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Dr. L.W. Barnes, Editor, Volume V, Number 1-Comedy-Part V

We can call one of the tools of comedy "wit." "Wit" has rather specific meanings carried. Central to the concept of the term is that all is done through words, themselves. The phonology of the word, the word changes, and the word order themselves serve as carriers for the comic thrust, usually one involving satire. Wit is not as successful over radio and television normally because of the rapidity of the verbal flow over these forms of mass media. The important element with wit is that the audience must be highly intelligent, quite perceptive. Audience response is less spontaneous with respect to wit, because thinking is an individual matter. Many members of the audience do not get the point. Some perceive the point more or less clearly than others. Then, a few obtain the point readily. When they commence laughing, they interfere with other members whose slower rational processes are struggling. In many cases, the verbal delivery is so rapid that only the most perceptive register. Again, one problem with oral wit is that while the members of the audience are still struggling with the first example of wit, the next example follows.

The higher the wit, the more intelligent the audience must be. The word, or words, or concepts are so handled through words that the listener or reader is surprised into understanding. With the surprise comes the insight, then the laugh. (Wit is a rather subtle matter.) Sometimes the laugh or pleasure comes through being able to get the point, rather than at the point itself. We are never certain which is being operative. Everyday words, phrase, or sentences are so marshalled as to illuminate specific situations in a critical way, for wit, as a tool of comedy, is designed to expose someone. Not very much emotion is involved. The audience is forced to attend carefully, and careful attention is a de-emotionalizing state.

The speaker, writer, listener, or reader often obtains his delight from the surprise of recognition. Quite often wit is not as effective a tool in criticism as other tools. Quite often wit throws light on a situation so well that the pleasure is in the light and not in the critical perception of a view of the short side of man. The ego of the speaker or writer is gratified by the laughter of a comprehension he takes credit for. The audience members beam with delight in that they have been able to get the idea, but they quite often do not think about the idea. The solution of the puzzle is the exercise they enjoy. They have expended so much energy, as members, in solving the words to get the point that they have little energy or direction left as to what to do with the point. In gentle satire, there is little wit involved. The audience members and the speaker or writer are sympathetic in mutual senses. In wit, the listeners are to some degree in competition. There is a game in the competitive sense with the witty speaker or writer. Not all wit is of the "high" variety.

There is a saying that a "pun is the lowest form of wit. However, all puns are examples of wit. Even if the pun is the lowest form of wit, any form of wit is higher intellectually than is true of that which is not wit. The ability to handle the pun denotes a quick mind and a lively invention. When a pun is heard for the first time, there may be a negative reaction because the matter seems so obvious that the reader or listener feels embarrassed because he was

Puns may be somewhat under-rated. A study will reveal to those who are in doubt that there is more present than the turning of sounds or words and sentences. In virtually each one, there is a relief from a situation by the reliance on something incongruous to rid the listener of his tension, to take him away from commonplace assertions, or to arrange for an escape from the intellect by the intellect. One of the most obvious and interesting forms of the pun is illustrated by

Why is Fido like a positive creed, Pa?
Because he's a dog, Ma.

There is no question that even a simple pun like that one does require both sympathy and attention. The humor depends upon a knowledge of "dogma" and upon the sudden shift to a mental picture of a dog stacked up against the hoary regulations of some institution. Other forms of wit are harder to catch. The wittiest dialogue comes from the language in the works of such people as Shakespeare, the Restoration Dramatists, Oscar Wilde, G.B. Shaw, Anouilh, and Clare Booth Luce. There is much wit in the poetry of Chaucer and Alexander Pope. Chesterton, Leacock, and McGinley are three names bringing to mind the wit that is in their works.

Virtually all public figures have some experience and competence with uttering and understanding wit. The problem is to decide at what points wit becomes satire or invective. The moment one leaves the realm of throwing light and furnishing illumination for their sakes only, he is in the area of satire, or some other tool of comedy. We might consider that when the listener or reader understands wit, he does so because he is mentally eager and intellectually attuned to the speaker. Between speaker or writer, insofar as wit is concerned, there must be no fear, aversion, and no resentment. Were these negatives to be present, wit simply could not succeed.

For wit to be successful, audience and speaker must have quick mental faculties and the ability to perceive like elements in situations, people, and objects that are not really alike. Wit calls for an intense concentration. No slow learner can be comfortable in this arena. Wit is a game. There can be no patent attempt to hurt through wit and have wit successful. If one member withdraws from the game, there is no wit.

Probably the earliest form of wit was a sort of mystery, one with several clues. From the earliest tales of Roman, Greek, and Egyptian came the riddle. The person with sufficient ability and intellectual stature to devise and to decode a riddle was highly esteemed. The earliest forms of riddles were told and answered seriously since they represented a sort of prowess. The laugh which followed the early riddles was not one of pure joy, but of a relief through having vanquished the opposition. In a riddle, the initial object is concealment. Then clues must be given, but hidden as deeply as possible. Then comes the "all or nothing law." If the answer is discovered, the answer springs forth, suddenly, from the antagonist. The sudden response is at the heart of wit. No one succeeds partially. All of the laughter at success is wholehearted and triumphant.

We have such contests today between groups on television. To get the correct answer, for each, results in two positive responses: first, the feeling of superiority is assured; second, the antagonist releases his intellectual tensions through laughter. The protagonist must take his pleasure from the fact that his superiority comes in having made up the riddle. Then there is the conundrum as a form of wit.

The conundrum lacks the honesty of the riddle. The conundrum is more complicated and more tricky. The riddle is quite straightforward in that the clues are to reveal, not to conceal. In the conundrum the correct solution depends upon having been able to deceive the antagonist. There is no fair one-to-one contest on words as denotative. In the conundrum, one admits that there is no logical way to solve the problem--thus there is no intellectual superiority. The protagonist has his way and his laugh. The antagonist must, if he is not to be an even more comic character than he is when he is angry at a silly answer, is to realize that there is no reasonable answer and that he must get his pleasure from the incongruity.

Let us take a look at a conundrum. We have the words running out

Little animal. Lots of fur. And a great, great
big heart. What am I?

The antagonist cannot answer. He becomes furious with the answer "A skunk." He protests and asks "How come?" Then comes the answer:

He would give you his last scent.

Because the chances of getting the right answer by rational means are no better than about 500-1 in such an instance, there is no struggle that is decided by the light of reason. But two phases of comedy do remain. First, the role of comedy in serving to downplay too much intellectual prowess or seriousness is evident. Second, on the part of the protagonist there is an air of superiority because he has been clever enough to put the thing together, and, in so doing, to keep the antagonist from succeeding. At least the speaker or writer comes out all right. The only defense for the audience and the antagonist is that one which is always adopted--considering riddles and conundrums as fun, seeking the comic release through that which is incongruous. We come next to the "retort" as a form of wit.

The battle of the retort is a verbal one, one quite vicious. The audience is usually on the sidelines, and, apart from the action, counts the thrusts for each side. The fact that the dialogue is with words does not take away from the savagery of the contest. The simplest retort or repartee is that one which destroys the opponent in a single thrust. An example of the one shot retort is Brooks Atkinson's

When Mr. Wilbur calls his play Halfway to Hell, he underestimates the distance.

There is the form of retort which answers a question or solves a problem yet damages, without wiping out, the opposition:

Secretary: Well, your husband said that compared to you I look fabulous.

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Wife. Yes, you look like a million- and I mean every year of it.

Some of the finest examples of the retort come in Shakespeare's Much Ado About Nothing in the plays of Wilde, and the theatre art of Philip Barry, G.B. Shaw, and Noel Coward.

We have another example of wit far more subtle. This form is the "suppressed or restrained wit." The restraint is brought about because of society's prohibitions, morals, and mores. The criminal can no longer escape physically, so he coins terms and jests in such a way as to gain a verbal victory. Because man is restrained in the province of sex, he makes up bawdy jokes individually, and, in a certain social gathering, relieves himself through asserting what he dare not attack physically. These jokes are not humorous because they deal with sex, but because they signal man's triumph in suggesting verbally what he is not allowed to do physically. All men have to do to have a good laugh is to locate some area denied them and to make a remark which will hold the prohibitions in ridicule. A person denied entrance to a club will sooner or later find a good joke concerning such a club. The joke will usually degrade its members or ensure that they are no better than he.

Because of the inevitable pressures of sex, many of the jokes are based upon relationships that are prescribed by both mores and morals. Man cannot escape the physical restraints of the laws and prohibitions, so he jokes. He cannot escape the brutal fact of the physical presence and menace of the mother-in-law, but he can and does make up the most horrible jokes about her, and silences her through intellect where he cannot otherwise succeed. Or we have the anti-April 15 mood. The reluctant taxpayer must fill in forms. He cannot revolt, physically. So, when he comes to the query "Nature of the taxpayer?" he fills in the precise answer "mean and hostile."

Because man is not simple and because he is often moved by a complex interplay of physical, intellectual, and emotional desires, he has frustrations. Apart from his desire to get to the point of a joke, he also finds himself in a society where there are restraints. Thus, his jokes often involve not only an intellectual exercise as getting the point, laughing at the incongruous, asserting one's superiority, but also in laughing against restraints. The jokes about eloping and getting married involve more than one element: they include nationalities of the pair, misunderstanding parents, a dull or avaricious justice of the peace, inflexibility of the law, and suggestions for the need for a rapid marriage. How can one tell whether a joke is present? If the remark about a restraint is removed, and if the laughter is then entirely removed, then there is no pure wit or not satire. If the restraint is eliminated from the joke, and if the removal of such suggestiveness still leaves a laugh present, we have some pure wit or satire there.

Wit, then, rests entirely upon the verbal nature of word and phrase in asserting one's individuality. From the pun, the riddle, the conundrum, the retort, and the restraint central to the joke, wit rests heavily upon man's character as expressed in intellectual terms. We must realize that in each case man is trying to assert himself to others and to himself. Where he cannot and must not wage a physical war, he attempts verbal compensations.

Paradoxes and epigrams are examples of wit. They are not as popular today as in the past. There are so many restraints that the majority of witty statements is found in the retort and the jest against restraining social forces. More laws, more human impacts, less living space, and more frustrations do multiply the restraints that man feels. Thus, his jests become more complicated. When he cannot retort, and when he cannot gain sufficient satisfaction through his jests at the restraining worlds of law, custom, mores, and morals, he sometimes tries the verbal method of escape through such jokes as the elephant "joke." He expresses the absurdity of the human condition by making statements which are so absurd as to bear no relationship to reality. The "shaggy dog" stories are examples of such absurdities. We now turn to a more obvious and rugged tool- invective.

With invective, we have indictment, patent, direct, and forceful. Human misconduct, of a serious nature for comedy, is lashed by vigorous language so that the person or audience is totally discredited. In invective the total individual is assaulted in body, mind, and spirit. He is totally condemned. The problem here is that he cannot reform because there is no nerve left untouched, and no point from which he could possibly reorganize for betterment.

Because invective is powerful, direct, and vulgar, and often profane, there can be no retort, no repartee. There is only one side to the question. The speaker or writer marshalls all of his forces and delivers a crippling blast. Two famous-or notorious-examples of invective have already been cited- the attack by Hal on Falstaff and the indictment of man by Swift-in Gulliver's Travels. The crudest form of invective is that employed in a sustained string of oaths or curses. Swear words are examples of the invective mood. Invective seldom evokes a laugh because the language is too close to values of a more serious nature. In politics, in castigations of criminals by sentencing judges, in the harsh exhortations of players by coaches, in the vulgar language of the huckster, and in the ranting of the fanatic or eccentric, invective is most frequently found. The language is composed of the most powerful and violent consonantal effects. The tones are savage and unrestrained. The striking force of the words is high. The words do not aim at making subtle distinctions. Our next tool of comedy is quite vital and important, and exists in the epic and in tragedy, as well as in comedy.

In irony there are statements of facts, but the facts carry different meanings for some people rather than for others. There is a certain mystery because the central character cannot understand why others would have different opinions concerning the same facts when he has his opinion concerning them. He delivers his opinions or makes a judgment on a certain plane which does not reveal to him all that is known to exist. When Duncan looks forward to ease in Macbeth's castle, his comments concerning the attractiveness of the setting are an example of irony. Another and limited audience understands full well what is in store for Duncan. In the instance of Macbeth, the irony is a present-future sort of concept. Duncan actually finds facts which convince him for that time and place that all is well. We know that an action is supposed to take place an action that has yet to arrive. In an important way, Duncan is thoroughly justified in holding his point of view, for no matter what may happen later, the castle does have a pleasant air then.


When Jones goes into the office of his employer, a certain Jackson, thoroughly expecting to be given notice of a promotion and an increase in salary, his expectation is a fact. Its realization is not, at this point. As much as expectation can constitute what people really have, our friend is dealing with a present reality, to him. We know that another set of circumstances exists. This set will result in a thwarting of Jones' expectations. We know that he is going to be fired. Irony may be present, too, in such a way as to be known, not to a circle of other people, but to the hero alone. The irony may result from what he believes about a certain event or an expected event from the physical universe, only to be shocked by what occurs. When Hardy wrote his magnificent poem "The Darkling Thrush," he was stunned to find that what he believed to be a world of unrelieved desolation turn out to be a glorious symphony of carolings by a bird, one that would be the least likely to echo happy tidings. We must not fall into the error of considering that irony refers only to the double audience in which the hero hears and does not understand and the other audience which knows what the hero knows and which also knows much more. The hero does really hear; he does really understand, and he really does know. But what he does not know is that his frame of reference must encounter another frame of reference, living, or dead. He is not so much misled by the facts that are fodder for his experience as he is by other facts that he does not know, or cannot know. Sometimes irony results from character, sometimes from accident. The hero may be such a person having such a defect that always operates to limit his vision. On other occasions, pure accident or coincidence may intervene to thwart our hero--as in not having change for a telephone call at a critical moment. He has ten dollars in bills, but not even ten cents in silver to get the operator.

There is a deliberate kind of irony, one in which an individual will profess to an ignorance he does not have. In so doing, he will entrap a person who acts in the light of the other's pseudo-

ignorance. This type of irony is "Socratic irony." In this variety an audience gathers to watch a person make a fool of himself by encountering one supposed to be naive, unsophisticated, and ignorant. We have discussed the double audience in which experience the hero has a double knowledge, the second knowledge proving, sometimes, more unpleasant than the first.

Occasionally, the entrapper is entrapped. In the subtle "The Cask of Amontillado," the audience is taken into confidence by the hero "I." But, when the one who would entrap his proposed victim and wall him up because of an insult delivered in the past does succeed in walling him, the entrapper perceives the irony. His victim does not realize why he is being walled up, although he perceives what is being done. Thus, the insult is not avenged. Fortunato, the victim, is the victor because he has insulted the "I," and, although he has been murdered, the insult is not avenged. The insult is not avenged because such vengeance would require that the victim know just why he is being dealt with. In Graham Greene's The Power and the Glory, the state does not win with the death of the whiskey priest because another priest, even stronger, takes his place. All the struggle is followed by an irony: the intensity of the state's persecution serves only to set up a quiet and strong resistance, one through which the new-comer, the new priest, will be all the more effective.

We are more aware of irony in tragedy than in comedy, and a few of the illustrations cited are in the tragic tradition. But comedy, from Aristophanes through the present, has dealt with the incongruous, the difference between what we think is worthwhile and what is really of value. Comedy relates the confusion which exists when man gives full seriousness to situations which are not really involved with fundamental values. The young lover who cannot eat, who cannot sleep, and who would throw the better part of his life away because he has not heard from his girl friend comes under the irony of the comic tradition. The stereotyping which makes the old seem futile and doddering to the young, and the irresponsibility seen in the young by the old exemplify this difference between appearance and reality. There is some irony in the June and November courtship. Each is condemned for being together in view of the disparity in age, experience, interests, and vigor. However, the irony comes in the picture in that those who often object are the young. The young man ridiculing the older man who has succeeded may often be playing the role of one who uses the difference in age factor to cover up his own lack of success. Or the irony may come in because of the assertion that only the young are suitable mates for the young. The irony does not result from the fact that the young are not usually suited to and for the young, but through the reasons why such a thesis is asserted. The irony here may not come from the act, but from the reasons why the act is performed or not performed. Ironically, many of the problems do not come from acts or decisions, but from the reasons for each.



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MOREHEAD STATE UNIVERSITY: BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Editor: Dr. Lewis W. Barnes, Professor of English

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Dr. Ruth Barnes, "The Nature of Physical Nature" Vol. V, No. 3

Whatever is done in literature will be done with words and through words. Such is true concerning the writer and speaker--and such is true concerning the critic. Whatever the magnificent and sometimes tortuous workings of the mind in its creations of various literary forms, the net results are WORDS. In virtually every case the words come from the dictionary, from the common lore and store of terms which stand for classes of referents.

These words carry more than one meaning. To ask for the exact meaning of any word--even in context--is to reveal one's ignorance of the nature of language. Words carry several meanings. The same referent may be tagged by different words. But there is a finite number of meanings, and because of this fact, one can "focus down" on words, and, through so doing, approach the meaning most likely for any particular context. The "focusing down" becomes somewhat more difficult in literature. Normally, the increased difficulty is also attended by a richness of literary ambiguity, an ambiguity which is central to literature. Perhaps there is a need to review the nature of literature, or perhaps there is the need to define the way in which literature is viewed for this writer.

When anyone has thought, sensed, and felt, he has encompassed the range of human reactions to experience. Considering "experience" to be the conscious or unconscious responses to the world of things, ideas, events, institutions, places, and people, in time and space, I would assert that any experience must involve the worlds of sense-thought, sensations--sense stimuli, and emotions--or the worlds of head, heart, and hand, metaphorically stated.

I consider a work--oral or written--to be literature if there is "thinking with feeling" about the elements of experience--people, events, things, ideas, institutions, all in time and space. The feeling must be of sufficient threshold intensity, as we have observed in earlier issues of this bulletin, to evoke certain emotive states. That different individuals respond to different intensities within these states seems adequate evidence for defining individuality and for accounting for the richness in diversity in literary vehicles.

Returning to my opening sentence, I assert that whatever is done with and for literature--or for non-literature, in fact, will be done by words. At this point I will modify this assertion through limiting myself to a consideration of the literary statement as found in books--as distinct from the literature of screen, television, and radio.



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MOREHEAD STATE UNIVERSITY: BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Editor: Dr. Lewis W. Barnes, Professor of English

Dr. Ruth Barnes, "The Nature of Physical Nature, Vol. V, No. 4

In pursuing the language of physical nature in literature, I shall pause for a moment or so to indicate that "nature" is a term somewhat loosely employed. I mean, by "nature" the essence of a thing, idea, institution, person, or event. I refer to "nature" as indicating that which makes one kind of experience that kind of experience, rather than any other kind.

We read and hear such expressions as "He is a nature poet." "Wordsworth, Longfellow, and Byron loved literature." "Robert Frost writes poetry about nature in New England." Next to the words "goodness," "democracy," "truth," and "cooperation," few words are used with more vagueness and uncertainty. While we admit that all words are used as images, metaphors, and symbols, and while we agree that meanings are seldom in the word itself, nearly all people with some experience in English manage to have a common understanding with the majority of our words. This paper is written with the hope of clarifying the nature of physical nature as used by writers and speakers, and as understood by readers and listeners. I shall continue with the question of "nature" for a few more lines.

We will prosper more, perhaps, if we consider the words "essence," "definition," and "nature" together. The "essence of a thing, idea, institution, event, or person is that which makes the part of an object discussed different from any other object. Because of the essence of man, he can make fire, pass judgments; write, speak, and consider his religious state--among many other human attributes. "Definition" refers to that which makes all forms of experience different from each other in at least one unique way, if not through more than one unique way. To define "dog" or "cat" we find at least one particular element which will make the one different from the other--and from other living forms.

In philosophy, in art, in accounting, and, in fact, all other forms of human endeavor, we also use the term "nature." What is the nature of Kant's philosophy? What is the nature of cubism? What is the nature of impressionism? What is the nature of the balance sheet? What is the nature of the off-tackle play? We can see that "definition," "essence," and "nature" have many similarities, and that they are, in many cases, quite synonymous.

Together with the use of nature as the nature of man, the nature of the mind, the nature of government, the nature of mathematics, we also have the other "natures of." Most important to the literary figure is nature in terms of the world of things outside us--

In defining the nature of "physical nature," we discover that one of the "essences" is that physical nature must include the total world of matter--man, all other forms of biological life, and all forms of non-living matter.

Because each man has a different personality, but also because each man defines physical nature in a unique way or ways, all men have one or more visions or definitions of the nature of physical nature. How does each man visualize physical nature? The forms are many and quite amazing: on many occasions, man views nature as controlling man; on other occasions, man views man as controlling nature. We shall list the different interpretations that literary figures have had of nature. Then we shall discuss through words, through visual effects, through thematic music, and through poetic and prose statements of different writers, specific illustrations and examples of each view. The list to be treated is as follows:

1. Physical Nature as "Beautiful"
2. Physical Nature as Useful, Utilitarian
3. Physical Nature as Friendly
4. Physical Nature as Hostile
5. Physical Nature as Indifferent
6. Physical Nature as Good
7. Physical Nature as Good and Evil
8. Physical Nature as Evil
9. Physical Nature as Immanent
10. Physical Nature as Transcendent
11. Physical Nature as Transcendent and Immanent
12. Physical Nature as Pantheistic
13. Physical Nature as Pantheistic
14. Physical Nature as a Mirror For Man's Moods
15. Physical Nature as Setting Man's Moods
16. Physical Nature as a Highway to God
17. Physical Nature as Reflecting Naturalism
18. Physical Nature as Christian Existentialism's Support
19. Physical Nature and Atheistic Existentialism
20. Physical Nature in the Classical Tradition

This list by no means exhausts the number of possibilities for interpretation. There is no question that the list could be presented in other ways. We shall also observe that we can make sub-classes or sub-lists under each of the main headings. We shall keep in mind during the succeeding presentations that we refer, in all instances to "physical nature."

As well, the point must be made that in addition to the qualities and attributes we emphasize the language tones which carry and serve each unique view treated here.

Nature as "Beautiful"

Here, the author tries to give such expression as will convey some aspect of his aesthetic experience. Whether we believe that beauty is found in the object or whether beauty is found in the subject, or whether the subject has, per se, the makeup to apprehend the dimensions which yield the sensation of beauty in the objective world are not issues here. The author, at least, uses physical nature to express himself, verbally, in language which yields the pleasurable sensations one has in terms of sensorial aspects of physical nature. I suggest that we consider, for one example, the lines found in Sir Walter Scott's Lady of the Lake :

The western waves of ebbing day roll'd o'er the glen
their level way,
Each purple peak, each flinty spire was bath'd
in flood of living fire.

The crispness and dynamism of the terms indicate the positive pleasurable sensations obtained from a certain experience of physical nature. The enduring imperial note in "purple," the rough enduring grandeur of "flinty," and the rolling permanence in "living fire" carry a phonology reflecting a certain rugged and powerful beauty. In some contrast, physical nature can be treated as useful. Poets do not often reflect this aspect of physical nature, but novelists often do .

Nature as Useful


As indicated, few poets would seek universality of truth in laboring the thesis that nature is, essentially, useful, or utilitarian. Truck gardeners would do so. Owners of vineyards would do so. Owners of coal mines and oil wells have been known to view physical nature in terms of its utilitarian aspects.

