



BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Dr. L.W. Barnes, Professor of English
Editor

Volume I
Number 1

OF EXPRESSIONS, LINGUISTICALLY SPEAKING: LITERATURE AND NON-LITERATURE

LINGUISTICS is the science of language and is so because the linguist goes about the ways of handling the data of a language as the chemist goes about handling the data of his particular materials. Linguists do generally agree that any language is a unique system of articulated sounds through which an individual expresses himself and communicates to himself and to other beings, all within an identifiable social organization, or community. The "pure" linguist concerns himself only with the patterns and principles of any specific language, and with the general laws of all language. He is concerned with the phonological aspects of human expression and communication.

The applied linguist must know the principles of language, and of the specific language to which he devotes his attention. Applied Linguistics realizes that the principles of language must be applied, and that the major roles of application are those uniquely human, and the application must be in human roles. Any human being must express himself or must communicate in a social situation, because he is a social being. The ranges of expression and communication must be with respect to the physical environment, the economic environment, the social environment, the political environment, the philosophical environment, and the psychological environments in which he necessarily finds himself.

Such expressions and communications can be only in terms of human personality. Human personality involves the head, the heart, and the hand, or, less metaphorically, the mind, the emotions and spirit, and the world of the physical things. Or man thinks, feels, and acts. Any expression and/or communication is with reference to himself, to others, or to the supernatural in terms of the environments we have indicated. The significance of what has been said may be clearer if we realize that there is nothing that escapes man's thinking, feeling, and acting faculties. Considered in another way, the linguist tells us the many ways in any language in which a matter of human concern can be stated.

The psychologist, on the other hand, may not know what the linguist knows--the number of ways in which the thing can be phonologically expressed or conveyed, but he does know why human expressions and communications are made. He can measure the causes of human expression. The dramatic impetus to Linguistics has been sustained and forwarded through the union of psychologist and linguist. We approach language in an applied sense in using sounds that carry meanings so as to speak in expression and communication through the sounds of feeling, thinking, and acting. Speech is human personality in operation.

We should distinguish human sound as literature and non-literature, expressed and/or communicated. There are oral and written expressions and communications. They take the form of literature and non-literature. Literature is that expression which indicates "thinking with feeling" about things, ideas, institutions, people and events in some variable proportion. When the world of spirit and feeling are emphasized, we have the romantic statement. When the world of physical things has ascendancy in expression, we are in the world of naturalism. When the mind is given high priority, even in matters emotional, volitional ^{or} spiritual, we are in the world of rationalism. When the emphasis is on thinking with feeling about things, ideas, institutions, people and events in the right proportion for that specific time, we have the ever-recurring, but infrequent, event of classicism. When the individual rejects totally any dependence on outside forces, laws, theories, facts, or principles, whether emotional, intellectual, or physical, we have the rare--but modern--phenomenon of existentialism. When the expressions or communications are used to make the "abstract" "concrete" through appeal to human senses, whether supporting romanticism, naturalism, rationalism, existentialism, or classicism, we have a method, not a philosophy, called realism. Thus, the sounds of human expression, whose number, nature, and principles of operation, as distinguished by linguists, reveal the emphasis of human personality in its operation through different experiences. When the sounds that carry meaning can be represented in units of sentences, or greater, through graphical representation, we have writing--writing that can be literature or non-literature.

When the threshold of emotions can be stimulated, while still making distinct and recognizable appeals to both mind and the worlds of the senses, we have some form of literature, whether romantic, rational,



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
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Volume I
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
Dr. L.W. Barnes, Professor of English
Editor

HOW TO SUBTRACT: ADD!

Those who read this bulletin may well be excused if their first reaction to this number is that we are dealing with trivia. Nearly everyone who teaches can subtract, and virtually all of those who teach and subtract normally get the correct answer--arithmetically. "Furthermore," you may answer, "what has subtraction to do with Linguistics?" "Plenty," we answer. And away we go! We shall develop the area of subtraction later. Consider the last question first.

Mathematics of any kind, whether arithmetic, algebra, geometry, trigonometry, or calculus must have some verbalization, if only through the name. Certain sound units go together to make up the statements in word problems, or in explanations, illustrations, and demonstrations. Even when the problems involve working with numbers only, the explanations of the processes must involve verbalizations. When we verbalize, we are in the area of a specific language, one composed of a system of articulated sounds through which each individual member of an identifiable human society enters into social relationships with other human beings. Or any number of individuals may express themselves about mathematics to themselves, the sound units carrying meaning coming from the common fund of the sounds of that specific language. Thus, different people will work with mathematical relationships that are the same, but the statements made about the same operation by different members of different languages do not sound the same, nor are they written down as representations through the exact graphic forms.

But let us confine ourselves to American-English today when we tackle the question of subtracting. Nearly all Americans agree on the meanings carried by sounds in such words in context as "borrow," "minus," "subtract," "addition," and "carry," among others. Traditionally, in subtracting, two principal methods are employed, and each can obtain the correct answer. Before starting our demonstration, however, we will observe that some substantial experimentation has shown that we make many ~~fewer~~ errors in adding than we do in ~~subtracting~~. To the teacher



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SOUNDS OF EMOTION AND THOUGHT:


THE ADJECTIVE &

THE ADVERB



article by

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Far more fruitful than the sheer recognition of adjective and adverb, a recognition made rather simple through linguistical devices, is the role each plays in expressing or communicating thought and emotion. As is always true in human language, the word, by itself, has little or no value. We should never ask "What does such and such a word mean?" We would be better advised to ask "What meanings does that word carry in this particular context? Thus, we shall not consider the meanings of specific adjectives or adverbs when they exist by themselves as single words. (We might keep in mind the fact that in English a word is defined through a statement with a primary (heavy accent) accent and at least one vowel. Thus the term boy is a word in our language because of its having a primary accent and at least the one vowel, in this case o.)

What is significant to realize is that when man speaks in expression or in communication he has a mind to consider, emotions to reveal, and the world of the sensorial to do justice with and to. He thinks; he feels, and he tastes, smells, sees, hears, and feels, among other sensory matters. When we speak of a man's beliefs, we are in the world of thought, primarily. When we consider man's attitudes, we are in the world of the emotive responses. Attitudes involve beliefs, of course, but they involve them in such ways as to feel about them. The statement to the effect that Joe Jones has a poor attitude indicates that whatever expressions and communications Joe has concerning his various experiences, his attitudes indicate an emotional content that is considered negative by a certain number of people in his society. If Billy Brown's attitudes are considered good, apparently the latter's belief are impregnated with an emotive content that is considered positive. Or, in other words, Joe Jones has at least one emotional facet that, associated with a certain belief, evokes a negative response from his immediate society. Unless one is an existentialist, he is always directing his emotions at an external object. He is not angry, but is angry about something. He is not just happy; he must be happy about something. If his responses are positive, his emotions

We return, now, to the question of the adjective and adverb. We shall leave the matter of their identifications to a later issue and discussion. We are not concerned, directly, with the fact that the force of the adverb is its being added to the verb. Nor are we concerned that the adjective describes, limits, or defines the noun. But we are concerned with the position of adverbial and adjectival statements.

Consider the following statements:

1. I will go when I want to.
2. When I want to, I will go.
3. I will love you always.
4. Always, I will love you.
5. I shall go, however,
6. However, I shall go.

When the first statement is made, "when I want to" is characterized by two crucial qualities: speed and emotive force. The "when I want to" always indicates a violence and determination when ending a sentence.

Consider the second statement. When we shift to "When I want to" at the beginning of the second sentence, we are forced to slow up sufficiently before "I will go" to demand a comma. What would happen if we did not use some punctuation to the value of a comma? There would be a complete fade-fall, an indication in American-English that the end of a sentence has been reached. But the introduction of that comma, caused by placing the adverbial statement first, robs the second statement of its emotive force and slows the pace of the statement.

In the third statement the adverb "always" gives the sentence emotive force, and the word "always" goes swiftly indeed. When, as in the fourth statement, the "always" is reversed, the speaker is forced to slow his pace before "I will love you." In English, he has no other choice. The slowed pace diminishes the emotive force. "Always," used initially in the sentence, must be sustained, as is not the case in the third sentence.

In the fifth statement we consider "however." The position of "however" at the end of the statement gives that statement an emotive force of challenge, determination--even of defiance. In the sixth statement, shifting the position of the term to the beginning of the sentence takes away the challenge, slows the pace, demands the comma, and removes the force of attitude. The reader, then, through his own efforts and experimentation will discover that in English EMOTIONAL FORCE IS OBTAINED AND ATTAINED BY PLACING THE ADVERBIAL STATEMENTS TO THE RIGHT--AT THE END OF THE SENTENCE. TO DIVEST THE STATEMENT OF EMOTIVE FORCE AND TO FORCE A NOTE OF REFLECTION AND THOUGHT, THESE CONDITIONS ARE BROUGHT ABOUT BY SHIFTING ADVERBIAL CONSTRUCTIONS FROM RIGHT TO LEFT--FROM THE END OF A SENTENCE TO THE BEGINNING OF A SENTENCE. THE ADVERBIAL STATEMENT IN AN EMOTIVE SENSE ALWAYS HAS THE NOTE OF SPEED. THE ADVERBIAL STATEMENT LOSES ITS EMOTIVE FORCE AND ACQUIRES A REFLECTIVE FORCE WHEN SHIFTED TO THE BEGINNING OF A STATEMENT, SLOWING THE PACE OF EXPRESSION IN PROPORTION TO ITS SHIFT FROM RIGHT TO LEFT. Let us consider the nature of the adjectival statement in context.

Consider the following statements.

1. The theater will close at eleven effective the first of May.
2. Effective the first of May, the theater will close at eleven.
3. He is keen, rugged, and determined.

7. Go slow.
8. Slow down.
9. Impatient Griselda's done it again.
10. Done it again, that's impatient Griselda.
11. They have no patience with the cowardly.
12. With the cowardly, they have no patience.

In each of these statements a shift to the left of the adjectival statement results in a more emotive force. The use of the adjective to the right of the sentence--in the last part--weakens the emotional force of the utterance. The shift of the adjective to the left slows down the pace of the statement. Apparently, in English, the adjective, in slowing down the rush of meaning when shifted to the left lends more emotive force to the expression or communication. Let us review, then.

In English, particularly in American-English, the following principles hold:

1. When the adverbial statement is shifted to the left, emotion decreases; thought increases, and the pace of utterance is decreased.
2. When the adjectival statement is shifted to the right, the emotive impact decreases; thought increases, and the pace of utterance is increased with respect to the adjectival statement.
3. When the adverbial statement is shifted to the right, the emotive force increases; thought decreases, and the pace of expression is increased with respect to the adverbial elements.
4. When the adjectival statement is shifted to the left, the emotive impact increases; thought decreases, and the pace of utterance is slowed--with respect to adjectival elements.

Insofar as the adjectival and adverbial elements are concerned in English, we may conclude that the total emphasis on the emotive power of the statement is obtained when the adverbial elements are shifted to the right and the adjectival elements to the left, with the pace increasing from left to right insofar as speed of statement is concerned. We must also conclude that when the adjectival elements are shifted to the right and the adverbial elements to the left, the total emphasis is on the reflective elements of the statement, with the pace decreasing from left to right.

While we cannot make an "ungifted" individual "gifted," and while we cannot make a poor speaker a brilliant orator, and while we cannot make a mediocre writer a great writer, we can improve the quality and effectiveness of the use of the native tongue. We can do so by indicating the structures of our language. We can show that shifts of statements carrying the meanings of the human personality in its response to experience can make the statement more or less emotive as the case may be. We can slow down the emotive force by manipulating adjectival and adverbial statements, among others. Once the individual is aware of these phenomena of his language, he will become interested through personal engagement in making and using such shifts of thought and emotion.



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
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SPEECH AND LANGUAGE: CONSIDERATIONS Number 4

A large majority of the people in any one country can speak the native tongue on a level called "standard dialect" for that country and people. Some members of a particular country speak more than one language.



A few people can speak many languages. A person who can speak several languages, such as Spanish, Chinese, French, Russian, and Hindustani, among others, is often called a "polyglot" (many tongues.) Let us consider one Joe Jones who may speak his own native tongue "Q." He may also speak other languages, such as "R," "S," and "T." He may speak them sufficiently well to understand the languages insofar as ordinary meanings of expression and conversation are concerned. He may even be understood by the native people of those languages. We call him, if we so desire, a "polyglot."

Is Joe Jones a "linguist"? A linguist studies language, and he studies language in such an orderly way that the subject matter of his concern--Linguistics--is often termed "science of the language." We may put the matter in another way and say that the orderliness of the language is such that a serious student of language must be a linguist. Linguists may study individual languages, as such, or they may study language in general: if they study a language or languages, those whom we term "linguists" are seeking knowledge of the structures of the subject matter. We would state that a person who speaks many languages is a polyglot: if he studies the structures of the languages in a scientific manner, he is also a linguist. If he makes no such systematic study of structural features, then he is a polyglot, only.

Jones finds that his fingerprints are different from those of every other person: thus, they are unique. He finds that his language is different from that of any other country, or different from that of any other linguistic society--since more than one country may use what would appear to be the same language. He discovers, if he is a student of language, that his tongue has regional variations, normally termed "dialects." There are many competent linguists who believe that every individual is so unique in his personal use of language as to be in the category of having a "voice-print," or a "speech print." However, there is, of course, one distinct difference between fingerprints and voice prints, or between fingerprints and speech prints. Jones is born with his fingerprints: he inherits them. He has his fingerprints, but he has to form his voice and use his voice in learning his language. The comparisons break down, as is usually true of nearly every analogy because language is far more complex than being a matter of a voice print or a speech



MOREHEAD STATE UNIVERSITY

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Dr. Lewis Barnes, Editor

Volume 1: Number 8

THE CASE OF THE EXPLETIVE "IT" :PART 1

We are told that "expletive" means "filler." Roberts (Understanding Grammar) believes that the condition of having the expletive phenomenon springs from our dislike of having long phrase or clause subjects at the beginning of a sentence and from the fact that we prefer, in English, at least, to have the subject before the verb. He goes on to develop the point that the expletive "it" is a compromise between the conflicts involved between having the long clausal—or phrasal—statement as subject in the initial position in the sentence while having, at the same time, the need to have the subject before the verb. Roberts then continues to handle this question through the resolution that in the compromise "it" fills the subject position, awaiting the arrival of the real subject. Finally, he concludes that when the expletive "it" is used the real subject is usually an infinitive phrase, or a noun clause. Taft, et al, in The Technique of Composition, consider that "it" is one of the members of a small and special function group called "anticipatory subject" or "pattern fillers." In this point of view "it" is alleged to serve to start the sentence whenever the usual SV pattern is inverted.

