription. It is an ideal. What a wonderful state were everyone happy. As an ideal, everyone "ought to" be happy. Robinson, in "Do you think the hem of this dress ought to be higher?" soon ran into trouble. On the face of the question, there is a "prudential" note. There is a utilitarian note to the question. But then we are told that "what the speaker has in mind is rather the question of beauty, of betterness, of the ideal dress-length." ** But the question is one of how we can know what is in the mind of the speaker and to what degree the question of that which is utility and that which is the aesthetic determine the situation verbally. . .

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Robinson goes on to point out certain difficulties in succeeding sentences, but his point is that there is a note of the ideal, a value-judgment quite distinct from any prescription. (He would have been on sounder ground had he indicated that in the four uses and usages of "ought" and "ought not," two seem Hellenic and two seem Hebraic, perhaps in the Arnoldian sense.) I now move to consider the fourth concept of "ought" and "ought not," that of the "probable ought."

Robinson's position here is one of probability. His sentences "That ought to be easy to find," "He ought to be here soon," "I ought to have oiled the bearing and loosened the nut," and "He ought to have reached London by now," are examples. Some of them are more clearly at point than others. There is a definite concept of "under the conditions which exist," all leading to probability. There are fewer problems in this category than in the others. Of course, in such a statement as "He ought to be here soon," there can be a strong sense of obligation or necessity. Even in the others, there is still a note of "If he did what he should have done, then" Now, there is no question that "ought" and "ought not" carry different meanings. Such a statement is also true of the modals generally and specifically. In fact, the term "modal" would have been an excellent starting point for Robinson.

It is also true that "ought" and "ought not" do carry tones of moral necessity, probability, prudence, and the ideal. It is also true that we could substitute other terms for these, but, in all, the terms would be somewhat synonymous. Robinson's article goes on beyond the points discussed to insist that "ought" and "ought not" are not opposites. The article also asserts that the negative of ought is not the opposite of "ought." He calls this phenomenon "a grave linguistic error in our language."

Now, language does serve man, and serves him well. The defect is not a linguistic one, but the defect is a lack of knowledge as to how language handles that which is opposite and that which is negative and not opposite. Language must serve the faculties of man, and cannot not serve them. The problem involved with Robinson, at least as evinced in his article, is the question of terms. If one takes the position of the ordinary language philosopher, it is very difficult to make precise distinctions when the use and usage of ordinary language always tend to idiom or metaphor. It is equally difficult to make distinctions with a highly-formalized symbolic language or logic about matters which so commonly affect so many of the language-speaking community. Unless the language set aside for formal and exclusive treatment is number or design only, the terms must be known by a few philosophers only in one sense, and by the larger part of the speaking community in another sense, or in no sense at all.

At any rate, the failure of Robinson is a frequent one, and one that merits both sympathy and understanding. The only hope for dealing with an important treatment of "ought" and "ought not" more effectively, is a more precise format, one based on a more precise semantic functional design. And such would be true of a treatment of the other modals.