Fishermen viewing the seas, lakes, oceans, and rivers as sources for food and for making a living often do so. Our Puritan ancestors, often embarrassingly materialistic, and many of the gentleman farmers in the South had a vigorous view of nature as being rather useful. William Byrd, in his "History of the Dividing Line," gives a typical eighteenth century view of nature as meeting many of man's material needs and desires:

...each cell contains a seed of the size and figure
of a black-eyed pea which... is very good mast for
the hogs and fattens them in a short time.

The tar, made in this method is less valuable because
it is said to burn the cordage, though it is as
full as good for all other uses as that made in
Sweden or Muscovy.

The lines may have an informal and "homey" touch, yet the note of nature as quite useful is ever-present. In the next number, I shall consider other aspects of physical nature in the list.



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Editor: Dr. Lewis W. Barnes, Professor of English

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Dr. Ruth Barnes, "The Nature of Physical Nature," Vol. V, No. 5.

In the last issue, we considered nature as beautiful and nature as useful. I shall present more views of physical nature, commencing with the third concept of friendship.

Nature As Friendly

Nature viewed as friendly is not uncommon to poets, but is less common to novelists. Writers of the sea often tend to see physical nature in a less friendly light. The romanticists, on the whole, tend to reflect physical nature as exercising or presenting a friendly and sympathetic face or attitude toward those who contemplate and respect or love her.

Even here, however, the English romanticist's poetry is tinged with a melancholy, a melancholy often sufficient to reveal less friendlier notes in the universe. While Milton's poetry indicates some mild awareness of physical nature as friendly, his puritanical nature, as reflected in his poetry, exhibits many notes of rejection. Wordsworth was the most consistent poet in viewing physical nature as a friend and ally of man. If not always an ally, his poetry reflects nature as a sympathizer. From his "Three Years She Grew in Sun and Shower," we find this theme:

Three years she grew in sun and shower,
Then Nature said: A lovelier flower
On earth was never sown;
This child I to myself will take;
She will be mine, and I will make
A Lady of my own. (ll.1-6).

The phonology both eulogistic and calm and intimate in its sustained tone carries an inclusive, entirely harmonious union of physical nature, the speaker in the poem, and the subject as child. The unity of the "three years" and the union in the triad of possession and embrace in

/ this child I to myself will take:/
/She shall be mine,/
/And I will make
A lady of my own /

are excellent examples of the perfect functioning of phonology and syntax to yield a distinct tone carrying a range of meanings, but carrying a range in that all members of the set give or evoke pleasant or friendly notes.

Not all poets view Nature , Physical Nature, as Benign.

In nature viewed as hostile, the poet or writer gives a powerful personality to the physical universe, holding her material manifestations as those seeking to destroy man.

Nature as Hostile

Rolvaag's Giants of the Earth does not yield language which views nature as solicitous. Any farmer who has lived much of his life in dust bowl areas, for example, is not likely to consider physical nature as genial, nor would he see her as indifferent. Matthew Arnold seldom considered nature, physical nature, as being on man's side. In his "Rugby Chapel" we find the lines:

Coldly, sadly descends
The autumn evening: The field
Strewn with its dank yellow drifts
Of withered leaves and the elms
Fade into dimness apart (ll. 1-5)

The chill and harsh falling sounds in "coldly," "sadly," and "descends," reinforced by the bittersweet symbolism inherent in autumn, together with the drawnout flatness of "evening" tend to make the words carry a remorseless lack of sympathy. "Strewn," "dank," "yellow drifts," "withered leaves," and "dimness," sustain the pervasive discordant phonology of the sequence of the phonemes which, together, tend to yield the negative effects. I perceive the hostile notes in the poem "Grass," one of Carl Sandburg's vigorous, but harsh pieces of poetry.

Carl Sandburg's poetry does not harbour much friendliness for men or man on the part of physical nature. In "Grass," the following lines carry antagonistic nuances:

Pile the bodies high at Austerlitz and Waterloo
Shovel them under and let me work--
I am the grass. I cover all.

And pile them high at Hettysburg
And pile them high at Ypres and Verdun.
Shovel them under and let me work.
Two years, ten years, and passengers ask the
conductor:
What place is this--
Where are we now? (ll. 1-11)

From our experience with the meanings carried by the words, but also from our sensitivity to the sounds in combination in "pile," "shovel," "cover," and through the drawnout and falling tones in "years," we can see and feel the same heavy and hostile weight of physical nature, as employed in the words of the poem. Here, much of the effect is achieved by the repetition of "pile" and "shovel."

In the lines from the two poems, "Rugby Chapel," and "Grass," the notes have been heavy and falling in intonation, and markedly so. But hostility is not always carried through dull, thudding, and pounding notes. In the delicate and rapier-like artistry of the lines of the poet A.E. Housman, one sees a quarrel with an aspect of physical nature that is assuredly unfriendly:

Yonder see the morning blink:
The sun is up , and up must I,
To wash and dress and eat and drink
And look at things and talk and think
And work, and God knows why.

Oh, often have I washed and dressed
And what's to show for all my pain?
Let me lie abed and rest:
Ten thousand times I've done my best
And all's to do again.

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Here the negative effects are achieved through the harsh, imperative, and demanding meanings carried by "must I," "wash," "drink," "eat," "dress," and "ten thousand times." From a phonological point of view, I call attention to the dyslogism in the sounds of "a" in "pain" and "again." Then I invite consideration of the abrupt and conclusive use and usage of the "k" and "w" throughout the verse. The "s" is sequenced in such a way or ways to carry the tone of an inevitable being forced ahead, beyond the scope of one's own volition. But there are other views of nature other than those of being friendly and unfriendly or hostile. Another view, and a rather grim one is that of physical nature's being a force of indifference.

Indifference is usually more difficult to bear than hostility, for hostility can be changed to a more optimistic view of man and experience. To be ignored or not considered, or to be a subject or object of uninterest is often unbearable for many individuals.


Nature As Indifferent

In viewing nature as indifferent, neither for nor against man, one can cite the language in Hardy's novels and poetry. Classic examples from his novels are Return of the Native, Mayor of Casterbridge, and Under the Greenwood Tree. Many of the lines of his poems are charged with the tones of indifference:

"Come hither, Death," I heard Death say:
"I did not will a grave
Should end thy pilgrimage today,
But, I, too, am a slave."

"The Subalterns," (ll. 12-16)

Interesting to note, and the reader can ascertain the intonation through his own efforts, are the balanced falling and rising tones, and the terms of opposition. Where the word "will" indicates force, necessity, and obligation, the opposition and cancelling effect(s) can be noted in "did not." The closing phrase "am a slave" is opposed and cancelled by "But, I, too," There are not many examples of poetry and prose as indicating indifference, but we can obtain some of these effects in the works of naturalism.



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MOREHEAD STATE UNIVERSITY; BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Editor: Dr. Lewis W. Barnes, Professor of English

Vol. 5 No. 4

Dr. Ruth Barnes: "Interpretations of Physical Nature"

We have noted that nature has been considered as "indifferent." I suggest again that any interpretation that places the entire world of physical objects, with all its total and specific forces, in the role(s) of rolling on, caring neither for man nor for any other living form is far from an optimistic view of life.

Hardy's view had, for him, and for his art, the consequences of limiting his concern, eventually, to merely describing the nature of physical nature. In such description, he found and revealed a delayed contentment, a contentment which carries the central meaning that we can appreciate other forms of experience without expecting any specific communications from physical nature for or against a human being. The problem with such a view is that we have to abandon the concepts of "good" and "goodness"--unless we are to define them pertaining only to the relationships among human beings and the relationships of human beings and the creator(s).

But there have been those who have considered physical nature as "good." And as good in moral senses! Since "good" can have its variations and can be variously-stated in different religions, we do not expect to see the concepts of "nature as good" appear in identical forms. Let us consider the concept of nature as "good" in Ralph Waldo Emerson's "Woodnotes":

For Nature ever faithful is
 To such as trust her faithfulness.
 When the forest shall mislead me,
 When the night and morning lie,
 When the sea and land refuse to feed me,
 'Twill be time enough to die;
 Then will yet another mother yield
 A pillow in her greenest field,
 Nor the June flowers scorn to cover
 The clay of their departed lover.

Here the speaker in the poem goes to the central core of Nature in the realization that the highest values in her go beyond gratifying man's physical needs. Yet Nature will, for a time, even show her essential concern, her maternal concern, as "good." For the speaker does not say that "Nature" is, through its forest and night and morning, denying him. The key word "when" indicates that such a time has not yet arrived, and, in the meantime, as the mother guides and feeds her children, he will be taken care of, if he trusts Nature, until the time for dying has come. Then he will find, again, the good and goodness that he

From a language point of view, we might note the horizontal and even falling tones in the words, indicating that the emphasis is on Nature in a horizontal sense, not in the sense of having forces in NATURE which are above us, or forces which we reach by any upward or spiralling thrusts. "Nature," "faithfulness," "mother," "yield," "cover," "departed," and "lover" carry tones in a straight line; terminated by a fade-fall, each capable of being able to carry the meaning(s) of a Nature substantially pantheistic. (We must take care that we do not assert that every word stands for a specific meaning which can be determined by level, rising, or falling tones. However, we suggest, strongly, that certain phonemic constructions are more appropriate in carrying certain meanings than is true of other meanings.)

Then we come to a "transcendent" or "deistic" way of viewing nature. Pope's Essay On Man carries, among other meanings, the meaning that the entire universe, nature, is good. Man does not find nature good: one man can see only parts of the whole. He lacks adequate reason, or he does not use the reason that he has. There is a moral absoluteness in nature that cannot be discerned or intuited without a keen rational insight. We have some of the lines from the Essay on Man, Epistle I:

All nature is but Art unknown to thee:
 All chance, direction which thou canst not see:
 All discord, harmony not understood:
 All partial evil, universal good:
 And spite of Pride, in erring reason's spite,
 One truth is clear, Whatever is, is right.

:Deism" is the philosophy, one most significant during the first-third of eighteenth century England, that God exists outside and not inside the world of sensible objects. He created the world, and, as perfect, God could not create that which would be other than perfect- or other than "good." The suggestion or the implication that even the Creator can not disturb the universe, once created, seems to be evident to some degree. We can easily be led from an apparent optimism to the realization that here we might have a state of "indifferentism."

Yet, considering the fact that each one of us has an element of Platonism within him, we can agree, perhaps, that as human beings we can see only parts of a whole. We cannot be at all points at the same time. Being at one point and having the physical, intellectual, and emotive views that such a point affords, we cannot have the views we would have at other points. We can, of course, stand at one position and postulate the view that we would have the same percepts and concepts were we to stand at other positions. If we find a consistent pleasurable view from one point, we may ascribe the same view to all other points. If we stand in a time and place where we have a disastrous earthquake, or tidal wave, or both, we may ascribe the same kind(s) of misfortune or misfortunes as being characteristic of other times and places.



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MOREHEAD STATE UNIVERSITY: BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Editor: Dr. Lewis W. Barnes, Professor of English

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I indicated that we are concerned with the theses and language which would treat Physical Nature in the sense of being both good and evil. We need not be surprised that such a view has emerged. We often believe that we can know one aspect of experience only through knowing other-and opposite- aspects of experience.

Physical Nature affords effective opportunities for developing or presenting or describing a view of life as composed of elements of both good and evil. Sometimes the point of view is that one is not intelligible without the other. Another point of view is that the world must always be partially unpleasant and unsatisfactory because evil exists along with good. When one sees the sunshine soon followed by floods, earthquakes, typhoons, tornadoes, or tidal waves, he must consider that there is some merit in urging this point of view as to the evil-good aspects of nature.

The parallel or analogy between physical nature as good and evil can be seen in the calms and storms in human nature, in the bewildering array of generous and selfish action in and within the same individual. Thus, whether this concept of good and evil ranges from a mere use in demonstrating that man can be as pleasant and unpleasant as the faces nature wears, or whether physical nature is employed in terms of a dualism which is essential, as to good and evil, this view is a significant one in literature.

William Blake considered the world of physical nature as constituting a strange dualism--an interesting, if agonizing mystery. Evil is as essential as good, apparently, to the speakers in Blake's poems. In Blake's "The Tiger" the poet asks, almost angrily:

When the stars threw down their spears,
And watered heaven with their tears
Did he smile his work to see?
Did he who make the Lamb make thee?

The tiger symbolizes the evil in physical nature, in this, a seventh, view of physical nature. But the tiger also symbolizes the good. If fire burns, scars or destroys, fire also cleanses and tempers. In the initial stanza, such meanings are carried through

Tiger! Tiger! burning bright
In the forests of the night,
What immortal hand or eye
Could frame thy fearful symmetry?

"Symmetry" and "bright" stand in paradoxical contradistinction to "fearful" and "burning." Such is the case in tone as in the more overt semantic effects. In this brief treatment a detailed analysis and synthesis of the poem cannot be possible. Nevertheless, the reader is invited to read aloud, with proper and natural rhythms the different stanzas of this poem. When he does so, he will note the range of the sensorial, the intellectual, and the emotive contradictions as to good and evil. The tone of the questions in each of the six stanzas carries powerful implications to note, all springing from the denotative elements of the questions, and the implications move the reader to look up and out toward a power that the speaker in the poem would not dare to judge on the same horizontal level which would indicate that the tiger reflects only evil.

On a more sophisticated level, the six stanzas reflect and represent more than an experimental form. There is the "six" as representing in many languages the hour of insight, recognition, and truth. The end of the sixth stanza, a stanza which repeats the first stanza closes with a question that accepts the reality of the "immortal hand" and leads toward the transfigurative truth of the necessary reality of an evident physical evil and a no less compulsive supernatural truth of a goodness that can be questioned, but not denied. There is the point, at which the material worldly reality of evil has to be resolved: the synthesis of twin facts. First, the tiger can be but a reflection of attributes already a part of the perceiver, and the speculation as to the "how" and "why" and justification of the tiger's creation must be at least the realization of a superior creating power. That the tiger is not created by Satan must be evident through the phonology of the words carrying the meaning, and through the sense of religious and ethical history, all of which would state explicitly the fact that Satan is not the Creator.

Even when the speakers in Blake's poems employ a symbolism not always the common knowledge of the community of readers who read the poetic lines, the tones of the words cannot deceive.

The sustained and pervasive force of the words reflects a vibrant, powerful, resurgent, and dominating force that is not to be defeated or submerged, and this overall powerful set of tones is more characteristic of a being with more good than evil. There are more sources than the poetry of Blake for this concept of good and evil in action together. We can cite the Faerie Queen, Moby Dick, The Iliad, Pilgrim's Progress, any Shakespearian history play or tragedy, War and Peace, The Red Badge of Courage, and The Ambassadors among other poems, plays, and novels.

Perhaps the American representation of the good-evil thesis is more evident and dramatic in Whitman's work, in the novel Moby Dick and Mark Twain's novels. At any rate, the readers are invited to compare and contrast the use of the good-evil doctrine as it appears in American and English literature, as well, of course, as in Russian and German literature. Then we have the concept of physical nature as evil, as malign, as diabolical.

The Puritans tended to view physical nature as evil. Many of Hawthorne's short stories carry this note. There are few that do not.

Few poets carried on a longer running battle with a god who would permit nature to be evil than Housman. Very few of his seventy-seven years were spent in other than angry observations that all that is beautiful, worthwhile, and exalting must die, and die soon. The words in his poetry carry a delicate facility that lasts long enough to make the happier elements of youth entirely momentous. This delicacy of tone sharpens to indictment at the time of the fact that nature robs and destroys without discriminating between the good and the bad, between the attractive and the unattractive. If there is any slight balance, the bad may fare a bit better. The tones which indicate the lofty and the high are contrasted unforgettably with those which carry the low and duller tones of earth, as in "To An Athlete Dying Young." I offer the first two stanzas as furnishing some truth for this assertion:

The time you won your town the race
We chaired you through the market-place;
Man and boy stood cheering by,
And home we brought you shoulder-high.


Today, the road all runners come,
Shoulder-high we bring you home,
And set you at the threshold down,
Townsmen of a stiller town.

In terms of phonology, morphology, and syntax, the contrastive elements as words in sequence between these two stanzas should indicate support for the observation made that there is the sharp cut off and the abrupt decline from airy heights. The pervasive if not eternal course of physical nature as evil is nowhere more poignantly stated than in Housman's from More Poems, "Number7":

Stars, I have seen them fall
But when they drop and die
No star is lost at all
From all the star-sown sky.
The toil of all that be
Helps not the primal fault;
It rains into the sea
And still the sea is salt.

The evil that pervades our experience cannot be remedied by the wasting and ceaseless labor that is man's, a labor that robs him of his physical and intellectual beauty. The "primal fault" which is that of Adam is still with man, in physical nature and in man himself, as a form of that nature.

The tones that fall and promise a sort of death in "fall," "drop," and "die" are kept from fading out through the interposition of the strong "star-sown sky," and "still the sea is salt." Then, we must leave Housman and his blaming of God for creating a world of nature, sinister and evil in all respects and parts.



MOREHEAD STATE UNIVERSITY: BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Editor: Dr. Lewis W. Barnes, Professor of English

Volume 5, Number 8

Dr. Ruth Barnes: "The Nature of Physical Nature"

We consider now a thornier matter, that of Physical Nature as "Immanent." "Immanent" as used here refers to a powerful God who places himself in nature, not outside nature. Such a belief acknowledges that God exists. Blake's lines in a "Stanza From Auguries of Innocence" reveal this immanence:

To see a World in a grain of sand
And Heaven in a wild flower;
Hold infinity in the palm of your hand,
And eternity in an hour.

The words carry such meaning that we can, without too much labour, see that eternal values are infused into microscopic elements of the material word- such as "grain of sand," "wild flower," "palm of your hand," and "in an hour." But there is much more to the matter! The phonology is powerful indeed. ALTHOUGH THE ELEMENTS CHOSEN ARE PHYSICALLY MICROSCOPIC, the tones of the particular words or phrases are strong, indeed. "Grain," "sand," "Palm," "hand," and "hour" are far from weak. Thus, when the meanings carried by "World," "Heaven," "infinity," and "eternity" -themselves phonologically powerful- are placed in close syntactic relationship with the words that seem microscopic, meaning-wise, they are strong enough to hold all the weight and force of the infused words-- World, Heaven, infinity, and eternity. Additionally, the speaker allows no more than a comma's juncture in the first and third lines, allowing the cumulative effect of "World" + "heaven." then that cumulative effect of "infinity" + "eternity."

We note that there is major punctuation at the end of the second line. This punctuation forces the reader or listener to ponder or reflect. The tempo is slowed. Here, the major punctuation serves the role of stopping to take on or amass the powerful final two lines, giving, at the end, a tone of overwhelming power.

I also point to Irwin Edman's "Eternity" as casting God as inevitably immanent:

I know there is no meaning in the mist
 That wraps in gray these mountain girdled shores ,
 Nor in those loud black waves once moonlight kissed,
 I feel no threat in their untimely roar.
 I cannot read a language in the surge
 of Breakers; there is no immortal sign
 In midnight winds: I hear no Demi-urge
 Hiss in the storm, nor think the world divine.
 I am too lessoned in the changeless law
 Behind the beauty of this cloud-banked gloom
 To mark it with simple trembling awe
 God's reckless thrust of avenging doom.
 Yet while Reason routs these dreams and fears,
 Eternity keeps thundering in my ears.

In this fine and powerful poem there is a speaker who is seized with the concept of a remorseless world of atoms which seem to speak of nothing that is supernatural. In none of the small physical details does this speaker hear the words of the divine or semidivine. The speaker implies that he is so strongly gripped and convinced of the power and inevitable workings of Newton's Laws and the other laws of science to feel the breathless and all-encompassing call of faith, reverence, and or awe.

Then, at each critical moment all nature thunders its message of eternity to him, His world of hand is swept aside; his world of head is not adequate; for, he is swept, if tormentingly so, by the world of heart, sensibility, emotions, volitions, or conation.

But, when we read carefully, and when we hear the sounds of words reflect the orchestra of human thoughts, senses, and emotions at work, we can see expressions so powerfully sustained that they contradict the use of the "no" in the entire set of lines.

When we read the lines aloud we realize that the "I" indicates that the negative aspects are from his own self, as real or fancied. That is, he really cannot find meaning; he can feel no threat; he can read no language; and, he can hear no demi-urge. Or, he imagines, or desires, or tries to will or wish that he cannot hear, read, and find all these signs and realities.

But the tones betray. He cannot weaken the force of "mountain girdled shores," "loud black waves once moonlight kissed," "language in the surge of breakers," "immortal sign in midnight winds," "world divine," among other phrasing. The speaker has done in this poem what Blake's did in the four short lines cited earlier. Here, however, the effect is done through powerful tones of motion, touch or pressure, and sounds: "wraps," "kissed," "roar," "surge," "breakers," "winds," "hiss," "storm," and "thundering." The "I" and "no" are not powerful enough to counteract the speaker's desire for rational solutions, or for the comfort, if a grim one, of the acceptance of the world as one of a determined naturalism.

Physical Nature asserts herself, and successfully so. Because the last line, with its syntax so ordered that we have a powerful personification in "Eternity," knocks out or eliminates the "I," the reader has an explicit statement that physical nature is ordered, infused, and made real through a divine spirit great enough to submerge Reason and the world of the senses of a powerful, perceptive, and probing speaker.


Then, finally, the speaker's statements are those that are wrung from him by a force greater than his own. His very denial of "no" becomes futile since he follows the negation with the worlds of experience that he is negating. That is, he "protests too much."

When the speaker keeps "matter in the mind"--rationalism-- he is still unable to cope with the spirit of nature. When he shifts to a world in which the "mind is in matter"--naturalism--he is still no more successful, for the "mind in matter" is overpowered by the divine spirit which, infusing all elements of the material world, can result and does result in a condition, where /Eternity keeps thundering in my ears./

So much for God as "Immanent." We will find that the romanticist and the romantic spirit insist in a divinity that is in nature herself, and which enlivens and ennobles nature. Many of the popular love songs carry words which insist that God is in and of every act of love and courtship. The pervasive idea that there is some creator with immanent powers occurs, perhaps negatively, when, as individuals, we curse and condemn, even using words which are of a sacred or religious nature or order, physical objects a part of physical nature--rakes, hoes, the rain, the wind, the sun, the winds, and the waters, among other elements of the physical world.

In the next issue, I shall consider an order in physical nature which views God or a creator as transcendent, and another which postulates the supernatural as both transcendent and immanent, as inside and apart from the world of physical nature.

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MOREHEAD STATE UNIVERSITY: BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Editor: Dr. Lewis W. Barnes, Professor of English

Vol. 5., Number 9

Dr. Ruth Barnes: "The Nature of Physical Nature in Literature"

This concept which deals with a force, or a god, or God as both immanent and transcendent is primarily a Judaic-Christian concept. That is not to suggest that other religions such as Mohammedanism and some forms of Greek religion were unaware of a force existing outside and inside the universe.

In the literary sense of dealing with this transcendent-immanent concept, God is outside the world in a sense that is inflexible and ordering. He is also inside the world as immanent. With such a theory, a god or God need not be tied to any theory which makes the deity equal to any particular manifestation of nature. The "Twenty Third Psalm" from the Book of Psalms reflects that presence in and out of nature:

The Lord is my shepherd; I shall not want.
He maketh me to lie down in green pastures;
He leadeth me beside still waters...