Insofar as the usual (structural) sentence patterning in English is concerned, we are faced with a solid core of agreement that no matter how we state our basic sentence patterns—as NV, NVA, NVAd; NVN; NVNN, NVNA; and N Lv... or as SV, SVO, SVOO, SVC, or SVOc—the language is structured in "favor of" having the subject before the verb. The question that we are to examine here is whether or not grammarians are correct in their statements to the effect that the filler "it" is not the same as the third person singular "it." Enroute, we are faced with the question as to whether or not "it" is a "filler" as distinct from being the third person singular "it."

We shall shift our main attention to Roberts and shall use his own sentences for bases of discussion. He gives (p.488) five consecutive sentences in which he states that each begins with the expletive "it." He then asserts that the real subjects are those underlined in each sentence.

1. It is hard to explain his behavior.
2. It is interesting to speculate about what might happen.
3. It is known that Melrose was loitering near the bakery on the third of July.
4. It is not known whether he was the culprit or not.
5. It is absurd that he stole the cake.

In an earlier section of his book (Understanding Grammar) Roberts states This "it" (expletive) is not—notionally, at least—the subject of the verb; rather it fills in for the subject, which comes later in the clause. The term



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Lewis Wesley Barnes, Editor

Volume 1

Number 9

THE CASE OF THE EXPLETIVE IT: PART 2

The position suggested, even urged, in the last issue (# 8) is that the so-called expletive "it" is not a filler, nor even a delayer, but, in the instances cited, the subject of the sentence. Or in, short, when the term "it" occupies the S position in a basically -structured English sentence, the "it" is the subject, not that which signals a delayed subject. Let us consider the following sentence, one in which "it" is alleged to be a "filler." (This sentence is taken from Taft, et al, The Technique of Composition, p. 91.)

It is a beautiful day in Chicago.

A condition or state exists, in this case, one of weather. What are we speaking about? What gives rise to the conversation, expression, or communication? The answer is "a state or condition" about something. The thing merely specifies the kind of state or condition. Thus, we are saying, in effect

The condition, of being a beautiful day in Chicago, exists.

It (the condition) is a beautiful day in Chicago.

(that of)

or

1. A condition (or state) of weather exists.
2. The condition is that of a beautiful day.
3. The condition exists in Chicago.

In Roberts (Understanding Grammar, p. 250) there are two sentences set out for discussion:

1. *It is afternoon.*
2. *It is Aunt Flo*

Roberts comments: "In 'It is afternoon' it has no meaning or reference of any kind. In 'It is Aunt Flo' it has a kind of reference since it points vaguely to something in a situation, a something that is specified by the subjective complement, Aunt Flo. In both of these sentences 'it' must be construed as subject, in lieu of any other subject." Again, we would demur, not to the statement that "It" is the subject of each sentence—in every case where the "it" occupies the normal S position we have taken the position that "it" is the subject. We demur to the concept that "it" must be the subject because of a sort of desperate realization that there is no other possibility. In the sentence "It is afternoon" we are saying, in effect, "The situation (time, state, or condition) is

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Volume 1

Number 11

Terms Make a Difference: Function Word, Marker, and Determiner Part II

If we take Josephine Lowery's statement as to the nature of the "function" word, we shall be very close to the use of the term as indicated by many texts and by many teachers in modern grammar, with its linguistic emphases. The purposes of this issue and the next issue (12) relate to questioning the uses of the term "function words." Let us give the term a fair and complete review.

Lowery's this is grammar states, clearly, that

Function words are common, small, rather neutral words like the, and, will, very, than, to, which indicate the classes and relationships of other words. Such words act as logical or grammatical signals in somewhat the same way as inflections and suffixes do. There are many classes of function words, each class performing a particular kind of grammatical service. The examples which follow illustrate the more important classes and the use to which each class is put.

(p. 16)

We must concur that for the most part "function" indicates not what a thing is, but what the thing does. In indicating that her function words perform services and that the function words "act," that author is certainly close to the concept of doing as distinct from being. Miss Lowery goes on to point out the important classes (function words) and the use to which each class is put. We state her divisions as follows:

- ML
g 405
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v.1
no. 11
- Serve as markers of nouns (some, the, a, his, no, every, few)
 - Serve as markers and as auxiliaries of verbs (is, were, will, be, has, can, does)
 - Serve as qualifiers of adjectives and adverbs (quite, too, very, rather)
 - Serve as indicators of logical and grammatical relationships between words (within, near, of, for, during, beside, because of)
 - Serve as indicators of logical and grammatical relationships between word groups (and, or, but, because, if, although, unless, which, as)

If we accept the term "serve," then we must accept the classification as to "function words." We have little trouble, if any, until we come to her statements that indicate that

"function words are not easily classified on the basis of their form," and "Function words are apt to have idiosyncrasies." That certain words in English perform many services in expression and communication can be shown from the examples that Lowery gives in classifying the uses of function words (p. 1. a-e, among others.) For example, they are termed both "qualifiers" and "signallers." They are called "indicators" and "markers." Logically, they serve in different ways; they perform uniquely. One must admit that a person can be quite useful in stating and advocating if he defines his terms. But we have some problems connected with the term "Function," as used in modern grammar.

We agree with the author (Lowery) when she states that function words are nearly indispensable. But we come back to our problems with the term when she comes to the point of stating the ways through which function words differ from English form words. Let us go directly to her chart on this matter (Lowery, op. cit., p. 17):

<u>Form Words</u>	<u>Function Words</u>
include nouns, pronouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs	include all other kinds of words
are usually inflected	are not usually inflected
add prefixes and suffixes	do not add prefixes and suffixes
are freely and frequently borrowed or invented	are seldom borrowed or invented
are relatively numerous	are relatively few in number
usually have many synonyms	have few synonyms

Now, nouns, pronouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs have both structure and function. Their structure makes them what they are, and their functions make them perform what they perform. A noun may be structured like a noun, but function like an adverb—"Wednesday." A structured adjective may function like a noun: "The guilty are punished." The phonologically structured "fast" may function like an adverb. We must note that the well-constructed table (supra) as to form words and function words contains warning notes: these warning notes are indicated by "usually," "freely and frequently," "seldom," "relatively few," and "have few." With the exception of "add prefixes and suffixes" and "do not add prefixes and suffixes," there is little definition in each statement in the table. But we need definition. We do not believe that "Form Words" as distinct from "Function Words" has much significant meaning. We are willing to agree, whole-heartedly, that words, terms, expressions, and communications in English, at least, have unique structures and functions, but they are not exclusively so. That is, there is no word having function that does not also have structure. We do believe, however, that the words called "Function Words" can be clearly distinguished. We move to such distinguishing in the next issue-- Number 12.

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MOREHEAD STATE UNIVERSITY

BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Dr. Lewis W. Barnes, Editor

Volume 1 Number 12

Terms Make a Difference: Function Word, Marker, and Determiner—Part 2

Let us consider a matter discussed earlier in our bulletins. We use terms "markers" and "determiners" with great care and specificity. We stated that a "marker" signals that a certain element in the sentence is present. A determiner makes a certain part of speech what that particular part of speech is as borne by a certain word in a certain sentence. These markers and determiners, of course, have their own unique structures; they also have their functions. But their functions do not eliminate them from being "form words." Consider the first class of function words indicated by Lowery:

Serve as markers of nouns

We would say that the proper term for "some," "the," "a," "his," "no," and "every" would be "determiner." Each makes the term before which this determiner stands what that term is in the light of the initiation of the expression or discussion. In "I need some encouragement," "encouragement is determined or made by the" "some." "Some" specifies that "I" do not need all the possible encouragement available. But since I have "some," I shall not have "all." In "I need a few friends," we have the same parallel. When we say "We need no money for that purpose," "money" is made or determined by that word "no." Now, we agree that "no" plays a function in the statement, but so does "money." As well, "no" has a structure and form, and is as much form as structure, neither more nor less. We would state that anything that determines a noun certainly "functions" as an adjective—by definition. Thus, in the sentence above "some" is a determiner, and functions as an adjective. The phonological length of each word indicated under this heading in the series "some"..... is that of an adjective—save only the term no. "No" does not meet the test of phonological length for an adjective, but does meet the test of change of speed of the statement when shifted from right to left in an English statement. Again, in context, every term except "no" carries a secondary accent, but "no" carries a primary accent. Thus, each term except "no" is structured—by form—as an adjective when placed in sentences like those above. "No" is structured as an adverb, for reasons indicated. However, each term is a determiner, or "marker."

Serve as markers and as auxiliaries of verbs

We accept the term "marker" (rejecting auxiliary for reasons to be stated in a future issue), under one condition, only. Such terms as "is," "were," "will," "be," "has," "might," "can," "may," "should," and "does," mark the time of the verb. They point out the time of the verb. But, if there is no verb following these markers, then these words, if having verb



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BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Volume I

Dr. Lewis W. Barnes, Editor

Number 13

The Uses of Phonetics

George W. Boswell

One of the greatest values I have ~~discovered~~ of linguistics is in teaching pronunciation.

I find welcome assistance in understanding the meaning of the word linguistics in Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language, 1953 edition. According to this dictionary it is

The science of language, including phonology, morphology, syntax, and semantics. . .subdivided into descriptive, historical, comparative, and geographical linguistics.

Under present consideration is its phonological aspect. This involves analysis of the identity and production of separate speech sounds, or phonemes. When these phonemes are combined in a way agreed upon by the speakers of a common language, they form meaning-carrying words or morphemes. If they are mispronounced, as /b/ in bin for /p/ in pin, they will convey erroneous or no meaning.

Pronunciation, of course, may be indicated by the traditional system of diacritic marks or similar plans; but in its simplicity and clarity the International Phonetic Alphabet (IPA) or linguist's alphabet is of unique utility. Once learned, and it is easily learned, it can accurately provide the "correct" or most widely accepted pronunciation of any word in English. The symbols compare with diacritic marks as follows:

b	-	b
v	-	v
ð	-	th (voiced <u>th</u> , as in <u>then</u>)
d	-	d
z	-	z
ʒ	-	zh (as in <u>pleasure</u>)
dʒ	-	j
g	-	g
p	-	p
f	-	f

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θ	-	th (voiceless <u>th</u> , as in <u>thin</u>)
t	-	t
s	-	s
ʃ	-	sh
tʃ	-	ch
k	-	K
m	-	m
n	-	n
ŋ	-	ng
l	-	l
r	-	r
j	-	y (consonant)
w	-	w
ɹ	-	wh
h	-	h
i	-	<u>e</u>
ɪ	-	Y
e	-	<u>ā</u>
ɛ	-	<u>ě</u>
æ	-	<u>ä</u>
ə	-	"schwa"; unstressed vowel as in "a <u>b</u> out"
ɜ	-	unstressed vowel with <u>r</u> as in li <u>v</u> er
ɝ	-	ér
ʌ	-	ü
u	-	<u>oo</u>
U	-	<u>oo</u>
o	-	<u>o</u>
ɔ	-	<u>o</u>
a	-	<u>ā</u>
aɪ	-	<u>i</u>
au	-	ou
ɔɪ	-	oi
ju	-	<u>ü</u>

A superior mark in front of a syllable indicates primary stress; an inferior mark in front of a syllable indicates secondary stress, thus: 'dɪkʃənəri (dictionary). A colon after a vowel symbol indicates considerable physical length: ʃa:m in Southern speech (dropping the r).

With the use of the IPA a teacher may readily instruct in accurate pronunciation and correct a student's sub-standard or dialectal articulation. Checkov is pronounced 'tʃɛkəf, mnemonic-ni'mɑnik, comptroller-kɑn'trɒlɜ, hiccough-'hɪkəp, schism-sɪzm, pthisic-'tɪzɪk, chamois-'ʃæmi, fuchsia-'fjuʃə, nausea-'nɔʃə, cello-'tʃɛlo, grandeur-grændʒɜ, alms-ɑ:ms, plaid-plæd, gauge-gedʒ, myrrh-mɜ, quay-ki, sieve-siv, biscuit-'bɪskɪt, renege-rə'nɛɡ, brougham-brum, bourgeois-bur'ʒwɑ, Boer-bur, worsted-'wʊstəd, choir-kwair, euthanasia-juθə'neɪzə, cliché-kli'e, telepathy-tə'lɛpəθi, gene-dʒɪn, incongruous-in'kɑŋɡruəs, dichotomy-

daikatami, zoological-zo.o'lædʒɪkl, philatelist-fɪ'læ təlɪst, and psychosis-sai'kosis.

The IPA has symbols for all sounds in every form of Standard English. What about dialects and "speech-sounds," for example, of ejaculations like uh-huh, ugh, and a scream? If characters are not in existence for interjections, they can be devised by the teacher. (The same goes for foreign languages, Old English, and Chaucer and Shakespeare.) Instances of Southern speech can be shown as follows: power ('pauə instead of 'pauɹ), more (moə instead of mor), on (ɔn instead of ʌn), order ('ɔdə instead of 'ɔrdɹ), pert (pɜ:t instead of pɜːt), greasy ('grɪzɪ instead of 'grɪsi), new (nju instead of nu), and Mrs. (mɪz instead of 'mɪsɪz). New England pronunciation requires principally the introduction of /a/: lance (lans instead of læns), and of /ɒ/: odd (ɒd instead of ʌd) and the dropping of final and preconsonantal r.

It seems to me that dictionaries and schools should employ a phonetic alphabet like the IPA to assist in achieving better instruction in pronunciation.



MOREHEAD STATE UNIVERSITY

BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Dr. L. W. Barnes, Editor

Vol 1: No. 14

I. "Structure, Function, and Meaning" : Structure Dr. Ruth Barnes

We commence our fall publications with a consideration of the matters of "structure," "function," and "meaning." We not only consider the terms, but also their order as stated above.

By "structure" we consider what the thing "is." What essential qualities does the term, word, or utterance exhibit? We consider the structure of a bird carefully. We note that there are certain structures as claws, beak, feathers, and wings that are universal structures of every bird. We also find that different kinds of birds have modifications of structures common to each bird. We find such observations to be true in matters of chemistry, physics, athletics, and all other fields of human endeavor, composition, and activity.

From what the thing "is," we can determine what the thing does. Equally important, we can invariably determine what the thing cannot do. At this point we are using the term "thing" somewhat loosely. In our close considerations of human experiences as subjects and objects, we shall limit "thing" to that which has mass, occupies space, and is subject to the pull of gravity. We could not really consider that "electricity," "mercy," and "endurance" are things. They do not meet the minimal requirement of the "thing." "Light," for example, is not a thing, for light passes through but does not occupy space. That we do have linguistic utterances which make such statements as "I did many things last summer" is true. But equally true is the fact that all possible linguistic utterances do not distinguish between what is asserted or communicated in the sense of being "true" or "false." Since there is, in the epic sense, error, sin, falsehood, and misjudgments, human language, as stemming from human beings, must always have statements that are true syntactically while having an excellent opportunity of being false as to content.

Thus, when we make the statement that structure is what the term, word, utterance, or expression "is," we make the statement in a linguistic sense, not in the sense that a "triangle" is that figure bounded by three sides and containing, always, one hundred and eighty (180°) degrees.

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We could be entirely happy with differentiating human utterances and statements in terms of "function," "structure," and "meaning," if they did not all stem from human personality. Statements and utterances are made for and from reasons. Whether conscious or unconscious in their nature—they are both—human conversation comes from human beings. The conversation represents some essential combinations of the mind, the body, and the emotive or volitional aspects of man. When an individual gives rise to linguistic utterances, he does so because he is a man, a social animal, and because he has a conscious or unconscious purpose. He functions as a man. To function as a man is to give meaning to what a man is or does. Thus, we must always have in mind that while we speak of structure, we can do so only in the context of function and meaning.

The anatomist invariably opens his formal presentation of his science with the statement that "structure determines function," and "function determines structure." From our applied linguistic position, we believe, from experimentation, that in learning the nature of one's language—and the nature of language that is not uniquely ours—such starting from the viewpoint of structure makes our task easier. But we do not question that in the "long run" what we are forced to do will determine our actual physical, intellectual, and emotive structures.

Parts of speech, in the context of the minimal linguistic utterance, the sentence, can be spoken of in the light of structure, function, and meaning. However, our starting point is with structure. We identify the noun structurally and functionally, but we start with the structural identification. We consider that in English a "noun" is that term or word which has a structure indicating

1. possession—of attributes
of other objects, subjects, places, things, or ideas
2. plurality, singularity, and their potentials
3. written forms carrying a unique possessive mark for possession (')
4. ability to add a bound morpheme

We use possession in two significant senses. Ownership of the term does indicate possession in its usual denotative sense as "John's," "pity's," "man's" and "gravity's." But, by "possession" we also have strongly in mind the accumulation of more than one quality or attribute.

"Man" is a noun because of its appearance, at times, as "men." Such is true of "flower," "ox," and "petal." Teachers and students tend to have difficulty with such terms as "money," "wealth," and "mercy." However, we have degrees ranging from the unitary singularity and an utmost or almost unlimited amount. I do have money even though I have only a cent, but I can have money ranging to millions—in theory. Such is true of "wealth," and "mercy." Thus we do not only consider plurality in the sense of being more than one, or two, or a hundred difference as in "bird" or "birds," but also as indicating differences in amounts and quantities. The question of the possessive mark in written form speaks for itself—as to the noun. The noun has the structure of being able to add the bound morpheme, as "y" to "stone" = "story." We determine other parts of speech in terms of identifiable characteristics. But we consider, in the next issue, "function," leaving each part of speech to special issues.



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BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Dr. Lewis Barnes, Editor

Vol 7: No. 15

"Structure," "Function," and "Meaning": Function — Dr. Ruth Barnes

By "function" we refer to "what is done." We refer to the purpose. We refer to the activity. A horse is structured so that he can perform certain functions. One function is that of being able to move with some considerable speed over undulating terrain. He is also structured so that his legs sacrifice strength for mobility. Such is true of the collarbone of man. From the structures of what is we can determine what can be done and what must be done. However, in the long run, certain external forces as function determine structures in that original structures are modified, or disappear over time. Man's need to rely on his intellectual powers has caused an increase in the area of the cerebral hemispheres, attended to and attested by more cerebral convolutions. Many such examples are indicated in biological texts. However, such is also the case with machines. Different functions demand different machines or modifications in machines. Now, what man has to do and what he has to become in his varied social interactions determine certain language structures.

Man functions in many ways. Among these ways are his penchant and necessity for "naming" phenomena. Man is man because he must name; he must name things, events, ideas, actions, and people. Thus, we can approach parts of speech through their functions—such as the noun. Naming people, places, things, ideas, and events result in the noun. Or, when a thing, person, place, event, idea, or action is named, we have a "noun" or nominalization. Textbooks have always said that a noun is the name of a person, place, or thing. Overlooking, for the moment only, that the definition must fail because of its being incomplete—thus not a system—we would ask why "mercy" is called a noun, when "mercy" is not the name of a person, place, or thing. We would also pose the same problem for "endurance." Now, if we were assured that "endurance" is a noun because of our structural definitions noted in No. 14 of this bulletin, we would be much happier than we must be from the textbook definition of the noun—traditionally. We would also be much happier to have a noun such as "endurance" defined as a noun because of its ending in "ance"—if no other part of speech could be found to end in "ance." If a noun is defined by function as that which names a person, place, or thing, then we are in trouble with "mercy," are we not? But we must realize that grammarians have not been lazy, indifferent, or incompetent, per se. They have had their problems, not having had available the results of research.

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When we consider the matter with care, we realize why the grammarians have not defined a noun in terms of naming "acts" and "ideas." Now "mercy" is considered a "noun." "Fishing" is sometimes considered a noun. What if the grammarian were to say that nouns are determined as naming people, places, things, acts, and ideas? He runs into trouble. He can try to wriggle out of "endurance" and "mercy" on the grounds of their being "abstract" nouns. But, here, he is dodging the issue through mentioning a different kind of noun, while avoiding the nature of the noun, in all, and the abstract noun, specifically. The functionalist does what many other people do, falsely. Although grammatically correct, he lets acts and ideas fall into the category of things. With the event or action, the functionalist has a problem. "Fishing" is not, structurally, a noun. Structurally, that which shows the forms of the third person singular present, present progressive, past progressive, and past tenses is a verb, in English. "He walks; he is walking; he was walking; and he walked" is the structural test of the verb—in English. "He is; he was, he was being, and he is being" is another example at point. Therefore "fishing" in the sentence "Fishing is fun" is structured as a verb. The functionalist finds that he has the problem of dealing with words that are functioning as nouns and words that are structured as nouns, while, at the same time, he must also consider words that are functioning as nouns, but structured as some other part of speech.

In the sentence "Fishing is fun," we know that "fishing" is structured as a verb, but functioning as a noun. We know why "fishing" is structured as a verb. But why does "fishing" function as a noun? Well, of course, "fishing" names an act, or is that which is talked about or discussed. Again, the traditionalist, if he has been exposed to some elementary work in linguistics, may clutch at the help offered by position in the sentence. He may say that since "fishing" occupies the first position in the sentence, and is, by definition, in a basic sentence structure, the subject, then "fishing" functions as a noun. However, when he goes to the question of position in a sentence, then he relies not on function, but on structure. Here we begin to see why there is some danger for both structuralist and functionalist, as well as more trouble for the traditionalist in relying on position in the sentence for definition as to part of speech.

In our final example, take a look at the statement "The guilty flee." From the point of view of function, "guilty" is a noun since the word is that which is spoken about and since guilty is the abstraction (made concrete through "the") which is named. But, structurally, "guilty" is not a noun. "Guilty" is an adjective. "Guilty" is an adjective through three tests of phonology. First, "guilty" answers the phonological tests "The guilty seem very guilty." Second, "guilty" cannot carry the primary accent, but only a secondary accent. Finally, "guilty" must be an adjective because of its long phonological extent. Here, the term is an adjective which functions as a noun. In the sentence "This day is the one before Wednesday," "Wednesday" is structured as a noun, but functions as an adverb.

The structuralist has the easier task. He knows what his word is structured as, but he also notes that one structure can perform more than one function. An axe can be identified through its structures, but also has more than one function. An axe can cut. But an axe can also be used for other purposes—one excellent purpose being that of hammering in tent pegs. We can see why the student has much trouble with function. We next view "meaning."



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BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Dr. L.W. Barnes, Editor Vol. 1., No. 16

"Structure, Function, and Meaning": Meaning - I - (Dr. L.W. Barnes)

In English, at least, we identify a word, linguistically and structurally, as that term, expressed or communicated, which carries a primary stress in context or a primary accent in a dictionary, or sitting by itself, and that term, expressed or communicated, which has at least one vowel. So, to have a word in English we have that spoken or graphically represented element which carries a primary stress and at least one vowel. Thus "a," "good," "pity," and "Joe" are words in English. We have considered words as being described or identified through structure and function. But what do words "mean?"

If you want to find out what a word means, where do you go? We find that in the western world, at least, that the location of the meaning of a word is in a dictionary. We look at a dictionary and find that a word has more than one meaning. But should we say that a word "means?" We define our position here by saying that words carry meanings, but that no word "means." A word, as found in any good dictionary, has listed several meanings. We say that a word carries several meanings.

In our position that a sentence is the minimal linguistic utterance—that which is expressed or communicated—we would seem to be at the position of indicating that a word carries meaning in a particular context, which context is the equivalent of a sentence. There are many ways of defining a sentence, but we have two considerations in mind, anyway. A sentence is that utterance which indicates that a human being has said some significant statement about a person, place, thing, act, idea, institution, or event, and has done so in terms of materiality—the body—the intellect, and the world of emotions. Or, equally well, in English, a sentence is that statement terminated by a fade-fall. (We distinguish the sentence as indicated here from that question which is indicated by a fade-rise.)

Now, words carry meanings or embrace ranges of meanings in dictionary form. In the sentence any word is capable of carrying a range of meanings. Some words carry more meanings than others. In the sentence a word can carry what is known as the denotative and connotative meaning. We can say that "denotation" refers to things as representing examples of what meanings the word carries. We can say that "Joe Brown is a hockey player." But we must be careful and point out what too many readers may not understand, the matter of "illuminating", for want of a better term. When we "illuminate," we enumerate,



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on "list" some or all of the characteristics or attributes that must be present in denoting the word—in context. We have to say that a hockey player "is" one who plays on ice, on a team of six men, and who tries to score a goal with a puck, or prevent a goal from being scored with a puck. We must, then, be careful, in instructing our students concerning "denotation." "Illumination" is more significant than the denoting factor. Only through the former term can we know when and how we should use the term. The "denoting" can indicate, but no more, some specific illustrations of the word. Consider the statement in a denotative sense, but also consider the statement in an "illuminative" sense. The meaning, then, is really carried by the "illuminative" aspects of the term. These are either spelled out, or they are known in a prior sense by both speaker and listener. When we consider the term "square," however, we can see why listener, or reader can be confused. "Square" can be used in the sense of that which has lists of attributes, carrying different meanings. We have "square" as that which represents a bound area through four sides which meet in such ways as to form four right angles. We have "square" as representing that which is clear, direct, plain, and honest. We also have "square" as representing that which refers to a person's being somewhat dull, uninteresting, and not in the picture.

The list or attributes of phenomena—ideas, events, persons, things, and institutions—as "illuminations" is of critical significance, then, in meaning. We take Hoppers' position that language is a "pattern" of symbols, carrying meaning. What is significant is that we do not discover meanings in words, but that man must always give meanings to words. Thus, any time that man makes a linguistic utterance of minimal value—a sentence—he gives meaning to some experience expressed or communicated orally, or in written form. Some meanings are "inevitable." We call such meanings "signs," as to the word or words which carry such meanings. Man does not have to agree in a sign that he must let a word stand for something. As Hoppers states "a word is a symbol for the meaning the word carries," while a "cloud is a sign of rain." Nevertheless, a cloud needs a list of attributes to be "illuminative" and meaningful, if we consider that meaning must be expressed or communicated. A "connotative element" is the meaning that a word carries as distinct from the physical, intellectual, or emotive properties indicated in "illumination" and "denotation." Connotations include more than "illuminations" and "denotations." A connotation must include an attitude. An attitude is the result of a belief + an emotion, with the attitude being one that is "snarl" or dyslogistic or "purr" and eulogistic. Thus, a connotative meaning is a meaning given by a human being in terms of the interactions of the mind, the world of senses, and the world of emotions. In the statement, "He bore his cross with fortitude," the denotative and illuminative elements must be expressed in the light of elements of some composition crossed at certain angles. But "cross" has connotations indicating "pain," "suffering," "glory," and "sacrifice," among others, to those of the Christian religion. Every connotation requires a term that is capable of illumination and denotation. The emotive elements of the speaker, writer, listener, and reader give meanings to the words—such as "cross," "spiked," "the sword," and other terms. In No. 17 we consider this matter of meaning in a closer grammatical context, and move to consider the definition of "meaning."



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BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Dr. L.W. Barnes, Editor Vol. 1: No. 17

"Structure, Function, and Meaning": Meaning—2 Dr. L.W. Barnes

Willard Quine, in his "The Problem of Meaning in Linguistics," points out the extreme difficulty in defining "meaning." The grammarian, linguistically, focuses on a language and determines which articulated sounds have "meaning." (He would be better off were he to concern himself with the term "carry" rather than "have.") He does not come to grips with the definition of meaning, for he will have no "truck" with that which cannot be observed and verified in terms of scientific methods. The dictionary, as the work of the lexicographer, does not give an insight into meaning, but considers only words that are alike in carrying meaning—synonymity. Still, the invariable human cry is "what does that mean?" "What is the meaning of this word." "What ideas are in this passage?" We can see the human faculty leaping to associate ideas as meaning. However, ideas are mental phenomena, and the scientist stops short of accepting any possibility of verifying the phenomena inside the human mind.

There is certainly a thorny problem here. We can know that a system of articulated sounds moves into action in terms of human experience when there is a concept or percept in the human mind with respect to being expressed or communicated. But can we prove that the concept or percept in the mind of the speaker or writer is equivalent in being equal to the streams of sounds evoked or stimulated? or that array of graphic symbols does represent the streams of sounds? On the other hand, can we prove that the decoding of graphemes or phonemes will result in a percept or concept on the part of the listener or reader in the sense of equivalence of meaning? In each case there is the impossibility of giving mathematical certitude to the sounds and the percepts or concepts as equal or equivalent. Thus, the grammarian avoids the philosophical worlds of speculation as to "meaning." So does the lexicographer who settles only for statements in terms of "alikehood" in meaning.

In looking at what is often termed "General Semantics"—where semantics is considered the study of meaning if not the science of meaning—we come to the thesis that a word is not a thing, idea, event, person, or idea, but a word stands for identifiable experience. That which a word must stand for is the "referent." As Francis points out, in Structure of American English, the scientist is not averse to such a position. Since what the word stands for is "out there" subject to scientific analysis, the semantics called "referential meaning" is more acceptable than the meanings hidden inside man's mind. However, there are troubles. Francis indicates one. This field of semantics, centering on that which the word stands for cannot be linguistical.

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Language is a system of articulated sounds. The grammarian works in terms of these sounds and in terms of their graphical representation. Semantics considers "referents." These referents are the phenomena which the sounds and their written forms can only represent. A grammarian, then, must be a structuralist or a functionalist, or some combination of both, but a grammarian, in the modern and linguistical sense, can not rest on meaning, in the senses in which we have discussed meaning. Words have similar meanings as we have considered. Let us look at "no" and "not" and "eager" and "enthusiastic." We have two reservations concerning "no" and "not"--similar in meaning. We can agree as to their synonymy without ever defining the meaning of one of these terms. Again, "no" and "not" are not capable of mutual substitution in any single sentence. With respect to "eager" and "enthusiastic," we have two adjectives, structurally. But we would be hard put to use their likeness in meaning in "He is eager to please," and "He is enthusiastic to please," and be convincing. Again, from which word in the two words that are alike in meaning do we derive the meaning of the word?