C. Day Lewis' The Magnetic Mountain reflects this total presence:

Where is he, where? How the man stares!
Do you think he is there buttoned up in your stars?
Put by your telescope:
You can't bring him nearer, you can't stir, you haven't a hope.
Is he the answer to your glib equations,
The lord of light, the destroyer of nations?
To be seen on a slide, to be caught on a filter? The Cause
Lined in his own laws?
Analyst, you've missed him, or worse and worst
You've got him inside? You must feel fit to burst.
Here, there, everywhere
Or nowhere. At least you know where. And how much do you care?

Apart from the phonological clues, there is a sharp difference in the relative abstractions in the words in the earlier lines as compared and contrasted to those dealing with God as immanent. If the speaking or writing is effective, any form of communication or expression must distinguish the words in two categories, an aloofness of the God outside and the gripping force of a God inside. The tones of the words in context in the closing two indicate a moving away again from the immanent, from the force as personal and inside.

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In a religious sense, when the concept of that which is transcendent and immanent is applied, there is a God outside, a divinity inside, and a fusing or synthesizing force that establishes a reversible flow of force- as in The Father, The Son, and The Holy Ghost.

In literature, the synthesizing force would be the poet, or the novelist, or the playwright, or the short story writer. This concept is not often applied to literature. The poet, for example, would find himself caught and made somewhat impotent in terms of two forces that he could not control. The transcendent is difficult for a poet. Perhaps that is the reason why there are so few sonnets written well. Pantheism is an easier concept for the poetic art in the sense of being able to apply physical nature to it.

Pantheism, is, in a brief and somewhat incomplete sense, a pagan concept. The meanings carried by "theism" and those carried by the god Pan, of Greek vintage, indicate a worship of physical nature associated with the presence and operation of a god in the universe of things. Pantheism is the belief that a religious, all-controlling spirit speaks through physical nature, and that the religion is, primarily, a polytheistic one.

In Greek literature, Pan has certain positive and negative qualities, among the latter a certain marked sensualism. However, in more modern applications of pantheism, the stuff of the "sensuous" is employed, rather than that of the "sensual." The Greek concept of a number of deities existing in and through various concrete parts of physical nature has the advantage of being able to present richer varieties of human personality as thrown against the many faces in physical nature--where each face is given an animated personification through the god or gods associated with physical nature.

Furthermore, within physical nature, although each minor deity has his own method of operating and a sphere for operations, each god has his own rules and laws which can be relatively abstract. Thus, there is the "nature" of Ceres, as well as her specific concern with various edible forms of vegetation. There is the "nature" of Pan, and then there are his individual operations.

Instead of calling on a traditional god, Wordsworth reveals his pantheistic elements in the passage:

Therefore am I still
A lover of the meadows and the woods,
And mountains: and of all that we behold
From this green earth; of all that mighty world
Of eye, and ear--both what they half create,
And what perceive: well-pleased to recognize
In nature and the language of the sense
The anchors of my purest thoughts, the nurse,
The guide, the guardian of my heart and soul
Of all my moral being.

The tones of the phonemic combinations in context are horizontal and sustained. The tones are infrequently allowed to move up. Quiet and long--somewhat rolling--the tones, ending with "mountains," echo a sense of breadth through the following words:

therefore	meadows
still	woods
lover	mountains.

When the voice would tend to soar as in "behold," we are brought back to this encompassing horizontal force in "from this green earth"--with the extending tones in "green" and "earth."

This continuum is sustained through the phonological length of the structure starting with "well-pleased" and terminating with "moral being." The decisiveness in the tones of "guide," and "guardian" indicate a permanence, a lack of the ethereal aspects of the more airy parts of physical nature.

One would believe that the many faces of physical nature, as such, would require or evoke different tones. We have the sensorial aspects of earth, itself, tones with considerable range. However, the upper ranges--pitch-wise--are not as high as is the case when dealing with "air." We have word tones evoked by or associated with water, in the forms of ponds, lakes, seas, oceans, creeks, brooks, and rivers. Because we would not believe that all persons look at any aspect of the physical in the same way or light, we would expect a range of tones.

Keats is more concerned with the stuff of earth itself than is the case of Wordsworth, if we can assess this interest or concern with their lines as they appear in poetic form. On the other hand, Shelley's lines have phonological reaches quite in keeping with his ever-present concern for all that is supernal to earth. Through reading aloud, one should be able to hear the lifting, spiralling, and soaring effects of the phonemic combinations. I suggest reading aloud Shelley's "Ode to the West Wind," "The Cloud," and "To a Skylark." When these poems have been read aloud, I suggest that poems by Wordsworth and Shelley be read aloud. One can hear the differences and understand much through hearing such differences in tone. Careful attention to pitch, stress, and juncture are essential and rewarding.

There are many poets whose pantheism is evident in the semantic analysis of the poems, an analysis which is best reached through feeling to the depths of one's orchestral being the range of sounds of sense, sensibility, and sensation.

There is often some confusion as to distinguishing between "pantheism" and "immanence." In "immanence," there is a force which is complete in itself, needing no further justification or structuring as to its powers and limitations. In "pantheism," the controlling force is itself subject and subordinate to other forces and gods. Nearly all examples of pantheism reflect some religious or supernatural ideas. In sharp contrast to the last three interpretations of nature, we come to the interpretation of nature as a source of physical laws governing the universe.



MOREHEAD STATE UNIVERSITY: BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Editor: Dr. Lewis W. Barnes, Professor of English

Vol V, No 10

The period called the Neo-classical Period, the Augustan Age, or the Age of Reason, could more properly be known as the "Age of Newton." No individual exercised a more potent effect on his era than did Newton. Alexander Pope, the "Lord High Priest" of this neo-critical age, paid tribute to the intense influence Newton made on the thought of his time:

Go, teach Eternal Wisdom how to rule--
Then drop into thyself a be a fool!
Superior beings, when of late they saw
A mortal man unfold all nature's law,
Admired such wisdom in an earthly shape,
And showed a Newton as we show an ape.

Lucretius' line in "Of the Nature of Things" (De Rerum Natura) makes a magnificent approximation of the atomic theory in a work that visualizes physical nature as the source for understanding the complete laws which govern the entire entity of the universe.

Here, the complete tone negates the romantic statement. The crispness of "Superior and Admired," the non-poetic syntax in "teach Eternal Wisdom," "unfold all nature's law," and "Admired such wisdom" miss the organ tones that strike to the soul. However, in their being sustained, crisp, and incisive, they tend to evoke intellectual responses. The quality that makes for an emotive response is the semantic element of inversion, of an antithesis that furnishes transport from the sublime. The sudden shift from wisdom to foolery and from wisdom to apishness is revealed in the sustained elevation of the first line's tones to the abrupt, shocking effect of the second line. There is a sharp downward gradation in tones. Here, phonology is important in enabling the reader and/or listener to get the effects. We shift, now, to a unique view of nature as reflecting men's moods, or as being influenced by man's moods.

This fourteenth concept is that classic example of the poet who believes that physical nature best serves the role of reflecting back the temperament or personality of man. From Childe Harole's Pilgrimage come Byron's lines:

Once more upon the waters! Yet once more!
And the waves bound beneath me as a steed
That knows its rider. Welcome to their roar!

The punctuation of the transforms as exclamations, the up and down tones in the three lines, and the sustained violence in the "r" sounds lend themselves to expression a concept whereby nature, herself, takes on the role of serving the moods of the writer or poet.

In the poetry of T.S. Eliot the mood of various personalities - many of them decadent--determines the treatment accorded or reflected in physical nature:

"The yellow fog that rubs its back upon the window pane."
and the line
"April is the cruellest month"

Despite the relatively short words in the first line cited, there is a painful dragging out and levelling set of sounds present. In the second line "cruellest" both violently and lingeringly signals "month." We are thrown back into a questioning mood that seeks to solve the paradox. We say "paradox" because April is usually associated with being the real essence of spring, a time for renewal and re-invigoration. Here, the words in "April is the cruellest month" result in our considering the spring can bring back memories that winter has allowed us to forget--painful memories.

Then, there is the lesser art of Rupert Brooke but an art, nevertheless. His art seized on all aspects of physical nature in terms that made--and make--them symbols of man's variable moods.:

Ah! God! to see the branches stir
Across the noon at Granchester!
To smell the thrilling sweet and rotten
Unforgettable, unforgotten
River smell, and hear the breeze
Sobbing in the little trees.

More carefully attuned to nature as revealing its will to man by way of imposing her many moods on man is that thesis that nature serves mainly for the purpose of revealing her nature and moods through individual men.

Much of Wordsworth's poetry reflects the impacts of physical nature on man. An excellent example of having man reflect nature's soul comes from the following:

] It is a beauteous evening, calm and free.
The Holy time is quiet as a nun.
Breathless with adoration: the broad sun
Is sinking down in its tranquillity.

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Thy soul was like a star and dwelt apart:
Thou hadst a voice whose voice was like the sea.

For oft, when on my couch I lie.
In vacant or in pensive mood,
They flash upon that inward eye
Which is the bliss of solitude;
And then my heart with pleasure fills,
And dances with the daffodils.

Here we have three examples from Wordsworth's poetry , and each one indicates some of the effects physical nature has upon the artist, as poet .


It is important to note that one should read to major punctuation. Careful reading and paying attention to the tones of the words at appropriate places indicate the fire and power of words as they move from nature through and to the individual. The significance of the colon needs to be stressed, in that, in English, at least, such punctuation is a signal that what follows the whole or entire assertion is but a part or series of parts. The semicolon, not too often used in the poetic mode, indicates equality of importance on either side of the semicolon.

The use and usage of the semicolon can be noted and the relative effectiveness senses through considering the extracts from Wordsworth's poetry.

Coleridge reflected, equally well, the power of nature over man's feelings. From "Kubla Khan" we have the awe-evoking word sequences:

But oh that deep, romantic chasm which
    slanted
Down the green hill athwart the cedarn cover!
A savage place! as holy and enchanted
As e'er beneath a waning moon was haunted
By woman wailing for her demon lover.

The speed of the phrasing in the second line rushes the reader or listener in an oblique career until checked by the decisiveness in "A savage place." Then the slow tones of the rest of the passage force the reader to an active imagination seized by the contrasting tones and meanings carried in and through "holy and enchanted" and "waning moon" and "woman wailing." "Then, there is the seldom surpassed art of Shelley, as he works through the concepts of the effects of physical nature. Shelley, far more Platonic in tone and theme than is true of her fellow writers in the English Romantic Tradition, indicates, through his poetic lines, the unique appropriateness of the fusion of language and literature.



MOREHEAD STATE UNIVERSITY: BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Editor: Dr. Lewis W. Barnes, Professor of English

Dr. Ruth Barnes: "The Nature of Physical Nature in Literature"
Volume V, Number 11

In the last issue (Vol. V, No. 10), I closed with reference to the art of the poet Shelley. Shelley's personal knowledge of the physical aspects of physical nature and his no small skill in physics and chemistry, made him most powerful and effective in handling the poetic statement:

His exquisite "Ode to the West Wind" reveals, through this small cluster of lines, this unique power:

Drive my dead thoughts over the universe
Like withered leaves to quicken a new birth!
And, by the incantation of this verse,
Scatter, as from an unextinguished hearth
Ashes and sparks, my words among mankind.

The first two lines, ending with the powerful "new birth!" blend the concepts of opposition, through which the "dead" can be "revived." The slow but driving tempo of "Drive my dead thoughts over the universe" shift to the speed of to "quicken a new birth." Semantically the "quicken" and "new birth" are entirely appropriate and effective. The speed of "quicken" promise and presage a new birth or life, as the contrast between "the quick and the dead."

When we move to the next three lines, terminating with another exclamation point, the theme commencing with "drive..." and ending with "birth," and the passage commencing with "and" and ending with "mankind" are, together, in tone a powerful incantation. They can literally be sung. The powerful remorselessness of the force of the west wind is paralleled, linguistically, with "Scatter, as from an unextinguished hearth/Ashes and sparks, my words among mankind." The unremitting and unending actions and nature of the west wind have their comparison and contrast in "unextinguished hearth", a pair of words both vigorous and sustained. As the action of the wind sends the leaves out and down, Shelley's words also go out and down to mankind, indicating and permitting the strong inference and implication that Shelley identifies himself as being on a supra-earthly plane--with the West Wind.

Then, there is Keats, another English romanticist. Facing the certainty of a horrible death from tuberculosis, Keats looked at nature in "La Belle Dame sans Merci." Surrendering himself to her wintry and death-like mood, he wrote his death lament:

And that is why I sojourn here
Alone and palely loitering
Though the sedge is withered from the lake,
And no birds sing.

I call the reader's attention to the fact that there is no punctuation until the final line, ending with "sing." The entire set of words is horizontally cast. The extension through "loitering" and "sojourn" is phonologically and semantically painful.

The significance of "though" should be noted. When all that is representative of life in action in touch or pressure and sound is gone, he is a part of but not one with what is left. The tones and meanings in "alone" and "palely" reinforce the concept "loitering." No interpretation of "loitering" can take us far away from unpleasant connotations. He can be said to loiter because he has no purpose and no intimate or even rational association with being on earth where he is--not even when other forms of life are apparently gone.

Or, he finds himself at odds with nature, for, although the birds will return and although the sedge will renew itself, such will not be possible for him. Thus, his loitering seems almost agonizing and heart-rending in intensity. The whole lament is reinforced through the finality of the final line, one quickly descending in tone, and one decisively ending with a strong fade-fall or fade-out of the voice. Yet, in the sixteenth interpretation of physical nature and literature and the poet, we can move to a somewhat happier scene.

In this concept, the poet employs nature as a highway to God. Physical nature, in all of her aspects, is designed to lead man, under the right conditions, directly to a God transcending nature and man himself. Gerard Manley Hopkins considered that man could find his way to God by more than one route. Moreover, he could find his way to God through physical nature as well as from other traditional and institutional methods and creeds. For Hopkins, artist that he was, religion was essential in that only a person in a state of spiritual grace could make such an artistic flight to God as that through the physical forms of the universe. Using his theory of "inscape" and "instress" through which a person, spiritually moved, could blend in such a way that he could literally merge with nature and she with him, Hopkins could make the spiral flight to God over the highway of natural beauty. This winging, spiralling flight is indicated in each of his short poems, particularly in that of "Spring."

I walk, I lift up, I lift up heart, eyes,
 Down all that glory in the heavens to glean our Savior;
 And eyes, looks, heart, what lips yet gave you a
 Rapturous love's greeting of realer, of rounder replies?

.....
 The heart rears wings bold and bolder
 And hurls for him, O half hurls earth for him under
 his feet.

The short duration and the stabbing intensity in "walk," "lift up," "heart," and "glean" give a springing effect. Then the gathering speed in the first few words parallels the image of an aircraft moving down the runway, gathering the impetus essential to make both the horizontal and spiralling up effect on the takeoff. The last two lines gather sonority through "rears," "bold," "bolder," and "hurls."


I find an interesting contrast in the poetry of William Cullen Bryant's "Thanatopsis." The direction is quite different--nature is not the highway to God in a spiralling sense, but, instead, a dictum to go down to a quite alien divinity, a material divinity in the soil itself:

So live, that when thy summons come to join
 That innumerable caravan which moves
 To that mysterious realm where each shall take
 His chamber in the silent halls of death,
 Thou go not, like the quarry slave at night,
 Scourged to his dungeon, but, sustained and soothed,
 By an unfaltering trust, approach thy grave
 Like one who folds the drapery of his couch
 About him and lies down to pleasant dreams.

If the lines are given their natural and proper articulation, the tones will be found to be measured, powerful, dignified, and even majestic in a somewhat harsh way. But the tonal features shift and change rapidly commencing with

"but" and ending with "pleasant dreams." The vigorous horizontality of the first five and a half lines gradually deepens and ends with a marked falling thrust, terminated by the final phrase.

I have directed attention to the matter of moods evoked by or thrust upon physical nature. The moods reflect the romantic temperament of the poet. The next issue will consider the question of physical nature and naturalism.



MOREHEAD STATE UNIVERSITY: BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Editor: Dr. Lewis W. Barnes, Professor of English

Dr. Ruth Barnes: "The Nature of Physical Nature in Literature"

The reader needs to be cautioned, again, that no particular set of sounds, no specific morphology, and no inflexible syntax will, of themselves, indicate one meaning rather than another insofar as a one-to-one relationship with semantics may be concerned. Nevertheless, syntax, morphology, and phonology must be seen as expressive and communicative of human personality. Insofar as there are definitely certain emotions, beliefs, and attitudes encompassed in each individual and through all individuals the language must have certain signals, signs, and markers to point to or evoke certain meanings rather than others. The past few issues have indicated some useful "clues." Over any passage of substantial length--and over a series of such passages--the language will reveal certain directions and routes leading to central meanings carried in the language. As has been pointed out, some of the clues are more than obvious. Others are---and quite rightfully so--- more subtle. I suggest a review of the past few issues. I now direct your attention to the question of the nature of physical nature and naturalism.

This philosophy equates man with the basic qualities and particles of physical nature. Unique to this philosophy are the facts of its equating the basic stuff of matter itself with man, himself, and its equating man with the qualities and attributes of all aspects of matter. This unique blend of metaphor and absoluteness make for its literary effectiveness--as well as for a difficulty in mounting an effective attack on its premises. Naturalism has entered literature in at least two ways. First, there is the matter of "style." One of the features of style is the appearance of the form of ornaments and figures of speech. The use of the flat image, with a faithful reliance on physical details, has increased appreciably in American, English, and French literatures.

Second, the reader has been forced to the primary and somewhat engrossing concern with the physical fact itself. Sometimes, when the reader's art is great, the physical meaning carried through and by the flat statements is so powerful that the reader is left on that level. If he is raised to "wonder" or "surprise" the wonder or surprise comes from contemplating the physical fact, as such. The use or employment of naturalism in literature has tended, in American and English writing, to show man as brutal, sordid, vicious, and altogether primitive. Quite often, however, some readers and listeners are found to be in confusion over certain aspects of "romanticism" and "naturalism."

Each tries to make literature a matter of the sensations and attitudes of the reader or listener. However, the meanings carried by "romanticism" seem to reflect a god or gods within nature; while, on the other hand, "naturalism" itself makes matter a god. While the romanticist insists on rendering the "common" uncommon, the believer in naturalism insists that the common remain "common" even though he has to work uncommonly hard to achieve that effect and direction. The ultimate goal of "naturalism" is one of "telling it the way it is," or of destroying such moral value statements as "truth," "mercy," "justice," and other terms bringing to mind or to heart virtues and vices. Obviously, the former statement of goal or purpose is that of its supporters, and the latter, that of its detractors.

In "naturalism" there is found no evidence for personal survival and no encouragement that life in this human race is more than a brief second in the dream of a relentless human existence related to the chance movement of atoms. That is one of the bases for the grim--if honest--philosophy of naturalism. We now come to the deep, sometimes mysterious, and always dark realms of the interpretations of physical nature in this literary philosophy. Instead of placing "matter in the mind" the believer in naturalism places the "mind in matter."

There is the belief that all matter, including that which comprises the human being, combines through merely the chance movement of elemental particles through which movements all forms of organic and inorganic compounds are created. Naturalism will take matter as not "God-like" but as God. Naturalism from the religious points of view sees the universe as an impersonal order in which things are created and events made only by and through the pressure of natural causes. Two lines from Swinburne's poetic art indicate a natural interpretation of man and his spirit as opposed to a supernatural view:

O natural force of spirit and sense that are
One thing in all things, fruit of thine own : fruit.

The same thesis is invariably held in the works of Steinbeck and Hemingway. From the latter came Across the River and Into the Trees, a work strongly replete with this grim view of nature. Steinbeck's East of Eden and Grapes of Wrath are examples of literary naturalism. The same grim notes come through in poetry, in such as Jarrell's "The Death of the Ball Turret Gunner":

From my mother's sleep I fell into the State
and I hunched in its belly until my fur froze,
Six miles from earth, loosed from its dream of life,
I woke to black flak and the nightmare fighters,
When I died they washed me out of the turret with a hose.

The flat images, asserted on the primary level, are more than adequate in making the assertion semantically and philosophically clear and effective. The personification used heightens the dramatic impacts.

Thus, naturalism identifies man with the stuff of matter in such a way as to strip him of his aspirations and to dehumanize him through stripping away his sense of his own dignity and divinity.

In Masfield's "If All Be Governed by the Moving Stars" is the frightening question a poet must ask of modern science:

Is all this beauty that doth inhabit heaven
Trail of a planet's fire? Is all this lust
A chemical means by warring stars contrived
To bring the violets out of Caesar's dust?

The question warns man as to what can be lost if the soul is negated in terms of embracing a philosophy of life derived from chance combinations of matter. Masfield goes on with same gloomy judgment:

Better be grass, or in some hedge unknown
The spilling rose whose beauty is its own.

We see the same bare but stark assertion of the physical fact. The philosophy strikes the same grim notes in Mann's The Magnetic Mountain.

Rather was it conveyed and shaped by the somehow
awakened voluptuousness of matter, of the organic,
dying, living substance itself, the reeking flesh."
Leopardi strummed the sombre chord in "On an Ancient Sepulchral
Bas-Relief":

But for our woe
Or for our weal no care
Hath nature, bent on ends no one can know.

We can see here a certain "Indifference" that we discussed earlier, particularly with respect to Hardy. However, apart from being written at different times, diachronically-speaking, there are distinct differences in the phonological aspects of the poetry of "naturalism" and the poetry of "indifferentism." John Manifold, Australian poet, in a grim mood, drove home the "nail in the coffin" of man's dream of seeming really important. In "The Griesly Wife," Manifold states, devastatingly

Oh- long may the fire burn for him
And open stand the door,
And long may the bed wait empty:
He'll not be back anymore.

The reading aloud of these passages in comparison and contrast to other writers and poets not in the tradition of naturalism will serve to make the importance of relying more upon the "sound of sense" a sound and profitable practice.

MOREHEAD STATE UNIVERSITY: BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Editor: Dr. Lewis W. Barnes, Professor of English

Volume V, Number 13

Dr. Ruth Barnes: "Existentialism and Physical Nature"

How does the "existentialist" regard the nature of "physical nature." Are there significant linguistic features in any interpretation of physical nature insofar as existential thought and expression are concerned?

There are varieties of existentialism as there are varieties of other kinds of "isms" and "ists." I am aware of the difficulty in making the clear-cut statement as to what an existentialist is. However, there are certain assertions that can be made concerning the existential mode and person.

First, the existentialist is concerned with living, and, as such, with the realities of sensing and feeling. In the area of sensing, the existentialist leans heavily on sensorial appeals, but does so with the emphases on the "ing" or "progressive" part of tense and tense structure. The existentialist is concerned with "choosing," "willing," "enduring," "agonizing," and other verb forms indicating process, rather than completion.

The existential mind is one that abhors the direct object. The direct object admits of external standards or criteria. The existentialist is "choosing" but not choosing someone, something, some person, some event, some idea, or some institution. For him, the awareness of the acting and sensing counts more than the completion of acting or action.