From the structural elements of a word we can derive some meaning. For example, in the word "rivulet," we know that the morphemic structure added to "river" does "mean" that which is small, of lesser degree. But from meaning, even when obtainable, we do not work as easily toward structure and function.

Meaning is carried by words. Although the same word may carry different meanings in the same sentence—"He is a square peg," and although the same word may carry different meanings in different sentences—"A square is that bounded figure wherein all sides are equal in length and wherein their junctions constitute for each a right angle." Meaning comes from personality as expressed or communicated in words. Behaviorally, we say that a man responds through thinking, feeling, and sensing. Whenever he does respond in terms of his personality structures he does so in the light of his unique functions as a man. To act and to be a man—even in the sense of the basic activities of the cells—is to give meaning to himself. Thus, each expression or communication in language represents a meaningful human experience. Since the range of experience, however wide, is limited, the range of words is likewise limited. Within the limitations of man's personality responses and responding there is the core of "meaning." We must realize that meanings and meaning, in a linguistic sense, can be available only through the words that express meanings. There is one central thesis however, if a somewhat melancholy one. However many limited possibilities we may have for graphic or oral representations of percepts and concepts—and there are many—the wealth of that which a human being has to express or communicate is much richer and varied than is the language available for carrying human meanings. Meaning, referred to human language expression or communication, is that which indicates a person's conscious or subconscious reaction to experience—experience that is explicable only in terms of man's experience as sensory, intellectual, and emotional—with all three elements engaged in some proportion. We do not question the fact that life without meaning would be a contradiction in every sense. We assert, when we consider language as expressing man's reactions, that structure, function, and meaning are the orders and the best order in which to handle man's language.



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BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Dr. Lewis W. Barnes, Editor Vol 1., No. 18

Psycholinguistical Notes 9

Let us consider the "pure" linguist who will assert that "language is a system or order of articulated sounds through which members of a society express or communicate their affairs and social nature." These sounds are vocal and can, therefore, be captured and recorded. They may be represented in written form. The sounds of the sense of any one language can be taken and defined and differentiated from those of any single other language, and from all other languages. Our linguist, in the sense discussed, is not concerned with the personality as expressed or communicated through the system of sounds, but with the system of sounds themselves. We can have activities that are oral, or activities that are not oral—in verbal and non-verbal patterns.

We can express ourselves orally, or we can draw, sculpt, paint, blaze signs, or point out: we have nonverbal activity in the latter instances. One can suppose that with a minimal amount of linguistical endeavor—as oral—that we can express and communicate without linguistical structures. If I see an arrow pointing in a certain direction, then I assume that this certain direction has meaning. If I follow its head, I assume, from my earlier experiences, that I might well be expected to take a walk in its direction.

If I see a painting of birch trees, and if I have seen like trees before, I assume that the painting of the trees in some way stands for the trees with which I am familiar or with which the artist is familiar. Of course, he may have "imagined" such trees, and neither he nor I may have seen such trees before. Nevertheless, some expression and communication will result from the painting. I would gather that by signs any artist might communicate. The results of such activities as we have discussed are distinctly non-verbal. The deaf are enabled to communicate without audible external sounds. On the other hand, we may well have purely linguistical expressions and communications. However, the extent to which man communicates or expresses himself in purely vocal activities, as distinct from other human forms of behavior, is distinctly limited. Of course, the point we must make is that we cannot have a linguistical system, that is alive, in any one society, as entirely distinct from non-verbal and non-vocal activities. Let us examine this assertion more closely.

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Over the radio we can hear without seeing, touching, tasting, and feeling, although the results of the linguistical utterances may be such as to evoke and stimulate sensory reactions. We hear the speaker or speakers; we attend, over radio, to the actor or actors. However, if we had not already had much experience with the non-verbal or non-linguistical elements of the experiences indicated by the language, the sounds, themselves, would be unintelligible. To be human sounds as language, they must be about, stand for, or represent human experience and meaning, much of which must function as some denominators to the listeners. The oral report that constitutes the results of a horse race, over radio, for example, would scarcely be intelligible unless the listener knew something about horses and races, the "knowing something about" being markedly non-vocal. In listening to the sounds of the spectators at a bull fight, the listener, if he could not see the bull fight, would be much better informed if he knew considerable about the nature of bull-fighting. Even if he were watching a bull fight, he would be understand the total situation if he knew what constituted a "good" bull, a "good" bull fighter, and a "good" bullfight.

The silent "movies" needed musical accompaniment; they needed captions. With the actions and written captions went music corresponding to the tone and mood the events were to represent. However, one can do no more than admit that the moving pictures of today represent better aesthetic experience and better experiences concerning the total behavioral aspects of the people and their experiences, as reflected in the motion pictures. Human gestures and human cries express and represent human meanings. Such is true of man's carefully articulated sound system. But we do not care to accept the statement that although we can handle linguistical structures systematically, and, thus, scientifically, then there is a distinct break-- as discontinuous-- between man's articulated vocal system and man's non-vocal behavioral patterns. A hissing sequence of sounds may reflect human approval in one society and human disapproval in another society. We call the "hissing" non-verbal, but we would not consider this non-verbal behavior as distinctly removed from language.

We cannot say that each gesture, each piece of painting, each song, each piece of architecture, or each tear, sigh, whimper, or frown has definite and invariable language equivalents. We do say, however, that the personality of any one individual and the makeup of any one society is not thoroughly understood, expressed, or communicated unless we know that there are many interactions between the non-verbal and verbal behavior of individuals in social situations. Pure conversation, without descriptive situations and explanations, capable of being understood in no small non-verbal degree, would scarcely be intelligible without the background and backdrop of a knowledge of the situation (s) in which those speaking at a particular time and place find themselves. There are many times when language substitutes for non-verbal activity. There are many occasions when human gestures--or paralanguage--substitute for linguistical activity: shaking a thumb in pain from a blow, grimacing in disgust, raising one's eyebrows in disdain, among others. We shall see that there can be no discontinuity in language and non-language, and such is the case because man behaves in molar units of behavior.



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Dr. Lewis W. Barnes, Editor, Vol 1., No. 19

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Unless the human body responds in a purely physical response on the involuntary level, as in the case of some kinds of swallowing, digesting, secreting, among other involuntary responses, all units of human activity are molar in nature. By "molar" we mean here that human expressions, non-verbal or verbal, generally involve the total personality. Thus, any act is complex. The complexity comes from the fact that the human makeup involves man's sensory nature, his cognitive reactions to experience, and his emotive nature toward and in response to experience.

"Experience" is a difficult term for many teachers, students, and laymen. We term, herein, "experience" to be man's conscious and unconscious store of responses to the materials of the outside world, to the views of the supernatural elements, to the world of himself, and to ideas, emotions, and beliefs about the things, people, ideas, events, and institutions in the external and internal worlds of his—the individual's—day by day contacts. A "molar unit of behavior, can never be other than somewhat social in nature. The "molar" unit of behavior is central to nearly all social psychologies. (The reader is referred to one of the best treatments on and of social psychology, that of Krech and Crutchfield's Theory and Problems in Social Psychology.) The significant part of each person's existence is expressed in the concept of the "i.p.f." or the "immediate psychological field."

This field is a cross-section of the individual's behavioral nature at any one time. The field is comprised of all the neural impulses that have been impressed on the individual's nervous system over past time. We do not mean, however, that all of his past neural experiences come to light and action in any single immediate psychological field. We do mean that each "i.p.f.", as behavioral and as containing units of molar behavior are not without synthesized elements of past individual experience, experience which has enough attitudinal force to make its enduring impressions. The field, for its second constituent, is also comprised of the present physiological state of the individual. The individual's physiological state ~~complex~~ can vary markedly from one behavioral experience to another, and from any one unit of time to another. No basic activity of the human body operates quantitatively and qualitatively the same over units of time, although each individual has a basic finite rhythm of thinking, feeling, and physically-reacting responses. One need only check his pulse rate, his blood pressure, and his other cellular activities through scientific methods in order to discover the truth of the variable physiological state. The third part of the individual's "i.p.f." is that to which he is currently attending—someone's hat, his idea about his

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English professor, his aspirations toward catching a ten-pound red snapper, on his long range considerations of his career, among an almost infinite number of other centers of attraction. Recapitulating, then, the "i.p.f." is constituted from past neural traces—experiences with a registering emotive force—the present physiological stated of the individual, and his current centers of interest. These centers may be physical, intellectual, or volitional—emotive and attitudinal. Why do we consider these statements important?

We consider them important because we assert that language must be equivalent to human behavior. There must be a logical and structural relationship, as synthesized, between an individual's "i.p.f." world and the language which articulates his continuous series of "i.p.f.'s." We will agree, with Sapir, that "purely linguistic facts may be seen as specialized forms of symbolic behavior." We will agree that grammar can be studied as the possible combinations of words which eventually comprise utterances in any one language. Language is a system; as such, language may be studied as a system, as is true with chemistry. But, in the larger sense, both language experience and nonlanguage experiences constitute the side of a human equation whose other side is human behavior. We do not know that we can repeat Kluckhohn's thesis that "language is just one kind of human behavior," but we can say that human behavior can never be thoroughly understood without linguistical equivalence in expression and communication. By the same token we would assert that human behavior, in its terms of molar units of behavior, and as seen through man's "i.p.f.'s," needs nonlanguage elements and those of linguistical elements to complement each other, if not to act in synthesizing relations. In Pike's view of language, he considers that behavior is comprised of "psychological processes + internal responses to sensations + all thinking + feeling." While there is some distinct lack of parallel equivalence in his statement, as can be seen from the psychologists' more logical view of human behavior in terms of his "i.p.f.'s," we can see the evolution of the thinking of linguists toward a theory of language, in a total sense, as psycholinguistical. We can state that the linguist knows the possible ways of making a statement in a given language. We can also state that the psychologist knows the reasons why people need to make statements in any language, if not in all languages. We can also see that we can study psychological systems and linguistical systems for structure, at least, in a somewhat independent environment, but, having proceeded along the lines of structure and function, we must, inevitably, come to the matter of "meaning." When we reach this point, a point which is, in reality, always a concomitant feature, one that "runs along," we must note that psychological features of man are without meaning and significance unless they are expressed or communicated in ways both matters of verbal and nonverbal concerns and activities. At the same time, language and paralanguage and non-verbal activity are fruitless without the percepts and concepts of human behavior. Within such a context of expression, language can be studied systematically.



MOREHEAD STATE UNIVERSITY: BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS
MOREHEAD STATE UNIVERSITY, MOREHEAD, KY.

Dr. Lewis Barnes, Editor Vol 1: No. 20

Structure As Distinct From Meaning: Ruth Barnes

The linguist, he who, in the narrower sense, equates language as a system of articulated sounds, unique to a certain social order, desires to be able to describe his system. In so doing, he wishes to avoid the concept of "meaning" and the methods of history. We say "methods" because there is no one set concept of "history." Our friend the linguist wishes to escape what he calls the alien feature of history as introduced into his language system. One of the features of "history" is that of the "diachronic" element. By "diachronic" we consider the terms "dia" + "chronic" which, together, refer to passing on moving through time. A historical consideration of language will involve changes in language over time. Concurrently, such a consideration would, or does, involve reasons for such change—or alleged reasons for such change. One can measure a sound, but he cannot measure a change in sound over time unless he has recorded, faithfully, all prior sounds in that language being measured or considered as changing over time. There is the persistent belief that history has much to do with its being the record of past events. Of course, one could, in a specific sense, describe past events. However, as descriptive, the pure linguist tends to think of describing the language as that specific language which exists at the specific time of his own measurements.

Thinking in terms, or collecting terms, of basic sound units in a specific language, the linguist views phonemes as relative to other phonemes. How are these sounds distributed in such and such a language? This question is his main question. When he can answer this structural question, he will have derived the distributional elements of sounds unit common to a language under study or consideration. He will have described the language. Returning to a statement we have used consistently, "The minimal linguistic utterance is a sentence," we will consider that a language is described, in the sense that we are relying here on the position of the structuralist, rather than on that of the psycholinguist, when all the kinds of utterances—as sentences—that the language could have will yield all the distributions that sounds, as carried to words, can have in each sentence and in all sentences. Let us explain more specifically.

There are certain parts of speech that appear in certain positional relationships to other parts of speech in each language. There are certain instances and variations of the same part of speech that demand certain positions in a linguistic utterance. In English we cannot say, grammatically, that "I will go next year there." Here, the adverb of time cannot, in English, come before the adverb of place. Even where we have idioms, slang, substandard speech, or colloquialisms, there are certain unvarying structures in each languages, structures that hold for all dialects of the same tongue.

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In describing a language in the light of its structures, we find that there are so many structures that can occur in anyone one language. These structures are centered in and limited by and to what we call "phonemes." A phoneme is a group of "phones," which, in turn, are speech sounds. One requirement of the phoneme is that the phoneme must be constituted from one or more phones. Another requirement is that the phoneme must be a significant sound of speech within a certain language. There are only so many phonemes in each language. At any single time the number of phonemes is known. We must not overlook the importance of the word "significant." Our linguist who works through these structures, as distinct from meaning, psychology, and history, must work through the relationship "phones to phonemes to morphemes," thence to words, words that occur in minimal linguistic utterances as the sentence. We can have no more phonemes than can be derived from the speech sounds of a language. We can have no more words in kind and degree than can come from the morphemes. What distinction is made, always, between the phoneme and the morpheme?

The phoneme, as we have stated, is the smallest unit yielding a distinctive or unique sound character in any language. (In the English language we have forty-five phonemes, or forty-five unique sound features of our language.) A morpheme consists of the minimal "meaningful" linguistic form in a language. Such a form gives the range of meanings possible in a language by having, for each morpheme, a form that cannot be broken up into smaller units for linguistic analysis. As an affix which appears in a "post" relationship to the root of a term, ~~and does so~~, as a "suffix," the morpheme "er" refers to "one who does," in English. A "player" is one who plays.

With this brief background we can return to our linguist who maintains that he is one who describes the structures of a language and assesses their distribution in a language. The linguist is not so much concerned with the "meaning" as behavioral as he is with the occurrence of certain morphemes and with their classification as structures which form words which occupy certain positions relative to each other in speech and in writing. He is much like the chemist who is concerned with the make-up of the Periodic Table and with his discovery and description of the fact that certain elements occupy horizontal and vertical relationships to and with each other, with no concern as to the meaning of each. There are some elements that can combine with each other and some which cannot. There are some words that can occupy certain position in a linguistic utterance, relative to each other, and there are some that cannot occupy such positions. Because each individual in anyone language repeats the structures and observes their positions relative to each other used by other members of a linguistic society and/or culture, then the linguist believes himself free to declare that each language has a structure as such, and that within the sets in a total language, there are certain invariable structures with sub-sets and members within these smaller units. Each linguist tends to consider a major unit or set as being that of minimal linguistic utterance, or that of a sentence. Of course, our linguist, such as Zellig S. Harris, would assert that no "system" of meanings is a precise parallel to the structures of language as determined through their morphemes. Although the morphemes that go to makeup up words can be approached sometimes through meaning, the structuralist will rely on the distributional frequency and quality of the morphemes, not on meaning.




MOREHEAD STATE UNIVERSITY: BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Dr. Lewis W. Barnes, Editor

Vol. I: No. 27

The Sentence: Significant Considerations
(Dr. Ruth Barnes)



The defining of the English sentence can never be without its thorny problems. Such problems have been discussed since 1750, and never more seriously discussed than by Roberts in his Understanding Grammar. His observation that of all the definitions attempted but two definitions are widely cited in grammar books is correct as to that point. Of some 227 grammar books surveyed by the writer of this article, 187 indicate that "A sentence is a group of words expressing a complete thought." Some 192 (thereby including both definitions) indicate that "a sentence is a group of words containing a subject and predicate."

In considering the definition that "A sentence is a group of words expressing a complete thought," we are approaching the definition through "meaning," a philosophical matter. Simply put, the gist of the statement is that a sentence expresses or communicates some human concept linguistically ordered. What has been expressed or communicated is unique through being able to stand by itself, a being uniquely independent. Roberts goes on to observe that although single words and phrases, sometimes without explicit subjects or predicates, can take the value of sentences under this notional definition the question of standing alone or of being independent is not answered in the definition. Roberts gives the following example in support of his thesis. "This is what he means." Roberts indicates that since we do not know the reference of "this" and "he," the sentence does not express a "complete" thought. The statement is dependent on what has gone on before and on what is yet to be said or written.

We agree with Roberts as to the validity of his observations on this point, yet there is more to be observed and stated. The point that we must make is that even were the definition correct as to "A sentence is a group of words expressing a complete thought," the definition could extend only to a limited form or sort of truth. We focus on the word "thought." Whenever a man speaks, he speaks some kind of knowledge—even if his statements are to him knowledge or "anti-knowledge." He can know that he knows, and be genuinely mistaken, of course. He can assert "knowing," and he can know that he is speaking falsely. In any kind of human behavior, as expressed through linguistic or through non-linguistic utterances, the individual can speak to his knowledge which he may believe, or which he may not believe. Having covered this point, we shall assume, for the purpose of this article, that there is sincerity and honesty in the assertions we shall consider here. In terms of this qualification, then, we shall view the kinds of human expressions and communications. In terms of knowledge they are those of belief, faith, and opinion.

We accept Kretch and Crutchfield (Theory and Problems of Social Psychology) as definitive on these terms, to the extent that belief is that form of knowledge which we can prove to our own satisfaction through external methods available to other people, that faith is

Now, we also have the firm starting point that all human expressions involving some aspects of "knowing," are constituted of strong elements of thought. However, in the instances of knowledge—belief, faith, and opinion—we have elements of emotions. In the areas of educative materials—those which have a low emotive content—such as science and mathematics, the thought aspects are most strong and pervasive. When we clothe man's thought elements with emotions, however, we have not thoughts, but attitudes. Very few instances of "knowing" are without emotive content. The rhythms and intonations of language will indicate the truth of these observations. Thus, the definition that "A sentence is a group of words expressing a complete thought" is bad from the beginning. If we can grant the right to use such terms as "completeness" and "independence" to a sentence, we could not accept a sentence as being stated "notionally," or philosophically, without also taking into account the question of "attitudes." An "attitude, or attitudes, is or (are) fused from knowing and feeling. Thus, any definition of a complete human expression or communication must take into account man's total personality as "thinking with feeling" about experience. We must insist that expressions or communications do stem from an individual's human personality in interaction with the stuff of his inner and outer experiences.

Having amended the definition to be one of having a sentence defined as "a group of words expressing (and/or communicating) man's thoughts and attitudes," we proceed to view the questions as to independence and completeness. The tricky matter is that of "being complete." We are forced to consider the matter of the "i.p.f.," one that we have mentioned before, and one that we shall indicate many times more. We talk here in the light of a molar unit of human behavior, one resulting in a complete behavioral act—as distinct from yawning, scratching, or engaging in other acts which may be purely involuntary, or which are divorced from any conscious considerations in the context of man's behaving in a social way. We consider that the immediate psychological field of a man is one cross-section of his personality in response to experience, all subsumed in the categories of his past neural experiences, his immediate physiological experience, and his focus on some form of human experience. Now, then, his sentence, as such, might well be sufficient to explain, express, and communicate his total behavioral view toward his world. On the other hand, consider a situation where there is an extended discussion or quarrel between A and B. No one sentence may be capable of being independent or of standing alone in the sense of explaining the experience, or even in the sense of expressing or communicating the individual's view of the experience.

On the other hand, the sentence as being fused of thought and emotive aspects, can be considered as "being complete," or a "capable of standing alone" in the framework of being completed steps through which any individual approaches an experience. Because of the flow of time, no one experience can be accomplished in any one moment. There are series of recognizable time units through which any person "flows" over and through time. These have beginnings and endings because the beginning of any one experience may terminate before that experience. On the step toward and through one experience may result in other steps leading beyond that experience. We do know when steps have been made, although the steps may go forward, halt, or recede. In the sense that a sentence can be a discrete, recognizable, and complete step in any single experience of expression and communication, among others constituting a unit of molar behavior, then we can maintain that a "sentence is a group of words expressing or communicating a complete thought or attitude (or complete thoughts and attitudes) so as



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Dr. Lewis W. Barnes, Editor Vol. 7: No. 22

The Sentence: Significant Considerations 99 Dr. Lewis W. Barnes

In the No. 21 issue, Dr. Ruth Barnes considered the definition of the sentence in the philosophical sense of "being a group of words expressing a complete thought." Among the conclusions made were those that a sentence must be considered as embracing attitudes as well as thoughts, and that a sentence may or may not be independent or complete except in the context of defining that which is "complete" and "independent." If we view a total behavioral act of any human being as expressive or as communicative of his personality, then we consider that Roberts is sound, as must be true of others taking his position on similar positions, in demurring to the matter of "completeness" and "independence." We did consider, as Mrs. Barnes developed, that insofar as each sentence expresses and/or communicates some discrete and recognizably completed step in any situation involving human experience, a sentence can be capable of standing alone or of being independent as to that step of thought, emotion, or action. We would also take the position that some sentences can be sufficiently expressed or communicated to be the equivalent of a complete human experience. Meaning is also difficult as a criterion in defining: for that reason, we prefer, for definitive purposes, to work through structure, and, if need be, through function. Let us now look to the matter of defining a "sentence" as a group of words containing a subject and predicate."

Roberts is sound in his observation that Jespersen is correct in asserting that the English sentence usually has a subject and finite verb, that the "usually" can constitute only a trend or tendency, not a law or system. From our notional or philosophical view we can prove that "Ouch!" "Fudge!" and "On your way" are sentences or sentence equivalents. Roberts deals adequately with the "ellipsis" thesis. Where there are sentences or their equivalents without the subject, or predicate, or without both, some authorities assert that ellipsis—the omission of patent terms—is operative. In the sentence "Run down the alley" there is ellipsis through the omission of the subject. Then Roberts brings up the challenge as to ellipsis in "Heads up." He lists several possibilities as to ellipsis:

(You put your) heads up.

(You keep your) heads up.

(You should have your) heads up.

(You may be injured if you do not have your) heads up.

(We must keep our) heads up.)

His (Roberts) observation is that we cannot assert ellipsis because we do not know exactly what subject and what verb are left out. The expression "is not associated with any particular subject and verb." Without making out a case for "ellipsis" as such, we must question Roberts as to his reasoning here. If we agree that we are not testing his examples orally, then we would observe that the five possibilities he urges, among others that he may have used, are well-taken. However, his objection, unless based on the

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different from challenging the concept of "ellipsis." "Ellipsis" is the deliberate subconscious omissions of parts of a sentence." Ellipsis is the result of man's need to use economy in expression, intensity in effect, and rhythm and harmony of thought, feeling, and sensory apprehensions in communication or in expression. (Lindley Murray's An English Grammar, 2 vols., N.Y., 1817, Collins and Company, gives an interesting treatment to the matter of ellipsis, one not without considerable insight and force.) We should note that such a sentence as "John and Mary are playing" is elliptical, as being composed of two kernel sentences. "John is playing." "Mary is playing." Consider, also, the word "The laws of God and man...." We have "The laws of God....." and "The laws of man....." We have ellipsis as applied to nouns, verbs, and articles, as noted above. We consider an interesting example of more than one application of ellipsis.

We view the utterances "I went to scold him," and "I went to punish him." There is an ellipsis of the governing verb "went." There is also an ellipsis of the sign of the infinitive mood, "I went"-that which controls the infinitive. Perhaps Roberts has not gone far enough into the nature or essence of ellipsis. We also have ellipsis in terms of the preposition, the adverb, and the conjunction: "He went into abbeys, halls, and churches"; "He spoke and acted wisely," and "Though I love him, I do not flatter him." Thus, we cannot define a sentence as a "group of words containing a subject and a predicate." We would have to make some modifications and alterations to handle the sentence in this manner. There are more approaches to defining in terms of the subject and predicate; one must suppose. We suggest that we might say that "A sentence is a group of words containing an explicit subject and predicate or a group of words so formed as to imply a subject or predicate, with the proviso that the words that constitute the sentence must not, at the same time, constitute a dependent clause." We have problems with both the notional or philosophical definition of the sentence and the "subject and predicate" definition of the sentence. Roberts, chary of ellipsis, fastens on the concept of the "verb sentence" and the "verbless" sentence. He cites such examples as

"Ouch" "Phooey" "Nonsense" "The nerve of some people"
and "To all intent and purposes, none."

Looking at the verbless sentence "Ouch," Roberts finds that "I am hurt" or "That hurt me." The statements are equivalent, and, insofar as human statements are concerned, equal. Such is also true of the assent and dissent words, "yes" and "no." Roberts is correct in assuming that there is no form or syntax available for defining "Ouch," "Phooey," and "Nonsense" in the graphic sense. He admits that his definition that a verbless sentence must be notional, one dependent upon meaning "The verbless sentence may be defined as a group of words which, despite the absence of an unsubordinated finite verb, is felt to constitute a complete utterance." Such a definition rests upon the philosophical determination of one who can distinguish between the concepts of that which is complete and that which is incomplete. Such a position is difficult to reach for school children, as well as formidable to and for many adults. Defining



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Dr. Lewis W. Barnes, Editor Vol. 1: No. 23
The Kernel Sentence: Dr. L.W. Barnes

The physicist is likely to assert that a "molecule is the smallest particle of matter that has all the properties of matter. The chemist will state that an atom is the smallest part of matter capable of entering into chemical combinations. The linguist generally asserts that a sentence is the "minimal linguistic utterance." Then we, as linguists, take a closer look at the sentence. We have encountered sentences before in terms of the simple, compound, complex, and compound varieties. The terms "simple," "compound," "complex," and "compound-complex" are not without functional value. However, they no longer carry, as terms, the same urgency they carried before. We come to the concept of the "kernel" sentence.

We shall give, first, examples of "kernel sentences."

1. Jets are fast,
2. The temper rose.
3. Johnny was keen.
4. Knives slash the skin.

We note that Sentence 1 has, structurally, the noun "jets"; the verb "are," and the adjective "fast." We note that the subject (simple) is "Jets," and the main verb is "are." We also note that the simple subject and the complete subject are represented by the single "Jets."

In Sentence 2 we have the simple subject as "temper"; "the temper" as the complete subject; the verb "rose" as the main verb. In Sentence 3 we have "Johnny" as the simple subject and as the complete subject; we have "was" as the verb, and we have "keen" as an adjective. In the final sentence, 4, we have as the simple and complete subject, "Knives," the verb is handled by "slash," and "the skin" constitutes the article "the," the direct object of the verb as "skin."

We note that each sentence has one subject in terms of its verb, and in terms of a single quality, a single action, or a single receiver of the action—as in "skin." Such sentences are termed "kernel" sentences. No one sentence can be made simpler. We have reduced each sentence to one thought, or one emotive, or one sensory statement.

What kind of a sentence is not a "kernel" sentence? Consider the following sentence.

"Few men are brave."

We really have two statements:

1. "Men are brave."

2. "The men are few."

We call this sentence that is broken down into the two kernel sentences a "fused" sentence. This particular kind of a "fused" sentence where one kernel sentence "The men are few" determines the other sentence "Men are brave." We determine that "few" men are brave. Consider another sentence: "Weary men walked." We have a "fused" sentence because we can obtain two kernel sentences:

1. "Men walked."

2. "The men are weary."

In this situation "men" are determined by "weary."

We see that kernel sentences can be "fused." The result of "defusing" must be a kernel sentence. Consider the following kernel sentences in 1-4 as distinct from those sentences in 5-8:

1. The pay was inadequate.

3. Heat destroyed the cheese.

2. The guns roared.

4. Boys play games.

but

5. The poor pay was inadequate

7. High heat destroyed the cheese.

6. The heavy guns roared.

8. Active boys play games.

When we take a glance at the fused sentences, of the "determined" variety, we find that we have an adjective shift. The adjective which was "to the right" in the kernel sentence has now shifted to the left of the noun. Such an instance is true of the kernel sentence where we have the so-termed "predicate adjective." In the kernel sentence we find this adjective in the end of the minimal linguistic utterance—the sentence. When the kernels are fused, we find, as noted before, the adjective to the left of the noun "determined." (We say "determined," since the noun is affected, if not effected. In "The poor pay was inadequate," we find that the pay which is now "poor" cannot have any other quality ascribed to its nature in this particular sentence at this particular time. The same parallel can be made in "yellow house." The color "yellow" precludes its being any other color for this instance in time.

We see that the kernel sentences 1-4 do not seem the same kind in that we have in "The pay was inadequate" a kind of sentence, structurally, expressed as N LVA, or Noun-Linking Verb-Adjective. (In a way we shall discuss later, we would prefer to view the so-called "linking verb" as an assertion of equality, or as an "=" verb.) In "The guns roared," we have, structurally, the N V pattern. Sentences 3 and 4 are of the pattern N V N. We shall continue the matter of the kernel sentence in the next issue.