If, indeed, the existentialist does follow his "-ing" statements with some noun or nounal, he does so for the sake of the "process" rather than for the sake of indicating a transitive action. If the existentialist is "choosing alternatives," "alternatives" as the word or as the samantic unit exist only for the sake of bringing "choosing" into play.

As long as the existentialist is awareness of himself as "existing" and as long as that awareness has primacy in his own personal response to experience, he considers himself as "free." The awareness of all of his experiences could be better put as "being aware of his experiencing." To surrender himself to the completion of an act, or a thought, or a sensation is to give part of himself over to someone else or something else, at least. He acts as though he must not allow the verb to have a verb-completer unless such a completer would be one of a process or "ing" mode or tense.

The romanticist is one who agrees that the personality in experience with the world of events people, ideas, things, and institutions has three interacting claims and ingredients--the worlds of thought, the worlds of sensation, and the worlds of attitudes. His assertion, with its many forms and varieties, is a direct and unequivocal one. The world of the imagination which is equated with the world of emotions and volitions is the world that is the most important--to him. The rationalist makes another and different claim.

He agrees with the romanticist that the same kinds of experience exist for each and that the three worlds of thinking, sensing, and emoting are there for each. However, his assertion is that while all three must exert their claims, reason is, by far the most important and crucial in dealing with experience, or, in short, in facing life. Then there is the adherent to and of naturalism.

The "naturalistic" individual agrees with his colleagues--the romanticist and the rationalist--as to the nature of the world of experience and as to the same three kinds of worlds that are operative--mind, senses, and volitions or emotions or attitudes. However, the believer in naturalism asserts, shortly and not uneffectively, that the kinds of experience are the same for each, and that he agrees as to the three worlds of sense, sensibility, and sensation. But, his vote, decisively for him, goes to the world of matter, to the sensorial world.

Yet, all three are essentialistic, not existential. By "essentialistic" I mean the philosophy that there are objective and external essences dominating and controlling all kinds of experience. One essence is that of the absolute claims of the mind, another of the absolute claims of the body, and the third of the absolute claims of the spirit. The fact that the three schools which encompass the romantic school, the rational school, and the "naturalistic" school differ only as to the primacy of the demands of one part of the personality should be kept in mind. The romanticist, asserting the power of the volitions, will not reject the reality of the world of thought. Nor will he reject the reality of the world of things.

The believer in naturalism, asserting the necessity of the dominance of the world of the sensorial, does not deny the realities of thought and feeling. Nor will the rationalist ignore the claims of feeling and substance, however much he may cast his election for the world of cognitions. Each accepts the reality of external claims, claims having the force of reality beyond--and even pressing on--the individual.

Now, the "classical tradition" is characterized by the same belief that there are worlds of ideas, events, people, institutions, and ideas--existing and functioning in space and time. He also believes that the three worlds of thinking, feeling, and sensing are all that each individual has at his disposal in meeting experience. The classicist asserts that what is important is not the mind as such, not the will as such, and not the world of senses as such. What is important is that each is stressed according to what kind of an experience is being handled by a certain person at a certain place and time.

That is, in a "classic" there is the felicitous blending of thinking, feeling, and sensing so that writer and reader come to the conclusion that content and form blend nearly perfectly for what happened or what existed for that particular time and place.

Now, existential statements cannot be in the traditions of the romanticist, the believer in naturalism, the rationalist, and the classicist. They wrote and write about experience in such ways as to indicate that one may respond to the worlds of security, personal affection, power, and adventure in certain unique ways of acceptance, tolerance or rejection, but the acceptance, tolerance or rejection are for themselves only. The reality of all kinds of experience are accepted as existing and having realities for different kinds of people at different times and places. The existentialist, whatever his brand, agrees whole-heartedly with his position that to admit group standards and concepts is to make them a part of him, and that to make any kind of external reality a part of one's own central self is to surrender one's freedom.

Doing, thinking, yearning, working, choosing, rejecting, and deciding are all that count, and all that count because they are not capturing some external force or being captured by some external force. "Loving" is vital, but "loving someone" is frightening. "Being loved by someone" is even worse. Consciousness of the process is that which is critical.

To say "I love him" or "I am loved by him" is, for each case, for each existentialist, an unhappy if not fatal condition or position. To say that "I love him" is to ascribe the "I" and the "him" in some definite relationship which binds each to each. To say "I am loving," or "I am loving him" is another situation and condition--and for the existentialist, an infinitely happier one.

The existentialist who is convinced that awareness of his processes in the progressive "ing" sense indicates the fact of "existing" finds himself in a terrible predicament. His entire allotment of space-time, clock-time, and psychological-time is utterly and entirely filled with moments which become real to him only through the sensorial impacts made on his consciousness. Further, his predicament is also one in which he is at the mercy of the language of the essentialist. The entire array of religious, ethical, professional, political, economic, and social statements are derived from and grounded in a language requiring the major use and usage of the transitive mode. When the mode is not transitive, the mode is one which invariably furnishes the speaker or reader with a verb completer which is often different as to kind and degree from the subject itself. (Only the intransitive is without the verb completer in English, among other languages.) In the concluding paper on this whole aspect of the nature of physical nature, language, and literary philosophy, I shall make further references to this existential mode.

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MOREHEAD STATE UNIVERSITY: BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Editor: Dr. Lewis W. Barnes, Professor of English

Volume V, Number 14: Conclusion: "The Nature of Physical Nature"

There are "Christian" existentialists and there are "Atheistic" existentialists. The former may see that physical nature is some of God's work; only the work is directly present, not God. Such a view has not produced powerful literature which can rely upon a statement concerning man and his problems. One can easily see that such a view, if literature were demanded in its terms, would result in the poetry of a Hardy who would agree with the statement on grounds of indifference in nature-- or in the poetry of a Housman who would consider such a view valid on the ground that nature is hostile to man. Atheistic existentialism??

The so-called "standard existentialist" is inclined to be atheistic or agnostic. He does not so much stress the thesis that God does not exist as he considers and urges that God's existence is not an issue. He simply believes that the existence of the individual precedes essence, an essence which the non-atheist would consider derivable from God. The atheist considers that subjectivity is the starting and finishing point(s). The atheistic existentialist would agree with Jaspers, for example, that in knowing physical nature herself there are only objects-- but objects which admit of the possibility of knowing or of being known. Unfortunately for the atheistic existentialists, this view of physical nature is disastrous. The view which is disastrous is that which admits that objects in nature can know. The only way they can know is to be transferred by chance action of atoms to living objects. Once this admission is made, then the existentialist can no longer preserve the integrity of individuality. There is no proof that he can supply, no support that he can seek, no aid that he can claim, and no hope that he can have that he is not, himself, the chance result of an accidental collision of the basic particles of matter. Thus, the existentialist confines his views of physical nature to philosophic discussions--keeping many of his views from nature. However, such a piece of work as Hart Crane's long poem, The Bridge embodies an attempt to deal with physical nature in terms of a sort of atheistic existential theme or thesis. In the concluding look at the nature of physical nature there is a much brighter picture.

This view of physical nature is one which sees her embraced in such ways that a classic may or can result. I define, for this instance, at least, "classicism" as that literary philosophy which synthesizes heart, hand, and mind--with "hand" representing the world of sense objects--in terms of things, persons, ideas, events, and institutions in the right proportion at the right time.

When Macbeth opens with the theme of
 /When shall we three meet again/
 In thunder lightning, or in rain?/

there is a happy integration of thought, emotion, and physical nature. The entire tragedy encompasses thinking with feeling in terms of the three elements of sense, sensation, and sensibility and does so in such ways as to reveal beautiful and moving truths of mankind--the grandeur of a struggle in which tragedy strikes a god-like man who would then become or be God. The magic of Margaret Mitchell's use of nature to reveal rational and romantic qualities of her heroes and heroines in Gone With the Wind is another example of the use of nature in the classical tradition. T.S.Eliot's view of modern man as seeking only freedom from fear, not freedom for action, has found a powerful expression in The Wasteland. For those who dread being reminded of the grandeur that man could have, the first few lines of the first section of the poem are unsurpassed:

April is the Cruellest month, breeding
 Lilacs out of the dead land, mixing
 Memory and desire, stirring
 Dull roots with spring rain.

Few passages can surpass the grandeur of the language of physical nature used by Christopher Fry in his Thor, With Angels. Equating the coming of God and Christianity with the return of the men of Rome and extending his imaginative personality to a blazing personification of physical nature, Fry's verse bursts the bonds of ordinary life:

..... the men of Rome
 Returning, bringing God, a winter over, a breath
 Of Green exhaled from the hedges, the wall of sky
 Breached by larksong. Primrose and violet
 And all frail privileges of the early ground
 Gather like pilgrims in the aisles of the sun.
 A ship in full foliage rides in
 Over the February foam and rests
 Upon Britain.

For perfect synthesis of soul, mind, and nature in the physical sense, there is little question that Keats' "When I Have Fears That I May Cease to Be" embraces all aspects of time, reason, emotion--all of the macrocosmos:

When I have fears that I may cease to be
 Before my pen has gleaned my teeming brain,
 Before high-piled books in charactry,
 Hold like rich garners the full-ripened grain:
 When I behold upon yon night's starred face,
 Huge cloudy symbols of a high romance,
 And think that I may never live to trace
 Their shadows with the magic hand of chance:

And when I feel, fair creature of an hour!
That I shall never look upon thee more,
Never have relish in the faery power
Of unreflecting love! then on the shore
Of the wide world I stand alone and think
Till love and fame to nothingness do sink.

In such senses, then, and with such sense, physical nature is the inevitable part of all great literature.

We have seen and have heard the various interpretations that man has made of physical nature. While the majority of illustrations has been through the poetic mode, physical nature is, to a degree, treated in like respect in other forms of literature and also in other forms of art.

I pass for you, in review, the world of an inexhaustible supply of material forms: nature as stimulating the sensation of beauty, nature as useful through satisfying man's material needs, nature as friendly to man, nature as indifferent to man, nature as hostile to man, nature as good in a moral sense, nature as both good and evil in dualism, nature as evil, nature as immanent, nature as transcendent, nature as immanent and transcendent, nature as pantheistic, nature as a highway to God, nature as the source of natural law, nature as reflecting man's mood, man as reflecting nature's moods, nature as naturalism, nature in terms of Christian and Atheistic existentialism, and nature in the classical tradition.

I close this set of presentations with the reminder that in addition to the semantic aspects of linguistics, there has been much emphasis on the tones of the language structures with reference to different philosophies and interpretations involving physical nature. Each piece of literature will contain more than one view of physical nature: thus, the tone pictures in a language sense will be rich and rewarding.

Because of the significant numbers of ways in which and through which man expresses his meanings in the various interpretations of physical nature, teacher and student---and layman---will profit well from a phonological experience with the verses of poetry and with the paragraphs of prose.



MOREHEAD STATE UNIVERSITY: BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Editor: Dr. Lewis W. Barnes, Professor of English

Volume V, Number 15

Robert S. Walther: Importance of Structure and/or Function in Poetic "Phrasing," "Balancing," and "Clausing"

Josephine Miles indicated what reference to English Syntax can do for English Poetry. There are many ramifications to her work, and many avenues which can be explored--and are being explored. In summary and in short, she made a study of eras or cycles of English poetry, commencing with the fifteenth centuries and running through 1940. She explored a thesis that there are cycles in English Poetry, cycles which can be broken down into three main classes: there is the phrasal kind of writing, the balanced sort, and the clausal type.

While the length of the cycles is not immediately critical to these observations, her cycles go, in regular rhythmic changes, from and through periods of 40, 30, and 30 years respectively--from the fifteenth century.

The phrasal type of poetic statement places more emphasis on the adjectives as pronominal than on the verbs, all in relationship to the noun. That is, the whole tone and tenor of her work are centered around the relationships of Adj-N-Verb. When there is an emphasis in the direction of the adjective, we have the phrasal statement. When the adjectives and verbs have a constancy or equivalence, numerically speaking, to each other, there is the balanced mode. When the verb is weighted numerically over the adjective, there is the clausal statement or mode.

Examples of the phrasal mode are 11-17-7, where the first number refers to the adjective, the second to the noun, and the third to the verb. The balanced is indicated by 8-11-8. Here we see that the numbers of adjectives and verbs are evenly weighted. In such a ratio as 7-13-10, we can see the 11/7 weighting of the verb over the adjective.

Now, the thesis or hypothesis adopted by Miles is shown as operative over the 450 years encompassed by the study's range in that during different cycles there is a shift from clausal to balanced to phrasal, and then back again. Not all major writers during the same period will be clausal, or phrasal, or balanced. However, a major number will be, for that period, in one of the three categories. The information given thus far is only to indicate the scope and nature of her study.

Phrasal writing is that which is descriptive in nature. That is, we would expect to see well-developed and powerful noun phrases, with significant slot-filling in the adjectival class ranges. The balanced mode assures descriptions and narration through the well-balanced verb phrase and noun phrase. In the clausal statement the emphasis as to quality and quantity is centered on the verb phrase and the inactive or dynamic modes.

Her key essay "Eras in English Poetry,"¹ assures us that she is making no extravagant claims. She points out that while the 40-30-30 cycles are reasonably well-defined there is some wavering over the mid-centuries. She does not claim that every philosophy such as rationalism, romanticism, existentialism, and naturalism have certain fixed and inflexible sentence structures which separate one philosophy from the other. She does not assert that diction or metrics are enough, in themselves, to distinguish one literary mode from another. However, she does claim, and the majority of reflective critics have tended to agree that the ratios Adj:Noun: Verb do reveal a sequential pattern.

If anything, she has understated her case. The patterns do recur, and in their recurrence seem entirely characteristic to the major spirit of "zeitgeist" of an age. The "sense of sound" and the "sounds of sense" can never be merely accidental. The beginning and ends of periods can be likened to the analogy of the extreme swings of the pendulum, with the mid-periods seeking a balancing or restoring synthesis for each period. The process can be measured through the incidence of Adj-Noun-Verb ratios for each writer and for the general spirit of a cycle.

There is considerable individuality within the general mode. "Clausal" poets, for example, indicate the clausal spirit with the verbal force and thrusts of their statements, but each differs from others, and consistently so. Where one "clausal" poet may have a rather constant range of 7-12-10, another might operate through the range 8-15-12. Such a range is also relevant and evidence for the phrasal and balanced writers. There is no intent and no effort made in this paper to give her work in more detail. The reader is urged and directed to the Miles essay, stated supra and footnoted below. Many specific examples are given, and the reader will be in no small degree illuminated and better informed for his study of her work. Study of the comparative ranges for different poets during the same and different periods will serve to give the reader greater insight into the importance of measuring at least style from the network of phrasal, clausal, and balanced lines.

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¹ Josephine Miles, "Eras in English Poetry," PMLA, Vol. LXX, September 1955, Part I, pp. 853-875.

At this point, sufficient background has been given so that I might raise three or four points that need consideration. First, there is the obvious suggestion that the relationships as to numbers of adjective and verbs with respect to nouns in the same poet's work need to be considered. We are well aware that an excess of verbs over adjectives indicates the clausal note, that the excess of adjectives over verbs for the same condition or poet indicates the phrasal statement-- and, of course, that an equivalence of adjectives and verbs yield the balanced statement.

What kind of writing or what quality of poetry results when the ratio of noun to adjective or to verb is 10-5, rather than 10 to 6, or 11-7. Is the poetic statement stronger in a ratio set of 6-13-6 than in a ratio set of 8-13-8? Here we are asking that we need to consider at what point the focusing on the quality of a thing is stronger than the focusing on the thing itself.

I would suppose that part of the answer would come from the nature or kind of thing, idea, or person that the poetry is defining or detailing. If the adjectival statements are in the position to the left of the nounals, would a number force of half of the nouns direct our attention to the nounal itself, or would the small number act in an exclusive sense? These are critical avenues opened for research and exploration.

One would believe that a set of verbs numbering five with respect to a noun set numbering 11 would give a different tone, temper, tenor, and timbre than poetic occasions where the numbers would indicate a verb set of eight and the noun set of eleven.

What is revealed by and through the poetic art, syntactically stated of 8-11-8 of Poet A and that of the syntax stated as 5-11-5? Does the difference go to reveal the unique styles of two different poets, or does the difference focus on a content and direction that demand the one rather than the other? Certainly, I have no difficulty in considering either or both approaches. In considering the latter, for example, I am opening the way to pointing out that having a difference in the ratio of the same kind of writing based on the ratio of noun and verb and/or adjective points to the specific author, to the kind of writing, or to both. I would be invited to answer a question as to whether or not I would believe that Poet A might vary from Poet B in the sense we have spoken about because he has something different to state than the other poet. Or I might be brought to attention with the question as to whether one could have the same message as to kind and quality with a variation in the ratios. Now, this sort of question can be approached and answered because we can have this useful and stimulating kind of measuring by syntax.



MOREHEAD STATE UNIVERSITY: BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Editor: Dr. Lewis W. Barnes, Professor of English

Periodicals Department
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Volume V, Number 16

Robert Walther: Further Questions on "Phrasal, Clausal, and
Balanced Poetic Writing"

As indicated in the previous issue, I am looking to Josephine Miles' essay "Eras in English Poetry" for new avenues of approach and for certain problems. In the first issue or section of my paper, I gave my interpretation of her general work and its worth and also opened to door to investigation of the "form" and "content" based on the adjective and verb ratios to the nouns themselves, when different poets were not phrasal, clausal, or balanced with respect to each other, but when each being compared was in the same mode as the others. Now, another area offers some challenge.

Let us look to the nouns themselves. We need to consider, I believe, the questions of "structure" and "function." Are we dealing with nouns by structure or with nouns by function? Now, by "structure," I am talking about a "pure" noun. A "pure" noun is that which is by its nature, a "noun." Now, in talking about "structure," I do not talk about "nounals." But, in speaking about "function," I do speak about "nounals." The "al" indicates that the concept of "used" is involved. Now, then, A nounal may consist of a pure noun used as a noun, or a nounal may represent some other part of speech used as a noun. In "Those horrible guilty," "guilty" is an adjective by structure, but a noun by function. I do not need to labour the point by using other parts of speech as nouns, for I am certain that every reader can see or conjure up such examples. But I do desire to point out that we might need to know, in our working with the hypothesis "Adj-N-V" whether we have in mind pure nouns- as structure- or nounals-which can include pure nouns or other parts of speech- as function. What position would we be in were we to consider not only the numeric weight of the noun, but the kinds of nouns and nounals characterizing each example of poetry or each poet. We would perhaps like to consider the number of nouns characterizing substantial sections of one poet's art, but we might fare even better in considering how one poet is unique in his use of verbs for nouns with respect to other poet's, or how strong he is in seizing the adjective for use and usage in the nounal slots. I believe that these areas need to be "researched."

Then there is the interesting question as to the (N-1) slot. There is a place, in English Syntax, reserved for a pure noun- and only a pure noun--to the left of the nounals. How many poets make unique use and usage in and of filling this slot?

Then, in the noun count, has Josephine Miles or her workers taken into account the number of nouns standing next to each other in such a N and (N-1) relationship--as in, for example, "fence posts." Here, we should see that the noun "posts"--whether used as the subject, object, or object of a preposition, has to its left the pure noun "fence." Now, the relationship here is not adjectival, but, is, instead, one of classification in that the posts are a part of the fence--in the same way that we might think of "stone gate" in such a way that we would be considering a "gate" made of stone, or the stone as classifying the material in the gate. We are not talking about attributes or qualities.

We can see that some poets might well use this N and (N-1) syntax, and, in so doing, give another dimension to the ratios of Adj-N-V than may have been considered in Miles' work in "Eras in English Poetry." I do not believe that we can consider that each poet will tend to use the N and the (N-1) slots and slotting in the same way and in the same degree. Then, I would consider that the adjectives would be of some problem.

First, we consider the term "adjectival." All of the adjectives would be within the (N-2) range in our way of slotting in the English syntax because the position to the left of (N-1) is reserved, in English, at least, for the adjectivals. Now, the parenthesis does indicate that this slot is optional. That is, we are not forced or compelled to fill this slot; if we do, then the location is as designated, two places to the left of the nouns. Let us reconsider, for sake of review. The "N" slot is obligatory as to being filled. The (N-1) is not obligatory. The (N-2) slot is not obligatory. Now, the (N-1) slot must be filled, if filled, by a "pure" noun. By a "pure" noun, I mean a noun that is a noun by structure and by function. We should never use the term "Noun by function" to describe the (N-1) words. (However, we can speak of having the entire slot fulfill a function in the English sentence.)

When we come to the (N-2) slot, we consider the term "adjectival," and we are concerned with the "al." We realize that we are speaking about "being used as an adjective." Thus, an adjectival may be a pure adjective, or another part of speech used as an adjective.

This (N-2) slot has several subslots. That is, adjectivals can be broken up into different subclasses since some kinds of adjectivals must stand in a certain relationship to other kinds of adjectivals. For example, the adjectives of "size" cannot stand after the "adjectives of shape." We would say "large triangular" rather than "triangular large." There are at least seven subclasses of adjectivals to the left of the N and (N-1) slots. We can see an interesting set of questions that we would like to pursue, in considering Miles' "Eras in English Poetry." In fact, we can consider this adjectival arrangement as worthy of concern in making any analysis of the short story, or other kind(s) of writing.

There is little point of detailing these subslots in any definitive manner because in all likelihood there are more than seven divisions we can make as to classes of adjectivals within the main (N-2) slot. However, at this present moment, moving from right to left, from closest to the (N-1) to the direction of the last element in the (N-3) slotting, we will encounter the proper adjective, the adjective of color, the adjective of shape, the adjective of size, the adjective of age, the adjective of value, and the verbs used as adjectives.

Now, I suggest that we would need to consider the subclasses employed. Excellence in writing is partially indicated by skill in filling the adjectival slots of color and shape. Less important are those of age and size. There is some need to consider the quality and quantity of the use of the "proper adjective." In the use of the proper adjective, we are usually involved with employing a noun by structure as an adjective. With regard to shape and size, we have no such other-part-of-speech problem. When we come to the adjectival of value, we encounter such terms as "cruel," "vicious," "kindly," "mean," and "genial," among thousands of words calling attention to traits.

I am certain that it would be entirely useful to know how many value words are used as adjectives with respect to the N and V parts of the ratio. Even more significant would be the process of establishing ratios within this entire (N-2) slot as to the kinds of adjectivals used. However, in some aspects of these suggestions, we would be far from questioning the gross or overall value of the work done along the lines of phrasal, balanced, and clausal writing. I would believe that we might shed more light as to the different kinds of clausal, phrasal, and balanced writing--in poetry--for any age and for different ages.

When we come to the (N-2) slot which deals with verbs used as adjectives, the matter may be somewhat more critical. I refer, of course, to such statements or words, or phrasing as in "...delay reaction," "interesting experience," and "harrowing torturing" and other illustrations where we have the present or past participle forms to the left of the N and (N-1) slots. I am concerned as to what effect(s) there would be with relationship to the verbs in the set Adjective-Noun-Verb categories set up in the phrasal, balanced, and clausal category for looking at the poetic statements.

Now, these observations are not directed in any destructive sense at the work or thesis set up and accomplished in the work "Eras in English Poetry." I would suggest that they are logical and inevitable--and healthful--avenues indicated for future and further exploration.