MOREHEAD STATE UNIVERSITY: BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Dr. Lewis W. Barnes, Editor: Vol 1: No. 24
The Kernel Sentence: 2 Dr. L.W. Barnes

We commence with a brief review of the material cited in Vol 1: No. 23. We discuss the kernel and non-kernel sentence in that issue. We continue the subject in this issue. Restating that the non-kernel sentence consists of more than one kernel sentence—whatever the "more" may be, let us keep in mind that a sentence, in English, is an expression or communication indicated by the fade-out, or the fade-fall of the voice. In written form, this fade-out or fade-fall has its characteristic period, a mark that stands for the termination of the minimal linguistic utterance, the sentence.

We have the so-called "simple sentences": characteristic of this sentence is the fact that there is only one main clause. In the compound sentence, we must have more than one independent clause. However, each independent clause can well constitute the situation where we have more than one kernel sentence. Such, of course, is the case with the simple sentence, also.

Simple Sentences for Illustration

- | | |
|--|------------------------|
| 1. Players kick the ball. | Simple and Kernel |
| 2. Good players kick the ball. | Simple and Non-Kernel |
| a. Players kick the ball. | |
| b. (The) players are good. | |
| 3. John and Mary run and jump. | Simple and Non-Kernel |
| a. John runs. c. John jumps. | |
| b. Mary runs. d. Mary jumps. | |
| 4. The four old Guernsey cows were "good" milkers. | Simple and Non-Kernel. |
| a. (The) cows were milkers. | |
| b. The cows were Guernseys. | |
| c. The cows were old. | |
| d. The cows were four (The number was four) | |
| e. The milkers were good. | |

Compound Sentences

- | | |
|------------------------------|-------------------------|
| He is old, but she is young. | Compound and Non-Kernel |
| a. He is old | |
| b. She is young. | |

Compound Sentences—continued:

2. The old lady is mean, but the young girl is vivacious. Compound and Non-Kernel

- | | |
|----------------------|---------------------------|
| a. The lady is mean. | c. The girl is vivacious. |
| b. The lady is old. | d. The girl is young. |

3. The autumn leaves are red, yellow, and orange. Compound and Non-Kernel

- | | |
|---------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| a. The leaves are red. | d. i. The leaves are (of) autumn. * |
| b. The leaves are yellow. | ii. The leaves are autumn(leaves). |
| c. The leaves are orange. | iii. The leaves are autumnal. * |

* What, then, is the relationship between the "of" and the "al"?

We also take into account, for identification, the "complex sentence." This kind of sentence is characterized by having at least one independent clause and at least one dependent clause. Examples are furnished for the purpose of indicating how they fare in terms of the "kernel" and "non-kernel" concept.

1. I will go when I want to. Complex: Non-Kernel
 a. I will go.
 b. I want to.

2. The good lad will go when his good mother calls. e. The mother is his.
 a. The lad will go. c. Mother calls.
 b. The lad is good. d. The mother is good.

3. He asserts he will go. Complex: Non-Kernel —conjunction not present
 a. He asserts
 b. He will go ('that' understood) "He asserts that he will go."

There is also the "compound-complex sentence." This indicates the range of meaning. There must be at least two independent clauses to obtain the compound relationship. There may be "n" of dependent clauses, as well. We need give but one example at this time.

1. He is a good soldier, and his brother, who is younger, is a tailor..

- | | |
|----------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| a. He is a soldier | <u>Compound-Complex</u> : Non-Kernel |
| b. The soldier is good. | |
| c. His brother is a tailor | |
| d. (Who) He is younger. | |

We are dealing with the concepts of the "kernel" and "non-kernel" sentence, but we are also doing so in the framework of the sentences used in speaking and writing. We continue in Bulletin 1:25.



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Dr. Lewis W. Barnes, Editor: Vol 1: No. 25
The Kernel Sentence 3: Dr. L.W. Barnes

Let us take another look at the kernel sentence and non-kernel sentence phenomena from another vantage point. We divide our sentences into NP and VP units, as we have seen earlier. Consider that we have the statement

1. He kicked the ball.

We rewrite (with the horizontal line and its arrowhead on its right) any sentence in terms of the Noun Phrase and the Verb Phrase. In "He kicked the ball," the noun phrase is "He" and the verb phrase is "kicked the ball." In this particular sentence we have a "kernel" sentence because we cannot reduce this utterance to a simpler one.

We view another sentence

2. The good boy kicked the rolling ball.

Here, the NP (noun phrase) is "The good boy." The VP (verb phrase) is "kicked the rolling ball." Yet, Sentence 2 is not a kernel sentence for we have

a. The boy kicked the ball.

b. The boy is good.

c. The ball was rolling.

Breaking these sentences into NP and VP units, we have.

N.P.	VP
The boy	kicked the ball.
The boy	is good.
The ball	was rolling.

When we rewrite sentences and when we read sentences that are non-kernel, we look to the whole statement. Thus, we can divide as NP + VP the subject and predicate of a sentence, having in mind that we "define" the NP on the left as the subject of the sentence.

We can see that if we have a kernel sentence, we have "that" which is spoken about. (We must avoid saying the "thing spoken about." A "thing" is that which has mass, is subject to the pull of gravity, and occupies space. If we confine ourselves to "thing" in terms of the subject, we will eliminate people, events, place, acts, and ideas.)



MOREHEAD STATE UNIVERSITY: BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Dr. Lewis Wesley Barnes Vol. 1: No. 26
The Kernel Sentence: 4. The Importance of Time

We return to an earlier-stated concept concerning man in the "Western Tradition." He is strongly time-oriented. Consciously or unconsciously, our man, in this tradition, is aware of two factors: himself as acting, and himself as acting through elements of duration—elements we are pleased to call seconds, minutes, hours, days, weeks, months, and years. What he is aware of as "not now," but as that which has been experienced, he places in his past tenses. What he expects to experience, or to experience again, he places in his future moments. When he is not particularly aware of time, or when time is of no particular significance in a specific way, he relies on the present tense—which we must distinguish from the present progressive tense. His awareness of mathematical relationships or of scientific relationships which do not depend upon his own specific experiences is a matter of the present tense with its "is" or "are" elements.

Language, as systems of articulated sounds, used in expressing or communicating with one's self or with one's fellow man, must be stated in patterns so structured as to express his basic personality, one of at least the notions of the physical, the intellectual, and the emotive elements carrying meaning. We have seen, or we are seeing, that these patterns in English, at least, have a minimal unit of structure as the sentence. By way of important review, we also remind ourselves that these units carrying human meaning—as sentences—have oral and graphic representation to the extent that the individual does become understood by a large segment of his society. The grammar of a language, overall, must be that which is capable of containing units of structure whereby in any single society its members can understand each other with a reasonable degree of facility.

While there are many, many, individual differences among the members of the society, and while these differences must appear as stated in the individual utterances of each individual within a society, the social nature of man is such that his linguistic structures must provide a common denominator through which different members of the unique society can make themselves coherent in the framework of the major number of functions of that society. If this were not so, family, school, legal structures, and religious institutions could never exist except in the context of different structures for each individual in a particular social organization, or speech community. We now return to basic ingredients in the basal unit of expressive structure, as the sentence, through which man operates. We know that he talks about "something," or "about some idea, or event, or act." We are pleased to call these things spoken about "the justification and the reason for the sentence, the minimal linguistic utterance. We define this part of the linguistic utterance, as sentence, the "subject" or the NP, as "noun phrase." The rest of the utterance is considered the VP, or verb phrase. Now, the noun and the verb as that spoken about and that which "is" or "acts" is one part of man in his existence or in his expressions or communications. We have noted that what he is or does, or what his experiences "are" or "do" are in terms of time, or of the timeless. (We equate this

Whatever is done or whatever exists or "is" must be in the environment of time and space. Characteristic of language, and characteristic of the American English tongue, then, must be elements of the "when" and the "where"—or of "when-ness" and "where-ness." Even in the basic linguistic utterance of the sentence on the kernel level, the matters of "when," and "where" enter the picture.

Consider, in such a context, "The battle ended yesterday." The noun phrase (NP) is "The battle" and the verb phrase is "ended yesterday." Looking at "yesterday," we find that the word is structured as a noun. How does the word function? By the principal of opposition we find that the ending yesterday prevents the ending of the battle at any other time, in this context. Therefore the verb has been affected. That which affects the verb is the adverb. In passing, we note that the adverb does not, in basic sentence structure, take the first or second position in the sentence. We can use any acceptable symbol. However, if we let Ad stand for adverb and tm stand for time, we have a noun, structured as an adverb which represents, in this case, time. We would have the same situation in "They fought Thursday." From the functional point of view, we have a sentence structure—kernel in this case—of having the adverb (functionally-speaking) as part of the VP, or the complete predicate.

Were we to subtract the word (or words) functioning as an adverb, we would have left what we shall term the "predicate." We view the sentence structure in "The soldiers were ill Monday." The noun phrase is, of course, "The soldiers." The verb phrase is "were ill Monday." Subtracting "Monday—which functions as an adverb of time (Adtm), we have left "were ill." We have termed this element the "predicate." In some instances, grammarians would call "were ill Monday" the complete predicate. They would then go on to state that leaving off "Monday," or the adverb of time (with Monday as a noun functioning as an adverb) would leave the "were ill" as the verb phrase. We have defined all that is not the noun phrase, as subject, as the verb phrase. All that which is not spoken about is the verb phrase. We now come to another use of the adverb, in this kernel sentence context discussed; we refer to the adverb of space (place.) In the sentence "The boys were lazy there" we have the noun phrase "The boys." The verb phrase is "were lazy there." "There" is the adverb of space (place) —Adsp. We are dealing here with "whereness." We could use the symbol Adwh for stating the same meanings for such an adverb. The predicate is "were lazy." The completed predicate, or the verb phrase, is "were lazy there." We note that adverbs, or words that function as adverbs, have their position in the basic sentence patterns after the first and second position. The first position is that of the subject, the second that of the verb, and the adverb follows. What position does the adjective take? We note that "ill" takes the third position. In the sentence "Jack is happy today," "happy" is in the third position. What is the adverb of time "today" taking as its position in this kernel sentence?

We close this aspect of the treatment of the kernel sentence with the observation the adverbs of any kind (where, when, how, degree, among others) are discussed in



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Dr. L.M. Barnes, Editor Vol 1: No. 27

Dr. Ruth Barnes: The Kernel Sentence 4: The Verb Phrase

Virtually all linguists, concerning themselves with grammar, will state the minimal linguistic utterance as a sentence, or as one having sentence value. We state, in structural form that

$S \longrightarrow NP + VP$

where *NP* is the noun phrase, and *VP* is the verb phrase. We define the noun phrase as that which is the subject and the verb phrase as that which is the predicate. Our attention in this issue will be directed to the *VP*, or verb phrase. We are specifically interested in the verb. We can view the verb as being "regular" and "irregular." The term "regular" would apply to such verbs in English that always have the same forms. The term "irregular" will apply to verbs which do not have the four distinct forms of the regular verb: their forms may range from three to eight. As examples of regular verbs, with their four distinct forms, we have the following:

appoint, appoints, appointed, and appointing
elect, elects, elected, and electing
drop, drops, dropped, and dropping
call, calls, called, and calling

Then we have the irregular verb in its unique forms, ranging from three to eight. However, we are tempted, and justly so, to break these irregular forms into two sub-classes. First, we consider the verb "to be." This verb functions differently from all other verbs, and this verb has eight (8) unique forms:

be, is, am, are, was, were, been, and being.

Then we have examples of the other irregular verbs

ring, rings, rang, rung, ringing
knit, knits, knitting
sit, sits, sitting

among others which we could employ as illustrative of the irregular verbs.

We need to consider this matter of "auxiliaries" again. We have indicated that the term is not a good one. There is no way to take any meaning carried by the term and have that term logical as referred to aiding or assisting a verb. We shall call what is known as the "auxiliary" the verb marker. The verb marker will mark time, the time of the verb phrase, or better still, the time through which the NP operates or is operated upon.

We shall come to a situation where we shall have more than one verb marker in the same verb phrase. Let us view such a sentence as

"The fullback could have picked his hole better."

We have as the NP "The fullback." We have as the VP "could have picked his hole better." The two verb markers, respectively, are "could" and "have." Defining "could" as the verb marker of possibility, we would use such a symbol as vm_{pos} . For the term "have" as a verb marker, we would use the symbol $vm_{pr.per}$. Or, the specific teacher could coin any other suitable subscripts to the verb marker as vm.

Let us list some kernel sentences, keeping our attention riveted on the VP, as verb phrase.

1. The player kicks the ball. (transitive verb)
2. Nagurski kicked the ball there. (transitive verb)
3. The politician could have fooled the electorate. (transitive verb)
4. Mike McGurk was serving his sentence. (transitive verb)
5. The clouds have seemed ominous. (copulative)
6. The fur feels warm. (copulative)
7. The teams appeared inept yesterday. (copulative)
8. The students are prolozing. (intrans. verb)
9. The orange may sell there. (intransitive verb)
10. The snow will melt. (intrans. verb)
11. The rose is a flower. (verb to be)
12. The professors can be miserable. (verb to be)

We have different varieties of verbs in our languages, and these varieties are exhibited in the sentences above-noted. Sentences 1-4 have the transitive verb— in the second position, with respect to basic sentence patterns. Sentences 5-7 have the copulative verb in the second position. Sentences 8-10 have the intransitive verb, and, finally, Sentences 11-12 have the verb "to be." In basic sentence patterns we have the NP in the first position, the verb "to be," the copulative verb, the transitive verb, and the intransitive verb may occupy the second position. The third position is occupied by a complement, a noun phrase, a zero (0), or a predicate. We shall consider rewrite rules for the V (verb) and a chart of positions in our next issue.



MOREHEAD STATE UNIVERSITY: BULLETIN OF APPLIED
LINGUISTICS

Dr. Lewis W. Barnes, Editor: Vol. 1: No. 28

Dr. L.W. Barnes: "The Noun" I-- Problems

We have run across the word "syntax" several times in our discussions: taking the adjectival form for definition, we find that , for the sentence, the minimal linguistic utterance, we are concerned with word order . One of our signals in linguistics is that of the grammatical signal--for example, the inflections. There are not many noun inflections in English, but the -'s is such a one. This -'s indicates that there is a noun present, that the noun possesses and that there is a noun to follow--in English: "Jack's marbles." As we have indicated before, nominalization is of the utmost importance in English. Nouns or words that act as nouns have other markers. The preposition marks a noun or its equivalent:

I go to town .
p n

I look to the guilty •
p noun equivalent

The difficulty with identifying a part of speech by markers and/or determiners is that we are working with function and structure at the same time. In " I look to the guilty" we are faced with the fact that the preposition does indeed mark that which functions as a noun --"guilty." But "guilty" is, in reality, an "adjective." Sometimes the preposition does mark a noun, sometimes a noun equivalent. Now, as well, articles do not always mark nouns, but sometimes mark parts of speech which function as nouns. In the sentence "I will reward the good boy" we note that the article "the" does mark a real noun "boy." But what about this sentence? " I will bat first during the fifth . Here "fifth" is an adjective which functions as a noun, and is determined by the article "the," the article which also marks "fifth." We can even say--and so say-- "That was Jack's first." Thus, Jack's does not mark a noun here, but a word functioning as a noun. The central problem here is that our linguists have not stressed

the essential difference between the noun as structure and the noun as function. We commit ourselves, as always, to the thesis that we work more significantly as we proceed from structure to function. If we are going to have the thesis that -'s always stands with a noun that stands before a following noun, then we must distinguish the fact that such a case can be true only for "function." But we do not answer the question "What is a noun." Now, a "noun is a noun is a noun is a noun....." By this statement we mean that the "is" stands for a timelessness of a scientific nature. We must go to the nature of the noun, then settle, later, whether a noun is being marked or whether a noun-equivalent is being marked.

We have spoken of the first noun inflection in English--the genitive, or possessive. We have noted that a word carrying this inflection can stand before a noun, but can also stand before a noun equivalent. Let us see whether or not the second noun inflection in English can stand before a noun and only a noun--by structure. We note the plural inflection "- s " for the noun. (Keep in mind that after the sounds s, z, s, z, c, and j the plural inflection is, by spelling " -es. " There are other variations according to nounal endings.) At first glance and even after several other glances, we might conclude that the ability to be inflected for the plural indicates the bona fide noun, not a noun-equivalent.

We have "boys," "cities," "children," " marbles," and other such plural nouns. But we also have such a statement as the following: " He dreamed that he had the bad luck to win several thirds but not firsts at the garden party. " What parts of speech is "thirds"? What part of speech is "firsts." ? Are they adjectives functioning as nouns? Are they nouns? We need a criterion or criteria to decide such matters. Of course, we can do as some authorities do, we can call them "slot fillers" and give each a number according to order in a sentence, waiving the question as to part of speech . In one system we have N-6 as pre-determiners, N-5 as determiners, N-4 as numerals, N-3 as intensifiers, N-2 as adjectives, N-1 as nouns, and N as the simple subject. We shall see, later, that there are problems in and with such a system. We shall next consider the noun as a noun by structure.



MOREHEAD STATE UNIVERSITY: BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Dr. L.W. Barnes, Editor: Vol. 1: No. 29

Dr. L.W. Barnes: "The Noun " II--Matters Entirely Structural

We define the noun as that symbol which stands for more or less or more or fewer, which stands for having or "possessing" more than one quality, and for that which can take certain derivational suffixes not true of other parts of speech.

We can review our objections to the traditional definition as the noun is "the name of a person, person, or thing." Noting, again, that a "thing is that which has mass, occupies space, and is subject to the pull of gravity," we are at loss as to what to do with "perseverance," "viciousness," "cruelty," goodliness, and Godliness. " They certainly are not names of persons or places. They do not meet the criteria of being "things." Again, we warn the reader, student, or teacher against depending on word order only. In the basic sentence patterns, we know that the NP, or nominal is, by definition, the sentence containing part.

When we look at a sentence pattern stated as N V N , we must realize that the basis for such a classification must be function. Consider this sentence: " Under is worse than over." Here, we have "Under" functioning as a noun--in the first position--but "Under" is an adverb functioning as a noun, not a noun by structure.

When we apply the test " more" or "less," we have no difficulty. We take such terms as "money" and we know that we can have more or less "money," or more or fewer "dollars." We can have more or fewer "Johns," more or less "cheese," more or fewer "marbles," more or less "electricity." We can have more or less "godness" and "godliness." Then we next take a look at the quality test: that of having or possessing two or more qualities, characteristics, or attributes.

We have tended to view the genitive or the possessive as having the form of-'s, such as John's, cat's, and Mary's. We have also considered the possessive as embodied in such a statement as "I often think of the many attractions of Boston." Here we have surveyed the form as indicating Boston's many attractions. However, there is another more significant view of "possessing," "Having," "Containing," and "embracing." An adjective represents an attribute or a quality of a noun. Nouns have qualities. They must have at least two; invariably, they have very many qualities which they possess.

Iron has physical and chemical properties-- quite a few of each. "Electricity" has qualities or properties. So does the number "seven." At least two of these are properties are that "seven" is one more than "six" and one fewer than "eight." Thus, what part of speech is "seven?" "Seven" is a noun. There can be more or fewer than "seven." We can have more or fewer than a "herd." We can make more than one statement about a "herd." For example, we can say that when the members of a herd are moving together in one accord in one direction, that the herd is "singular." When the members of the "herd" wander in all directions, we consider that the herd must be plural.

We know that when the symbol-- in English-- ends in -ship, -ment, -ity, among other unique derivational suffixes, that we have a noun as structure. Thus, through the criteria of "more or less," "more or fewer," through the criterion of possessing, or having, qualities, attributes, or properties, and through unique derivational suffixes, the noun, structurally, can be identified, always. Then we proceed to the matter of function. Finally, we advance to the thorny areas of meaning. We have been speaking of the noun as a class: we have unique subclasses, each identified, structurally, by certain properties not possessed by any other subclass. In our next issue, we shall consider aspects of the subclasses of nouns.



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BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Dr. Lewis W. Barnes, Editor Vol 1: No. 30.

Dr. Ruth Barnes: "Subclasses of Nouns"

Whatever subclasses of nouns we may have, we must hold to the central elements which make a noun a noun by structure, and not some other part of speech. We have indicated these specifically-- the question of quantity, the question of possession of properties, and the matter of having unique derivational suffixes added, a uniqueness denied other parts of speech. Other parts of speech do have derivational suffixes, but they do not have the same derivational suffixes as the noun has.

Two significant subclasses of nouns are the mass noun and the count noun. Other terms may be substituted for the term "mass" and "count." However, these terms have gained some force through wide acceptance. There is a tendency to stay away from the term "concrete" and "abstract" since there can be confusion in some instances. We can make at least two significant observations concerning the terms "mass" and "count." First, we can itemize the count noun-- N_c -- as in "three dollars," "five children," and "fifteen hundred pounds." We cannot itemize the mass noun-- N_m -- in the same way. We have to say "more money," "less wisdom," and "some gall." Our second observation is that apart from the question of more or less, or more or fewer, we note that each abilities denied the other.

The mass noun cannot be inflected for the plural: we do not say "wisdoms," "galls"--other than as a verb, but we could say "pearls of wisdom" and "quarts of gall." Not every determiner will work with a mass noun: we cannot say "a generosity," although we can state "the generosity." We can run into tricky areas of meaning, for we know that words carry more than one meaning. Nichols in English Syntax cites two sentences at point:

The host passed the toast. N_m

The host proposed a toast. N_G

Then there is the element of numbers as indicated by and through cardinal and ordinal numbers. With the count nouns we have no problem using the cardinal number; such is true in the instance of ordinal numbers:

He has one problem to overcome.

He has overcome his first problem.

We cannot state that ordinal and cardinal numbers cannot appear before mass nouns. We can say, for example

One peace is enough.

One wood used for skis is that of elm.

Can we state, absurdely, that we need another subclass of a subclass? Can we state, then, that ordinal and cardinal numbers cannot come before a subclass of the subclass the mass noun? That subclass of the subclass would have to be that of the abstract noun--such as "goodness," "honesty," "kindness," "liberty," and "beauty."

Can we employ such sentences as the following:

The seventh kindness was the best of all.

The one liberty that we need is that which protects us from illegal search and seizure.

While we do not usually specify goodness by number, we could tick off each goodness as a particular kind. However, we would have trouble with "honesty." We could hardly say "I will seek out the ninth honesty." However, we can see that on examination the assertion that some determiners can never be used should be approached with great caution. We must distinguish between what we do seldom, what we cannot do, and what we always do. If we can make the statement once, there can be no rule, no law, for rules and laws must hold.



MOREHEAD STATE UNIVERSITY: BULLETIN OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS

Dr. Lewis W. Barnes, Editor Vol. 1: No. 31

"Plans and Behavior—Linguistically Viewed"

Presumably, the task of any man is to make some sense out of what human beings do, and out of the world of external experiences, as well. We need to know, as individuals, what is going on. When we view the individual's reaction to "what is going on," we are in the field of behavior. If we look for a system in behavior, we are probably functioning as psychologists function. If we look for the linguistic system (s) that parallel such examination of behavior, we are in the field of linguistics, at least in the field of tagmemic structures. If we consider that people really do build up within themselves an inner representation of the external environments, together with the individual's reactions to these environments, then the total and habitual linguistic utterances should reflect and reveal such a representation.

If, as Sir Frederic Bartlett details in Remembering, a "schema" refers to active organizations of past reactions, systematically ordered, then the expressions and communications must be linguistically ordered. They must be so because systems of past experiences and past reactions must be described in the light of certain common denominators. They must be named and spoken about. In such naming and speaking about, there must be certain linguistic patterns, greater than sentence value, perhaps, which articulate these examples of molar behavior, or which articulate these elements of the individual's i.p.f.'s—immediate psychological fields. We have defined the i.p.f. as that expression of human behavior in the light of past neural experiences, present physiological states, and current objects of awareness or attention, in social settings. We are uniquely interested in the verbalization of the individual's awareness of his behavior. However, descriptions involve us in the present tense, as distinct from tenses of narration.

If language reflects man in speculation and cognition, language must also reflect and evidence man in action, for to be a man is to act, to do. We can assume that if a man understands, he will act. The linguistic structures are adequate to tell us whether an organism understands or not. We might assume that if Joe Jones understands that he ought to be married and if he further understands where he can find a girl for such a purpose, we still may not predict what Jones will do. There is a gap from what one knows to what one performs in the light of such a knowledge. We need to know whether Jones can make the leap from what he knows he should and can do to whether he will act. Linguistic structures, systematically viewed, can be viewed as to their expressing what is known, what is done, and what obtains to predict the doing from the knowing. We have the language of insight and description as a matter of the present

tense. The state of Jones' insight into his bachelor state and his recognition that he needs to marry, and that he knows where the prospects are would appear to be "is" and "are" language. However, when Jones moves to marry, then his actions through time provide the language of narration. If we can assume that Jones has sufficient linguistical competence to verbalize his awareness of himself an experience, then an examination of his behavior and an examination of his speaking and writing should have some correlation. We do assume, perhaps too much, that he is not feigning, and that, to the best of his knowledge, his words bespeak his thoughts and actions.

What is interesting to us, as linguists, is the matter of language which parallels the gap from what we know and understand to what we do. Whatever bridges a gap from what is known to what is done is that something or ideak or event that is needed. Then we need to be aware of the linguistical structures that express that need.

What we need to do, linguistically speaking, is to provide the kind of linguistical statements that express such a form of experience as understanding-move to action- and action in one discontinuous verbal flow. Of course, if we cannot comprehend such a pattern of behavior, we cannot provide the language essential for its expression and communication. Now, granting that what we have said is correct, that man's realization of what he needs to have the continual experience will be accompanied by the language that will communicate such a realization, we must take stock of our real position. Linguistics take into account what is presently known and stated, in the light of oral articulations.

However, knowing what we need and what we lack should indicate to the linguist that in his descriptions of his systems he must comprehend that there is a gap, a big null, which needs to be filled. Grammar can indicate all that can be said in the light of man's language system. Grammar can also indicate what cannot be said. However, there is always the critical area of what can be said and what is not stated. Lack of knowledge of fact can account for the fact that some structures are not used, or not known, merely because the behaviorial situations have not been realized, or have not been translated from the known to the acted on action state. Kohler has observed that when a person grasps the "whole layout," he will behave appropriately. We must speculate, language-wise, on the assumption that once a person behaves appropriately in the light of his view of the whole picture that his linguistical structures will reflect such appropriate linguistical statements, as parallels. Again, we ask, are there unique language structures which reflect an insight into the whole picture, as distinct from those which reflect the behaviorial gap from insight to action?



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Dr. Lewis W. Barnes, Editor Vol 1: No. 32
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A description of human behavior in the sense of the "i.p.f."—immediate psychological field—must take into account the entire behavioral act or experience. Let us consider a behavioral act: John Jones goes to church in order to be seen by the "right people." The entire human act may consist of three parts, arbitrarily assessed in this instance: let us consider that Jones perceives several alternatives for the time and place, one of them being the act of actually going to church. Let us consider that the next main part or area of his attention is that of considering being seen at the right time and place by his employer, Smith. Let us consider further, for the sake of simplicity, that the third element consists of his attending church in view of the first two acts. Perception being functionally selective, he attends in view of his cognitive field at that time and place of perceptions, weighing and acting. We might well suppose that each act could be divided into several parts.

However, the entire problem, represented by P , which demands a solution consists of the three main parts— $P = XYZ$. Our X , the perceptions, could contain elements 1, 2, 3; Y could contain 4, 5, 6, and Z could contain 7, 8, and 9. Analytically, we could stop and describe any single act X , Y , or Z , or we could work with any elements such as 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, or any other combination.

However, if we desire the total personality response, we must have in mind, at all times, a complete understanding or description of the entire behavioral experience. Let us take matter into the field of human behavior as represented by verbalization. Chomsky has been able to combine his sense of psychology and his grasp of logic in seeing the relationships between linguistic analyses and behavioral analyses. In his Study of Language, John B. Carroll observes:

From linguistic theory we get the notion of a hierarchy of units—
from elemental units like the distinctive features of a phoneme to large units like each sentence type. It may be suggested that stretches of any kind of behavior may be organized in somewhat the same fashion. (p. 106).

The advantage, of course, of looking to the whole element, is that we can avoid, or we can solve, such ambiguities as may occur in (John)/(hates smoking)/(cigars) and (John)/(hates) (smoking cigars). These statements, obvious to any reader, are not the same. Going back to our units, we find that we have problems when we try to assess the units on

as acts and sub-acts on a microcosmic scale. There is a difference between (X) (YZ) and (XY) (Z) linguistically or psychologically viewed and determined. Even more so, there is ambiguity and lack of resolution in (123) (45), (1234) (5), and any other combination of numbers 1-9.

The majority of Behaviorists today subscribe to a whole theory of behavior, somewhat akin to, if not identical with, the i.p.f. theory of molar behavioral units. We can understand why linguists do consider the sentence as the minimal linguistic utterance. Unfortunately, the educational systems in language arts are strongly bent toward a less-than-sentence view of language, in both oral and written forms.

Words cannot carry specific meanings in any situation with less than the ab, bc, or cd combinations or fusions, when ab is defined as less than a sentence. Even here, we would not consider that there is the whole view of the word in its capacity to carry meanings unless there was sentence value, unless a in itself, or ab, or abc, or any other combination equated sentence value. However, we go much further and farther than Chomsky and Carroll. They are thinking in terms of the sentence unit. Let us consider a situation X, one made up of 7, 8, 9, for example, in that order. Let us further assume that 7, 8, and 9 are in the correct order. By "correct order" we mean that this order is possible in the grammar used in that specific language. In short, let us assume that 7, 8, and 9 are ordered in such a way as to constitute a basic sentence pattern used in that language in an experience X.