I close by suggesting some value in determining what kinds of sentence patterning are employed, characteristically, in the "V" part of her work, as for example, "to be," "the transitive," "the intransitive," and the "whole-part" verb constructions.

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MOREHEAD STATE UNIVERSITY: BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

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R.C. Goffun: "Some Thoughts on English Idioms: Preliminary Considerations"

The English language belongs to the "Indo-European" family of languages. The wide and embracing phrase "Indo-European Language" consists of a collection of both theoretical and reconstructed linguistic forms from which most of the current European languages, plus most of the languages of Persia and India, have been demonstrated to have descended.

In the early B.C. eras this language spread in both east and west directions, and, in the bilateral spreading, many modifications were, of course, introduced. Thus, the language or dialects brought to Europe from the original source grew into a large number of languages. While distinct in many ways, they have shown kinship even in their separations. When we remember the parts of the world over which these languages have spread, we understand why these tongues are called "Indo-European." We note, in passing, that a "living language" is one which is used in common speech; while a language which has ceased to be spoken but is found in writings of the past is dead, or a "dead language." Hindu and French are living languages, and by the definition used here, Sanskrit and Latin are, as language, dead. However, contributions from them keep the ancestry alive.

The Indo-European family of languages, then, is divided into two main groups, the Eastern and the Western. These are again subdivided, as follows: Eastern Group--Balto-Slavic, Indo-Iranian, (with Persian), Armenian, and Albanian; the Western Group--Hellenic, Italic, Celtic, and Germanic. I might say that as for the other languages of the civilized world, they are divided by philologists between the Semitic and Turanian family.

The English tongue belongs to the Germanic branch of the great Indo-European family of languages. It is the language brought into England by bands of invading Teutons who began to come in A.D. 449, and for over a hundred years afterwards they still kept coming. They found in Britain Celtic inhabitants whom they drove to the mountainous parts of the island. Bede, the old English chronicler, says that these invaders were of three tribes--Jutes, Saxons, and Angles. Long before the Norman Conquest of A.D. 1066, these Teutonic tribes had become so welded together as a nationality that they called their adopted country Angla-land, land of the Angles or England, and their language Aenglisc, or English. English, then, is the language brought into Britain by these invaders. It became the predominant language in South Britain as early as the middle of the sixth century of the Christian era. From that time on till now it has undergone many changes.

[illegible]

occasioned by its growth as a living language. It has adopted many words from other languages, and many of its modes of expression have considerably altered. The language in its old form was rich in inflections, but most of the inflections have been dropped and their function is now performed by prepositions and auxiliary verbs. Modern English is, in reality, a developed form of the language brought into Britain by Jutes, Angles, and Saxons. At first sight there is no close similarity between Old English and the language as now used; but Old English has grown into Modern English by gradual changes, and the successive stages of development are easily traceable in English literature.

Despite the influence of Norman French, and despite the great influx of French words into English speech, English still lived on the lips of the common people. The Saxons in English simply far-outnumbered the Norman invaders. Through the workings of the political aspects of the early eras after 1066, the Norman and Saxons were drawn more closely together. War with France engendered a hate of everything "French." Chaucer's writing gave a mighty impulse in favour of English; and, in the course of time, the so-called "Middle English" dialects asserted their supremacy. But the English vocabulary had by then also become enriched with French words and with Latin words. Norman French was itself a popular form of Latin. The Norman invasion led to the introduction of many new words into the English tongue. Most of the words relating to feudalism, hunting, law, and war came into English through Norman French.

With the revival of learning--a result much hastened through the invention of the printing press and the working of the "Reformation," a great number of words from Latin and an appreciable number from Greek were brought into English. Many scientific terms were derived mainly from Greek. Because of the extensive intercourse carried on by English peoples with the rest of the world for some many centuries, there have been many foreign words of miscellaneous origin brought into English. English is essentially a German language which has become enriched in its growth by a very considerable number of Romance or Latin linguistic elements, and by a smaller proportion of words from miscellaneous sources. The intermingling of German and Romance elements has given to English a greater power of expressing more delicate shades of meaning than can or could be found in a language altogether Romance or altogether Teutonic. The extent to which English has spread is truly marvellous. No other language, ancient or modern, has ever been so widely spoken. As the German linguist Grimm (Origin of Language) states:

English possesses a veritable power of expression such as perhaps never stood at the command of any other language of man. In truth, the English language, which by no mere accident has produced and upborne the greatest and most noble poet of modern times as distinguished from the ancient classical poetry (I can, of course, mean only Shakespeare), may with all right be called a world-language... In wealth, good sense, and closeness of structure, no other language at this day spoken deserves to be compared with it.

There is nothing strange in the fact that so many foreign students should wish to learn English, or should need to learn English. Many books found generally useful are written in English. Valuable books in other languages are certain, today, to be translated into English. The English-speaking people have no monopoly of knowledge, but, judging by the language found in various books, the English-speaking people desired to obtain knowledge from all sources. English has, as we have seen, drawn elements from many sources: hence, its copiousness of vocabulary and its greater power of expressing distinctions of meaning. It is particularly rich in "Idiom."

Under "Idiom" I include peculiar uses and usage of particular words, and also particular phrases or turns of expression which, from long usage, have become stereotyped in English. A few examples will make our meaning clear and plain.

When we say of a woman that "she has a tongue," we seem to say something that does not give much information, only as a whole-part statement on the physical level. That is, she does possess a tongue in her head, and we are aware of the general uses and functions of the tongue. But, then, this expression often carries a meaning that the woman spoken of has a "scolding tongue," or a "sharp tongue," or that she is a "great talker."

Again, "on" and "upon" are commonly equivalents and are usually interchangeable. Thus we say, correctly, either "He acted on my advice," or "He acted upon my advice." Or, we can say "Madras is on the sea coast," or "Madras is upon the sea coast." But though we can say, idiomatically, "Carry on business," we cannot say "Carry upon business." The last statement is meaningless--in English.


Further, many English verbs derived from Latin are compounded of a Latin prefix and a Latin verb. Some of these verbs take a preposition after them in composition, while others do not. For example, "abstain" is from "abs" and "teneo." "Contain" is from "con" and "teneo." But "abstain" is followed by the preposition "from", corresponding to the prefix "abs", while "contain" takes no following preposition:

Abstain from all appearance of evil.

This books contains much valuable information.

Many similar instances might be given. English idiom established by usage "requires" that some of these verbs from Latin should be followed by prepositions and others not. Although no rule has been given showing which usage should be followed in regard to any particular verb, much modern research indicates that the "phonological" has first claim. In other words, the sound complex tolerates or invites some following prepositions and rejects others.

The matter of idiom will be considered further in the remainder of the article as a part of Volume V, Number 18.



MOREHEAD STATE UNIVERSITY: BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Editor: Dr. Lewis W. Barnes, Professor of English

Vol. V, NR. 18

R.C. Goffun: "Some Thoughts on English Idioms"

With today's rapid researching a list of prepositions can be obtained, and, with a master list of verbs, the language can be described in the sense that we can see how much "idiom" exists with verb and prepositions. Then, looking over the entire range of verbs and prepositions in conjunction, one might formulate the rules which permit or do not permit, or which demand, or do not demand, the verb-preposition relationships.

It is not easy to explain why we can say "make a journey" and not "make a walk," but must say, "take a walk." However, if we had the entire range of such idiom, we could probably find some logic--psychologic-- why such is the case. Why can we say of one statute that it is a "dead letter," but cannot say of another that it is a "living letter."? Of a bird flying, we refer to "bird on the wing," and yet we speak of a man as "on foot" and not "on the foot." We say that we should take "matters in hand." But we do not say "take in hands" or "take into hands."

We have been known to say or state "stare one in the face," but not "stare in one's face." We do not say "stare one in his face." We say "set free" and "set at liberty," but we do not say "set at freedom." We speak of a farmer's "implements." But we must speak of a Surgeon's "instruments" and a carpenter's "tools." We "call in a doctor," but we "employ a carpenter."

"Lay a foundation," and not "set" or "put" a foundation!" We say "live from hand to mouth" and not "live from hand to the mouth." We say "upside down," but not "downside up." We can say either "take hold of," or "lay hold of." Now, we can say "take care of," but not "lay care of." Why must we say "take care of" and not "keep care of." We must say that a tree "sheds its leaves," and a bird "casts its feathers." Why does "do one a good turn" mean to do him kindness? Long usage has fixed the idiomatic expression in each case, and from the idiom we may not swerve.

(Editor's note.) I believe that idiom can be described in the sense of being more than "long usage." But I would admit that long usage tends to encourage one statement while keeping others that are possible latent, rather than patent. Further, I would believe that a total view of all idiom--an awesome task--would reveal certain tendencies in the language that would need more than "long usage" to describe them. However, the writer of the article tends to define "idiom" in terms of long usage

Idiomatic turns of expression are usually terse, forcible, and vivid: the same meaning could be set forth in some other way, but not with equal force and brevity. It is the idiomatic part of a language which a foreigner finds most difficult to master. It adds to the difficulty that no reason can be given, or that no reason is evident as to how or why a particular idiomatic phrase has assumed its present form. When the English turns of expression differ from those which set forth the same meaning in his own language, the foreign student is liable to go astray. As a general rule or observation, an idiomatic phrase may not be altered.

No other synonyms or synonymous word can be substituted for any word in the phrase, and the arrangement of words can be rarely modified. Any attempted change in the wording or collocation will commonly destroy the idiom and perhaps render the expression meaningless. Frequently an idiomatic expression omits several words by ellipsis; but to fill in the words so omitted would destroy the idiom. Hence the foreign student must be careful to note the precise words that make up any idiom, and also the exact arrangement of these words.

Idiomatic expressions are to be found daily in the daily speech of English people, rather than in elaborate, polished compositions. Likewise, on the radio, in novels, newspaper, and magazine articles, and books of travel, idiomatic turns of expression abound. The same may be said of the works of Defoe, Swift, Lamb, and others, whose writings draw largely on the Anglo-Saxon element of the language and little upon the classical. There is a steady tendency in writing English to develop a simple, vigorous, idiomatic style, and to get rid of stilted, high-flown composition. In learning English idioms, or in using English idioms, we should study, carefully, good modern authors.

Periodicals, radio talks, and television presentations may also prove useful. We would say to those who would desire to : : acquire the habit of using English idioms correctly to "Read much; note idiomatic peculiarities. commit idiomatic expressions to memory; compare passages in which the idiomatic expressions occur; and, endeavor by translation into your own language to find out the precise scope and force of the idiom. When opportunity occurs, listen to an educated Englishman speaking, and endeavor to catch the exact expression he uses. And write much, getting the compositions corrected if possible by an Englishman, and attend carefully to the corrections.

(Editor's note). The author of the article is English, and, therefore, there will be some difference between English-English idiom and American-English idiom. However, the operative principles are the same. We note that the author is directing some of his emphasis toward the foreign student of English. However, our own native speakers are scarcely conscious of "idiom," and, therefore, any student of his native tongue should also be so instructed and informed.

There is a need to give a word of caution. Good dictionaries or reliable books which list and explain English idiom must have some considerable value. However, there is a sharp limit to entire reliance on the dictionary or book of idiom. The student or reader will do well to test the idioms given by using them on his fellowman, in his writing, or in speech of a somewhat public nature. Now, in a few brief lines, I will attempt to give some useful divisions for approaching idiom.

The first is that of the "contraction." Contractions in English are usually formed by omitting a letter- usually a vowel, and sometimes a consonant- or by joining two words together. Contractions are favored more in conversation than in formal expository writing. A few of the contractions belong to poetry. In poetry we note that the "v" is often elided. In idiom we also pay attention to interrogative forms. We might note that the nominative occupies a different position from its usual position in the declarative sentence. The verb "do" is often brought in as a verb marker. Then we have "particular words and peculiar idiomatic meanings." I mention such terms as "shall and will," "should and would," "may and might," "must," "ought," "worth," "do," "become," and "call," "calls, or calling," among many others.

"It" and "there" have values as the pronoun and adverb of place, respectively, but they also have idiomatic value. I would believe that there are fundamental values inherent in each word, and that each requires a more systematic study than has been previously the case. The next most fruitful division for study is that of the "Idiomatic Adjective and Noun Phrases"--"absent-minded person," "apple pie order," "animal spirits," "bodily fear," among hosts of others.

Then we can look at the "Noun Phrases," such as "a beast of burden," "The Book of Common Prayer," "a burst of applause," and "a fresh lease on life." Then we come to "Idiomatic comparisons."

These encompass such statements as "black as coal," "black as jet," "brittle as glass," "cold as charity," "cunning as a fox," and "drunk as a lord." We move to "Verbs and Nouns"--those that go in idiom together: "cows low," "ducks quack"; "swans cry"; and "wolves howl." Then there is a sizable section or area of "Adjective Phrases." One or two examples will make the item clear: agreeable to, apart from, adjacent to."

Then come large sections, such as "Prepositional Phrases," and "Verbs Followed by Prepositions." Here we have such listings as "abound in," "to act upon," "along," "among," "amidst," and "act from." I trust that this paper has given some idea concerning the scope and significance of the English idioms. We can describe or enumerate them. Explaining them is another matter. If you have mastered all aspects of the "idiom," then, as a final effort, explain why we say "fall in love," rather than "rise in love."

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BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Dr. L.W. Barnes, Editor, Volume V, Number 19

William Mackey: "Method"-What Should We Look For?

The three main things to look for in a method are selection, grading and presentation. Let us stop for a moment to consider a matter of Linguistics. There is little or no difficulty in distinguishing between "method" and "content." The confusion enters when discussing "technique" and "method." One is not the same as the other! In fact, it has been customary, unfortunately, to leave out "technique." Such should not be the case. In discussing any action or activity, the three terms, while certainly having interdependence, are not synonymous.

"Technique" consists in the mastering of skills or unique attacks, whereby the method is made effective, and functional. Content, to be carried into significant relationships has to be carried through methods. Methods, in turn, operate through techniques. Techniques may be effective, the method poor. The method may be excellent, but, since the techniques are poor, the whole affair may "not get off the ground." In this essay then, I am going to talk about "method"--primarily.

"Selection" shows, in our treatment of linguistics, how much of the language is taught, how, why, and for whom it is chosen. It may include either the most frequent, the most useful or the most teachable parts of the language, or some combination of these. It will consist of words, meanings, forms, and structures which operate together as a limited language.

Since it is not possible to teach all of this limited language at once, something will have to come before or after something else. Two methods may teach the same limited language and yet differ widely in the order in which they teach it. In other words, they may have the same selection, but a different grading. The grading of a method is the answer to the questions: A. What comes before what? B. How much of it comes in at a time?

A.- What Comes Before What?

Does it matter what comes before what? If a language is a system and not a list of words or a collection of cliches, it matters much. It means we cannot start anywhere or with anything; for in a system one thing fits into another, one thing goes with another, and one thing depends upon another.

To teach a language, therefore, is to teach a growing system. To keep growing, everything must be kept functioning. To keep functioning everything must fit together. Everything that is added must have some relation with what has gone before; it must be useful to teach and useful to teach with, and it must be arranged so that the more teachable part of the language helps teach the less teachable part

Let us consider that we are examining a possible text for a first year foundation course in reading, speaking, and writing English. I have before me a half a dozen such courses which I shall use as examples. Let us call them Methods A,B,C,D,E,and F. There will be space here to give only a general idea of the beginner's text.

Suppose that we have already examined the selection (what the course teaches) and that we now turn to grading (the order in which it teaches it). We shall try to find out how the course builds up the framework of the language (structural grading), how the words fit into this framework (lexical grading), how the meanings expand (semantic grading), and finally how all this is put together into a system (systematic grading.)

It is useful to start with some sort of list of the order in which all this is taught. Since our texts do not include one, we shall have to make our own.

Now with our lists and texts before us, we shall try to answer the following questions:

1. Do simple things come in before complex ones?
2. Does the more useful and frequent come before the less useful and frequent?
3. Does the more teachable come before the less teachable?
4. Does what is taught first make clear what is taught next?
5. Are those parts of the language which are easily learnt together kept together, and those which are easily confused kept apart?

Answers to these questions will give some idea of the structural, lexical, and semantic grading of our texts.

Structural Grading

1. For simplicity Sentences A, for method, are better than Sentences B.

Method A=

Method B

1. I am here
2. This is a man.
3. He will take his hat off the table.
4. Now it is in the man's hand.
5. It is in the man's hand now.

Point to the picture of an aero-plane.
This is a book, is it not?
Yes, it is.
Colour this square blue.
This is a book, is it?

Method A is the better of the two because its sentences are limited to the general single pattern subject + verb+ complement. Method B has different and more complex patterns. We should move to the more complex after working through the simple patterns.

Second, the sentences in Method A are more useful and more frequent. The frequent statement forms of "A" can handle more vocabulary than the much less frequent imperatives and question forms of "B."

In Method A the structure of the sentence, from the point of view of teachability, can be taught by making it parallel to the structure of the situation. In Method B only one structure (This is a book) can be taught through the structure of a situation. The other structures in Method B assume that the learner understands the language already. For sentences which ask for physical and verbal responses must assume that the person to whom the order or question is addressed understands what is said.

Fourth, how clear are they? Does one structure make the next one clear? Method A makes its structures clear by varying all elements together:

	I am here.
	He is here.
or one at a time:	He is there.
	She is there.
	She was there.
	She was here.

This variation cannot be achieved through B. Care to make the effort? Finally, the sentences in Method A are easily expandable-- In Method B, we are starting with expanded structures. Now, under I. Structural Grading, we have consider what we can call (a) Structures. We will now consider (b) Structural Words.

(b) Structural Words

Structural words are those which keep the framework together. They are hard to teach but must be taught first because it is not possible to make sentences without them. They constitute about 1/3 (one-third) of the words used in most sentences.

Method C teaches	Method D teaches
this a there	I still has
is to and	a in to
I from they	and they
that it here	the which
you on the	are how
he off	on where
she in	but

Method C is better than Method D because "C" starts with general reference words to persons and things that can be pointed to. Then it moves to space words (here-there) and then, in sequence, to time words (now-then).

(c) Forms.

Both the structural and content words may appear in different grammatical forms.

Method (C)= is, my, your, his, her, give, him, here, gives, these, those are.

Method D= see, boys, getting, dressed, teeth, his, has, youngest, day's. gladly.

We should be able to see that "C" limits itself to one tense at a time; but D brings in plurality through more than one tense form,



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BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Dr. L.W. Barnes, Editor, Volume V, Number 20
 Mackey: "Method: What Should We Look For"? II

In the first part of this paper, I took into account, as method, "Structural Grading." The next grading to consider is that of "Lexical Grading"

11. Lexical Grading

The number of content words which form the bulk of the vocabulary may be either concrete or abstract nouns, quality words, or verbs.

(a) Concrete Nouns

I need highly teachable and useful names for things that can be seen, touched, tasted, or manipulated. I need concrete nouns such as "hat," "pencil," "book," combined with the words "table," "floor," and "shelf" for example, to have a concrete statement. Method B does not use as many concrete nouns, but tends to use words in alphabetical order, some of which are concrete, and some abstract. Although there are many concrete nouns used in Method B, these nouns are less teachable and less useful. Such words as "avocado, ant, and aspen" are not immediately useful.

(b) Abstract Nouns

The main question here is this: are the higher abstractions based on the lower ones, and are these, in turn, based on the concrete words which define them? They are in Method A, where, for example, "apples" and "oranges," after ten pages, become fruit, which then combines with "milk," "meat," and "bread" to become "food." Method C has a useful treatment of abstract nouns. Method B, wisely enough, has few. Method D brings in abstractions in haphazard form.

(c) Quality Words

Quality words can be concrete or abstract. They do not need to appear in the first few lessons, as they do in the less desirable methods D and B. Yet those in Method B (blue, brown) are more teachable than those in Method D (intelligent, beautiful).

(d) Verbs

Methods A and C start with verbs like "give" and "get" and "put" and "take", with which a large number of objects can be manipulated. Method B has a few of these but introduces less frequent ones. Method D includes far too many less useful verbs in that they are much less frequently used--belong, "splash," and "patter" --for example.

III Semantic Grading

Both the structures and the vocabulary of a language have meaning-structural meanings and lexical meanings.

The important question in grading the meanings is "Are the first meanings those which make other meanings clear?"

(a) Structural Meanings

(1) Structures: Some sentences have a number of structural meanings. For example the Subject+ Verb +Complement pattern may mean that a person or thing

1. is identified	This is Tom
2. is located or described	Tom is here.
3. does something to somebody	Tom sent him.
4. undergoes an action	Tom was sent here.
5. results in an action undergone	Tom was sent a letter.

Method C identifies person and things before describing them.

Method A locates them before identification, but Method F puts them into action before either identifying or locating them.

(ii) Forms

Some of the grammatical forms of both nouns and verbs may have a number of meanings. The addition of the final 's' in the possessive case may mean any of the following: the owner of a thing-"Tom's book," the doer of an action-"Tom's question," the receiver of an action - "Tom's education," a certain type-"a men's shop," and a certain measure-"a day's work." Method A begins with the first of these, the most frequent. Method D begins with the last.

(iii) Structural Words:

These can change the meaning of a structure just as much as word-order can. We can change the statement structure

"Tom is here" into a question by replacing Tom with the structural word "who" to give "Who is here?" We can also state a change by writing or speaking "He was sent a letter," instead of "He has sent a letter."

Although they are often called "meaningless" or "empty" words, these structural words have a large number of meanings. Let us take the definite article "the."

Absolute uniqueness the sun
uniqueness within context the floor
limitation of context the book on your table
previous reference This is a pencil- the pencil is in my hand.
 here the second "pencil" with its "the" refers back to the first.

In Method A the meanings are introduced gradually, one at a time. We can add, for example

any one go to the theater
all of them the boy is the hardest worker.
a definite part a bullet hit him in the leg.
fixed unit of measure cheaper by the dozen

Methods D would use some or all of these, but not in the same logical order.

(b) Lexical Meanings

Differences in meaning are most easily seen in content words. Many have physical meanings which can be extended metaphorically: "the mouth of a man," "the mouth of a bottle," and the "mouth of a river." In Method C we would start with head as the part of the body and then, systematically, extend it to carry the meanings in "head of a nail," "head of a pin," and then "head of a match." We would then move to such statements as those which follow: "head of the family," "head of the school," "head of the army," and "head of the government. Such would as true for verbs as for nouns .

IV Phonetic Grading

A graded system of sounds, stress, intonation, and rhythm can be made the phonetic counterparts of the graded words and structures. Stress is just as much a part of the pronunciation of sentences as are the sounds of which they are composed. Method C stresses drills from the beginning. So does Method A and Method E. The vowels most frequent in the language should be stressed first.

V Systematic Grading

If the method builds graded words and structures into a system, it will have to use words and structures which fit together. The better they fit, the better the system and the more that can be done with it. To find out how well they fit, we must answer the following questions:

Do words fit into manageable families? If we examine Method A, we find that they do. The whole goes with its parts: house-roof, door, windows; the object with its attribute: sun-heat, or its complement: Teacher- learners, school. Some words are linked by a common denominator: hat and coat; ham and eggs, soap and water, and knives and forks. We can have the interlinking of events: journey--train--taxi--bags--tickets. Method A does this much better than is true of Method B.

We then have the questions:

Are sentences arranged in sequences in which
     every unit is clear and teachable?
     each unit is based on the previous one?
     one unit leads to the next?
     no unit conflicts with any other?
     all units combine into sequences of
         inter-teaching words?
         phrases
         sentences
         meanings

Finally, I speak of quantity. It is better to have fewer words and more variations. If I think in terms of "productivity" the structures and words which combine into a large number of sentences come before those which do not. When all these matters are handled, the method is a graded synthesis of graded structures, forms, words, and meanings.



BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Dr. L.W. Barnes, Editor, Volume Five, Number 21

Roger L. Gaverney "Ideas and Things"

Let us suppose that I have an idea of "closing off" or "closing out" something or someone. Let us suppose that I think about this matter of containment or exclusion. I finally come up with a plan. But the plan has to be realized. That is, I need to apply my decision about this "closing in" or "enclosing" in a particular situation, or for a set of situations. I decide that I will "fence" my property in. I now need to consider with a great deal of care this question of fencing.

Since I intend, physically, to fence in an acre or so of land, I am not talking about "shutting out" or "shutting in" in an intellectual or emotional situation. I lay plans to obtain so many fence posts of some durable and inexpensive materials. Then, I plan to use wire--barbed wire." I write out my plans which will involve kinds of material, the amount of different materials, and a certain procedure now for building the fence. I would gather that the fence, when complete, would be man-made. However, the fence would first have been "thought-made" or "thought-oriented,"

Yet, I must be careful. I do not speak, here, of the thought without the resultant blueprints, written or scribbled plans, or the net result. I do speak of the fact that I could have all kinds of ideas in my mind, or on the TP, or thought plane. But, the fence as a concrete matter, or illustration, or example, must not be only from an idea, but from a cluster of ideas, one of them that of "closing in." Then, too, before the fence is actually there, the thought or ideas must have been ultimately reducible to a series or set of things. Now I can go as far as I desire with this "fencing in," or with this "fencing out," but, if I do not have things, workers, and "know-how" then the fence will not be put up. Once I see the fence actually "there," I can assert that the fence could not have come about for this time and place without the "idea" and without the "idea being translated into concrete representations." Now, apparently, the fence did not make or create the thought which resulted in the plans or designs, all of which brought into being the fence. The idea of relationships brought about sets of events, intellectual, sensorial, and emotive. We do not have to reach the point of actually having the fence. However, if we have the fence, itself, we can then say that the fence itself came about only through plans and designs interpretable by human beings, and plans and designs made concrete.

Following Perret's line of thinking about "exemplification," I agree that there is some point where we can say that a phenomenon is "man-made" and another "phenomenon" is "nature-made." Perret's unpublished paper on "exemplification" has the error of failing to point out that "exemplification" must first involve some relationships that must be solved before any concrete exemplifications can be made.

For example, Perret points out that an "orchard" is the result of man's thought and that a forest is not. There is merit in his position-- a position on important matters. It is true that man makes the orchard in a way that he does not make the forest. There are plans for the orchard, but there may be none for the forest. Yet, there is tenuousness here. There is a man-madeness about a "forest" that is not true of a "woods."

Then, I find that I must avoid Perret's approach to "exemplification" where he simply assumes too much. The most that we can say about a bridge's being built from blueprints is only that the particular bridge built must have come from a specific set of blueprints. However, only too often, the blueprints serve as a general guide or starting point--although we would agree that a highly-complex bridge could not be built except from highly-sophisticated blueprints. In Perret's article and in the adaptation of his article in ETC(XXVII,3), he makes the stand that exemplification, or the reality, must be preceded by the design or the plan. I believe that it is important to indicate that the dimension that should be inserted here is that of ensuring that we know that before the plan there must have been a relationship thought about,--in the case of the fence, that of "closing in."

Perret goes on to suggest that there is the need to go to the question of "time." He does so in terms of past thought, present thought, and future thought. He suggests that past thought has given rise to present exemplification, that present thought gives rise to future exemplification, and that future thought gives rise, or will give rise, to future illustration. Or, I put it simply as saying that thought gives rise to concrete illustrations, which, in turn, trigger present thoughts which can be realized only in future time, in which future time, the future details trigger more thinking for more future concrete details, and so forth.

Perret makes the point that we can do our thinking without concrete realization. On the other hand, the concrete details could not have eventuated without previous TL's, or thought levels. Perret repeats the thesis that "the plan precedes the reality, not vice versa." Yet, the "real" "reality," perhaps is this "fencing in" or "crossing over" concepts that must have preceded making plans for or about enclosing my land, or making Perret's bridge."

Then, too, there is the problem with time. The trouble with "past time" is always that we are talking about this past time in the fleeting number of seconds we must devour from future seconds, or elements of time, always flowing. It is doubtful that there is any such matter as "present time" other than in a purely scientific or timeless sense, or in the sense of the absolute, as in $2+2=4$.

The trouble here is that we are forced to the general more than we would like to be so forced. When I do look at the problem to be solved-- for example, fencing in my one and a half acres of land in Cathem County - two and one-eighth miles along State 165, running in a northwesterly direction, I am forced to the idea of "fencing in" and not fencing in a certain bit or piece of land. Instead of talking about the fence as having been the product of blueprint or designs, perhaps the concept of having to enclose a specific piece of land comes first. That is, although I soon reach the point of considering "enclosing" as a relationship or abstraction I had to first have had the idea of closing in a certain place, or thing.

Perhaps, Perret's idea needs some rewording. It is true that in a very important way, we must give some credence to the statement that "The plan precedes the reality, not vice versa." Yet, it is a reality that a certain bit of land needs fencing in, and the land and the need for enclosing are the realities needed to set in motion my contemplation of "enclosing." That is, before the blueprints can be written or pronounced, two ingredients are required: the reality of a problem which can be visualized in concrete terms and an abstract consideration to solve (fencing in). Then, from these elements will come the specific plans or blueprints from which the fence will be made.

It is true that much work is being done along inductive lines. Programmed texts, programs for the computer, and much of modern mathematics indicates this approach. I marvel at the need to have to point out--along with Perret and others--that there is an exemplification direction as well as an abstractive one. It is true that Korzybski pointed to the road that represents the "semantic process of abstracting." We cannot have one without the other. It has been known for some time that the scientific method is not the "inductive" method. But it should be labored increasingly that each complements and demands the other, and that the scientific method must include, always, the inductive view. I have been working, independently along the lines of thought of Perret's "Exemplification." Perhaps I have benefitted somewhat by looking at the problems in materials or points of view already set out, in Perret's work. I need to point out that Perret, understandably enough, needed to use certain symbols for clarity. His (SL) stands for symbolic level, or "thought." The (OL) stands for the concrete example. "F" stands for thought and the barred "E" stands for nonthought. He considers, using the term "primary stuff" that exemplification, or the concrete product, is secondary, and that thought (T) is primary. He indicates that we obtain thought (T or F) from the symbolic level (SL). From Thought (F) or from nonthought (E), we can get "T"--in the abstractive direction. Without looking at the importance of making distinctions between "E" and "F", Perret does not define the vital significance, or direction of his "primary" and "secondary" stuff values. As I have indicated, his (SL), or symbolic level, involves a "process" or "relationship" level, one brought about by a specific problem. And where and how this specific problem is to be defined and detailed is not known-- as I have indicated. It is much easier to say, briefly, that we can abstract, or arrive at general principles, from either thought or nonthought levels. (This view will be concluded in the next issue).



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BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Dr. L.W. Barnes, Editor Volume Five, Number 22

Robert L. Gaverney Ideas and Things"-concluded

It is inevitable that we consider more than fences, bridges, and parade grounds, and that we consider the matter of behavior, as Perret does. However, I believe that I need to define "behavior" for my purposes. Perret considers any total act a behavioral act, apparently. If Jones, for example, were to think about opening a pub in Chelsea, and he were also to think about opening the pub under certain conditions at a certain time, his actual acting and action in opening the pub at that place at that time would be "Behavior." I would accept such a wide view, assuming however, that I would need to inform the reader--as I do-- that such a plan and such an act --called "behavior"--is not within the context of beliefs+ emotions equating attitudes. (From a literary sense or from a psychological sense, I would go on to suggest that consistent attitudes develop what would or should be called "character.") I do think that the wide undefined exemplification of human behavior is a bit of a problem since behavior, as a term, generally conjures up some emotive aspects of man in action or reflection.

Perhaps indicating what behavior is not will aid in approaching this matter of exemplification. It would seem that any completed act could be called behavior--if we were to reject any completed act the result of some involuntary reflex or reaction. All that Perret urges at this point is that one thinks about a situation and considers whether he will or will not react in terms of his thinking. At some "future time level," there is a behavioral act as a result of some time-level thought. Perret insists that the "behavior" is secondary and not primary.

It is tempting to indicate that behavior is secondary, and to accept the Perret view that to consider behavior primary is to make a common error in reasoning. But there is the matter of cause and effect. Even when the time lapse between thought and act blend into a time so very close as to have the one follow the other rapidly, it is difficult to assert that the thinking is the cause of the action, or behavior. With any time lapse, the use of such terms "primary" and "secondary" in distinguishing thinking and the exemplification of thought is somewhat doubtful in value.

Apart from the real question of "cause and effect," we also have the problem of having a different individual at the time of the behavior as distinct from the time of the thought. Past traces of neural experience, changes in body metabolism, and the matter of considering the thinking, feeling, and sensorial elements at a given time would make for a subtle and tough set of thoughts and actions acting upon any different point at one time.

It would not be easy, in virtually any situation to say at any time "here was the thought" and "here is the behavior." When we consider the literary experience, or the emotive experience in real life, we realize that the total behavioral act (molar behavior) may spring from a vast number of factors coalescing at one time and at one place. Many of these elements may have been simmering for days, weeks, months, and, perhaps, even years.

Nor can we reduce the elements of an act of behavior to discrete and basic elements, as we might well do with a transformation in grammar. Perhaps we could say that "if" there are no sharp neural changes, the thought as (T) may be exemplified as the act, as "R." And yet, Perret's thesis is not without considerable merit.

I believe that it would be more fruitful to consider that man has problems which usually have to be decided or resolved in some concrete form. Keeping people out of property is a problem, and keeping people out of one's own property is a specific problem. From the specifics of the problem and from its concrete urgency, I must engage in some considering of relationships-- here, for example--"keeping out" or "keeping in."

I would suppose that the concrete fence that was built would be the result of not only thought, but also of the concrete problem I had to resolve in the first place. Nevertheless, Perret's direction is obvious and valuable. He would assert, as would I, that exemplification from thought has as much value as abstracting from the concrete. I would consider that each goes on in complex relationships all the time. However, it is true that we can focus on the direction. The next step taken by Perret is that of claiming that if A were to see B performing an action and if A were to realize that the action was secondary stuff and not primary, he would realize that he is conscious of B's actions. as an exemplification of some thought (T): if he were to believe that the action came before the thought, he would be unconscious of the fact that the action stems from the thought, or he would be incorrect. The problem here is that Perret is not distinguishing between an erroneous judgment and pure ignorance of the fact. Then, there is B to consider. "B" may or may not be conscious that his actions stem from his prior thoughts, or he may actually be mistaken. Presumably, we are to start with the assumption that each individual must admit that action stems from thought and that each individual must be aware of the correct order.

I believe that the "fences" can be mended here. We can make the assumption and can make out a good case for the assumption that some thought and consideration precede, in some linked degree, man's behavior. We do behave, and we behave about something. But the admission will have to be made that thoughts and actions are difficult customers if we try to assert a definite idea as bringing about a definite action.


Perret's next move is that of working out a macroscopic-submicroscopic series of steps through which one moves from the first notion or idea to more detailed and more concrete items. Starting with the broadest notion as T_1 and moving to the more specific thought items as T_n , we note that the subscripts for F increase as the subscripts for T increase. I would not subject Perret's analogy of the carpenter and his notion of building a house to too close a scrutiny. For, in all likelihood, the notion is not that of the carpenter. In nearly all instances, the carpenter may well be simply reading the blueprint. Would-be owners, the entrepreneur, the architect(s), and others play complex roles before the final exemplification.

However, it is true that were we able to separate out each concept in working through the various levels and in terms of the many individuals involved, we could accept, even if uneasily, some thesis concerning the thought (T) and its exemplification (E). We would have more of a problem in stressing or proving the concept of having each individual conscious of his behavior in terms of his initial thoughts about the action. Perret next steps boldly to the "diachronic" scene in suggesting that the pattern of exemplifying from stage to stage through the initial thought to the initial exemplification has occurred often in history.

Perret uses such examples as the great pyramids of Egypt and the Great Wall of China. I cite changes in war, changes in mass media, and changes in crons themselves as being cases at point. If Perret had started out with the suggestion that we can speak about the tendency to have thought precede action, leading to exemplification, some of the difficulty with his concept can be avoided. When he comes to the close of his paper, he does suggest that we can speak of moving from T to E as being less and less abstract, and of moving from E to T as being more and more abstract. Now, out of the ideas came examples. From these examples or illustrations, man has drawn conclusions and has derived general principles.

The questioning of Perret has been directed at his oversimplification of the processes. Also, I have indicated that before (T), we should have some symbol indicating consciousness of a specific problem, a problem entirely concrete. Thus, we might say that we move from C of an $S P$ to (T) thought, and thence through CD 's (concrete details) to the thing itself (E), or exemplification. However, thinking and exemplifying are doing on concurrently.

What is Perret's specific goal? He desires to show that we can use the process of exemplifying to inculcate good attitudes--in ethical and religious senses. That is, let us suppose that we have a broad concept about the dignity of man. Over the years we have, diachronically, developed the concept in terms of examples, concrete ones. The examples can be made equal to the thought and, imagining a series of blueprints of fine examples being equal or congruent to the thought of them, then we may continue to impart them to our colleagues, children, and fellow-citizens. However, we might keep in mind that we can do the same with less desirable concepts and examples--whether buildings, laws, or people.



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BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Dr. L.W. Barnes, Editor, Volume V, Number 23

Lynn S. Walker "Boundaries in Composition"

Whether they are in the first form, seniors, graduate students, editors, or some other kinds of individuals subject to some kind of instruction--in this case, composition--they have to use a language. Presumably that of their native tongue! The building blocks of a composition are those of words, and the functional units are what we call "sentences."

Like all other words, each carries different meanings--in some cases, many meanings. If I am to write a composition--I could yield up an oral composition--I put down words in a certain order, or in certain orders. In so doing, I have in mind some thing or idea that I either desire to relieve myself of, or which I am compelled to treat. Nearly all instructors will agree that there is an intellectual exercise involved, and the intellectual exercise is that of putting words and sentences in order, with the supposition that behind the word or sentence ordering there is a "content" ordering. That is, I would assume that there is some body of information that needs to be imparted.

In the "real" world level, writing compositions can be a matter of necessity where writing them enables John or Henry, or Eliza, to make a living. Either a sufficient number of readers have to read, understand, and "buy," or the compositions fail. Or, perhaps, a single individual needs to be convinced or told in writing about a certain thing, idea, or person, or about certain attributes of things or ideas. At any rate, writing compositions in the world of affairs, outside the classroom or "fun" situations carries with the actual compositions the necessity for a conviction greater and wider than that of the writer.

Whether I am writing a legal brief, a sales report, a description of the political scene, or a treatise on women's hats on the present scene, I feel the sense of urgency to communicate. Now, I may be in the position of simply giving my views. Here, I am not talking about "selling" my viewpoints. The point to be made now is that there is a "price" imposed. The price is that of succeeding in my writing. Now, what is the price in a classroom situation? The price is that of "grades." The one to be convinced is the grader who may or who may not be the one teaching the class, the one doing the instruction. The whole concept of judgment and price suggests that we are involved with a game, and that the game has rules. We have to learn some rules, and we have to know the nature of the game. That we do not write better than we do can be indicated by the fact that we really do not work too hard and too long with writing. Much of our composition comes in the oral form.

By contrast, we note the great effort, the careful effort, and the devoted effort made in learning the nature of sports and in learning the skills essential to play them well. However, if we care to think about the matter at all, we will realize the tremendous and pervasive nature and scope of composition, in contrast to the limited nature of a sport. Yet, to get the "job done" we must establish boundaries. We must be able to take a good look. We must see what "composition" is.

Composition is certainly an ordering of words into sentences and paragraphs all for certain purposes. Let us look at the "word" for a moment. The linguist will tell us that a "word" is a free morpheme. He will further indicate that a free morpheme is that unit of meaning which is capable of standing alone to carry meanings. It is the "s" on the end of the word "meaning" that may give us some trouble. (If a "morpheme" is not free, it is "bound." If it is "bound," the linguist tells us that it needs other bound or free morphemes to carry certain meanings for a certain oral or written composition for a particular time and place.) Then, there are linguists who will tell us, correctly, that in English, a word is that which carries a primary stress and which has at least one vowel: "man," "macaroni," and "a."

Then the linguist--and, we trust, others-- will indicate that a sentence does consist of one or more words. These words are put together in a certain order characteristic of the particular language used. Word ordering--syntax--in English--is by no means very flexible. Some linguists well-trained in the phonological aspects of language indicate that a "sentence is that which consists of one or more words which on utterance ends with the fade-out of the voice.

Now, the rules of the game suggest certain boundaries beyond those indicated. There must be words; there must be word-ordering resulting in sentences, and there must be some conventional system to indicate when and where the words and sentences end. It is assumed that the "formal training we call "education" has furnished some basic information and practice with these units and boundaries. If not, perhaps we should start with them.

Now, we need to look at "boundary" with respect to words. Words do carry, for every language, different meanings for each. Some words carry more meanings than is the case with other words. The range of meanings that a word can carry--up to the time of being placed in a certain ordered form--can be found in a good dictionary. The less complete the dictionary, the fewer meanings we are to find for each word. Because the experiences of individuals do vary, the number of meanings that may occur to one person may not be the same that would occur to another individual. Then, too, because of the experiences of one person, a particular word may carry only one meaning; while, to the writer or to other readers, the word may carry different meanings. The "gross" boundary of a word is the total number of meanings that word can carry. The specific or pinpoint boundary is that which the word carries for the reader or writer in a specific context.

Of course, we know from experience that words do fail us, or we can fail them. Words have, for example "sound" boundaries. Certain sounds or kinds of sounds indicate one meaning or one attribute, rather than another. If I were to attempt to stress "power," I would not use the word "fluff." If I were to appeal to the feminine mode, I would not be disposed to use the term "smash." If I were to set out a series of words which, together, would give a eulogistic note, I would not use the set of words "mean, crafty, cunning, and calm." Of course, once we have established the nature of words and sentences, we have to look at boundaries according to the purpose(s) we have in mind for the composition. We can see that in composition we have to concern ourselves not only with the boundaries of words and sentences in terms of phonology, syntax, and morphology, but also with an eye open to the nature of the reader and writer. Each is, by itself, an awesome matter or task.

What is the nature of the sentence? As I have indicated, the sentence may range from one to many words. In English, at least, if a sentence has one or two words, we can assume that the ellipsis resulting in the compression indicated by the one or two words is for the purpose of giving greater emotive impact to the communication or utterance. Generally, the greater the compression, the shorter the utterance. The shorter the utterance, the greater the emotive impact. If the English sentence opens with an adverbial clause, an adverbial phrase, an "ing" word, or an "-ed" word, the slower the pace of the sentence, and the less emotive the impact. Generally, if the sentence ends with the adverb by structure or the adverbial by function the greater the emotive impact.

If the verbs in a sentence are long and of the nature of having a Latin prefix, the more thought-evoking the statements tend to be. "Henry comitated for some time, perhaps an hour." Sentences containing such phrasing as "on the other hand," "having this in mind," "for this reason," or "even though we grant," tend to be thought-provoking, or thought-evoking. Here we have a set of boundaries relating to the kinds of words, phrases, or utterances in terms of having statements thought-oriented or emotion-oriented. We each need to be aware of these elements, and we need to practice them. If I desire to give a swift or rushing effect in my compositions, I would be wise to stay away from thought-oriented, thought-evoking, or thought-provoking utterances. I would also do well to stay away from such words as "bash," "perambulate," "crush," "smooch," and "harrass." That is, I would need to avoid "phonologically-long" words. (Adjectives are generally phonologically-long.) I would do well to use certain prepositional phrasing--"on the way," "down the hill," "on the fold," "on Monan's rill +---among others. I would suggest that each person desiring to understand these matters more fully should read aloud and become sensitive to the phonology of the word and sentence.

Then, too, there are different kinds of sentences, each setting some sort of a boundary. We need to consider these together.

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BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Dr. L.W. Barnes, Editor Volume V, Number 24

Lynn S. Walker "Boundaries in Composition? Continued"

There is the "and" sentence. Here we have the additive sense. In this sentence we have the concept of adding things or ideas together. If I discuss the baking of a cake, I would use the "and" in the sense of taking certain steps or mixing ingredients over time, a chronological sense.

Then I have a sentence of subtraction or negation, or what one can call a "no," "nor," "not," or "negative" assertion. In this kind of a sentence we can find words other than "no," "not," or "nor." We can use "hardly," "scarcely," or "but." In English these words carry a sense of negative or subtraction.

Then there is that "conditional" utterance. We have the "if... then" assertion. "If it rains, we will find ourselves pushed inside the crowded hallways." Then there is the concept of "it is false that," or, otherwise stated, "It is not true that." "He is a bad man." Or, "It is false that he is a good man."

Perhaps there is some surprise that I do not speak of the simple sentence, the compound sentence, the complex sentence, or the compound-complex sentence. Except for the first, they come from adding in sequence or syntactical order additional thoughts to the first thought. There is little point in enumerating these sentences if they do not serve unique functions. It is true, of course, that a complex sentence is supposed to indicate reasons or conditions in a way that a simple sentence cannot. Let us suppose that I have a thought exemplified by "I like her." Then suppose I have another thought exemplified by "She is rich." If I desire to indicate that my second thought contains proof for one of my reasons for liking her, I then say "I like her because she is rich." I use a pointer, marker or signaller which tends to assert a reason—"because." I call such a sentence a "complex sentence." I define a complex sentence according to structure--what it is--by stating that when a sentence has an independent clause and a dependent clause, I have a complex sentence. If I have two independent clauses, I call such a sentence a "compound sentence."

The beauty of structure is a certain ease in definition. One independent clause + a dependent clause = a complex sentence. One independent clause + at least one more independent clause = a "compound" sentence. If I have one independent clause, I have a simple sentence. By structure, then, I can tell the differences among "simple," "complex," and "compound sentences." Now, having worked from the viewpoint of structure, I move to function.

We now look at our different kinds of sentences according to the traditional format of complex, simple, and compound sentences. Is there something about the "complex" sentence by function which differentiates this sentence from the functions of the simple and compound sentences.

I can run into trouble. I can have a cluster of complex sentences indicating cause, or reason. I can also have the same effect in a compound sentence or in a simple sentence by including such phrasing as "for the reason," "considering another point of view," "and taking that aspect into account," among others. It is true, of course, that complex sentence structures do tend to give reasons and conditions to a greater degree than is true of the other varieties.