We would state, then, grammatically, that X is = and can be = to 7*8*9 wherein 7, 8, and 9 are language units. But we are not content. We would view that plans and behavior in language as well as in any other representation of plans and behavior cannot be view and described as a whole unless we know the greater structure of which X is a part. In the sentence "He hates smoking cigars," we might, theoretically, view 7 as the NP (noun phrase), and 8 and 9 as elements of the verb phrase. But there is a difference between the assertion that "He hates the smoking of cigars by someone else," and the assertion that "He hates cigars that are smoking." The molar unit of behavior and the molar unit of language, then, as expressive of behavior, will constitute more than sentence value. We are taking, of course, the tagmemic approach—and necessarily so. Thus $X = 7+8+9$ is true only insofar as the context of X is known, as well as the contextual and structural relationships of 7, 8, and 9 in constituting the sentence or experience X.

Yet, our linguists such as Chomsky, Newell, Shaw, and Carroll who have seen into the need to expand, or synthesize phonemic structures to sentence value as parallel to the need to look at a whole unit of behavior as molar may have overlooked another element—the importance of the first statement, since the VP takes its direction from the NP as to meaning and structure. Thus, there is a determining factor within the Sentence rewritten as NP + VP in somewhat the same way that the opening adjectives in an NP will determine the meanings carried by successive adjectives in the NP or VP.

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Dr. L.W. Barnes, Editor: Vol 1: No. 33

Dr. L.W. Barnes: The Determiner Problems

By "determiner," we have had in mind--and still have-- that the thing determined is literally changed or made into a form because of the presence of what we call the "determiner." As Thomas (Transformational Grammar and the Teacher of English) states " The system of determiners is relatively complex in English."

He breaks his system of determiners down into subclasses: regular determiners, postdeterminers, and predeterminers. Under regular determiners, he again subdivides his classes into three: articles, demonstratives, and genitives. The demonstrative group (this, that, these, and those) and the genitives (my, our, your, his, her, its, their, Nom + Z₃) offer no difficulty. His articles (subclass of regular determiners) pose two problems. The first stems from the elements included: (a(an), ø, the, any, every, each, and some.) Since the article structurally is defined in such a way as to include only the articles a, an, the, and ø, the presence of the other terms indicates other parts of speech functioning as articles--giving us an undesirable mixture, as always eventuates when structure and function in parts of speech are intermingled in one subclass.

His first observation is that the Determiner (Det) can be rewritten as

Det $\longrightarrow \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Art} \\ \text{Dem} \\ \text{Gen} \end{array} \right\}$. He observes, astutely, that there is a

minute class of words, which he calls prearticles which, as their name indicates can come before articles. However, and here we have trouble, they can also precede his demonstratives or genitives which are in the same subclass with the articles. He expands his rule as follows:

Det \longrightarrow (Preart) $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Art} \\ \text{Dem} \\ \text{Gen} \end{array} \right\}$ which indicates that

the prearticles are optional --as indicated by parentheses ().

Nevertheless, his choice of (prearticles) is most unfortunate since they can precede more than the article. He then moves to the postdeterminer which follows the regular determiner and also has a certain fixed order with another postdeterminer. He sets the subclasses of the postdeterminer as the ordinal (second, etc); the cardinal (four, etc and several, among others), and the superlatives and comparatives which he calls "comp.". While the order of the postdeterminer is set, the adjective can come in any order. We can have such structuring as "the third apple," and "the third two fence posts." Note that the ordinal comes before the cardinal. But, can we not have such a statement as "He observed that one second?" Thomas may well claim that we have another category, another situation, in "He observed that one second.") "Second" here could stand for an irregular item or for a kind of passage of time). There are other problems with his divisions of ordinals, cardinals, and superlatives and comparatives, particularly in instances where he has classified "next," "last," and "final" as ordinals, where he has classified "several," "many," and "few," as cardinals, and, finally, where he has used the term "apparent exceptions." At this point, he rewrites the determiner classification as:

Determiner (Det) \rightarrow (Preart) $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Art} \\ \text{Dem} \\ \text{Gen} \end{array} \right\}$ (Postdet)

Finally, we come to the case of the Predeterminers which precede regular determiners and postdeterminers. These are usually cut off from a succeeding determiner by "of." We have such examples as "all of the ships," "some of my friends," and "the eighth of those three sets." Thomas points to nouns of quantity in the predeterminer classification--"a quart of molasses," "a mile of spaghetti," and "only the first two barrels of oil." Then he gives a complete rewrite

Det \rightarrow (Predet) (Preart) $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Art} \\ \text{Dem} \\ \text{Gen} \end{array} \right\}$ (Postdet). He then has his

rule for the various kinds of predeterminers:

Predet $\rightarrow \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{(Preart)} \\ \text{N} \quad \text{quan} \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Art} \\ \text{Dem} \\ \text{Gen} \end{array} \right\} \text{ (Postdet) } + \text{ of}$

His treatment is quite sound, but he needs to settle the crucial (Preart) which he could do by using the term (Preregart) or Preregular-article, and that would make (Postdet) take the form (Postregdet.).



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Dr. L.W. Barnes, Editor Vol 1. No. 34.

"Observations on Patterning" I



In a transitional period we need not be surprised that different linguists take different approaches to the patterns of the language. Since the patterns are well known, what we find in different statements, treatments, or texts on grammar, particularly, are different terms, different approaches, and different degrees of classification. In our brief consideration of this phenomenon, we shall look at three different kinds of classification: those of Lefevre in Linguistics and the Teaching of Reading, of Allen, et al, in New Dimensions in English, and of Nichols in English Syntax. We shall view Lefevre's classification first:

- I. N V Bob plays. /↘/ Bob is playing. /↘/
N V A Bob arrives hungry.
N VAd Bob plays well. /↘/ Bob plays on the team. /↘/
- II. N V N Bob plays ball. /↘/
- III. a. NVNN Bob calls his dog Spot. /↘/
b. NVNN Bob gives his dog milk. /↘/
- IV. N LvN Bob is a boy. /↘/
N LvA Bob is strong. /↘/
N LvAd Bob is here. /↘/ Bob is in the house. /↘/

We see that he has used the kernel sentence classification for his types. We note his critical Class III where the VP stresses classification. Furthermore, we note his "call" and "give" classification in Class III. We note that III(a) differs from III(b) in another respect: in the (a) part we have no indirect object possibilities; in the (b) part, we have such potential. The division of the patterning appears to be that of function. Lefevre goes on to give simple pattern transformations of the question, passive voice, and agent varieties. In testimony as to his reading slants and emphases, Lefevre follows each sentence with the fade-fall symbol /↘/ .

Allen, Newsome, Wetmore, Throckmorton, and Borgh, in their New Dimensions in English use the following table of "Illustrations of Basic Sentence Patterns, (p. 36):

	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Predicate</u>
I	Students	debate.
II	Students	write examinations.
III A	Students	become friends.
III B	Students	are friends.
IV A	Students	seem adaptable.
IV B	Students	are adaptable.
V	Students	are everywhere.

We place Lefevre's basic patterns and Allen, et al's basic patterns together and note several differences. Allen has no statement comparable to Lefevre's Class III. Lefevre compresses Allen's II A, III B, IV A, IV B, and V into his Class IV N Lv N, N Lv A, N Lv Ad classification. Allen, et al, does not stress the intonation patterning, as indicated by Lefevre's emphasis on the fade-fall and fade-rise elements. (12/1, 17/1)

Lefevre's volume follows more closely the speaking patterns of the child as developing chronologically. (We do not indicate that one is superior to the other, only that they exist as distinctly different in approach. There is no question that Lefevre must stress the patterns that he stresses in the light of his reading emphases.) In the approach to transformations, Allen, et al, use the same words as found in their basic patterning above, but add groups of words to show the transforming.

	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Predicate</u>
I	<u>Students</u> interested in current issues	<u>debate</u> in state-wide contests every spring.
II	<u>Students</u> in high schools throughout the United States	<u>write examinations</u> each year to qualify for college scholarships.
III A	<u>Students</u> who attend classes together	often <u>become</u> close <u>friends</u> .

The rest of the table from III B, IV A, IV B, and V continues in the same vein. We note that these transformations are not as simple in development as those of Lefevre. In the next issue we consider Nichol's development of basic patterns, and make summarizing comments.

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Dr. L. W. Barnes, Editor Vol 1: No. 35.

"Observations on Patterning" II

Having reviewed the patterning in two views, those of Lefevre and Allen, Newsome, Wetmore, Throcmorton, and Borgh, we consider that of Ann Eljenholm Nichols in her English Syntax. Lefevre's approach was from the viewpoint of reading, Allen, et al's from the viewpoint of grammar, per se, and Nichols' from the viewpoint of English for non-native speakers.

Nichols, English Syntax, pp. 54-55, prefaces her introductory patterning by stating that "Here are five of the most commonly used basic sentence patterns." She then lists them as

1. Bread spoils. N V
2. Children like bread. N V N
3. Bread is food. N_x LV N_x
4. Bread is nutritious. N LV Adj
5. Bread provides mankind nutrition. N₁ V N₂ N₃

She uses "x" as a subscript to N to indicate that the nominals so marked refer to the same object or idea. As with Allen and his colleagues Nichols moves directly (p. 55) to the transformations, while employing the same basic N V statements:

1. Homemade bread spoils more quickly than commercially produced bread. N V
2. Most children like bread and jam. N LV N
3. Bread is a staple food in most families. N_x LV N_x
4. Not all bread is equally nutritious. N LV Adj
5. Bread has been providing mankind nutrition since the beginning of time. N₁ V N₂ N₃

There is no question that Nichols' choice of sentences, as to content, makes more sense from the point of view of significance than is true of both Lefevre's and Allen's choices. Such is probably essential because of the approach to the content needed by a foreign student in approaching the English language. We observe that the fifth sentence has the N V NN found in Lefevre's basic patterns: however, Nichols does not distinguish these "call" and "give" verbs, nor does she call attention to the possibilities of having an indirect object present in one variety of the N V NN type, but not present in the other variety.

Interesting to note is her use of N_1 , N_2 , and N_3 in her basic sentence patterning in Sentence 5. (p.55). She uses the numbers*of 1,2,3 to indicate the order in which the nominals occur. (* subnumerals as subscripts). Her method of approaching "modification" or "determination" of the noun, or its equivalent, is quite unique and effective. Consider that we have such a sentence as "The man is greedy." Her method or procedure would be to indicate " that man is greedy ", thence to " that greedy man. " We might consider how these aspects of patterning compare with respect to those of Owen Thomas (Transformational Grammar and the Teacher of English). His table (p. 35) gives his four basic types of kernel sentences -- basic sentence patterns. The table is based on the VP theses.

Type	Position			
	1	2	3	4
to be	NP	be	Pred	(Adv)
I	NP	V_i	\emptyset	(Adv)
II	NP	V_t	NP	(Adv)
III	NP	V_c	Comp	(Adv)

NP represents "noun phrase; VP represents VP phrase; V_i represents the intransitive verb; V_t indicates the transitive verb; V_c stands for the copulative verb, and \emptyset indicates that the third position in the sentence type represented by V_i is not filled. The teacher and student can compare these types with others found in other texts.



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Dr. L. W. Barnes, Editor Vol. 1 No. 36

Dr. Ruth Barnes: "A Close Look at 'Morpheme'"

There have been many discussions and definitions as to the nature of morpheme. Now, "nature" is most important, as a term. By "nature" we refer to the very essence of an item. When we have the "nature" we have the definition, for by "nature" we distinguish a thing, event, person, act, or idea from any other such element or experience. We have such significant and formidable critics and linguists as Bloch, Bloomfield, Fowler, Francis, Garvin, Harris, Hill, Hockett, Lees, Lounsbury, Pike, Sledd, Trager, and Koutsoudas having a "fling" at discerning the nature of the morpheme. They are not in entire agreement! However, their disagreements are not as serious as one would expect from the vehemence and detail of their assertions.

There is no question that we have certain basic elements essential in defining or stating the nature of "morpheme." The word "minimal" or "least" comes up again and again in carrying the meaning of the very least denominator, and minimal demands a "whatness." "Minimal" what? The "whatness" is answered by a "minimal unit of speech." In any one language at any one time and in any speech at any single time we have the concept of permanence, of persistence, of predictability, in short of "recurrence." Then we have the opening concept that the morpheme involves a concept of an indivisible unit or element of speech or language that persists--that is used by individuals of that speech and/or language over and over again. The very concept of "recurrence" demands the concept of having or carrying meaning--within that specific culture, or perhaps for other certain cultures.

We know, perhaps, that morphemes may be bound or free. That is, they may stand alone, as free, or they may need to be tied to some other minimal unit of speech or language that is recurrent and carries meaning alone or in context with another bound or free morpheme. An example of a free

morpheme is "macaroni," of a bound morpheme is "micro." From "here on out," we have problems. We have proponents of two major schools of thought: first, those who consider the term and its arrangement; second, those who consider the term and its process or movement. Some linguistics call the first concept the I.A. concept--item: arrangement, and the second concept the I.P. concept--item: process. Passing over certain elements of terminology employed by the opposite schools of thought, we can state with force that the I.A. school believes that all language structures have their being in human speech and that such structures can be derived through data which can be mechanically assessed, the data being the various utterances. The I.P. adherents state that the morpheme comes through inference from a body that is phonemic in nature. The so-called inferences come from the phonemically stated body before us and from the abilities of the specific linguist. There is no question that in the I.A. process the units of higher linguistical speech or language elements come from lower level units, and the movement of the linguist must always be in that irreversible direction "lower level ling. units to higher level linguistical units."

The objections of the I.P. school to the I.A. school are several, but primarily center on the fact that I.A. people use the morphophoneme to explain their position while asserting that the morphophoneme has no structural existence in the data used by the I.A. linguists. The I.P. linguist, particularly Koutsoudas, does not believe that the I.A. school can show a mechanical process for uncovering the morpheme. As Koutsoudas indicates in International Journal of American Linguistics, Vol. 29, No. 2., April, 1963, "The Morpheme Reconsidered," I.A. defining of the morpheme will destroy, if accepted, the study of semantics which must come from understanding grammar. Furthermore, Koutsoudas' strongest point is that the I.A. procedures will never give all the morphemes of any specific language, and will never give only the morphemes.

The sounder approach is that of the I.P. although Koutsoudas' definition of the morpheme is by no means as powerful as his incisive views of the position of the I.A. exponents. We believe that the better definition: operating for "morpheme" is that of its being a minimal unit of speech that is permanent, and thus meaningful, and which, being in the string of grammatical units, replaces the syntactic string of symbols. In so doing the process must result in morphophonemic rules an