More significantly, for one who still desires to stay with his traditional arrangements of sentences as simple, compound, complex, and compound-complex, one could determine their functions more usefully--if not their structures--by considering the total rhythmic pattern for each of these traditional kinds. Perhaps it is better to set the boundaries of our sentences along the lines of "and," "but," "if... then," and "it is false that" or "it is not true that" utterances. There is one problem that could come up. That problem stems from the real possibility that all sentences without the patent "if...then" phrasing are really derived from the "if...then" concept. Let us consider the statement "I shall be here tomorrow." Is it not true that we are saying "If all I envisage occurs, then, I shall be here tomorrow"? In my sentence "We shall play Dayton for the football championship tomorrow," the "if" would appear to run along with the assertion. Further, in order to be able to make such a statement, an "if" had to be resolved. The "if" that had to be resolved must have involved defeating all others who could have been in a position to play Dayton for the championship.

Nevertheless, we drop, consciously, or unconsciously, many of the "if...then" elements. It is open to the reader whether he desires to set his boundaries as to sentences along the lines of simple sentences, complex sentences, and compound sentences, or along the lines of "and," "but," "if...then," and "it is false that" or "it is not true that" phrasing. Then we come to other kinds of boundaries. Do we desire the "descriptive" mode, the "narrative" mode, the "expository" mode, or the "persuasive" mode.

How do we define the "descriptive" mode. Well, one good rule of thumb is that if nothing happens, we are in the realm of description. If I say "He has a good color in his face," I am, traditionally, descriptive. If I say that an act takes place, if I detail the act, I am, traditionally, in the narrative mode. Thus, the statement "He galloped over the lea" is in the narrative mode because of the action. "He has large hands" indicates the descriptive boundary. "He raised his hands" indicates the narrative boundary. But, what happens when we say that "The sun sets every day"? We can have a problem with description and narration when the assertion tends to be one of a habitual state, a scientific truth.


There is a more accurate way of determining the "descriptive" and "narrative" modes. If the slots in the nounal phrasing are filled, the sentence will, most assuredly, be weighted along descriptive lines. If the slots to the left of the verb are filled, there will assuredly be strong narrative notes. Of course, we can fill the slots in the noun phrasing and also those to the left of the verb. But, when we do, the sentence will advertize itself as one poorly constructed.

Then we come to a kind of writing called "exposition." If we assert, explain, or detail, we are, apparently, in the expository mood or mode. Such a sentence as "John Peacock discovered the reverse blocking patterns" indicates the expository mode. If I say "All men should or must be humble," I am in the mode called persuasion or argumentation. There are some writers--such as Sidney A. Moss, Ravel M. Brunley, Johnson S. Darrell, and A.S. Hornby--who are content to suggest that all writing is, in essence and in effect, "persuasion" or "argumentation." Admitting that it is true that if I write about a certain state of events I probably desire that the reader accents my utterances, I would still distinguish between my utterances on reverse blocks and any desire I might have to have other individuals use the reverse block.

Thus, we do need some kind of boundary to distinguish persuasion or argumentation from an objective detailing of events or things. Words such as "should," "ought," "deserve to," and "would be advised to" certainly signal a mode that is different from kinds of sentences and paragraphs where such terms are not used patently or implied in any degree. It is true that the writer uses description and narration in such ways that he does hope that what has been described or asserted will be viewed by the reader in much the same way. However, that is still not the same as persuasion. We can define by still another approach: we can go to the "Wh-" areas. Here, we have "why," "who," "what," "how," "when," and "where."

The "when" and "where" types of sentences or paragraphs are not usually favored, as separate entities, by instructors or authors, or critics. Their arguments run to the effect that they can be answered briefly and that they are of little concern. It is true that such may often appear to be the case. It is also true that time and space are always incorporated in the body of a sentence or of a paragraph. However, "when" is not as simple as may first appear to be the case. "When" involves time. The boundary for "time" in a general sense, can be set. However, when we consider that time involves clock-time, space-time, eternal time, and psychological time, the value of "when" as a critical kind of composition becomes more evident. Certain kinds of words do mark and indicate certain kinds of time. Further, when we desire to emphasize time we shift temporal elements to the left of the composition's sentences.

Further, we need to keep in mind that boundary which indicates that in English--and its varieties--we cannot use the adverbs or adverbials of time before those of space or place, when both are present.



BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

 Periodicals Department
 Johnson Camden Library
 Morehead State University

Dr. L.W.Barnes, Editor

Volume V, Number 25

Dr. L.W.Barnes "Language and Style--The New Is Not So New"

We must not believe that this generation is the first, in English, to concern itself with language in its many forms, a concern we have been pleased to raise to the position of a science--Linguistics. While the earlier grammarians, and semanticists, and phonologists, and morphologists, and all the other "gists" concerned with language did not have at their disposal the research facilities and the time for research available to the linguist today, there was much concern with written and spoken language. I shall center these observations on some of the utterances of Alexander Jamieson, LL.D. The book specifically chosen is one which contains the majority of his statements on language and style. His "Grammar of Rhetoric--divided into seven books-- was published by A.H.Maltby,(New-Haven), 1918.

Readers interested in consulting other writings in this general vein during the same or earlier periods will profit by going to the works of Campbell, Kames, Alison, and Blair. Jamieson refers, in his Grammar of Rhetoric to them on many occasions. (Dr. Campbell was noted primarily for his Philosophy of Rhetoric, Lord Kames for his Elements of Criticism, Alison for his Essays on Taste, and Dr. Blair for his Harmony of Periods..The interested reader will find that Jamieson incorporated quite a bit from the works of each of these "rhetoricians."

In "Book I" of 'A Grammar of Rhetoric, Jamieson defines language as an art: "the art of communicating thought, or the ideas of the mind, by certain articulate sounds, which are used as signs of those ideas." I note in passing the emphasis on the communication of thought, with no reference to the emotive or attitudinal aspects of the individual. As a carry-over or "carry-through" we find the sentence still defined in current grammars in terms of "the word or group of words constituting the complete thought." Of critical interest, too, is the distinction that the "certain articulate sounds" are not the ideas, but the "signs" of them. After defining articulate sounds by means of their mode of production, he stresses the point that connections between words and ideas must be both arbitrary and conventional, all resulting from the agreement of men among themselves. He then points out*that written language is a symbol of the spoken language which is "a representation of our ideas. He stresses, in his work, that little relation exists between "letters" and "sounds." Thus perhaps even less relation exists between "sounds" and "ideas."

*

When the present tense is used, the reader is to realize that we are speaking of his "living work"--the book.

Having made clear the point-- one agreed upon, certainly, by virtually all current linguists--- that language is primarily the result of a need to express or communicate, Jamieson goes on to point out that the history of language is a history of the "artifice and singular efforts of ingenuity employed in the construction of language."

It is interesting to note that he soon found out that he needed to account for cries of emotions, and, for, specifically, the use of the interjection. His own words may be useful (p.20).

4. The cries of passion, accompanied with such motions and gestures, as are further expressive of passion, are the only signs which nature teaches all men, and which all understand.

Illus. Cries indicative of fear, and gestures expressive of peril, would be used by him who sought to warn his neighbour of danger.

Corol. These exclamations, therefore, which have obtained the name of "Interjections", uttered in a strong and passionate manner, were, beyond doubt, in the rude ages of the world, the first elements or beginnings of speech. Names began to be assigned to objects, when more enlarged communications become necessary. (p.20).

Whether we consider these statements sophisticated enough for modern psychological thought is a matter for the reader. The theory of sentence or phrasal "compression" centers on a direct relationship to the intensity of the emotion or attitude involved. That the first needs of man were those of expressing strong emotional intensity, and therefore, those which brought into being the forerunners of more sophisticated language can be accepted without too much stress by us. We now come to an equally interesting observation by Jamieson and his contemporaries and/or predecessors.

He next turns his attention to the question of the invention of words. (He earlier pointed out the fact that different nations with different tongues or language would have their own unique sets of articulated sounds. Each language would have some sounds the same as those in other languages, but the sounds that would carry one meaning in the one language would not necessarily carry the same meaning(s) in other languages.)

We might well look to his own words. (It is interesting to note that for every statement he makes, there are two following paragraphs: the first is prefixed by "Illus"-illustration, and the second by "Corol."-Corollary.) It remains for the reader to consider the language at the time of Jamieson and to consider the current -synchronic-state of the language to see what merit he discovers in Jamieson's observations, or to consider the weight of Jamieson's observations for the current language modes.)

11. The invention of words arose from the imitation, as nearly as it could be carried, of the nature or quality of the object which was named, by the sound of the name which the object or its quality received.

Illus. As a painter, who would represent crass, must first employ a green colour: so, in the beginning of spoken language, the man who gave a name to any thing harsh or boisterous, would employ a harsh or boisterous sound in the pronunciation of that name. He could not do otherwise, if he meant to excite in the hearer the idea of that thing which he sought to name.

Corol. The desire of men to paint, by speech, the objects which they named, in a manner more or less complete, according as the vocal organs had it in their power to effect this imitation, must have been the general motive which led men to the assignation of one name to a particular object rather than another.

There is little doubt that Jamieson implied that what would be harsh or boisterous in one language would not, for the same sounds, be required to be harsh or boisterous in that other language. It is true, of course, that there are some individuals who would not consider combinations of sounds harsh or boisterous, although the majority of their fellows would agree as to the harshness or boisterousness. Language, like other phenomena, is not binding as to any specific word or sound, on every individual within that society.

Jamieson follows the next logical course of moving to what he considered an obvious illustration or exemplification of this "imitative" note in language. He considers that there is nothing more appropriate than to use the sound of the voice to imitate or represent certain sounds found in nature through its objects. I shall give only his illustration here:

Illus. Thus, in all language, we find words constructed upon this principle. A certain bird is called the "quckoo" from the sound which it emits. The analogy between the word and the thing signified is discernible, when one sort of wind is said to "whistle," and another to "roar," when a serpent is said to "hiss," a fly to "buzz," and falling timber to "crash," when a stream is said to "flow," thunder to "roar," and hail to "rattle." (p.20)

Jamieson realized that analogy becomes more difficult when the objects we see or consider are available to the sight, only. There are more problems when noise and motion are not patent. Even more difficult becomes analogy when we consider words and moral terms, as "value" judgments.



BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Dr. L.W.Barnes, Editor

Volume V, Number 26

"Language and Style" II -- The New Is Not So New"

In looking at some of Jamieson's views and while asking the reader to consider the merit and conditions of his observations in the current language situation, I indicated in (I) the position and line of development taken by Jamieson on his initial treatment of language and style.

It is worth noting, again, his system of development, one quite characteristic of pre-twentieth century grammarians, mathematicians, scientists, and rhetoricians a system involving illustration, and corollary. (There are a few notes quite characteristic of the programmed text method(s) being developed today.) At the close of (I), I indicated that Jamieson admitted that analogy became difficult when working in terms of phenomena available to the sight only, and when working with "value judgements"---those involving such ideas as "mercy," "love," "hate," "kindness," among many others.

Yet, Jamieson, a sturdy soul in more ways than one, indicates that the power of analogy is not altogether lost and that some degree of correspondence (can) be identified with the object, or idea, or value signified.

Jamieson asserts--in A Grammar of Rhetoric :

The terms significant of moral and intellectual ideas are derived from the names of sensible objects to which they are conceived to be analogous. The most distinguishing qualities of sensible objects have certain radical sounds appropriate to the expression of these qualities. The organs of voice assume but an obscure resemblance to such external qualities as "stability," and "fluidity," "hollowness" and smoothness," "gentleness and violence," yet are these words painted by the sound of certain letters or syllables, which have some relation to those different states of visible objects. (p. 121)

He then proceeds to make out a case for himself, through taking certain "value" words and indicating some features of what he calls the "radicals" of these words. I suggest that the reader consider Jamieson's statements carefully, following which each reader shall assent, deny, or take some intermediate position.

Jamieson asserts that words formed with the initial "st" carry meanings of that which is strong, firm, and forceful. He lists such words as "stand," "stout," "stay," "staff," "stop," "steady," "stake," "stamp," and "step." I can also think of "stalwart," "start," and "storm." There are others.

He next observes that words beginning with "str" carry meanings of violence and energy. He cites "strive," "struggle," "strong," "strength," "stride," "stress," "stretch," and "strike." Other such words as "strap," "strangle," and "strife" may join this list.

He considers that the initial "thr" usually suggests forceful motion. There are such words as "throw," "thrust," "throb," "through," "threaten," and "thralldom." We could also add such words as "throttle" and "thrash."

The initial "wr" carries the meanings of that which is distorted, quarrelsome, or deprived. Such words as "wry," "wrest," "wrestle," "wreath," "wring," "wrong," "wrangle," and "wrath" are listed as examples. That list can be augmented by adding "wriggle," "wring," and "wrap."

"Sw" carries the meaning, generally, of a turmoil or agitation which is silent, noiseless. There are such terms as "sway," "swing," "swerve," "swim," and "sweep." Perhaps we might modify his views as to this particular category. Although there is agitation or movement, and although we can see what is happening, there might well be some sound connected with or through such terms. We do associate certain sounds with these particular words. We could also add "swish," and "swamp." In each case, the visual element is strong, but there is also some element of sound.

Words commencing with "sl" imply or suggest a gentle fall, a less observable action, and--from my point of view--some appeal to sound. This list includes "slide," "slink," "sly," "slow," "slack" and "sling." Such words as "slice" and "slick" would not be inappropriate to add to this category.

Then we have the initial "sp" combination. Here we seem to have what Jamieson calls "an expansion" or a "spreading out." Words in this category include "spread," "sprout," "sprinkle," "split," "spill," and "spring." A little thought or reference to our current dictionaries will indicate that we can add substantially to this list. I call attention to the sound that can be associated with some of these terms.

The lists so far indicate meanings associated with initial letters or phonemes consisting of one or two elements. He next lists two "terminations"--his words for suffixes--those ending with "ash" and "ush."

Jamieson's treatment of "ash" is best stated in his own words:

Ash, in the ending of words, indicates something acting nimbly and sharply as "crash," "dash," "rash," "flash," and "slash."

When we consider Reiss' sophisticated listings in his Language and Psychology (N.Y., Philosophical Library-1965), we realize how much more work is being done along the lines of the work started by Jamieson. Yet, we also realize how much was done without the use of the research and computer available to the modern linguist.

In his "-ush" classification, Jamieson's list suggests a dull sort of power, as in "crush," "brush," "hush," "gush," and "blush." Of course, nearly any reader through consulting our better dictionaries could expand this list many times over.

At this point in his treatment of language and style, Jamieson seems to have found it necessary to limit his concept of radical elements and their degrees of correspondence. In A Grammar of Rhetoric, Jamieson wrote:

18. The immense field of language, in every nation, is, however, filled up by numerous fanciful and irregular methods of derivation and composition. (p.117)

Corôl. Words, therefore, come to deviate widely from the primitive character of their roots, and frequently lose all analogy or resemblance in sound to the thing signified. Taken generally, as we now employ them, words may be considered as symbols, not as imitations: as arbitrary, or instituted, not natural signs of ideas.

Much of what Jamieson has said is correct. However, there is-- and was-- a much better case for himself in regard to analogy and resemblance in sound than he realized.

With larger numbers of people available for research and with our sophisticated methodology and techniques for collection and classification, we know that the list of syllables, prefixes, suffixes, or certain radicals which can be said to have some sound correspondence is far more complete and complex than his lists are.

However, it is somewhat of a sad commentary when we realize that fewer than ten percent of those in the instructional fields on all levels- elementary school, high school, and college or university- have much less understanding of the structure and composition of words than was true of those teaching some one hundred and fifty years ago on the same educational levels.



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BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Dr. L.W. Barnes, Editor

Volume Five Number 27

L.W. Barnes: "Language and Style--The New Is Not So New" (III)

The two preceding articles were intended to imply that what we consider the very new approach is not quite as new as we might believe. There is much going on today in our overdue concern with language. I have relied primarily on Jamieson--and his contemporaries from whom he drew for his A Grammar of Rhetoric--to demonstrate that some of the principles of language that appear to have been enunciated for the first time were, in fact, well enunciated nearly a century and a half ago. We agree, of course, that our modern research and modern methods and techniques for handling a vast number of words in their classes have given us the opportunity for even more significant hypotheses and conclusions concerning our English tongue.

In his book The New English, William Chisholm, the author, has an introduction by Albert H. Marckwardt. Marckwardt makes the observation:

For many years English, as a school subject, like Caesar's Gaul, was divided into three parts: language, literature, and composition. It was a disjointed concert which all too often led to fragmentation in teaching and uncertainty in learning. "In a New English classroom," the author tells us, "language is the name of the game." In short, the newness here lies not so much in the discovery or adoption of a new body of content as in recognizing that all English activities are language-centered. Composition is essentially the use and manipulation of language. Literature consists of language used in special and formalized ways, for special purposes. One might even go so far as to insist that language is more than just the name of the game, it is the game itself.

Yet, it is ironic to note that such phrases as those from Marckwardt seem to jar and surprise many instructors and other readers or listeners. Jamieson and his contemporaries, and his predecessors were at one with Marckwardt's thesis and Chisholm's thesis some fifteen or sixteen decades ago.

One of the major concerns of Jamieson's text is that of the "second main character of language"--the manner and reason and degree through which mankind pronounced and pronounces and uttered and utters words.

*

William Chisholm, The New English, Introduction by Albert Marckwardt, N.Y., F&W., 1969, xi, 118 pp., p. iii.

Jamieson develops the concepts that paralinguistics become less significant as men become more and more refined by civilization, the arts and the sciences. That is, kinesics and gestures--save only the most subtle, become less significant with respect to communication among intelligent and educated people. However, Pike does not subscribe to this theory, particularly when there are significant numbers of people together, or when the social intercourse is intimate.

But Jamieson does not entirely abandon the need for paralinguistics. He asserts that the extra-features of language did not disappear. He asserts that what was no longer essential continued for ornamental purposes. He considers that when the temperament of a nation or people was one of fire and vigor, there was much action. This activity called for vocabulary that would accommodate a greater number of emotions. This increase in the number of emotions was sufficient to bring about a greater range in tonal features of the language--ranging from the softest and most melodic tones to the harshest and most violent.

The increase in the emotive range not only caused an increase in tonal features of the language, but also brought about, as ornament, or embellishment, or style, certain customs:

Illus. Upon this principle men spoke by action. Jeremiah, in sight of the people of Israel, breaks a potter's vessel--throws a hook into the Euphrates--puts on bonds and yokes, and carries out his household stuff. The Indians of North America, also, declare their meaning, and explain themselves by belts and strings of wampum, as much by their discourse, with all its significant but flowery modes of expression. **

Jamieson then indicates that some nations do not increase the numbers of words for all their ideas. but, instead, vary the tone with which they pronounce the same word. He points out that the Chinese can vary the sound of each word by no fewer than five different tones. The same word may carry the meaning of five different things, events, people, or ideas. He does not consider this phenomenon too critical, for he concludes the the Chinese way of handling their language indicates, more than anything else, the fine ear of that people. Jamieson, in his text, then asserts that as soon as the harsher or cruder sounds of a language become polished, they become more harmonious. At the right juncture we have what is called the "prosody" of a language. Yet, he is quick to make a disclaimer concerning any direct or logical connection with "music." He asserts that

It does not appear that the languages of any cultivated nations have ever been regulated by any musical principles:**

** Jamieson, A Grammar of Rhetoric, New-Haven, Maltby, 1813, xviii, 796nn., p. 163.

***

Ibid,, pp. 172-173.

Although the facility for making the fine measurements was not as available to the early nineteenth century linguist as would be true today, he was not without some skill and discernment. Jamieson's statements concerning differences between speech and music are interesting:

113. The sounds of speech and music are regulated by different scales, both in point of length and elevation. In point of length, the sounds of speech are only two, the one double the other; for all words consist of syllables either long or short, and the long syllable is invariably double the length of the short one. The sounds of music being measured by a geometrical scale of proportion, may be extended as far as the composer pleases. In respect of elevation or depression the sounds of speech are subject to no rule: their distances are neither equal nor great. The speaker may divide them according to his inclination, and the utmost compass of ordinary speech seldom extends beyond the distance of a few notes in music. It is not so with the tones of music: their distances are all determined by rule, and the elevations and depressions, though somewhat very considerable, are adjusted with the greatest nicety of geometrical science. ****

We must not be deceived by the Aristotelian assertion that "the music of tragedy" is one of its chief and essential parts. The true meaning is that the whole of a tragedy was accompanied with musical instruments. One part was not uttered in the ordinary tones of conversation while what was left was sung in the tones of music. It is evident that Jamieson, making these comments, must sooner or later come to the matters of figures of speech and ornaments of poetry.

He assures us that figures of speech are not arbitrary inventions of orators or rhetoricians. They are the language of man, himself, when there were hardly any other words available for expression, or communication, or sheer assertion. He approaches his thinking by suggesting that since there is no one unique name for every distinct object, our earliest speakers had to use one word or name for many objects. Because they had to do so, they expressed themselves by comparisons, metaphors, similes, and other figures of speech and ornaments.

Jamieson's argument develops along the lines of noting that since man is more aware and more intimate with the concrete physical objects about him, names were given to such objects long before man gave names to moral values or to emotive experiences. Man was more controlled by imagination and passion in earlier societies. (In the next and last issue on this subject of language and style for a while, I will investigate further Jamieson's concepts of figures and ornaments.) I might suggest that Jamieson did not, himself, realize that figures of speech and ornaments of poetry relate more specifically to earlier states of society. It is true that man cannot compare and contrast without the language of metaphor,

**** Jamieson, op. cit., p. 173.



BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Dr. L.W. Barnes, Editor   Volume V, Number 28

L.W. Barnes "Language and Style: The New Is Not So New" (IV)

I suggest, in this final set of statements on language and style, that the reader become acquainted, specifically, with modern writers on style--particularly on the aspects of style discussed with reference to the early nineteenth and late eighteenth century grammarians, rhetoricians, or linguists. He should then consider how far along the line Jamieson, specifically, progressed in terms of style in and through language.

It is true, I believe, that on the whole, man does keep his more violent feelings under control. Yet, as one can see in terms of certain movements in our society in its various institutions there is still much violent and not-so-accurate or well-directed rhetoric. Jamieson's thesis, expressed in his writing, is that the style of new and rude societies is full of figures and ornaments, largely hyperbolic, and entirely picturesque.

Whether Jamieson had, personally, much experience or intimate knowledge of the American Indian, he frequently used the Indians and the Old Testament--and the poems of Ossian as exemplifying his points. His main reference seemed to be Cadwallar Colden's--with respect to Indian lore--History of the Five Nations. He observed that their private and public ceremonies were far more replete with style and metaphor than would be true of his own society..He then moves to the Old Testament:

231. In the Old Testament - the best example of oriental style.- constant allusions to sensible objects characterize the language of the various writers. Thus, guilt is "a spotted garment"; iniquity is the "treasures of darkness": a sinful life is "a crooked path"; misery drinks the "cup of astonishment"; vain pursuits are seen as "feeding on ashes": innocence is known by its "white robes": wisdom is a "lighted candle": and royal dignity is "purple" and a "crown." *

From the poems of Ossian, Jamieson finds many picturesque phrasings and a host of figures of speech. There are "sons of song" for number. For strength of expression, there are the heroes' "breasts of steel." In order to create illusions in the reader's mind there is the phrase "meteors of death." When there is the need for a violent expression of passion, we have "the white-bosomed love of Cormac. For slowness of movement, there is the utterance "slowly moved as a cloud of thunder, when the sultry plain of summer is silent **

* Jamieson, A Grammar of Rhetoric, New-Haven, Maltby, 1813, xviii, 796., p. 179

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Our modern writers have the gift of metaphor, synecdoche, metonymy, and alliteration in adequate and effective quantity and quality. Southern politicians, TV newscasters, and advertising persons can hold their own with any ancient master. Jamieson keeps referring, however, and not always happily, to the fact that as a language progresses it loses much of its figurative nature.

There is much more written representation of language today. Our complex society engendered by the advance of the scientific movements, or, our complex societies which have engendered the scientific modes and views, has necessarily had to have much of its written expression striving for as little ambiguity as possible.

While ambiguity is the heart of literature and advertising- and propaganda-- it is also the bane and foe of the communicative statement. Therefore, with all of our reliance on texts and on directions, and on explanations, we tend to overlook the very great amount(s) of literature, advertising, and propaganda. It is interesting to note that scientists themselves hasten to find metaphorical expressions for scientific phenomena, as is true of sports figures, economists, sociologists, and all other individuals in specific professions.

I might point out that one of the most difficult areas for both formal and informal instruction is that of being able to motivate individuals to understand and enjoy poetry. Whether we assert that this is the age of the critical and scientific emphases or whether we assert that it is not possible to be poetic when faced by the machine or by the ugliness of its products, few individuals would assert that poetry has as much appeal as in yesteryear. In the evolution of language, Jamieson, among others, believes that language, originally poetical, has lost its figurative style--its earliest and most important characteristic. He equates the advance in civilization and the acculturation of man with more precision and more reason. The more one exercises his reason, or his understanding, the less he can exercise his fancy. In order to communicate more clearly with one's fellowman, the more man has had to clear his style--according to Jamieson. The philosopher tends to take the place of the poet. The forms of reason demand a clearer and simpler style. They force the kind of writing called "prose."


I might suggest that we keep in mind the fact that Jamieson was essentially a product of the English "Age of Reason," or its "Neo-classical Age," or its "Neo-Augustan Age." Therefore, we expect a more critical bent or opinion than would be true of Elizabethan or Pre-romantic writers. Nevertheless, what he asserts in his books has much to commend it for certain insights. Whether we would subscribe to many of his insights is not as important as is the fact that he seems to have understood, in keeping with the modern linguist, that language is the "name of the game." Whether the statement is one of prose or one of poetry,

We come to a rather interesting set of observations when Jamieson tackles the progress of language as regards the order and arrangement of words in sentences. He considers, in his work, that there are two main forces brought to bear on the syntax of the English sentence: the first is the understanding, and the second is the imagination--which he equates with the power of emotions and attitudes--or with the worlds of the spirit and heart. He suggests that the "grammatical part" is dictated by the understanding, and that the inverted order results from the force of the imagination. In his examples he shows that he considers the understanding and its emphases to result in the order we know as N V N, N V Adj, N, V, Adv, and N V. That is, his illustrations parallel, very closely, our understanding of the basic sentence patterns as involving the incidence of the NP (complete subject first) and VP (the rest of the sentence next--the part including modals, have+en, be+ing, and the verb completers.) Jamieson then considers that changing the order of the noun phrase and verb phrase would indicate the force of the imagination.

At this point, there occurs one of his few major errors, an error entered into by many current or contemporary teachers or instructors. He seems to have assumed that making any change in the order of the sentence would bring about the emotive or attitudinal, or imaginative, or poetic mode. It is true that certain inversions or reversals will accomplish that. In English, for example, there are but few occasions when the negative follows the verb. The negative follows the verb normally and naturally when we use forms of the verb "to be." Usually, we would say, in prose style, "I do not care for the stars that shine." When we change the position of the negative with such a verb as "care," we get the poetic or imaginative note in "I care not for the stars that shine."

However, the adverb normally occupies the last or fourth position in the English basic sentence--a position that is optional as to being filled, but a position which, if filled must be filled by an adverb or by an adverbial. In such a normal order, the sentence is much more a matter of imaginative force than when the adverb or adverbial is moved to the left. It is a fact that when the adverb or adverbial in the English sentence is shifted left, the speed of the sentence--phonological speed--is markedly slowed, and leads, thereby, to a reflective or rational process. That is, if we desire more time for consideration as to what is said or written, we need to--in English, at least, slow the phonological speed of the sentence. Moving adverbs and adverbials to the left will accomplish that need. Moving adjectives to the right or to the postnominal position will also lead to the reflective process. He appears to have run into trouble at the point where he gives examples of this matter of inverted order and normal order from the point of view of the Latin language, an error very often made today.

Nevertheless, his observations are powerful. His treatment of the specific figures of speech and ornaments of poetry anticipate and in some cases surpass the accomplishment of the modern critic in this total area. Reference to his work and to the works of his contemporaries will be richly rewarding.



BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

MOREHEAD STATE UNIVERSITY

Periodicals Department
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Morehead State University

Dr. L.W. Barnes, Editor

Volume V, Number 29

The English Noun and Its Primary Accent

I. Introductory Remarks

We learn by being able to tell the difference(s) between one kind of an experience and another. We can discern the nature of a square by being able to distinguish it from other four-sided figures. Presumably we know more about a church spire by being able to appreciate the nature of a church tower. We understand the nature of football better by being able to distinguish it from baseball, lacrosse, and soccer. We understand the nature of the noun, in language through being able to discover the point at which it cannot be an adjective, adverb, verb, or any other part of speech than itself.

Through the realm of grammar which is unique to language and through specific grammars which are unique to specific languages--with one grammar for each language-- we distinguish the parts of speech. We do so keeping in mind that the grammar of any language must be known through the phonology, morphology, and syntax which, in synthesis, constitute a grammar of a language and the grammar of language. Now, for English, at least, we need at least a word for a part of speech. While the sentence is the functional unit of nearly all languages, each specific word belongs to, or is classified as, a part of speech.

We might well consider how we can define a "word" in our English language. A word has at least one vowel and carries a primary accent--or a full accent. With words of one syllable, we have few problems since there will be one or more vowels and but one accent, a full accent or a primary accent. We define a word as a "free morpheme." Now, a morpheme is designated as the smallest functional unit which carries some invariable meaning. There are two principal kinds of morphemes: the bound morpheme and the free morpheme. The free morpheme is a word in itself, and needs, for this reason, no affix to carry this invariable meaning. We can see, then, that such morphemes as the words "boy," "John," "bolt," and "a" are complete in themselves as free morphemes and as words.

The affix -er carries the meaning of "one who does." But this invariable meaning comes into play only when this affix is "bound" to another morpheme--as in the case paint + -er, to obtain "one who paints" or "painter." (Affixes are divided into two classes: prefixes and suffixes.) We can also speak about the bound morpheme involved in the inflectional situation where we have run and then run + -s, or runs. (Here the /s/ carries the /z/ sound. We need this background, perhaps, in order to consider how words are constructed. We can have a free morpheme as a word,

Insofar as the free morpheme as a word is concerned, there is always the primary accent and one or more vowels, no matter what part of speech. We can have the noun "day," the adjective "sad," the adverb "too," the pronoun "she," the verb "kick," the conjunction "and," or the preposition "to," with each one carrying at least one vowel and with each one having one and only one accent, a primary or full one. Thus, we are not likely to be able to define any single part of speech as distinct from the others on the basis of a free morpheme--as a word--of one syllable. We need to look, now, to our grounds for definition.

We shall assume that we can define a part of speech at that point where we can discover one invariable difference between that part of speech and all other parts of speech. Now, there may well be more than one invariable difference, but we look for that one first, or for the first invariable difference. If we can find no invariable difference, we are out of business insofar as considering Linguistics a science, one of the descriptive sciences.

Before we become more specific in this area, we need to consider that we can define, one supposes, in one of three ways, as a minimum, among the possibilities of structure- function- and meaning. We use the symbols S-F-M. Now, by "structure," we refer to "isness." By "function" we refer to "doesness." By "meaning" we refer to "valueness." We accept the proposition that we cannot directly teach meaning. From considering what the thing is and from what the thing does, we arrive at meaning. (We define "meaning" as the affect the experience has on any individual in terms of a conscious or unconscious stimulation and response on the parts of the nervous system.

Since experience reveals its phenomena to us in terms of general structures which tend to be recognizably the same for each phenomenon, but since experience reveals that one thing has more than one function, we find it more profitable and correct to work from structure to function. We can, for example, recognize the structure of the axe. The structure may vary superficially, but not significantly. But the axe may perform more than one function: the axe can cut through chopping and can drive through hammering-- as through hammering in tent pegs. We find that parts of speech have the faculty of being--for each-- used for more than one function. "Guilty" as an adjective by structure can function as a noun, as the subject of the sentence, as an indirect object, as a direct object, and as the object of a preposition. "Over" as an adverb by structure can function as a noun, and can be, thereby, the subject of the sentence, the object of a verb, or the object of a preposition.

We find it essential to start with structure if we desire to determine the patterning and order of each part of speech. Our main concern will be with the noun. At this point, a further distinction will be made between "noun" and "nounal." When the term "noun" is used, it will be understood to refer to the noun "by structure." When other parts of speech are used as nouns, or function as nouns, or behave as nouns, we shall use the term "nounals." Our ultimate concern is with the "noun" by structure.

Let us identify the noun by structure. That is, let us ensure, if we can--and we must--that we can define a noun so as to distinguish the noun from the pronoun, the adjective, the adverb, the conjunction, the preposition, the verb, the article, or the exclamation. Again, why do we not define the noun by function? We do not define the noun by function because there are other parts of speech which behave as nouns behave. To define, we must find the differences.

First, the noun is structured to answer the question "more," "fewer," or "less":

fewer dollars	more kindness
fewer children	more air
less energy	less air
more energy	fewer molecules

A noun is also structured to answer the questions "how much?" "how many?"

How many apples?	How much consideration?
How much cheese?	How many lectures?

Then, too, the noun is so structured as to have more than one quality:

a house as "white"	iron as "rusty"
a house as "old"	iron as "valuable"
a house as "huge"	iron as "heavy"

A noun is structured so as to have the slot to its left filled by another noun. The slot does not have to be filled, but if the slot is filled, the slot must be filled by a noun:

fence post	gold ring
glass jar	monkey business
chrome fender	law officers

We cannot trust to the use of the article in terms of defining or locating a noun. We can have such a sentence as "The guilty will be punished" where "guilty" is an adjective by structure. In the sentence "A white will take a chance there," or "A black will take a chance there," we have "white" or "black" standing for a man or a woman. We may also run into similar problems with attempts to use the demonstratives in locating the noun or the pronoun. It is unfortunate that so many texts attempt to locate the noun by insisting on using the determiners as tests. For, as we can see, these determiners can also stand before other parts of speech, such as the adjective "guilty."

Then, by structure, we identify the noun in terms of being structured to respond to "more," "fewer," "less," "how much," "how many," We then apply the test of discovering whether the word has two or more qualities. We then test to discover whether it can take a noun to its left, if that slot is to be filled.

But we are not "home free" at this point. To identify the noun by structure, there can be no other part of speech meeting the same criteria. If another part of speech does meet the same criteria, we have not, at that point, identified or defined the noun.

What of the pronoun? The pronoun will answer to the question "more," "fewer," or "less." The pronoun will answer to "how much?" or to "how many?" The pronoun has two or more qualities or attributes.

But, the first slot to the left of the pronoun cannot be filled by a noun, and although we can place a pronoun before a noun, we cannot place a noun before a pronoun. And there is the difference.

Having, then, identified the noun in terms of at least one distinct criterion, an essential one, we know that we can take care of all nouns in the English language through "structure." If we just once cannot take care of all words as nouns by these criteria, we will need, of course, to re-examine the criteria. But we do not have exceptions. The next question is that of discovering whether or not the noun by structure can be further identified or defined through "phonology."

As has been indicated, the grammar of a language is known through its elements of phonology, morphology, and syntax. We have considered the nature of the "word." Each part of speech is known through its minimal representation of the "word." We have defined the word as that morpheme--a free one--which carries primary accent and which has at least one vowel. Implied is the fact that when we do speak about the "free morpheme" as a word, we are talking about a word that cannot be further or farther subdivided. Although "loneliness" is a word, we would not speak of "loneliness" as a free morpheme. The word is constructed from the free morpheme "lone" + -ly + -ness, with -ly and -ness being bound morphemes.


Now, insofar as the phonology of the noun is concerned, there is no need for us to consider the noun that is a one-syllable word. The reason is that all one syllable words, whether noun or not, carry primary accent and at least one vowel.

III The Noun and the Primary Accent

We shall need to consider the noun and its accent and/or stress in terms of nouns of more than one syllable. Our position is that the noun, as structure, takes its accent on the first syllable, basically. If such is not the case, we are not dealing with exceptions, for in a science we admit of no exceptions.* At this point we will rule out cases where "oral interpretation takes over." By "oral interpretation," we refer to the fact that man often superimposes deliberately, and, unconsciously at times, a new rhythm of expression or communication. Under such conditions, any syllable will obtain a powerful stress, not in keeping with the ordinary rhythms of language in its natural verbal flow.

Continued in Number 30

* What may appear to be an exception is simply that element about which we have no present classificatory awareness.



BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Dr. L.W. Barnes, Editor

III The Noun and the Primary Accent-continued Volume V, No. 30 & 31

There is one more point that must be called to the attention of the reader. In "Metrics" we find that iambic pentameter is the most important metre in English and American verse, and such has always been the case. As Jespersen points out in his Linguistica

Verse rhythm is based on the same alternation between stronger and weaker syllables as that found in natural everyday speech. Even in the most prosaic speech, which is in no way dictated by artistic feeling, this alternation is not completely irregular: everywhere we observe a natural tendency towards making a weak syllable follow after a strong one and inversely. Thus syllables which ought seemingly to be strong are weakened if occurring between strong syllables, and naturally weak syllables gain in strength if placed between weak syllables**

We are not talking about what happens, then, if a noun of more than one syllable finds itself in one of the contexts indicated above. Our concern is with the natural accent on a pure noun by structure when that pure noun has more than one syllable. A pure noun by structure is one which meets the tests we have indicated. We do not have the time in this paper to discuss nominalization more intensively. But it may be irrelevant to speak of a general language principle on this score.

All people--language-speaking people have had or have their languages focused along one of four directions: first, the language is nominal or object-oriented; second, the language is action or being-oriented toward the verb; third, the language is well-balanced between the noun and the verb; or, finally, the language is not focused or centered on any of the first three combinations, but is distributed so that the adjective and/or the adverb may be equally significant.

There has been some tendency, in English, to approach this fourth position. In this position, the quality of a noun, rather than the noun itself, will be stressed or made dominant, thus calling into play the adjective, which becomes nominalized for that purpose. The same observation can be made about the flexible and fluid adverb which becomes increasingly "particle-ized" with the verb, and which is becoming increasingly nominalized. The articulation of the specifics of this trend is in itself, a somewhat formidable but rewarding and enjoyable consideration.

It would seem logical that what we speak about should receive primary stress. Since the noun represents that which we speak about in many instances, we would expect primary accentuation on the initial syllable.

As we have noted, when we use the single word, that word carries, for one syllable and for a basic word, a primary accent and at least one vowel. If we use a word of one syllable only, whether a noun or not, we make the reasonable assumption that whatever the word may be as a part of speech, that is what we are speaking about.

Let us use an inductive approach to the thesis we have in mind. The pattern of accenting for English words is not flexible if we take the correct position that the primary accent must always fall on a particular syllable for any specific word. The question is as to whether the main or primary accent must, in normal converse, fall on any specifically-numbered syllable in an English word. If we consider Polish, the Czech tongue, or the French language we will find that the accent is definitely and assuredly tied to a specific syllable. There is some strong opinion for the position that in English the primary accent is not tied to any specific syllable unless we have a free morpheme as a word.

But the position taken here is one of demurral. The position here is that while all parts of speech will not have the primary accent tied or fixed on a chain of syllables with one specific syllable in that chain invariably receiving the primary accent, different parts of speech do carry, according to the kind of a part of speech each is by structure and purity, an accent on a particular syllable for each--when they are multi-syllabic. This observation would be modified only where phonology steps in and makes its first claim.

Perhaps the most forceful example of nominalization must be that back formation where the power of the verb is converted to a "one who does" by -er: baker, maker, raker, strafer, and waiter. Here the two-syllable words carry the primary accent as nouns and there are many, many such nouns. Then we have the awesome number of nouns with a Latin verb root followed by prefixing. Here we have the stress on the verb root: as in native, version, vertigo, caption, clarity, captive, diction, clamor, halo, mirror, missive, movement, servant, summons, tribune, and tendon, and specter (spectre.) Here we have but a few of the many words, almost ten thousand words with two syllables, each a noun, taking the accent on the first syllable. (We are careful to distinguish our use of "accent" and "stress." "Stress" will be used only we think of the noun in actual context with other words in an utterance of sentence value. "Accent" refers to the word in terms of its dictionary value, with the word alone.)

Now, if we have a city of two syllables and if the city is Anglo-Saxon in origin as to name, the city will take its primary accent on the first syllable. However, if we have a city and that city is "Czech in origin, then the accent will go on the first syllable, no matter how many syllables in the town or city.

If we have a city with a French name, then the accent will go on the last syllable, but, of course, since the name of the town or city is admittedly French, we would have no contradiction.

We now come to compound words composed of two free morphemes. We have such words as

air-raid	knee-cap
bandstand	windscreen
backache	windshield
bluebird	route-march
blackbird	(any many others)
bulldog	
crossword	
heartburn	

Each takes primary accent on the first syllable of these disyllabic nouns.

We come to the situation where we have a disyllabic word, a word which can be, on the one hand, a verb, and, with the same spelling, on the other hand, a noun. The noun will have the accent on the first syllable, the verb on the second. We have a small list of the many such words available:

combine	desert	record
compress	export	segment
concert	object	subject
consort	permit	survey
contract	present	second
contrast	proceeds	
convict	rebel	

And, of course, there are many other such examples.

There are words ending in -et, disyllabic nouns such as wicket, thicket, picket, and ticket, each taking primary accent on the first syllable. Then we have disyllabic nouns taking the accent on the first syllable as they end in -ion, -ity, -ment, -ant, -ness, -age, -an, -ane, -ean, -ian, -ence, -ency, -ant, -ent, -ar, -er, -ard, -ary, -ate, -erly, -ery, -ry, -et, -ful, -fy, -hood, -ice, -ine, -ion, -ist, -kin, -ock, -or, -ory, -ship, -ster, -ure, -and -y. The question now comes as to whether disyllabic nouns take an accent of a primary nature on other than the first syllable.

We consider such a word as "antique," which has primary accent on the second syllable. However, "antique" is not a noun by structure, but an adjective. Our thesis applies to a noun by structure. Then we come to another example, which involves a set of such cases. Let us look at "machine." This word takes primary accent on the second syllable. However, both morphemes are French, not English, and, thus, phonologically, the French rule prevails. Let us look at one more case: that of "idea." Here we have three "bound" morphemes. Phonologically, for English, the first two are "strong." When the word is in isolation--or in dictionary form--if the first two bound morphemes are equally strong, the primary accent cannot go to the first one because the juncture would be so great as to demand two words, not one, since the minimal criterion for a word--at least one vowel, in this instance--would have been met.

We now come to the question of the noun with more than two syllables. In every instance, whether we have three syllables, four syllables, five syllables, or more than five syllables, every effort is made to have the first syllable carry the primary accent. We have examples as quantity, bachelor, appetite, pedigree, cowardliness, criticism, counterattack, gold digger, grasshopper, copyright, booby-trap, ladybird, office-boy, cabinet-maker, fire-extinguisher, catherine-wheel, chatterbox, waiting-room, and, and telephone--among hosts of others. Are there nouns of more than one syllables that do not take primary accent on the first syllable?

Yes. These will occur, as we have seen in the case of the disyllabic words when there are foreign morphemes involved that, of themselves, will not permit primary accent on the first syllable. Again, where there are bound morphemes with the first two being strong by nature for English, the second one will carry the primary stress--to keep from exceeding the limits of juncture. (We have noted that phonology must exercise first claim, if not the most important claim.

When the prefix before the root is phonologically short or non-Greek or non-Anglo-Saxon, the accent must fall on a syllable not the first as in "relation". We have the word "foreknowledge." Here, the first two phonemes have strength, with the A/S "fore" having almost enough strength to force a primary accent on the first syllable.

"Tomato" and "tobacco" do not take the primary accent on the first syllable, and such is the case because the first two phonemes from the Spanish do not tolerate primary accent.

The phonological speed of "circu" is so short that there is no possible way to give primary accent to the first syllable in "circulation." The question as to two initial strong syllables for bound morphemes indicates that in "rhinoceros" the accent cannot appear on the first syllable. Where the initial syllables are strong and more than one, it is impossible for the prevailing nature of the English noun to take primary accent on the first syllable because to do so--as we have observed, earlier, would cause a juncture so great that one of two events would occur--equally fatal. First, there would be two separate words, or, on the other hand, the breakdown into bound morphemes would split the word into fragments, neither one recognizable, in itself as a word.

After all, we are speaking about the word here; and we are not speaking about the word in context. We have indicated earlier in this discussion that in context, the matter of "stress" enters the picture. With a basic metre established through context, even when the subject matter is prosaic to some degree, there are modifications because of the principle of euphony which operates in terms of the total rhythm of the English sentence.

Here, when words are concerned, and when the noun in English is concerned, the noun takes its primary accent on the first syllable when polysyllabic by its nature of being a pure noun unit by structure.

When a prefix is affixed to the root or Latin derivative, for example, the phonology that is an integral and all-powerful unit of the grammar of the language makes its initial survey. When there are two strong syllables, and, when each contains a vowel, and when the first is a prefix, the primary accent must move along the linear sound line to the right. Otherwise, the juncture would be so great that there would be two or more words. If the same conditions obtain, with only one of the two initial strong syllables having a vowel, we would find ourselves with no word.

Again, where the phonemes are outside our range of phonemes derived from the Anglo-Saxon and, substantially, from the Greek and Latin derivatives, there are sets of words which cannot take primary accent on the first syllable if such could not be the case in that other tongue or language.

We need not be surprised that such is the case. We tend to stress the thing, the idea, the event, the institution, or the person in English as a nominal, as the noun. In isolation, or in dictionary form, every effort is made to ensure that primary accent is given to the noun. When we add the prefix, we are, to some extent, combining aspects of other parts of speech, or fusing them with the noun. To aid in this task, we find three prefixes: either quite strong or very weak, when compared finally to the root or Latin, or Greek, or Anglo-Saxon derivative.

On the one hand, we strive to keep the word one word, and, thus, protect the juncture from too much elasticity. On the other hand, the weak prefix, or the weaker of the two strong prefixes will operate so as to, on one hand, keep the accent on the first syllable, or, on the other hand, allow the accent to shift to the second syllable which indicates the heart of the noun's semantic value. It is interesting and significant to note that when the prefix is subtractive in taking away some of the essence of the root or derivative, the accent shifts to the second syllable so that the essential nature of the noun root comes through. When the prefix is additive and reinforces the semantic elements of the root or derivative, the accent stays on the first syllable.